


MONICA STENSLAND

Habsburg Communication in the Dutch Revolt

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS



Habsburg Communication in the Dutch Revolt

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HABSBURG COMMUNICATION IN THE DUTCH REVOLT

Monica Stensland

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Til mamma, pappa og Marianne

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	9
List of Abbreviations	11
Notes on References and Translations	13
Introduction	15
Rooting out Heresy and Rebellion, 1567-1572	27
From Rebellion to War, 1572-1576	55
The Breakdown of Royal Authority, 1576-1578	71
Communicating Reconciliation, 1578-1585	89
Losing the Peace, 1585-1595	115
A New Beginning, 1596-1609	133
Conclusion	155
Notes	161
Bibliography	197
Illustration Credits	227
Index	229

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List of Abbreviations

AGR	Archives générales du royaume, Brussels
BL	British Library
BMGN	<i>Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden</i>
BNF	Bibliothèque nationale de France
BT	<i>Belgica typographica 1541-1600: Catalogus librorum impressorum ab anno MDXLI ad annum MDC in regionibus quae nunc Regni Belgiorum partes sunt</i> , eds. E. Cockx-Indesteghe, G. Glorieux and B. Op de Beck (4 vols., Nieuwkoop, 1968-1994)
Van der Essen, <i>AF</i>	L. van der Essen, <i>Alexandre Farnèse: Prince de Parme, gouverneur général des Pays-Bas (1545-1592)</i> (5 vols., Bruxelles, 1934-7)
Gachard, <i>AEG</i> 1576-85	<i>Actes des Etats généraux des Pays-Bas 1576-1585</i> , ed. L.P. Gachard (2 vols., Brussels, 1861-6)
Gachard, <i>CPbII</i>	<i>Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas</i> , ed. L.P. Gachard (5 vols., Brussels, 1848-79)
Gachard, <i>CAF</i>	<i>Correspondance d'Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, gouverneur général des Pays-Bas, avec Philippe II, dans les années 1578, 1579, 1580 et 1581. Première partie: 1578-1579</i> , ed. L.P. Gachard (Bruxelles, 1853)
K	<i>Catalogus van de pamphletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek</i> , ed. W.P.C. Knuttel (9 vols., Utrecht, 1978)
KBR	Bibliothèque royale de Belgique

Lefèvre, <i>CPhII</i>	<i>Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas, deuxième partie</i> , ed. J. Lefèvre (4 vols., Brussels, 1940-60)
P	<i>Bibliotheek van Nederlandsche (en andere) pamfletten. Verzamelingen van de bibliotheek van Joannes Thysius en de bibliotheek der rijksuniversiteit te Leiden</i> , ed. L.D. Petit (3 vols., The Hague, 1882-1934)
Piot, <i>CGr</i>	<i>Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-1583</i> , ed. Ch. Piot (9 vols., Bruxelles, 1884-96)
TB	P. Valkema Blouw (ed.), <i>Typographia Batava 1541-1600</i> (2 vols., Nieuwkoop, 1998)
W	<i>Catalogus van de tractaten, pamfletten, enz. over de geschiedenis van Nederland, aanwezig in de bibliotheek van Isaac Meulman</i> , ed. J.K. van der Wulp (3 vols., Amsterdam, 1866)

Notes on References and Translations

Early modern pamphlet titles have been cited by full title at first mention, together with bibliographic details and catalogue number. Further references are in the form of the catalogue number only. To ease cross-referencing, the pamphlet bibliography has been organised by catalogue number. Note that no attempt has been made to include alternative catalogue numbers; I give only the number pertaining to the actual pamphlet I have consulted, not the reference to copies of the same pamphlet surviving in different collections.

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

Biblical quotations are all from the King James Version.

Introduction

‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic must ever be regarded as one of the leading events of modern times.’ With these words, J. L. Motley began his book *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, before going on to insist that the birth of the independent United Provinces, a direct result of the Dutch Revolt, was of such significance that, had it not happened, ‘the various historical phenomena of the sixteenth and following centuries must have either not existed, or have presented themselves under essential modifications’.¹ Why was it so important?

To Motley, the Revolt had established new and lasting political principles of a nation’s right to self-determination and freedom from foreign rule. In addition, the Republic safeguarded people’s freedom through strict controls on executive power. To Motley, therefore, the Revolt was a precursor to the later modern revolutions, a view that has been shared by others both before and since.² Decades prior to the French Revolution of his own day, Friedrich Schiller had seen the same struggle for freedom in the Dutch Revolt, whereas Heinrich Leo, a German contemporary of Motley who did not share Schiller’s positive perspective, regarded the Revolt as the beginning of a lamentable penchant for revolutions in human history.³

More recently, research on the influence of the Dutch Revolt on later developments in both Europe and North America has to some extent substantiated these earlier claims. G. C. Gibbs has detailed how, in addition to providing ideological inspiration for the American Revolution, the Revolt framed Americans’ experience of their own rebellion while also providing warnings of what not to do.⁴ In the English case, Hugh Dunthorne has shown how the Dutch Revolt was a source of inspiration in both the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, and he has provided evidence for the extensive personal and print connections that made such inspiration effective.⁵ Quentin Skinner has included the resistance theories developed during the Dutch Revolt, along with numerous other thought traditions, in the foundations of modern political thinking as it emerged in the seventeenth century.⁶ There have also been attempts to ‘upgrade’ the Dutch Revolt itself to the status of a modern revolution by comparing its development to the phases recognised in the American, French and Russian revolutions.⁷ In opposition to such suggestions of modernity, E. H. Kossmann has instead sought to prove that, far from representing the beginning of modern political thinking, much of early modern Dutch political thought was not very modern at all and was in fact an intellectual dead end.⁸

Of course, the Dutch Revolt was only one of several religious and political conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in political thought it has been argued that the Dutch

rebels were largely adopting resistance theories developed in the French Wars of Religion.⁹ In what is the most comprehensive work on the political thought of the Dutch Revolt, Martin van Gelderen has sought to demonstrate that, although Dutch thinkers were close followers of the ideas that developed in France, their own theories were also fundamentally shaped by the political culture of the Low Countries, which was significantly different from that south of the border.¹⁰ Compared to the French Wars of Religion, the Dutch Revolt was also strikingly more successful: it resulted in a viable, independent, Calvinist state that even during the conflict developed its own prosperous commercial empire. This kind of economic thrift has been associated with Calvinism more generally, most famously in Max Weber's thesis that the Protestant ethic of systematic hard work was at the core of the development of Western capitalism.¹¹ Although this approach has sparked little interest within research on the Low Countries, it is yet another illustration of how significant the Dutch Revolt has been seen to be.¹²

Given the significance that the Dutch Revolt has been imbued with, it seems only natural that it has been the rebels, and not the Habsburg regime that opposed them, that have grabbed historians' attention. Unfortunately, the focus on the rebels and their contributions to political theory has conditioned historians' approach to the Habsburg response to the rebel cause. Because the focus has been on innovative political theory, the regime and its supporters – who did not offer any new ideology or political principles – have simply been ignored.¹³ In studies with a broader focus on public communication and not specifically political thought, the tendency has been the same. Craig Harline has offered the only study of Revolt print based on quantitative methodology, but he restricts himself to the rebel provinces.¹⁴ Ronnie Kaper has produced an in-depth study of pamphleteering related to the peace negotiations leading up to the truce of 1609 but, again, this is an analysis of rebel pamphleteering only.¹⁵ Although B. A. Vermaseren produced a large work on Catholic writing during the Revolt, his analysis treated these pamphlets and books as history writing rather than as contributions to political debate and opinion-forming.¹⁶ For this kind of perspective, P. A. M. Geurts' *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten* remains the only work on pamphleteering in the first half of the Revolt to include substantial details of pro-Habsburg pamphlets, although the analysis as a whole tends to centre on the developing arguments of the rebels.¹⁷

Underlying this rebel focus is a larger tendency, visible also in studies of early modern public communication in other countries, to rely more or less exclusively on pamphlets. This has had some undesired side-effects. For pamphlets to realise their full potential as communication media, they required a literate audience. Although literacy rates in the Low Countries appear to have been outstandingly high compared to the rest of sixteenth-century Europe, the ability to read was by no means universal, and so different oral media remained an important – if not the most important – form of communication.¹⁸ To rely only on pamphlets risks exaggerating the relative strength and impact of messages that were communicated in print and also oversimplifies the media and messages that people were exposed to. A similar bias comes to the fore in the definition of what a pamphlet is. Harline identifies a pamphlet as a written work with an immediate political significance, often intended to persuade the reader about current events: in

other words, an argumentative political pamphlet.¹⁹ Although he later acknowledges that other types of pamphlets, such as edicts, copies of letters and treaties, dominated the market, there is no admission that genres other than the argumentative pamphlet could be politically significant or play any role in opinion-forming.²⁰ When comparisons between rebel and Habsburg pamphleteering have been made, it has been on the basis of argumentative pamphleteering alone and the Habsburg regime has generally been found wanting.²¹ The impression of the Habsburg response to the rebels' ideas, then, is that there was little, if any, of it, and that it was unsuccessful and of poor quality.

However, the Habsburg regime was heir to a longstanding tradition of active self-promotion. The efforts of both the Burgundian dukes and Charles V to promote their own authority, and the variety of media that they employed, are well known. Thus, J. G. Smit has shown how the medieval counts of Holland and Zeeland propped up their own authority by adopting a busy travelling schedule involving much participation in public ceremonies. In the process, he also makes a case for the political significance of the sovereign's personal presence.²² Similarly, Walter Prevenier, Wim Blockmans, Hugo Soly, Peter Arnade and Anne-Laure van Bruaene have stressed how both the dukes themselves and local communities made active use of urban ceremonial to renegotiate the terms of their political relationships.²³ Marie Tanner has shown how both Charles V and Philip II, in line with Habsburg family tradition, associated themselves with classical heroes and particular forms of religious devotion to enhance both their personal public image and that of their dynasty.²⁴ Juan Carlos d'Amico has provided a detailed study of both the imperial myth embraced by Charles V, first identified by Frances Yates, and the sometimes critical views of him held by others.²⁵ Peter Burke has offered an overview of the efforts of Charles V and his supporters to promote and spread the emperor's image through his extensive dominions, whereas Fernando Checa Cremades has researched the more symbolic and specifically artistic elements of that image.²⁶ Against such a background, how likely is it that the Habsburg regime simply sat back and refrained from communicating its own cause during the Revolt?

This book will offer an analysis of precisely how the Habsburg regime communicated its cause in the Revolt to the public at large, as well as how the regime and its supporters responded to the rebel propaganda onslaught. The traditional view that the regime did not contribute any new or innovative political theory will be confirmed, but it will also be shown that the Habsburg regime did in fact publicly communicate and advertise its response to the Revolt, sometimes even with spectacular success. Unlike most studies on rebel communication, this one is based on a multimedia approach to better understand how the Habsburg regime engaged with the diverse, and often mundane, media that were available to them in the sixteenth-century Low Countries. The book will consider how different genres of pamphlets and other oral, performative and visual media worked together, and to what extent and how the regime made active use of them. Finally, and unlike virtually all other studies of Revolt communication, the book will also investigate how the regime's efforts were received by the general public.²⁷ By bringing the Habsburg presence on the public scene into sharper focus, the book will not only nuance the impressions we have of

the media world of the Dutch Revolt, but also throw new light on the dynamics of rebel communication.

Although Habsburg communication in the Revolt has been a field where little research has been done, it has not been completely barren. In direct contrast to research on rebel communication, this work tends not to be based on pamphlets at all. Thus, Margit Thøfner has researched public ceremonial in Antwerp and Brussels, importantly including both rebel and Habsburg case studies. Her study is unique in the historiography on two counts: as the only one to do so, she considers the popular response to public media and, whereas much research on the Revolt has focused on the two first decades, she has extended the period under study from the beginning of the Revolt all the way to 1633.²⁸ Luc Duerloo has laid bare the carefully thought-out religious profile that the Archdukes Albert and Isabella projected of themselves, largely through public displays of piety, patronage and building works, and Paul Arblaster has detailed news distribution networks from the late sixteenth century onwards.²⁹ Vincent van Zuilen has highlighted the regime's use of edicts for propaganda purposes, and for the very early years of the Revolt, Monique Weis has examined the Habsburgs' attempts to influence the opinions of the German princes, an offensive that relied on private correspondence.³⁰ There remains, however, a total dearth of studies on pro-Habsburg opinion-forming that deal with a more prolonged part of the Revolt. In addition, there is little work on communication during the Revolt years, be it Habsburg or rebel, that attempts to look at how different media worked together, although Alastair Duke and Christi Klinkert have both looked at the interplay between pictorial and verbal print.³¹

So, what were all these media that the Habsburg regime had access to when the Revolt broke out? And how did they work? The following overview will provide an outline of the Low Countries media world, while also making clear that the regime was an active user of them all, and far from the mute and distant power suggested by parts of the historiography.

Proclamations

Public proclamations constituted a way for the regime to make something known to its subjects. An order would be sent out to local authorities and these would ensure that their town crier(s) proclaimed a piece of news, such as a military victory, a new law, dynastic births, marriages and deaths, or calls for communal action, for instance prayers for success in an ongoing war, to the public. The proclamations happened at fixed locations in the city, such as on marketplaces and in front of town halls, and were often introduced by a trumpet fanfare.³² When good news was announced, there could also be a follow-up in the form of public celebrations, such as a *Te Deum laudamus* in church and/or a procession of thanksgiving.³³ Equally, local authorities also relied on proclamations to inform their citizens of measures or important events that had effects on their lives, such as the organisation of guard duty.

Proclamations allowed a large proportion of the population to be reached. They were oral addresses in the local vernacular and so their reach was independent of literacy levels. They do, in



Proclamations were the regime's 'hotline' to the people. Frans Hogenberg and Simon Frisius,
The Proclamation of the Perpetual Edict in Antwerp, 1577

fact, appear to have functioned as a type of one-way hotline from regime to subjects. Depending on what type of proclamation it was, it could also be posted in print on public notice boards, and be printed for sale and distribution.³⁴

Edicts

Although traditionally taking the form of and providing the bulk of proclamations, the issuing of new edicts followed a distinct pattern that makes them stand out. Edicts were legal documents in which the regime would seek to address a concern, and generally order a particular course of action in order to remedy the problem that had been identified. They have usually been considered only from the point of view of legal history, but edicts were formulated in a way so as to include a preamble which allowed, and indeed required, the authorities to explain their reasons for or-



Edicts always included a preamble which allowed the regime to present its view of the situation.

The preamble was clearly demarcated in the text, separated from the actual ordinance by the words WAEROMME or ZOE EEST in Dutch and POUR CE EST-IL in French. *Placaet en[de] Ordinatie ons Heeren des Conincx / op istuc van het Crijchsvolk zoo wel te voete als te peerde / loopende den Huysman afferen / verdrucken ende oppresseren* (Ghileyn Manilius, Ghent, 1573)

dering this or that course of action. Here was, in other words, an opportunity for the regime to present itself and its policies in a favourable light, and this was made use of.³⁵

This, however, should not make us think that edicts were argumentative in style. On the contrary, the preamble served only to identify a problem and inform the audience of why this was a problem or what the effects of it were. Opposing views were never referred to or discussed, and no attempts were made to prove such views wrong.

Common to these edicts was that they were widely publicised. Publication could take one or both of two different forms: there was oral proclamation, and there was publication in print.³⁶ Indeed, those edicts that have come down to us in print virtually always include the order to publicise the edict as widely as possible, and sometimes the printed version even mentions when and in the presence of what local dignitary it had been proclaimed. Consequently, an edict was virtually guaranteed oral dissemination, and surviving diaries record frequent and repetitive proclamations.³⁷ Because edicts had legal force, it would also have been in people's interests to pay attention to what was being proclaimed, and so the regime's understanding of the situation or problem they were addressing was likely to reach a large proportion of the population. Moreover,

edicts were generally relevant to current issues and may thus have had a certain news value, which in turn may have added to the general public's interest in them.

Ceremonial

Like proclamations, ceremonial is a term that covers a wide variety of events, each of which in turn could include a whole array of very different elements. Examples of public events that can be treated as ceremonial (or spectacle) are religious processions, joyous entries, processions of thanksgiving, communal prayer and public executions. Many of these did in effect comprise other media, such as proclamations, sermons, plays and elaborate decorations. In the case of decorations, these could, again, take very different forms: from *tableaux vivants* featuring citizens dressed up to illustrate an event or a scene of symbolic significance, to paintings, triumphal arches with different decorations and inscriptions, and topical floats. These were essentially *tableaux vivants* on wheels and were rolled through town as part of a procession, all the while illustrating a particular situation or calling attention to a particular ideal, hope or problem. In Brussels and Antwerp, at least, some of these decorations were so elaborate and so enormous that they were re-used every year. When not in use, they were kept in their own designated storage space.³⁸

Ceremonial processions (*ommegangen*) were often associated with fixed religious festivals, and different towns would have had their own special feast days to celebrate, for instance, their patron saint or a relic that was kept locally. Thus, the most spectacular of the annual processions in Antwerp was the Whitsun *ommegang*, held to honour the holy prepuce, or Christ's foreskin, which Antwerp claimed to be the custodian of, whereas the procession for the Blessed Sacrament of Miracles came to hold particular importance in Brussels.³⁹

As a medium, what is particularly noteworthy about processions is that they were normally organised and paid for at the local level, and they involved high numbers of people.⁴⁰ In the case of festive ceremonial, many were involved in the actual preparations, the making of the decorations, playing the different parts in the *tableaux* and, of course, in the actual processing, and of those who were not, many would have been spectators on the day. Smaller communities within the city, such as the different guilds, the foreign business communities and even neighbourhood organisations, generally offered contributions of their own.⁴¹ Judging from the significant work involved in these productions, the time they took to plan, and the sheer space many diarists devoted to describing them, ceremonial festivities were important events in people's lives.⁴² Ceremonial, then, could not only reach a large number of people but could also involve them in a collective emotional experience in ways that other media could not.⁴³

Certain types of ceremonial, such as joyous entries, involved direct contact between the ruler and the governed. But the organisation of these festivities remained a local concern, and as such they provided an occasion for the community to make certain points, such as hopes for peace, clear to their ruler.⁴⁴ In these cases, ceremonial functioned as a mode of communication between ruler and subjects, and as such it was also an important political mechanism.⁴⁵



Processions were usually organised and paid for locally, with large-scale popular participation. From Johannes Bochius' book *Historica narratio profectionis et inaugurationis serenissimorum Belgii principum Alberti et Isabellae, Austriae archiducum* (Jan Moretus, Antwerp, 1602)

Sermons

Sermons were often a feature in ceremonial, and processions would often include pauses in order for a sermon to be preached before carrying on the route around town.⁴⁶ More often, of course, sermons were a regular part of people's church-going experience. As such, they formed the medium with possibly the greatest reach of all, as even people who did not go to market and hear proclamations there would go to church on Sunday.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, sermons are a difficult medium to study. Unlike Reformation Germany and France, where Mark Edwards and Larissa Taylor have pointed to a vast number of printed sermons, sermons were only very rarely published in print during the Dutch Revolt.⁴⁸ Although considerable numbers of manuscript sermons survive, the vast majority of these are on straightforward devotional issues.⁴⁹ This, of course, does not mean that priests did not make political comments; they may very well have done so, but without noting down what they were. An alternative way of finding out what was said in sermons is by consulting diaries and correspondence.

Sadly, although most diarists made notes of occasions when sermons were given, hardly a single one of them recorded what had actually been said. Although the fragmentary references that do exist suggest that political issues in the Revolt were indeed discussed by priests in their sermons, it remains impossible to know the extent of such practices, or indeed the effect these had on the congregation.⁵⁰

Pamphlets

Again, this is a hugely diverse category. In addition to the argumentative pamphlets that historians have usually been most concerned with, there were news pamphlets, festival books (ranging from short and simple pamphlets to illustrated, hardbound folio books with gilded pages), religious writings of various kinds, edicts, almanacs and prophecies. In addition to these printed publications, hand-written 'pamphlets' circulated.⁵¹ These could be copies of printed pamphlets, letters for public circulation, or anonymous writings pinned up on walls and gates.⁵²

The key advantages of pamphlets were their mobility and their longevity. As artefacts, they could be moved long distances and thus have the potential to reach a very large audience. The importance of travelling salesmen in the sale of pamphlets and prints obviously increased this effect.⁵³ Also, again because they were physical objects, they had a lifespan that far outlasted that of any oral proclamation, sermon or many ceremonial events. In addition, they were the only real mass medium that could be effectively used for illegal purposes, as public ceremonial, proclamations and the issuing of edicts all required the support and collaboration of local authorities. But pamphlets were in many ways the least public of public media: whereas proclamations, sermons and ceremonial commanded attention, often with great fanfare, pamphlets could easily be ignored, and were not necessarily picked up or bought.

Of no small significance is the fact that a degree of literacy would have been required to be able to fully absorb and understand a pamphlet. Although pamphlets may have been read aloud, there is actually little evidence to suggest that such a practice was widespread and, even if it were, to hear a pamphlet read aloud was probably not as effective as to read and re-read a piece of writing at one's own pace.⁵⁴ Pamphlets and prints were also bought by people who had no intention of reading them, even if they were literate. Instead, they could be bought as artefacts, mementos (festival books come to mind) or as a badge of identity.⁵⁵ Conversely, people who would read pamphlets might buy them not to find out something new, but because they already knew the contents and agreed with what the author said.⁵⁶ Although pamphlets certainly had a potential for long-lasting reach that no other medium could easily equal, there were also a myriad of circumstances which made that potential difficult to realise.

Visual media

Visual media included anything with a pictorial presentation, be it expensive oil paintings, cheap woodcuts, engravings, drawings, sculptures and even coins and medals. Although the Low

Countries did not have a woodcut tradition of the kind that existed in Germany, both woodcuts and engravings were widely published once the Revolt had broken out.⁵⁷ From works detailing the motifs on coins and medals minted in the same period, it is clear that these too could be the conveyors of political and religious messages.⁵⁸ With a few notable exceptions, the visual media of the Revolt have not been much studied and, as in the case of pamphlets, the emphasis has been mostly on the rebel output.⁵⁹

Visual media could make sense to people irrespective of their literacy levels. For viewers to understand the meaning of what they saw, however, they might require a degree of familiarity with the topic that was depicted as well as different symbols, such as heraldry, and classical and religious references. As with pamphlets, people may have had various motives for buying visual media, but cost may have been a more important factor. After all, a broadsheet might not have been very expensive, but an oil painting would certainly have been out of reach for most people, not least in wartime.

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From this overview it should be clear that there are vast amounts of source material available for a study on Habsburg communication. This book is based on over 300 printed publications ranging from edicts to festival books to news pamphlets and beyond, as well as collections of correspondence, and archival material detailing public communication. To explore the thorny issue of how the public responded to the Habsburg regime's communication, I have relied on around twenty diaries and chronicles written by contemporaries. Because pro-Habsburg visual media remain under-researched and therefore too large and unwieldy a topic to be included in a book of this scope, I have chosen to largely exclude them from consideration except in cases where secondary literature has been available. This reliance on secondary literature has also meant that my analysis of visual media has had to be in the context of other media rather than in relation to the actual corpus of extant paintings, drawings, engravings and the like.

The book has been structured around central problems that the regime was confronted with at the different stages of the Revolt. Chapter 1 focuses on how the regime chose to deal with the problem of heresy and rebellion, which had crystallised in the iconoclastic fury, or *Beeldenstorm*, that had broken out in August 1566. Chapter 2 examines the regime's response as the rebellion turned into a full-scale war with the rebels' acquisition of a territorial base in the spring of 1572. Chapter 3 investigates the Habsburg regime's ability to communicate its will at a time when its authority was breaking down, whereas chapter 4 examines the communicative efforts that accompanied Alexander Farnese's reconquest of the Southern provinces in the late 1570s and early 1580s. Chapter 5 deals with the continued failure to secure a peace after the fall of Antwerp in 1585. Chapter 6 concerns the way the Archdukes, the newly arrived sovereign rulers, chose to communicate their image to the public. As the only chapter where significant amounts of secondary literature on Habsburg public communication has been available, this chapter takes a more comparative perspective and examines why, compared to their predecessors, the Arch-

dukes have been deemed so successful. It will be clear throughout this book that not only was the regime conscious of the importance of public communication, but that the Habsburg cause was regularly propagated on the public scene, albeit often not in pamphlet form.

Finally, a discussion of the terms that are appropriate when referring to the use of public media is in order. Within Reformation history there have been warnings against the use of the term 'propaganda'. Although the neutral meaning of the word is merely to propagate, or spread, certain ideas, the modern meaning has a clear negative connotation implying systematic and manipulative communication intended to influence people's opinions and behaviour.⁶⁰ Elements of this understanding of the term fit badly with early modern media realities. No early modern political authority enjoyed sufficient reach to achieve anywhere near the same level of media control that modern totalitarian regimes have sometimes managed, even though censorship legislation suggests that this certainly remained an aim. The uneasy fit between, on the one hand, the modern understanding of what propaganda is, and early modern media, on the other, has made Peter Matheson counsel against the use of the term 'propaganda' altogether, whereas Miriam Usher Chrisman has sought to distinguish between polemic, where an interchange of ideas is implied, and propaganda, which does not acknowledge other points of view.⁶¹ There have also been attempts to distinguish different kinds and degrees of propaganda, while others still have used the term simply to denote persuasive media.⁶²

As we saw above, several early modern media, such as sermons, edicts and news pamphlets, had distinct primary purposes that had little to do with opinion-forming, at least in the first instance. Although it is an important tenet of this book that these media could all have propagandistic content, to label them as 'propaganda' pure and simple is to disregard their other, equally important functions within the media world.

But if the term 'propaganda' is so unsuited to early modern realities, what should we replace it with? In the context of the Dutch Revolt, dialogue and a prospect of resolution where both parties would concede something to the opponent were hardly in evidence, and so to use the word 'polemic' would be to imply an open and forthright exchange that simply did not exist. Certainly, Dutch Revolt edicts, pamphlets, letters and the like generally did not come close to equalling the kind of finely tuned manipulation that was the product of, say, the Third Reich or Stalinist Russia. But many of them nevertheless share a number of features with modern propaganda, such as attempts to demonise the enemy, the idealisation of one's own leaders, and the simplistic presentation of current problems as a choice between Good (us) and Bad (them).

These common features are significant elements of what propaganda is. If the main difference between the modern understanding of the word and the early modern material is the degree of control that modern technology can offer totalitarian regimes, then there can be no reason not to use it within an early modern context where the purpose of opinion-forming was the same, although the technical apparatus that could be relied upon was different. Moreover, although the inability of early modern political groupings to attain total control of the media world that they inhabited may have meant that they obtained less support than they otherwise

would have, this lack of control did not make individual pieces of opinion-forming material less propagandistic. Although the label 'propaganda' must be acceptable to use in reference to media used specifically for opinion-forming, such as the bulk of rebel pamphleteering, it cannot be an appropriate term to describe anything with opinion-forming potential. As much of the media relied on by the Habsburg regime had different primary functions, this material will be denoted as, quite simply and very blandly, 'public communication'.

Rooting out Heresy and Rebellion, 1567-1572

The cruelty and tyranny of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, third Duke of Alva, have become proverbial in the historiography of the Low Countries. From the beginning of his governorship, his name and image came to represent the injustice and tyranny the rebels identified in the Spanish regime. It was the defence of freedom against this Spanish tyranny that from early on was presented as the *raison d'être* of first the rebel movement and later the Dutch Republic, and Alva was the person who more than anyone personified what the freedom-loving Dutch had been up against.¹ The allegations of cruelty were so serious and with such international reach that almost 60 years after Alva's death, the Count of Roca, his panegyrist, felt a need to justify the tremendous hatred the 'iron duke' had provoked. His explanation was that Alva had actually performed an act of self-sacrifice: by willingly increasing people's hatred of himself, he was hoping to boost their loyalty and devotion to Philip II, once the king himself returned to the Low Countries.² Although there is no evidence that Alva was deliberately intent on increasing the hatred he inspired, the Count of Roca's comments do point to the two-part Habsburg strategy, namely the harsh policies of Alva and the intended return of Philip II.³

The 1560s had been marked by both political and religious tension in the Low Countries. In the years after Philip's departure for Spain in 1559, the highest-ranking nobles objected to what they perceived as attempts to squeeze them out of government in favour of Spanish advisors.⁴ The strict heresy laws that Philip had inherited from Charles V, and which he confirmed upon his own accession, became a focal point for political and religious discontent both among the grandes and at the local level. As a group, the grandes were religious moderates, although few adhered personally to Protestantism. In addition to a general antipathy towards religious persecution, they were also concerned about the economic effects of the strict heresy laws (much trade relied on close contact with the neighbouring heretical states), the possibilities for unrest, as well as the undesirable interference with local privileges that full compliance with the placards entailed.⁵

Local authorities were especially concerned with the threat to their privileges that the heresy legislation represented. The Caroline heresy placards had incorporated the notion of *majestas*, an element of Roman law that had been resurrected by medieval canon lawyers. This concept had then been used to equate heresy with divine *lèse-majesté*, i.e. treason against God.⁶ The treason element threatened the so-called *ius de non evocando*, a privilege enjoyed by most towns, which meant that they could try their own citizens in all cases except for treason. Only

then would they have to cede to central jurisdiction. Treason against king and country was a rare charge (at least in peacetime), but heresy, or divine treason, was not. This meant that, thanks to the heresy legislation of Charles V and Philip II, local authorities were faced with the prospect of handing citizens over to central judicial authorities on a regular basis, thus undermining their own claim to judicial authority.

What made matters worse was that the heresy legislation also stipulated that the property of the condemned be confiscated, something that threatened destitution for entire families if the head of the household was caught. Whereas traditionally local privileges had prevented such confiscation even though it had formed part of the Caroline heresy legislation since 1529, the 1540s saw more and more ordinances ordering such local privileges to be disregarded.⁷ The ever stricter heresy legislation thus managed to offend not just the growing number of people with Protestant or at least moderate religious leanings, but also the much larger number of people with strong feelings about both their hometown and province's autonomy and the material welfare of their fellow citizens.

In 1564, after a prolonged bullying campaign, the leading noblemen William of Orange and the Counts of Egmont and Hornes managed to convince Philip that Cardinal Granvelle, his trusted advisor from Burgundy, should be recalled from Brussels.⁸ Once Granvelle left and the grantees regained the upper hand, the persecution of heresy dropped spectacularly, and the Count of Egmont was sent to Madrid for the purpose of persuading Philip that the heresy placards must be made more lenient. But Philip adamantly rejected any form of leniency, and in October 1565 he wrote from Segovia to order that the placards be observed to the letter. Already, a number of noblemen had been holding secret meetings to discuss how to respond to the king's intransigence. Shortly before the Segovia letters became known, a group of minor nobles with Protestant leanings, later known as the confederate nobles, met at the Count of Culemborg's Brussels mansion and decided to form a league to secure the abolition of the Inquisition and the moderation of the heresy laws.⁹ A document, the *Compromise of the Nobility*, was drawn up to reflect their aims and circulated so that other nobles could sign it. Although about 400 signatures were secured, almost all of these were from minor nobles. Nevertheless, the confederates probably enjoyed considerable support among the grantees: a number of them refused to enforce the king's placards in their own provinces, and several, such as Orange, Egmont, Hornes and Hoogstraten kept in close touch with the signatories, some of whom were close family relations.¹⁰

In the spring the confederates decided to present a request for religious moderation and the abolition of the Inquisition to Philip's regent, Margaret of Parma (the so-called *smeekschrift*). On 5 April 1566, 300 armed nobles marched through Brussels and made their way into the palace to hand her their petition. They could count on considerable public support for their demands; the States of Brabant and Flanders had already submitted separate protests of their own, and the States of Holland were to do so shortly after.¹¹ In the face of the openly defiant initiative of the Beggars (the new name adopted by the confederates), Margaret was powerless to refuse their demands and agreed to circulate an order for a moratorium on religious persecution and the lenient treatment of all heretics until it was known what Philip's reaction would be.¹²

The concessions opened the floodgates to Protestant activity. Public preaching was organised, exiles returned home and Protestant pamphlets circulated in large numbers. In August 1566 the situation reached a breaking point when churches in city after city all over the Low Countries were attacked, ransacked, plundered and vandalised by Protestant militants in what has become known as the *Beeldenstorm*, or the iconoclastic fury.¹³ For the most part, town authorities and militias refrained from interfering. Here was a situation, then, where the regime was being challenged on two fronts: both local authorities and high-ranking noblemen conniving to flout royal legislation, coupled with militant religious deviants who had dared to take the offensive, to the point where they even took the towns of Valenciennes and 's-Hertogenbosch by force.¹⁴

The events of 1566 caused shock both in Brussels and Madrid. The impression was that heretics were allowed to do what they liked, that they did so with considerable aristocratic support and that the authority of the central government in Brussels had broken down.¹⁵ The response that was decided on in Madrid was a 'good cop, bad cop' strategy whereby the Duke of Alva would travel north with a 10,000 strong punitive force to restore order and punish those guilty of heresy and rebellion. Once this unpleasant part of the job had been accomplished, Philip would return to his father's native lands and bestow clemency upon the population, in order to re-establish a proper relationship of loyalty and obedience between sovereign and subjects.¹⁶ At no time did Alva support a policy of a punitive expedition on its own, and other counsellors and allies, such as Cardinal Granvelle, then in Rome, and the pope, also attached great importance to the king's presence.¹⁷ Philip himself even ordered his then ambassador in Rome, Don Luís de Requesens, to assure the pope that he regarded his own return to the Low Countries as indispensable and that nothing could prevent him from making the trip.¹⁸

Although the plan to have Alva do the dirty work before a triumphant royal return has been used to rationalise Alva's brutal policies in the Low Countries, the impact of the plan on the regime's communication efforts has gone unrecognised. Image projection did, in fact, form a significant part of the Habsburg strategy. Punitive action was necessary to punish the guilty and restore order, but Philip's own return was largely conceived of in terms of 'winning hearts'.¹⁹ It was therefore important that the king was not too closely associated with the punishment that was to be meted out. This was also part of the reason why Philip's journey was postponed in the autumn of 1567, as the punitive measures were still ongoing and, according to Alva, Philip's presence at that stage could generate hatred of him.²⁰ Alva's role as 'bad cop' was reflected both in his instructions and in his entourage. His instructions limited themselves to the task of meting out punitive measures wherever necessary and included few political guidelines, and his entourage consisted overwhelmingly of military advisors. Although Alva's last set of instructions expanded his authority from strictly military and judicial to a major political authority by granting him the same powers as the governess, Margaret of Parma, there continued to be no detailed political instructions for him to follow.²¹ Clearly, then, Alva's purpose was to punish and impose strict obedience to royal rule, not to engage in political dialogue or even try to maintain a popular appeal. That would be Philip's job once he came back to the Low Countries.

Punishment

Alva's 'bad cop' strategy was implemented immediately upon his arrival. The Spanish troops were garrisoned in different towns, regardless of whether these had been involved in the iconoclasm. Next, the Council of Troubles was set up. Its task was to try all those suspected of involvement in the uprisings of 1566 as well as anyone who had violated the heresy placards. It would operate independently of local privileges and the traditional judiciary, and overall authority was reserved for Alva himself.²² But already before the Council began its operations, Alva had secured the arrests of the two leading noblemen, the Counts of Egmont and Hornes, and it was their trials, as well as the formulation of charges against William of Orange, the rebel leader, and the other nobles who had fled, that the Council was busy with until the end of 1567.²³ At this point, summonses began to be issued for ordinary people to appear before the Council and answer the accusations against them, but few came forward.²⁴ Of those that did, the final sentence was generally for capital punishment, whereas those who had gone into exile were banished for life, and their property was confiscated. Thus, of the 1,881 cases that were entered in the register of sentences covering the first few months of activity, only seven resulted in acquittal, and of the remainder, only thirteen were sentenced to a punishment other than death or banishment.²⁵

The unprecedented high number of arrests and the concentration of executions turned punishment into a primary medium for public communication. Through the punishment of people who were proclaimed to be rebels and heretics, the regime delivered a strong indictment on all forms of religious and political disloyalty, however minor. There was nothing unusual about using public punishment in this way. Except in special circumstances, executions were theatrical events that took place in public in front of a large crowd.²⁶ The 'drama' involved certain stock characters: the condemned, the executioner and representatives of the authorities who, through the act of the execution itself, could be seen to be administering justice and taking care of the society they had been appointed to govern. Before the sentence was carried out, the verdict would be read out for all to hear 'in order that everyone know the cause of the said execution, and that the latter serve as an example to the people', as Article 45 of Alva's new code of criminal justice proclaimed in 1570.²⁷

There is evidence that members of the public were adept at 'reading' executions and the symbolism that was sometimes employed. Nicholas Soldoyer, a Catholic living in Tournai where Protestant activity had been especially vibrant, kept a diary during the years of Alva's governorship which for the most part reads like a detailed record of the many executions that took place. On a number of occasions Soldoyer noted that the condemned, guilty of crimes of rebellion and heresy, were hanged on gallows built with the wood that the heretics, in their brief heyday, had acquired to build themselves temples with.²⁸ Prisons were also built with this wood.²⁹ Instead of contributing to their heresy, then, this wood was now used to rid the town of that same evil. Similarly, in Valenciennes, people who had been found guilty of attending the hedge-preaching or taking part in the iconoclasm were hanged on the Mont d'Azin, where the hedge-preaching had taken place.³⁰ The location had now been reclaimed and put to better use.

The persecution instigated by Alva, and the fear it inspired, formed an intended and in-



Public executions were events that attracted large audiences. Through the act of the execution, the authorities could demonstrate their ability to ensure law and order. Under Alva, however, executions instead came to demonstrate the wide gap between the regime's perception of justice and that of local communities.

Frans Hogenberg, *The execution of Spelt, 1570*

tegral part of the 'good cop, bad cop' strategy. Exemplary punishment and its expected deterrent effects were seen as the primary means to prevent further outbreaks of iconoclasm and rebellion. In response to Philip's suggestion of a general pardon, Alva responded in early 1568 that punishment was still being meted out and it remained important to keep fear hanging over everyone in order that the towns submit to orders and that those wanting to buy their way out of trouble offer the largest possible sums.³¹ Granvelle, for his part, wrote to Philip from Rome that now that everyone was 'beaten' with fear, Philip would easily be able to restore normality upon his own arrival.³² The effects of punishment were also noted in the new and streamlined criminal justice legislation that Alva proclaimed in 1570: punishment not only appeased God who was 'often irritated by the enormity of the people's evils', it also rid society of its rotten fruit, reassured the good, prevented discord and civil war, while also securing the establishment of a 'good and solid

peace'.³³ The importance of swift punishment was also pointed out, in order that the 'terror and example' be as great as possible.³⁴ The exemplary function the punishment was meant to serve was also made clear in most other punitive edicts.³⁵

It was not just the physical punishment of people that was used as a deterrent. Criminal justice also included measures for the visual re-establishment of good order. Article 36 of the new criminal justice code stipulated that houses where illegal assemblies, heretical preaching and other seditious activities had taken place be razed to the ground.³⁶ But the practice existed already before this code was formulated. In 1568, it was ordered that anybody caught sheltering the so-called Wood Beggars, rebel guerrillas who had a reputation for cutting off the ears of priests, would be executed and have their house torn down 'as an example to others'.³⁷ In the same year, the Count of Culemborg's mansion in Brussels was torn down. Culemborg had been a leading member of the Confederate nobles and their initial meeting had taken place in his house. In its place, a column was erected with an inscription in several different languages. According to a newsletter written by an agent of the House of Fugger, the inscription read:

In the reign of Philip II, the Catholic, King of Spain, it has been decided in his Netherland Provinces, under the regency of Ferdinand Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba, that the palace of the Count de Cuilembourg shall be levelled to the ground, in order to obliterate the very memory of the conspiracies against the Roman Catholic Faith, the King's Majesty, and against the Provinces themselves, which oft have been hatched therein. In the year of Grace 1568 on the 9th day of June.³⁸

Philip van Campene, a Catholic living in Ghent, also reported the event, saying that a column would be erected on which 'their crime for the sake of eternal memory will be engraved to their shame and disgrace, and this in various languages'.³⁹

Similarly, in October 1569, Alva issued an order for all the property that had belonged to the rebels and which had now been confiscated, to have any personal symbols of the previous owners, such as coats of arms, removed. The defacing was to be carried out both inside and outside the actual mansions and houses as well as on all property on the former owners' land, all of which now belonged to the king. The only exception was stained glass windows and ecclesiastical property.⁴⁰ Complying with the order appears to have caused difficulties, as Alva issued an amended order less than two months later in response to the many enquiries he had received. This time he specified 'that our intention is that one removes and destroys all the arms, be they of those executed and banished or of their predecessors, which can be found set, laid or raised in public places outside and which can be seen by everyone, without proceeding further with the breaking of those in the bedrooms or other private places not subject to the view of passers-by'.⁴¹ It was clearly the public demonstration of royal authority and warning against rebellion that was at stake. The warning contained in this defacing exercise was noted by Van Campene, who recorded that some of Egmont's arms had been destroyed 'to his and his family's dishonour and shame'.⁴² Van Campene also saw it as an example to all nobles that they must honour God and the king more than their own nobility.⁴³

Surviving diaries make it clear that Alva's intention of grabbing attention and instilling fear in the population worked. Several diarists were struck by the unprecedented number of executions, and mentioned both those occurring in their own town and in other places. Mahieu Manteau, a textile worker in Lille, noted that on 17 January 1568 'in the town of Valenciennes, ten men were decapitated, and the following day another ten, and the day after that yet another ten, which makes thirty men decapitated in three days'.⁴⁴ Manteau was not someone to record his own personal feelings about the events that took place, but from the care he took to note down the numbers of executions in Lille's neighbouring towns (and there were far more than this one mention) it seems clear that he was struck by the high numbers who ended up on the gallows. Van Campene also took note of the scale of the persecution: in Tournai sixty men had been executed and 'great numbers' of townspeople were fleeing out of fear that they would be arrested.⁴⁵ Alva himself also noted the effects of the repression, and wrote to Philip that it 'has caused great fear throughout the country among those who feel guilty, an infinite number have fled'.⁴⁶

Ceremonial

Whereas public punishment allowed the general population to share in the regime's condemnation of heresy and rebellion, ceremonial and festivities allowed them to share in the ruling dynasty's successes as well as Habsburg family events. Alva continued this tradition, regularly ordering public celebrations of victories against the rebels. Thus, after the battle of Jemmingen in July 1568, where Louis of Nassau's forces had been virtually annihilated, Alva wrote to the Council of State to inform them of the victory. He told them how Louis himself had had to flee completely naked and swim across a river for safety (he had even been shown his clothes by a lieutenant they had taken prisoner) and stressed the great losses suffered by the enemy, at least seven thousand, whereas he had lost only six or seven men altogether. He concluded that the victory was a great favour from God, and as such should be made known far and wide so that appropriate thanksgiving could be conducted. That way, God might continue to help with the 'extirpation' of those who were upsetting the public order.⁴⁷ People's participation in the processions and the prayers would thus make them part of the war effort and associate them directly with the regime's cause and success.

By drawing attention to the religious character of the war against the rebels, ceremonial also helped underline the international dimension of the conflict. People were not just kept informed of and encouraged to get involved on behalf of the Catholic cause at home through processions and prayers. They were also urged to get similarly involved on behalf of the Catholic cause abroad. Battle victories were ideal for this purpose as they could be, and were, used to suggest that God was on the Catholic side, wherever Catholics found themselves under attack. Thus, the victories of the French king against the Huguenots were regularly a cause for rejoicing, as were Christian victories against the Turks.⁴⁸ As part of the celebrations in Ghent of the victory at Lepanto, one friar gave a sermon in which he stressed that victories did not result from the number of knights and soldiers, but from God's favour.⁴⁹ The victory at Lepanto was an example of just this, as God had put a stop to the Turkish plan of eliminating all Christians from the earth.

The infidels' progress had been greatly helped by the discord and heresy present within Christendom 'as we daily hear and see happening in the lands over here, and also in France', but now the prayers of good Christians had finally won the day.⁵⁰ The regular calls for prayers and processions in support of the Catholic cause, which diarists took careful note of, had now paid off.⁵¹

People were also made to get involved in the more personal life and well-being of the dynasty's members. Thus, both the deaths of Elisabeth de Valois, Philip's third wife, and of Don Carlos, his oldest son, in 1568 were the subject of funerary services in the towns of the Low Countries.⁵² These were certainly no small affairs: local authorities would troop up in full mourning gear, and for the queen's funeral service, Alva invited all the major ecclesiastical leaders to attend the service in Brussels.⁵³ Similarly, when Anne of Austria, Philip's niece and wife to be, travelled through the Low Countries on her way to Spain in 1570, celebrations were staged in the different towns she passed through. When she came to Bergen-op-Zoom, however, from where she was meant to leave for Spain, there was no wind for the boat to set sail. Once again, the general population was made to take part in the welfare of the Habsburg dynasty: through public prayer and processions they were to beg God to provide the necessary wind and protect the royal company on their voyage south.⁵⁴

Although we may question how effective a medium ceremonial was, the evidence surrounding the Jemmingen celebrations in early August 1568 suggests that the public understood what the regime was trying to say. On 28 July, six days after Alva had informed the Council of State of his tremendous victory, d'Assonleville, a privy councillor, wrote back to congratulate him. He also mentioned how they had offered thanks for his victory, and that they had ordered local authorities to stage celebrations themselves.⁵⁵ What makes this particular occasion stand out is that not only did diarists record the event, a number of them also recorded details of the battle that had been proclaimed as part of the festivities. Thus, the account of Louis' escape and the huge losses suffered by the enemy (always seven to eight thousand) were evidently understood by listeners, as was the virtually complete absence of fatalities (no more than eight) on the royalist side.⁵⁶

The celebrations staged after the victory at Lepanto offer more evidence for the attention people gave to what was communicated to them, while also providing a unique glimpse into how the regime relied on different media to convey the same message. Thus, Van Campene first recorded details of Lepanto after the bishop had announced the victory and called for a celebration. The bishop had obviously provided details of the battle, for Van Campene recorded the number of Turkish fatalities (20,000) and captured Turkish galleys (180).⁵⁷ A week later, he recorded yet more details, this time after having read news pamphlets published on the subject. He noted how, despite the death of some of the Christian captains, they had nevertheless secured their victory against the Turkish 'bassen'. A 'pasha', or 'bashaw', was an honorary title in the Ottoman political system, and Van Campene's decision to include an explanation of what the word meant suggests it did not belong to his own vocabulary, but that it had been acquired by reading the pamphlets.⁵⁸

Once Lepanto had actually been publicly celebrated in Ghent, Van Campene provided many more details of the battle. As part of the festivities, a letter from Venice, forwarded by

Alva to local authorities for dissemination, had been read aloud in church.⁵⁹ Again the numbers, and this time Van Campene recorded more numerical details, matched those he had first been informed of two weeks earlier. Van Hernighem, a Catholic diary writer from Ypres, also noted that letters sent by Alva were read out and that 180 Turkish galleys had been captured. As was proclaimed in the celebrations, he repeated the view that God's help had been instrumental in securing the Christian victory.⁶⁰ A nun in 's-Hertogenbosch was less exact with her numbers: in her diary, she reported the capture of 130 Turkish galleys, as opposed to 180, but she did get the total number of destroyed Turkish galleys right, namely forty. And, like the others, she embraced the idea of God's role in securing the victory. Indeed, she so took on board the idea of Turks as enemies of the faith that she shortly after referred to the rebels as 'our Gueux or young Turks' when going on to record 'all the bad things [they] do here in Brabant and especially in Holland and Zeeland'.⁶¹

The careful notes diarists took of the Lepanto celebrations make it clear that they understood the information the regime was conveying. Of course, the scale of the Lepanto celebrations was so exceptional that people may have paid more attention this time than they otherwise did. But their recorded notes still suggest that, when confronted with an extraordinary ceremony, people were already so aware of the forms messages took that they were able to tune in to them without difficulty.

Similarly, although the regime may this time have been unusually insistent in its communication efforts, the Lepanto celebrations make it clear that they were aware of the possibilities. Thus, they took the opportunity to actively commission pamphlets based on the letter from Venice so that news of the victory could spread still further. One pamphlet included Alva's order for celebrations to take place, and this made explicit reference to the 'enclosed' letter from Venice, from which the public could learn details of what had happened.⁶² There followed a summary of the letter from Venice, dated 19 October 1571, whereas the full letter was published in another pamphlet.⁶³ The regime was, in other words, actively seeking the widest possible dissemination of the Catholic victory. This was nothing new: Charles V had sponsored at least 63 Dutch-language pamphlets, and at least twelve in French, between 1520 and his abdication in 1555.⁶⁴ And the strategy worked: Van Campene's diary makes it clear that he got information about the battle from a variety of sources, and both his and others' apparent acceptance of the idea that divine support had been instrumental in securing victory suggests that at least part of the listening and reading audience took on board the message the regime sought to spread.

But although the repeated pro-Catholic messages circulated widely and in the form of different media, they were far from universally accepted. The diarists that furnish us with so much detail about the celebrations of Lepanto were, for example, all Catholic. The anonymous chronicler in Brussels with Protestant sympathies, however, did not record the celebrations for Lepanto at all, and so the regime's self-congratulatory discourse does not appear to have had much effect among those who had reasons to resent what the regime stood for.⁶⁵ For such groups – and they were not always simple religious categories – pro-regime ceremonial served instead to drive home a piece of unpleasant news or turn of events. Thus, the anonymous Brussels chrono-

cler noted that upon Queen Anne's entry into Nijmegen, a group of condemned were pardoned, as was the tradition upon royal entries. None of the condemned, however, were people sentenced for their involvement in the troubles.⁶⁶ The chronicler noted that these were excluded, and so the pardons granted by Anne appear instead to have underlined the regime's refusal to forgive the events of 1566, despite the general pardon which had been proclaimed the month previously. The same point was taken up by Van Hernighem, a Catholic, who also noted that heretics were excluded from Queen Anne's grace.⁶⁷

Similarly, when Franciscus Sonnius finally took up office as the first bishop of Antwerp in 1570, a procession was organised to mark the occasion. Sonnius was welcomed at the city gates by Alva as well as the entire city magistracy and the local clergy, and together they processed through town.⁶⁸ More than just the reception of a new ecclesiastical leader, the procession was also a case of the Antwerp magistracy eating humble pie in public: their participation advertised how their long-term opposition to letting the city become an episcopal see had failed.

Print

Although Alva was not beyond using pamphlets to disseminate news of victories, the 'good cop, bad cop' strategy was not based on a heavy reliance on print. Although the strategy included significant notions of how to project favourable and convincing images of Philip and his rule, these were not images that were to be conveyed through argumentation. On the contrary: it was Philip's presence and his public exercise of clemency and benevolence towards his subjects in the Low Countries, occurring after a 'no nonsense' spate of repression, that were to form the backbone of his subjects' idea of him, his regime and his unassailable authority. Although his visit might have been publicised in print, it was the actual royal presence that was the key political tool.

The absence of argument and print from the royal strategy should surprise no one. As Paul Kléber Monod has pointed out, all early modern monarchs, even elected ones, regarded themselves as enjoying divinely ordained authority and as in no way being dependent on popular approval.⁶⁹ To launch an argumentative campaign in response to rebel pamphleteering, then, might have suggested that the rebel accusations were being acknowledged as legitimate.⁷⁰ This was obviously not what the 'good cop, bad cop' strategy was about: Alva's brief was not to persuade people of the errors of their ways, or engage in dialogue to find a mutually acceptable solution. Instead, he had been sent in order to punish the guilty and establish in no uncertain terms that heresy and rebellion were unlawful. Debate and dissension were simply intended to come to an end.

In stark contrast to the regime's refusal to engage in argumentative pamphleteering, rebel authors continued to present their cause through this medium. They did this partly by repeating an argument from the early 1560s, namely that the constitutional laws of the Low Countries, especially the *Joyeuse Entrée* of 1556, allowed them to resist the ruling prince if he broke the privileges he had sworn to uphold upon his accession. The strict heresy legislation that Philip II had inherited from Charles V, and which he sought to enforce with even less room for mod-

eration than his father, was seen to be just such a violation of the privileges and thus called for resistance.⁷¹ In 1566, the Confederate nobles had further argued that Philip had been misled by evil foreigners who sought to introduce the Inquisition and destroy all privileges.⁷² Both these arguments were used by William of Orange from 1568 onwards. In an attempt to stir up popular support for his military invasion that year, he published a number of pamphlets claiming that he had resorted to arms to defend king and country against the ruinous activities of the evil counsellor that was Alva, as was his right given Alva's assault on the privileges.⁷³ Although this was a purely secular argument, a religious strand was also pursued where the persecuted Dutch were compared to the Israelites of the Old Testament, and where Orange was presented as the saviour of both them and the true faith.⁷⁴

Once Alva's repression got underway, rebel propaganda also capitalised on the persecutions and punishment. Engravings appeared in large numbers, and the depiction of Alva's tyranny and the scene of the decapitation of the noblemen Egmont and Hornes on the Grand Place in Brussels became standard motifs.⁷⁵ To increase the impact, rebel authors also issued forged letters in an attempt to 'prove' the sinister intentions of the regime. Thus, one pamphlet claimed to contain documentation that the entire population of the Low Countries had been judged guilty of *lèse-majesté* and had been forfeited of life and property.⁷⁶

The regime, however, did not provide responses to these accusations. Instead, its principal way of dealing with rebel pamphleteering and public debate in print was through censorship. Charles V had already issued extensive censorship legislation in 1544, which included a prescription of the death penalty for anyone found to print works that propagated 'errors' and that had not been issued with a printer's privilege.⁷⁷ This legislation was later reissued and new requirements added, such as censorship of stained glass windows in 1556.⁷⁸ In addition to repeated and ever stricter overall censorship legislation, several 'ad hoc' censorship edicts were also issued at particularly troubled times, and anti-heresy legislation also included bans on the production and circulation of seditious material. Thus, 1566 saw the proclamation of several edicts against the spread of anti-Catholic and rebellious material.⁷⁹

Alva too sought to impose strict controls on the production and spread of print. In 1568, he issued an edict against the printing and circulation of material designed to 'spoil, seduce or corrupt the people', circulated by people seeking to 'incite and move the community to some disorder'.⁸⁰ The edict's preamble made it clear that the regime saw print as a tool of rebellion and that its use had been and continued to be a principal means of a group of evildoers to 'make everyone else complicit in and guilty of the same crimes of divine and human *lèse-majesté* that they themselves had committed'.⁸¹ It was, in other words, nothing less than the prevention of crimes of treason that was at stake, and Alva stressed the importance of effective censorship by ordering town authorities to arrest and execute anyone guilty of violating it.⁸² In addition, there was a universal obligation to denounce anyone known to have broken the censorship laws, and also to hand in any seditious material so that it could be burnt 'in order that the memory of it be lost and extinguished'.⁸³

The same view of print as the prime conveyer of heresy and sedition comes across clearly

from all the other censorship edicts too. Thus, the revised overall censorship legislation that was issued in 1570 took as its point of departure that heresy and rebellion had been able to spread largely thanks to the 'desordre' among printers, booksellers and schoolmasters, and that this was what made increased control of current practices both necessary and desirable.⁸⁴ Anyone who wished to become a printer now had to show a certificate from their local bishop confirming their orthodox religious record and another from their local magistracy confirming that they were people of good conduct.⁸⁵ Similar requirements were made for anyone working in a print shop.⁸⁶ In addition, all printed material, including imported books, was subject to ecclesiastical and secular review prior to printing and publication.⁸⁷

Leon Voet has rightly argued that although the many censorship edicts issued by Charles V and Philip II make it appear as though the system was regulated down to the smallest detail, numerous loopholes continued to exist and were made use of by printers.⁸⁸ There was no central body responsible for censoring print, and the system remained dependent on the very printers it was designed to control in that these could often choose their own censors.⁸⁹ Although censors, as Catholic theologians, probably took their job very seriously, the fact that they were largely acting independently, following edicts and guidelines that remained vague beyond the outlawing of 'seditious' and 'heretical' material, left room for such material to slip through the net. Illegal material printed abroad certainly continued to circulate in underground networks, and printers continued to publish sensitive pamphlets anonymously despite the ban on this practice. Christopher Plantin even set up a separate press in the sovereign lordship of Vianen to avoid censorship at home. Presumably the sale and circulation of these illegal pamphlets were sufficient to make the enterprise worthwhile.⁹⁰

Even so, the seriousness of the censorship legislation and the dire consequences for anyone caught breaking it would have been clear to everyone. The promise of capital punishment for anyone producing, selling or even owning seditious material was no empty threat, as two printers in Antwerp had already been executed in the mid-1540s and two rhetoricians from the same city were executed for writing heretical books in 1547 and 1558, respectively.⁹¹ Book searches took place all over the country in March 1569, and in Tournai there were repeated book burnings.⁹² In June the same year, Van Campene noted that in a house-to-house search for 'strangers', some Anabaptists had been found hiding. What gave them away was a copy of the New Testament, printed without indication of city, printer or year (an offence since 1528) and at the end of which there followed some articles that exposed 'the twisted understanding' of the Anabaptists.⁹³ The pair ended up on the stake, another indication of how risky ownership of forbidden material was.

In view of the importance the regime obviously attached to the printed word and image and their opinion-forming potential, it remains a paradox that almost the only engagement of the regime with argument in print was through censorship and restriction. And yet this is a truth with modifications. In 1568, a pamphlet offering a positive take on the execution of Egmont and Hornes was printed in Lyon.⁹⁴ On the front cover, the printer indicated that it was a copy of a pamphlet originally published in Antwerp. There appears to be no surviving copy of the original, but if the claim was correct, then at least one pamphlet was published to propagate a positive

view of the persecution instigated by Alva. The pamphlet presented Alva's arrests as having been fully justified, in view of how the nobles had caused the rebellion.⁹⁵ But there was no attempt to demonise the two counts, and instead the author noted how people had wept at the sight of them, and how Egmont's final prayer had moved people to great pity.⁹⁶ Significantly, no attempt was made to deny the awfulness of what had happened. The spectacle had been 'so terrible and of such great usefulness' to the service of God and His Majesty that nothing similar had been seen or heard of.⁹⁷ The important thing was that the executions were justified and accepted as such by the two counts who asked forgiveness for their sins. In this way, they were God's demonstration that the king was once again in control of the administration of justice, and that crimes against God would be punished with all appropriate rigor.⁹⁸

Although this pamphlet presented a favourable view of Alva and his persecution, it appears to have been a rarity. Two longer panegyrics of Alva are also known to have been written, both presenting the duke's policies as services to royal authority and the Christian faith, but there was seemingly no attempt to launch a systematic campaign to glorify either Philip or Alva.⁹⁹ Instead, it was through edicts that positive ideas about the regime were proclaimed most frequently.

Alva made extensive use of edicts. In 1566 and 1567 prior to his arrival, the number of edicts had risen spectacularly, largely due to attempts to deal with the escalating conflict situation through new legal measures, a trend that Alva continued.¹⁰⁰ A constant in the presentation of the regime in these edicts' preambles was the emphasis on Philip's natural inclination for clemency. The public was told how Philip had pursued the path of mercy in dealing with the unrest and heresy in the Low Countries, and that only the ringleaders and those responsible for inciting the rebellion had been and would be punished.¹⁰¹ These enemies of the common good were sadly still so active that they were preventing him from declaring a general pardon, something he had wanted to do from the very beginning.¹⁰² Philip was in fact being very reasonable and not at all intent on harming the freedom of his subjects.¹⁰³ Given the enormity of their crimes, he could have taken a much more severe and rigorous path altogether, but he had decided to grant them the benefit of the doubt.¹⁰⁴

The regime was also portrayed as benevolent and protective in edicts that were not directly related to punishment of the rebels and heretics. Thus, the edicts regarding military discipline and the ongoing brigandage in the countryside showed the regime to be taking a firm stand on behalf of the civilian population, ordering the arrest and execution of anyone found to be guilty of such offences.¹⁰⁵ Van Campene noted several executions of Spanish soldiers in Ghent, so the edicts had real bite and were not just empty words proclaimed simply for the sake of it.¹⁰⁶

The edicts also offered the regime's interpretation of the causes of the Revolt. Henk van Nierop has noted how both Philip and his advisors blamed the nobles for the outbreak of revolt, and this view was reflected in the edicts.¹⁰⁷ Although nobles were generally not directly singled out as being particularly worthy of blame, what was often stated was that the 'simple people' had been taken advantage of by a few wicked men.¹⁰⁸ These evildoers were not usually named, although the Council of Troubles' sentences against William of Orange and other high nobles, which were publicised, certainly did blame them for the Revolt while also providing details of what they had done.¹⁰⁹

As for rebel allegations, these were only rarely alluded to. The edict against the circulation of Orange's pamphlets went some way towards denying the allegations that with its punitive measures the regime was proceeding beyond the remits of 'reason and justice', but offered no 'proof' to back up this denial.¹¹⁰ The same edict also vehemently denied the allegations that a member of the Council of Troubles had written a memo setting out the regime's intention to kill 'all kinds of people' but again did not include any substantiating evidence.¹¹¹ Another edict, intended to stem the stream of people who emigrated due to Alva's persecution, noted that the ongoing punishment process was not carried out because Philip wanted to take away his subjects' freedom.¹¹² 'Freedom' was, of course, one of the rebels' buzzwords; they had conceptualised their uproar as being a defence of traditional freedoms and privileges against the violations of Alva. But the edict, whether intentionally or not, did not elaborate further on the topic of which liberties Philip's subjects were free to enjoy, or where the rebels had got it wrong. It appears that the audience was expected to take their sovereign's word for it and not demand either proof or nuances.

The closest the regime came to offering a justification for its policies was through references to the divinely ordained role it had in the administration of justice and the punishment of evildoers. It was because God had given Philip the sword that the king could not renege on his obligation to punish those guilty of treason against both God and himself.¹¹³ The logic at work here was drawn from St Paul's letter to the Romans, chapter 13:

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.¹¹⁴

These biblical verses enjoyed such force that both Luther and Calvin had begun their careers by urging acceptance of worldly authority in line with Paul's injunction, however tyrannical the ruler might be.¹¹⁵ Once they and others embraced the idea that there was room for resistance, their justifications of resistance to worldly authority were primarily construed as responses to Romans 13.¹¹⁶

Romans 13 was also relied on in the few royalist prints that survive from the late 1560s. In *Diptych of Christ and Philip II*, we see Christ and Philip facing each other and being surrounded by different biblical verses that all call for obedience to God and the king.¹¹⁷ In addition to Romans 13:1 ('there is no power but of God'), 1 Peter 2:17 ('Fear God. Honour the king') is also given. Below the diptych, there is another lengthy quote from Peter's first letter, namely:

Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God.¹¹⁸




The little pro-Habsburg imagery that was produced stressed the divine nature of the royal office, along with the absolute duty of obedience. Hieronymus Wierix, *Diptych of Christ and Philip II*

Another royalist engraving, published in Antwerp in 1569, showed Philip receiving a globe from Christ.¹¹⁹ Below the picture was a statement outlining Philip's divinely ordained task:

You are Philip who will subject the world to the laws of Christ – may the honour of the faith prevail and may you serve justice and peace – and protect the people and obey the holy laws of the ancestors.¹²⁰

Both engravings stressed the divine nature of the royal office, with one of them even pointing to the divinely sanctioned authority of royal governors. This defence of royal authority was highly à propos, coming as it did at a time when Orange was circulating material in defence of his own military invasion, where he claimed to be acting for the protection of Philip against Alva, governor and evil advisor.¹²¹ In fact, the theme remained powerful: an engraving dated between 1572 and 1580 shows Philip II and Pope Gregory XIII receiving the symbols of their authority – the sword for Philip and the olive branch for Gregory – from Christ himself.¹²² Again, the print included biblical verses, such as 1 Peter 2:17, to stress the divinely ordained nature of their authority.



Pieter Nagel, *Philip II receiving globe from Christ*



Hieronymus Wierix, *Philip II and Gregory XIII receive symbols of authority from Christ*

It is not known whether these prints were commissioned by the regime, or whether their publication resulted from a purely business-minded analysis on the part of publishers of what would sell on the print market in the late 1560s. If they were not commissioned but were published because they would appeal to a perceived market, they represent an indication of how valid people thought Romans 13 and similar injunctions were. Modern research into media and audience interaction suggests that people are far more likely to listen to, read and buy media that convey messages that they agree with, and so it seems reasonable to suppose that at least a proportion of the buyers of these prints agreed with the message of divinely ordained royal rule that was conveyed.¹²³ Catholic contemporaries certainly appeared to take the divine support for royal rule for granted, at least if we are to believe those who, without elaborating on the topic, noted how Catholic and royal service were two sides of the same coin.¹²⁴

Their tendency never to elaborate on the 'natural' relationship between God and the king may even be an indication that it was viewed as a given, an axiom, and not something that it

was necessary to explain. If this was the case, then the prints can be taken to reflect widely held assumptions, regardless of whether or not they were commissioned. This would also mean that the logic of Romans 13 that was alluded to in edicts would have met with acceptance and understanding by at least a proportion of the public. In this analysis, therefore, even if the prints were commissioned, that would still not make them instances of the regime proclaiming views of the world that were completely incongruous with the public's view. Rather, both the prints and the edicts would merely represent current and accepted assumptions that were held by a considerable number of people.

Although the regime's use of print within the Low Countries was restricted to self-presentation through non-argumentative edicts, and possibly the commissioning of engraved images, it is important to note that this was not how they proceeded abroad. Monique Weis has detailed how a correspondence of justification was maintained between Philip, Margaret and Alva on the one hand, and different German princes and electors on the other.¹²⁵ These were letters written variously by Philip and his governors to the German princes from August 1566 onwards in order to justify the harsh religious policies that were being enforced in the Low Countries. Common to all is that they contained calls for the German princes not to lend an ear to the arguments presented by the rebels, and also that they furnished them with arguments and justifications for Habsburg policy. Indeed, in response to the German reactions to the imprisonment and execution of Egmont and Hornes, Alva even sent copies of documents relating to their trial and sentence to prove that the execution had been justified and in order to counter rebel allegations that they had been unlawfully tried and killed.¹²⁶ It is not known whether Alva imagined that the recipients, the Dukes of Bavaria and Cleves-Jülich, would issue a riposte in the form of a public proclamation or pamphlet, or whether the arguments in support of the regime were intended to be privately communicated between members of the political elite. What is clear is that the regime was here actively issuing arguments for its own position, an approach markedly different from the overwhelmingly non-argumentative stand taken on the domestic scene.

Popular response

Fear and punishment, then, were Alva's primary tools in going about his job of uprooting heresy. They were accompanied by non-argumentative communication in the form of edicts and public ceremonial, where both message and format served to underline the point that non-negotiable obedience was what Alva had come to enforce. This strategy was in line with Alva's goal-oriented approach to military matters, where the end always justified the means and where there was no room for persuasion or negotiation.¹²⁷ But was it successful?

Alva himself at least thought the harsh measures were working: after the execution of Egmont and Hornes, he wrote to Philip that their deaths had had a marked effect on the population, which they should be happy about as then the exemplary power would be all the greater.¹²⁸ And on the face of it, it was successful: within a couple of years of his arrival, executions had dwindled, heretical worship had seemingly been uprooted, the nobles were firmly on the regime's side, and local authorities were following orders.

Indeed, to commemorate this success, a statue of Alva was unveiled on the citadel square in Antwerp in May 1571. It was Benito Arias Montano, Philip's special envoy sent to cooperate with Plantin on the Polyglot Bible, who had originally suggested that a statue might be a fitting way of celebrating the tremendous victory at Jemmingen. There can be no doubt, however, that Alva had given his consent to the project, especially as it was funded by the public treasury and was made of bronze taken from cannons that had been captured at Jemmingen and then melted down.¹²⁹

The statue, designed by Montano and made by the sculptor Jacques Jonghelinck, showed a larger-than-life Alva crushing a two-headed figure with several arms. Although it was later destroyed, a contemporary print and explanatory document make it clear that the different elements of the multi-armed figure were intended to function as direct references to the rebellion, which Alva had now stamped out. Thus, the arm holding a document represented the confederate nobles' petition for a more moderate religious policy, the arm with the hammer was a reference to the iconoclasts, the mask referred to the nobles' hypocrisy in hiding behind a false defence of the privileges, the two-headed figure itself was a representation of heresy, and so forth. On the sides, there were reliefs showing Alva chasing away animals of prey and restoring the Catholic religion.¹³⁰

But although order had been restored, Alva's tactics of spreading fear had not done much to generate sympathy and devotion towards the regime. This would have required the population's consent that his persecution had been legitimate. When such consent was withheld, the public condemnation was instead of Alva, the persecutor.¹³¹ The satirical songs and prints that were published as a reaction to Alva's statue suggest that from a proportion of the population, consent to the persecution was anything but forthcoming. Instead of a commemoration to a proud achievement, the statue became a symbol of Alva's continued oppression.¹³²

People's failure to identify with the regime's cause is not so surprising when we consider that the part of the 'good cop, bad cop' strategy that was intended to generate precisely such sympathies – Philip's personal visit – never actually took place.¹³³ The population was therefore never given the kind of magnanimous closure after a spate of horrible persecution and punishment that the king's visit had been intended to effect. Philip's continued absence represented a serious flaw. First, his intended journey had been publicly advertised, and so the regime itself had encouraged popular expectation. Already in early July 1567, local authorities were requested to organise public prayers for Philip's safe return to the Low Countries.¹³⁴ Indeed, in the same year a special medal was even issued where the inscriptions served to advertise both Philip's expected arrival from Spain (PHILIPP[O] R[EGE], P[ATRE] P[ATRIÆ] EX HISPA[NIA] EXPECT[ATO] – King Philip, father of the country, expected from Spain) and the strategy of royal clemency (COMITE CLEMENTIA – accompanied by clemency).¹³⁵

Secondly, people appear to have viewed his arrival as nothing less than a panacea which could put a final end to the conflict, both as early as 1567 and also later in the Revolt. Shortly after Alva's arrival, calls for Philip's presence were being made, and Count Pierre-Ernest Mansfeld,



The statue of Alva that was erected in Antwerp was intended to symbolically illustrate Alva's struggle against heresy and his ultimate victory. Philippe Galle, *Statue of the Duke of Alva*

governor of Luxembourg, wrote directly to Philip asking him to come north. Mansfeld reckoned that only the king's presence could ensure a stable restoration of order.¹³⁶ Such hopes proved to be long-lived and were expressed throughout Alva's governorship, only to be superseded by calls for a governor of royal blood once it became clear that Philip himself would be staying put in Spain.¹³⁷ Given the long-running expectations of the king's arrival, it seems the regime's chance to put an end to the Revolt was quickly lost the moment Philip decided not to come.¹³⁸

This argument is strengthened when we consider Orange's reliance on the 'evil advisor' rhetoric in justifying his own opposition to both Alva and later royal governors. The argument was that Orange was not a rebel at all, but had taken up arms for the defence of king and country against the evil machinations of counsellors like Alva (the Inquisition also enjoyed a prominent place in this argument), who were seeking the country's ruin without Philip's knowledge or consent. Although royal proclamations did assert that Alva's policies had Philip's backing, so long as the king remained in Spain and Alva was pursuing unpopular policies on his behalf, Orange's argument could not be proven false conclusively. It is tempting to speculate that Orange would have been more effectively discredited as a rebel had Philip gone to the Low Countries in person and publicly sided with Alva.

Quite apart from Philip's failure to come to the Low Countries, however, the 'good cop, bad cop' strategy also contained a more fundamental flaw. Even if Philip had gone north, the strategy still relied on promoting a black-and-white understanding of events that appears not to have been shared by a significant proportion of the native population.¹³⁹ Instead, many were able to see both sides of the situation and felt uneasy about the events and punishments they witnessed. For example, in May 1569 Alva had an edict proclaimed ordering all those who died without receiving the last sacrament to be refused burial in consecrated ground and instead be buried 'at the public place intended for the law', in other words, the resting place of the condemned.¹⁴⁰ The order caused disturbances among the next of kin who found the order unacceptable. As the disturbances were common knowledge, it must be safe to assume that the relatives were Catholic; otherwise they would presumably have kept quiet about their anger. Here, then, was a case of the regime identifying a group of people as 'heretics and sacrament breakers', in the words of Van Campene, when their friends and relatives refused to label them as such despite what may have been more or less conscious refusals to receive the last rites.¹⁴¹

What further undermined the regime's image from the outset was the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the repeated claims that only the 'autheurs' of the troubles would be punished and, on the other, the identity of those that were actually condemned. Although edict after edict proclaimed Philip's concern for the 'simple people' and the desire only to punish those who had instigated the events of 1566, such claimed intentions were continuously belied, as most of those convicted did in fact belong to the very 'simple people' that Philip proclaimed he wanted to protect.¹⁴² Soldoyer noted that the list of summonses published for Tournai by the Council of Troubles counted 499 people, 'as many men as women, as many sons as daughters'. The sheer number of people made it clear that not all of them could be rebel leaders. But, although it caused much trouble for local commerce, Soldoyer, as the only diarist to do so, nevertheless expressed the thought that their punishment was necessary in order to root out the tares.¹⁴³

Philip van Campene took an altogether different view, possibly because one of his brothers was also indicted. From his diary we can follow the process of how the different summonses were proclaimed and how people turned themselves in, believing in their own innocence or at least in the insignificance of their crime. In doing so, they were acting in accordance with the proclamation of early July 1567, which had advertised Philip's arrival and his merciful intentions.¹⁴⁴ Most of these people, however, met with no clemency at all and were instead executed. Van Campene's account gives details of a situation that must have been both heart-wrenching and shocking to those involved. Many of the condemned had initially gone into hiding and come back only at the instigation of their families' 'fair words' possibly, one may speculate, because they trusted in the restraint the edicts advertised and wanted to prevent the confiscation of their property, which would leave their families destitute.¹⁴⁵

Van Campene noted the despair of the condemned's families and friends, especially of those who had worked to make them appear before the Council in order to come clean. They had been moved by the 'fair words' of the placards which promised clemency, but were ultimately disappointed. 'They are lucky, those that have not appeared', Van Campene noted, as there would have been no mercy for them either.¹⁴⁶ Van Campene's insistence on the importance of the regime's 'fair words' (he mentioned them twice) in getting people to come forward, coupled with the statement that those who remained in hiding had done well to do so, brings home how powerful the regime's promise of clemency had been and also how rude the disappointment was when it was not delivered on.

The proclamation of the general pardon in July 1570 was another such instance when the regime's self-presentation appeared not to match its policies on the ground. Although a pardon had been called for regularly since the arrival of Alva, he had postponed it in order to first complete the punishment process.¹⁴⁷ When it finally was proclaimed, much of the sympathy and devotion it was meant to inspire was instead lost to suspicions that it was a trick. Godevaert van Haecht, a Lutheran living in Antwerp, reckoned it was the Inquisition's idea to lure people to come forward. Others, he reported, saw the red cloth draped over the podium where the pardon was proclaimed as a warning: it was 'blood red' and the pardon itself would be too.¹⁴⁸ In view of Van Campene's account of what happened to people who believed in the regime's promises, such rumours probably appeared more than plausible.

Although suspicions about the pardon may have been most prevalent among people with Protestant sympathies (certainly all the diarists who gave negative personal opinions belonged to this category), Catholics were far from overly enthusiastic, either. Thus, the French ambassador to Brussels, present in Antwerp at the proclamation of the pardon, reported the generally cold reception it received, while both the nun in 's-Hertogenbosch and Van Campene dwelt on the many exclusions.¹⁴⁹

Moreover, the pardon itself did have features that served to nourish doubts about its credibility. First of all, whole categories of people were excluded from it, including anyone who had participated in the *Beeldenstorm* as well as all those currently in detention awaiting execution for their crimes in 1566.¹⁵⁰ For them there would be no hope of reconciling, as it was explicitly stated

that they could not appeal against their sentence. This contradicted a claim that was also made in the pardon, namely that it was intended for the benefit of the many simple people who had been tricked into heresy or rebellion.¹⁵¹ Secondly, the text of the pardon presented a view of events that did not tally with popular impressions. Like so many edicts, the pardon proclaimed that Philip had only sought to prosecute 'some principal chiefs' and 'some others who have offended enormously', and that he had had every reason to be even more rigorous should he have wanted to.¹⁵² Nevertheless it was ordinary, simple people who were the victims of most of the death sentences pronounced by the Council of Troubles, and it is therefore easy to see why a proportion of the audience remained sceptical about the pardon and the regime's sincerity.

The sermon given by François Richardot, Bishop of Arras, on the occasion of the pardon may also have had a hollow ring to it when heard or read (it was published in print) with this background in mind. Its praise of Philip's clemency and the need to sometimes punish less rather than more out of respect for the innocent cannot have sounded convincing when so many more than the rebel leaders were punished with death, banishment and confiscation, and those that were not still had to deal with the presence of foreign troops.¹⁵³

Indeed, in direct contrast to both the pardon itself, which wanted to impose 'perpetual silence' on the crimes of 1566, and Richardot's sermon, which suggested that there would now be a change from rigorous justice to clemency, the pardon was followed by a continued enforcement of the heresy placards.¹⁵⁴ The pardon, then, became nothing more than a small pause in a long-term process of harsh repression of heresy and rebellion, not the beginning of a new era when sovereign and subjects would be reconciled once and for all. In fact, already a week before the pardon, a new code of criminal justice had been issued, stipulating that the Caroline heresy legislation was to be enforced without any moderation. Ten days after the pardon had been proclaimed, Alva also issued a new heresy edict.¹⁵⁵ Anyone who thought the pardon might be a sign that the regime was reconsidering its policy of repression would not remain under that illusion for long.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, in Valenciennes the proclamation of the pardon was followed immediately by another proclamation, this time that all the goods belonging to those still in exile that had not yet been confiscated would be so forthwith.¹⁵⁷ In Utrecht, the day after the pardon had been proclaimed, a man was hanged for having returned to the province despite having been banished by the Council of Troubles. The heresy placards were also proclaimed again on Alva's orders.¹⁵⁸

Even so, the pardon did succeed in satisfying some people. Soldoyer, perhaps the most ardent of the Catholic diary writers, was happy with the pardon and ended his account of the celebrations by expressing his gratitude that 'mutiny and brigandage' had now finally come to an end.¹⁵⁹ Jan van den Viver, a Catholic in Ghent, noted that the church bells were tolling out of joy ('*blijtschap*'), as did an anonymous diarist from Utrecht.¹⁶⁰ The pardon certainly was publicly celebrated, and most importantly, people did also come forward to be reconciled: in Antwerp alone, as many as 14,128 people benefitted from the pardon.¹⁶¹ But total numbers were nevertheless disappointing, and on 6 September 1570 Alva ordered bishops to make sure their clergy further intensified their work to encourage people to reconcile.¹⁶² It seems, then, that the pardon was welcomed by a considerable number of people, but that the various discrepancies it

contained meant that it could not become the kind of large-scale public-relations event that had originally been envisaged for Philip's return. In fact, in some ways the pardon sounded the death knell for the 'good cop' part of the original strategy: on 9 August 1570, less than a month after the proclamation, Alva wrote to Philip that his return to the Low Countries was no longer necessary, and that once the three-month term for reconciliation had passed he would proceed rigorously against those who had failed to take up the offer.¹⁶³

Alva's rigor was yet another reason preventing people from fully identifying with the regime's approach to the conflict. The strict application and even the sheer cruelty of some of the punishment that was meted out offended people's notions of justice, regardless of religious affiliation.¹⁶⁴ Even Soldoyer, a regular at executions and not given to recording sympathy for the victims, described how one Léon Leblon was executed particularly 'cruelly'. Leblon had apparently said he thought he could stomach the fire as he had tried putting his feet on the fire to see what it felt like (!). He was therefore condemned to have his hands and feet burned in a red-hot waffle iron ('fer à gauffre tout rouge'). Afterwards his arms and legs were tied with an iron chain and he was lowered into a great fire and held there until dead.¹⁶⁵ Although Soldoyer saw the punitive process as a whole to be necessary, his admission that Leblon died 'cruelly' suggests he was not beyond feeling pity for those who were targeted. Van Campene who, as we saw above, expressed pity for all those who, in good faith, had turned themselves in and ended up being killed, also made notes of particularly cruel forms of punishment. When a Spanish soldier was killed by the '*stroppe de corde*', a method whereby the victim was raised high up and then let fall to hit the ground several times until dead, he commented that in this case it had not been done in the same merciless ('*onghenadelicken*') way as when the method was used on locals.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, he reported that upon the execution of a man by fire in Antwerp, some of the spectators ran away because they could not bear to listen to his horrible screams.¹⁶⁷

Although it has been emphasised that the bloodthirstiness of the Council of Troubles has been much exaggerated (no more than roughly ten percent of the known condemnations resulted in an execution), the rigorous application of the death sentence was new.¹⁶⁸ In theory, the death penalty had been the only punishment available to heretics since 1540, but the courts had used considerable leniency. Now it was imposed across the board, and although the ten percent rate may not appear too horrendous, the available registers suggest there would have been a near 100 percent application of the death penalty if people had not fled before they were summoned, as only a handful of those who did appear before the Council were acquitted or sentenced to another punishment than death.¹⁶⁹

Alva's cruelty was only one way in which his punitive mission offended traditional notions of justice. Although the pardon reached out to individuals, there was no intention of reversing the attack the duke had launched on local institutions and practices of governance and justice. The Council of Troubles remained in place, and towns whose privileges had been revoked did not get them back.¹⁷⁰ Confiscations also remained a bone of contention, as is indicated by the Lille magistracy's persistent efforts to regain its right not to impose this form of punishment.¹⁷¹

But what became the biggest grievance was the presence of the Spanish army.¹⁷² Although

only a minority of people had been actively involved in the iconoclasm and rebellion of 1566, Alva's decision to billet his troops with civilians even in towns that had remained loyal meant that good Catholics who saw the need to punish heretics, rebels and iconoclasts as legitimate ended up suffering too, even though they had done nothing wrong.¹⁷³ In fact, absolutely all diarists, regardless of their own religious affiliation, at one point or another testified to the troops' unpopularity and the problems they caused for the local population. Within a month of their arrival in Ghent, for example, one Spanish soldier was hanged for stealing. It even became necessary to set up a board of mediators, with representatives from both the garrison and the citizenry, to handle disputes.¹⁷⁴ In Tournai, tensions rose to such a level that both citizens and soldiers resorted to vigilante attacks.¹⁷⁵ Even in Lille, where the authorities had been unusually supportive of the strict heresy legislation and where no iconoclasm or rebellion had taken place in 1566, tensions ran so high that one man was killed by the troops.¹⁷⁶ And the resentment was not confined to ordinary people: even Margaret of Parma's own confessor claimed, within days of the troops' arrival in Brussels, that the Spaniards were all traitors, thugs and rapists.¹⁷⁷

In fact, the long-term deployment of the troops created a whole new set of problems which Alva had not come prepared for, and which undermined the success of his mission. The original plan had envisaged armed support for Alva's mission to restore order, which had been successful, but there had been no plans for long-term, heavy mobilisation. The extensive persecution Alva undertook and Orange's invasion attempt in 1568 made it clear that the operation would last longer and require more troops than at first expected. This meant that the billeting of now much higher numbers of troops would continue to remain a thorn in any civilian's eye and a burden on any city they found themselves in. Even worse, a way to pay them also had to be found. As less and less money was available from Spain, the army would have to be funded locally, through taxes.

Tax collection in the Low Countries was traditionally a lengthy business which required negotiations with the States General and generally some sort of payback in the form of redress of grievances. The tradition was also that provinces remained in charge of both the tax collection and the administration of the funds. Alva did not want to pursue this slow and frustrating game, and in 1569 he proposed three new taxes: the Hundredth Penny as a one-off income tax, and the Tenth and Twentieth Penny as permanent sales taxes on movable and immovable goods, respectively. Permanent taxation was a novelty in the Low Countries, and although the Hundredth Penny was accepted by the States without problems, they resisted the Tenth and Twentieth Penny tooth and nail. In the end, Alva was only able to extract consent by interfering with the votes of the individual States, and even then he found it most prudent to replace the two new permanent taxes with a two-year tax.¹⁷⁸

When he re-introduced the taxes in 1571, he was met with continued resistance and refusal. In fact, the taxes were so unpopular that otherwise loyal magistrates refused to publish the taxation edicts, collectors were not appointed and those that were came up with all kinds of excuses not to be sworn in, including bad health, not knowing how to read or write, not understanding book-keeping, and having no friends or family who could vouch for their good

conduct.¹⁷⁹ In Brussels, shop-owners went on strike to avoid paying up. After all, no tax could be collected if no sales took place.¹⁸⁰

There were also several instances of clergy preaching against involvement with the tax collection, and even withholding absolution from anyone who was thus involved.¹⁸¹ The most striking case was from Kortrijk, where Jacob Tsantele, a local priest, preached openly against the Tenth Penny and refused absolution to the collectors and the members of the city magistracy on Christmas Eve in 1571. Alva ordered an enquiry and Tsantele was imprisoned but later released. With the help of the Bishop of Tournai, he was able to resume his work and continued to preach against the Tenth Penny, albeit more covertly this time.¹⁸²

It seems, then, that although there were serious flaws in the original 'good cop, bad cop' strategy, the actual duration of the operation, and the problems this caused, undermined its success still further. Whereas the executions, in theory at least, only hit those guilty of a criminal offence, the billeting of troops with civilians amounted to punishment for all. This made it difficult for the regime to capitalise on the potential for Catholic support, and the new taxes aggravated the situation even more. As Van Campene noted: the country was suffering from new taxes that had been 'extorted without the consent of the States of the country'.¹⁸³ In fact, Alva's harsh policies did ordinary Catholics a disservice. Because the regime had associated its punitive strategy so strongly with the defence of Catholicism, Catholics could be accused of supporting Alva's cruel tyranny simply because they were Catholic.¹⁸⁴ In 1569, for example, Alva was publicly celebrated as the defender of the faith, an honorary title bestowed by the pope.¹⁸⁵ If the pope thought Alva's policies were worthy of praise, Catholics would be, in theory at least, obliged to adopt the same view of affairs. But the persecution, the army and the taxes also damaged the regime's own chances of restoring its authority: the harsh policies only served to prove right the rebel charges of tyranny, and made the claim that Alva, the evil counsellor, had misled Philip all the more credible.

Conclusion

To conclude, then, in the wake of the spread of rebellion and overt heretical worship in 1566, the regime opted for a two-pronged response: a punitive mission led by Alva to be followed by a visit from Philip II during which he would play the clemency card and magnanimously allow his subjects to make their peace with him. This policy explains not just Alva's harsh repression, but also the regime's communication tactics. Although the strategy relied fundamentally on image formation in that repression followed by clemency would establish Philip as a principled, just and ultimately benign ruler, it did not involve attempts to argue for that position. Instead, it pursued the traditional practice of attempting to quell unrest through punishment, which reminded the public of what the regime regarded as right and wrong, while seeking to instil fear and teach by deterrents. In addition, the regime relied on non-argumentative media, such as edicts, to present its interpretation of the conflict. The continued reliance on the ever stricter censorship legislation to deal with rebel pamphleteering makes it clear that the regime was highly aware that public

debate continued and that critical views circulated, but also that Habsburg policy was about the enforcement of unquestioning obedience, not efforts to convince people that this was what would be best for them.

The one argument the regime did rely on to defend its role and policies was that taken from St Paul's letter to the Romans, chapter 13. St Paul's insistence on obedience to worldly authorities and their divinely ordained power was a message that the regime propagated through different media. It was alluded to in edicts, and made very clear in both ceremonial and engravings, although the latter may have been made without the regime's involvement. Surviving diaries make it clear that references to Romans 13 would have been met with understanding by ordinary people, and also that many both understood and took on board what the regime was telling them through proclamations and ceremonial.

The regime, then, certainly enjoyed a constant presence on the public scene, but this was not enough to quell criticism or convert people to undying devotion. The regime's insistence that leniency in religious matters was unacceptable and that local privileges could be disregarded at will quite simply failed to meet with widespread sympathy among members of the public. The discrepancies between the discourse of clemency promoted by the regime on the one hand, and the continuing persecution, army billeting and enforced taxation on the other, all of which deeply offended traditional notions of justice, were also far too obvious and hit far too many people who had not taken part in either heretical worship, iconoclasm or armed rebellion. Moreover, Philip's failure to come north meant that the intended image formation – the part of the strategy that was to win hearts and minds – could not go according to plan. Indeed, instead of winning support for the Habsburg cause, the repression pushed through by Alva played straight into rebel hands. Their presentation of themselves as the true defenders of the fatherland and traditional freedom became all the more appealing and all the more trustworthy the worse Alva's repression became.

The historiography has pointed to an alleged absence of the regime from the scene of public communication and seen this as a major problem in the propaganda warfare of the Revolt. But this is to bark up the wrong tree. The regime and its messages enjoyed continual, widespread and visible presence in the public arena through several non-argumentative media. The problem was rather that the message did not appeal. Although edicts and ceremonial were in many ways ideal media in that their reach was unparalleled, they were also mere accoutrements to Alva's continued 'bad cop' policies that spoke far louder than any of his fair words.

From Rebellion to War, 1572-1576

On 1 April 1572, the rebellion that Alva had been working to crush changed into a war. On this day the so-called Sea Beggars, rebel privateers operating under the nominal authority of William of Orange, seized the little port town of Brill in Southern Holland. After having been expelled from their refuge in English Channel ports a month previously, they needed to stock up on supplies, but rather than limiting themselves to some plunder they decided to take full control of the whole town. Brill was a small place and the Sea Beggars did not possess large forces, but their capture nevertheless triggered something of a chain reaction. Suddenly, neighbouring towns were forced to make a choice between getting a royal garrison or relying on the local militia for defence against the Sea Beggars. On the whole, town magistrates were keen to stay loyal, but admitting Spanish troops into the town was a very high price to have to pay. They had already had their authority severely undermined by their more or less forced acceptance of the Tenth Penny, and the unpleasant prospect of a garrison proved such a 'deal-breaker' that they were easily out-maneuvred by local supporters of the Sea Beggars, especially when these included members of the militia. In several cases, locals appealed directly to the rebel pirates for assistance and even invited them to take control. Although most towns could probably have fought off the small Beggar forces had the will to do so been there, by the end of July the majority of towns in Holland and Zeeland, with the significant exceptions of Amsterdam and Middelburg, were in rebel hands.¹

Although the Sea Beggars' hold on their newly won territory was far from assured, their position was strengthened by the rebel leadership's decision to kick off their intended second invasion attempt from the east and the south. On 24 May, Louis of Nassau, who had been working to secure French support for an invasion, captured Mons, and by the end of July Count van den Bergh, Orange's brother-in-law, managed to capture Gelderland and much of Overijssel, Drenthe and Friesland.² Although the rebel gains north of the rivers were substantial, for the regime the threat of a French-backed invasion, which had been expected but whose magnitude remained unknown, was more frightening still. To make matters worse, Alva had only about 13,000 men left at his disposal, and these had long been unpaid and were dispersed in a number of garrisons around the country. He did not have enough troops or money to fight on more than one front and, while he increased the number of troops to 67,000 over the summer on his own initiative, he decided to concentrate his forces in the south to block any invasion from France.³

In the event, the French invasion force was small and quickly butchered to pieces before it could reach Mons. Further French support in the form of Huguenot soldiers was ruled out by the

St Bartholomew's massacre in August, and the relief force led by Orange, who had invaded Brabant, was forced to withdraw further north. Although September saw the rebels having to give up Mons and any control of the Southern provinces, they were able to hold on to their foothold north of the rivers, and it was here that military efforts would now be focused.

The capture of Brill marked the end of the success that Alva had enjoyed against the rebels of 1566 and against Orange's invasion of 1568. Although his punitive measures had failed to kindle active support for the regime, they had successfully stamped out open religious deviance and armed resistance, even though continued efforts to impose the Tenth Penny were provoking disobedience. The rebel invasions and their gain of a territorial base within the Low Countries, however, meant that the focus had to shift from matters of internal government – largely tax collection and continued action against heresy – to outright warfare.

Terror

The shift from a domestic rebellion to an actual war situation affected the very ability of the regime to communicate with the public. As we saw in the previous chapter, Alva had relied extensively on the traditional channels of proclamations and ceremonial, both of which were media that depended on territorial control and the active cooperation of local authorities. These essential preconditions were lost as the rebels gained control of territory, and with them went the regime's ability to communicate directly with its subjects in the occupied territories.

This does not mean that edicts were no longer issued, even though their number fell drastically compared to the heyday of 1567.⁴ The regime continued to address problems (including those related to the renewed conflict) through edicts, but the measures they contained were now only aimed at the population in the loyal territories. Unlike the situation prior to the rebel invasions of 1572, when the regime had repeatedly issued orders aimed directly at people guilty of heresy and rebellion, such as calls for named suspects to turn themselves in, they were now limited to banning contact and communication between the remaining loyal population and those that had declared their sympathy for the rebels, a situation that continued through the governorship of Requesens.⁵ In fact, between the rebel attack on Brill on 1 April 1572 and the death of Requesens on 5 March 1576, at least thirteen edicts banning contact, communication and trade with the rebels were issued, thus making this by far the most frequent way of addressing the conflict through edicts.⁶ But, unlike those issued against heresy and domestic rebellion, these edicts contained no elaboration on the regime's views of the situation, nor a flattering presentation of the king's benign intentions.

Argumentative pamphlets, which did not depend on the consent of local authorities for their dissemination, could have conveyed a persuasive presentation of the regime's position in the conflict within both rebel and loyal territory. After the Sea Beggars' conquests there would also have been plenty of abuses to pin on the rebel forces: they had, despite Orange's insistence on the need for religious toleration, banned Catholic worship, chased away and even tortured and killed priests, monks and lay people. Church ornaments and property had also been confiscated to help

pay for the war effort.⁷ The regime must have been aware of the potential of such propaganda, for in July 1572 Alva reported to Philip that the pamphlet the king had asked for had been published. It had been written 'to disabuse the people' in four different languages, and had been published anonymously so that its provenance could not be detected.⁸ Although no copy appears to have survived, from Alva's description it seems the pamphlet described the crimes committed by the rebels in Zutphen and their killings of monks and plundering of churches. In early September, Philip forwarded Alva copies of some of Orange's pamphlets and ordered him to distribute their own pamphlet, presumably the one already mentioned, in different languages. In addition, Joachim Hopperus, keeper of the seal in Madrid, had written one against Orange, which Philip also enclosed for Alva to make use of as he saw fit.⁹ Again, no copy appears to survive and it is not known whether Hopperus' contribution ever reached the press.

There are indications that pamphlets spreading news of the rebel atrocities could have had some effect in reinforcing people's loyalty to the regime. Although the royal army's abusive behaviour caused outrage, in Vicar-General Maximilian Morillon's opinion at least, the religious division meant that Catholic support was nevertheless still forthcoming.¹⁰ Wouter Jacobsz, a monk from Gouda living in exile in the still loyal Amsterdam, was appalled by the rebels' treatment of Catholics and especially the murders of clergymen.¹¹ Also, both he and Jan de Pottre, a Catholic diarist in Brussels, noted with sadness how rebel troops robbed peasants and set fire to villages, so the less sympathetic side of the rebels was becoming well known.¹² Conversely, when Mons fell in September 1572, a celebratory procession was organised in Amsterdam, and Wouter Jacobsz even wrote a heartfelt prayer of thanks to God in his diary.¹³ Similarly, when Haarlem surrendered to the royal army in July 1573, the citizens of Utrecht burned an effigy of William of Orange as part of the public celebrations of the victory.¹⁴

But although propaganda targeting the less sympathetic side of rebel rule could have been effective, and at least one anti-rebel pamphlet along these lines was published, Alva was not interested in mounting any kind of sustained pamphleteering campaign. Instead, he continued the strategy of teaching by deterrents. In dealing with the aftermath of 1566, his focus had been on persecution and prosecution; with the onset of war, the punitive measures changed, with sacks and massacres taking the place of persecution. In mid-September, Mons surrendered on very generous terms which were granted in order to avoid a prolonged siege. With the southern border provinces safely back under royal control, Alva was able to turn his army northwards to reconquer the rebel areas while chasing Orange's invasion force ahead of him. The first stop was Mechelen, where Orange's forces had been let in during the summer. Upon hearing the news that Alva was on his way, the Orangist garrison fled and left the town defenceless. Alva then allowed his forces to sack the city, even though he had been met with no resistance.¹⁵ While the sack was still going on, he wrote to Philip that the troops were inflicting the punishment that God had obviously intended for the inhabitants, as their previous chastisement had been insufficient. The sack would also set a highly necessary example to all the other cities that remained outside royal control, and which it would be far too much trouble to besiege individually.¹⁶

After Mechelen had been plundered and its privileges revoked, the army proceeded northwards to Gelderland, where the town of Zutphen was given much the same treatment.

Bed-ridden with gout, Alva left the operation to the command of his son, Don Fadrique, who was ordered to set parts of the town on fire and to not leave a single man alive. Again, the idea was to set an example: Alva remembered how, years ago, the fire at Duren had made the whole of Gelderland surrender to Charles V.¹⁷ Just over a month later, the same fate befell the small town of Naarden, where hardly a single inhabitant survived. In this case, Alva reported to Philip that the operation had been carried out with the permission of God. Once again, Alva expressed his happiness that they had been able to set such a great example.¹⁸ And the strategy seemed to work: Oudenaarde, Dendermonde, Leuven, Diest and Tongeren all sent delegates to surrender even as the sack of Mechelen was still going on, and after the sack of Zutphen, several towns in Gelderland and Overijssel did the same.¹⁹

The sack of Mechelen was the one single occasion when Alva is known to have commissioned a pamphlet on his own initiative, and it has been suggested that this was to counter the outcry caused by letting the troops loose on the town.²⁰ This, however, does not tally well with either the chronology of events or the publication circumstances. The sack took place from 2 to 4 October. Alva's statement was written and dated on the fourth; the order to have it printed was dispatched by his secretary Bertin on the fifth.²¹ The commission, together with Alva's statement in both French and Dutch, was received at Plantin's workshop in Antwerp at 9 o'clock in the morning of the fifth, and the requested broadsheets were delivered to Alva's contact at 4 o'clock that same afternoon.²² Although the sack certainly caused much consternation (Bishop Sonnius even sold his own silverware to aid the victims) and the news of it spread so fast that nearby towns had the time to send envoys to ask for mercy before it was even finished, there is no evidence that the statement was composed in order to calm people down.²³ The Duke of Medinaceli, who had been sent north to succeed Alva at an unspecified time in the future and who was accompanying Alva on his campaign, is known to have disagreed with the sack and later to have strongly criticised Alva for it during a meeting of the Council. It is, however, far-fetched to suggest that the statement was printed to counter Medinaceli's protests. These had not been made public and Alva had never before issued a public defence against criticism, even though he had certainly received his fair share of protest over the Tenth Penny.²⁴ To try to calm people down would also completely have defied his purpose, as repeatedly expressed in his letters to Philip, of frightening people into obedience. This tactic could, after all, only be effective if rebel towns thought the same could happen to them.

Although the title of the broadsheet, *Declaration des ivstes causes du saccagement de la ville de Malines* in French and *Vercleringe der rechtverdiger saecken vande plunderinge geschiet der stadt van Mechelen* in Dutch, suggested that it was a justification, it actually seems more likely that Alva intended the statement as a threat or as a way of amplifying the horror caused by the sack. The broadsheet was mostly taken up with an account of Mechelen's welcome of Orange and their refusal to admit a royal garrison, but the last sentence left little doubt about Alva's motives: 'Beyond this pillaging it will be proceeded against the same [the town of Mechelen] with all rigor, and this will also happen to and be done against all other rebel towns who can expect the arrival of His Majesty's army.'²⁵ Far from an attempt to calm people's fears, then, the broadsheet instead served to increase them.

Moreover, the publication circumstances suggest Alva had special plans for the broadsheet's distribution. First, Moretus' reply letter (Plantin was away and his son-in-law had been left in charge of the business) makes it clear that the number of pamphlets asked for was exceptionally small. Bertin had requested 'about 200 copies mostly in Dutch', and Moretus had produced 150 in Dutch and 100 in French.²⁶ The printer stressed that it was rare for such a small number to be requested and that they were therefore asking for their standard fee as they would not otherwise cover their costs.²⁷ Unlike edicts and other official statements, then, the point of this one was not widespread publication. Although Alva routinely relied on the long-established tradition of ensuring the widest possible dissemination of his message through edicts, this time he appears to deliberately have avoided it.

Second, the publication pattern was different from that of normal announcements emanating from the regime. These would normally first be announced in letter form and sent to provincial authorities, who would then take steps to have it proclaimed and printed.²⁸ Thus it was that Jan van der Steene, a printer in Ghent, enjoyed the lucrative privilege of printing edicts for the Council of Flanders, whereas the Brussels-based Michel de Hamont would print those from the Council of Brabant. Alva's statement after the sack of Mechelen, however, was not sent to local authorities for proclamation at all. Instead, a small number of printed copies was commissioned directly and all of these were returned to Alva himself who was, in other words, left in personal charge of their distribution. The request to have most of the copies in Dutch suggests that Alva's intention may have been to distribute his statement in order for them to reach the towns he wanted to surrender, all of which were in Dutch-language territory, and which would have been too much hassle to capture individually. This scenario fits the hopes he had outlined to Philip, namely, to achieve the greatest degree of reconquest by means of a few examples of applied terror.²⁹

The argument that the broadsheet was meant as a threat to be distributed selectively is strengthened when we consider the nature of the surviving copies. Leaving aside the French version, the Dutch statement survives in two different editions.³⁰ One is the edition produced anonymously by Plantin, but another Dutch-language edition, again anonymous, was also printed. This second edition has different spelling and the broadsheet contains a header that does not feature in the Plantin edition. This header is an extract from a letter from the Count of Bossu, the royalist governor of Holland and Zeeland, presumably to a local magistracy of a still-loyal town, although it is not clear exactly who the recipient was.³¹ Bossu was requesting that a copy of Alva's statement be distributed to 'some of your neighbours' for their information, something that evidently happened, as this second edition was clearly produced in order to comply with Bossu's request.³² It appears, then, that Alva had forwarded his statement to Bossu in order for the latter to ensure its distribution within his provinces, most of which were in rebel hands. The pamphlet must, in other words, have been intended to frighten towns into submission, not to provide excuses for a 'mistaken' massacre.



Alva's warning to rebel towns after the sack of Mechelen survives in these two different editions. Top: *Vercleringe der rechtverdiger saeken vande plunderinge gheschiet der stadt van Mechelen* (Christophe Plantin, Antwerp, 1572); Bottom: *Vercleringe der rechtverdige saeken vande plunderinge gheschiet der stadt Mechelen* (s.l., 1572)

Backlash

Although the terror strategy gave fast results to begin with, as a way of communicating the regime's demand for obedience it did not remain successful for long. Indeed, the campaign to recapture cities and make example cases of them cost so much that the royal army and its finances were severely strained by the effort.³³ Moreover, as frequently noted in both the historiography and in Dutch national legend, Alva's terror convinced rebel towns that their only hope was to resist to the last man, as any surrender, at whatever stage and on whatever terms, would condemn them to certain death.³⁴ Even though eyewitness accounts differ when it comes to whether the royal army deliberately broke guarantees of clemency, the belief that this was their habit was by far the most prevalent and was spread further through rebel songs.³⁵ Significantly in this context, the only pro-regime broadsheet to be published about the fate of Mechelen was an attack on the men who had let the rebels in, not a defence of the sack. The massacre was only alluded to in the statement that the treason of these rebel sympathizers would provoke royal punishment for generations to come.³⁶

The terror did not, predictably, serve to either generate sympathy for or reinforce loyalty to the regime. Even Martin del Rio, born in Antwerp of Spanish descent and a firm supporter of Spanish rule, noted the hatred the sacks had provoked, but defended them as the result of bad advice given to Alva.³⁷ But Del Rio was not typical: judging from the sympathy Jan de Pottre expressed for the victims of the royal army's massacres, he did not see their butchery as justified in any way.³⁸ The nun from 's-Hertogenbosch greatly lamented the sack of Mechelen too, saying that the soldiers had gone so far as to pull off the clothes of men, women, children and clergymen and even robbed women of their rings by cutting their entire fingers off.³⁹ Vicar-General Morillon was also horrified and suggested there had been greater effort spent in harming good subjects than in looking for real enemies. He also wondered what use it was to the king to have his towns ruined.⁴⁰

Popular resentment against the troops was nothing new. Far more serious to Alva was the growing criticism coming from the loyal elite. Both local authorities and the clergy had begun to raise their voices over the Tenth Penny, and several provinces, such as Brabant, Hainaut, Artois and Walloon Flanders, sent envoys all the way to Madrid to make a direct appeal to the king.⁴¹ But Alva himself was becoming a target too: the Duke of Aerschot and the Lord of Champagney, Granvelle's younger brother, asked Philip to recall Alva and institute a policy of moderation and clemency, as did a number of theologians from Leuven University. Morillon also reported that the Brabantine envoys sent to Madrid to complain about the new taxes had also been charged with protesting against the burdens caused by the soldiery.⁴² The renowned jurist Elbertus Leoninus even contacted Alva directly to draw his attention to the unfortunate consequences of his harsh policies.⁴³ As noted by Henry Kamen, non-native advisors who had previously supported Alva's policies now also changed their tune: both Cardinal Granvelle (labelled a foreigner in the early 1560s despite being from the Franche-Comté), Benito Arias Montano and Friar Villavicencio, a Spanish monk who had previously called for military intervention against heresy, thought the duke's methods were self-defeating.⁴⁴

The clergy were among Alva's strongest critics. Unlike the nobles, they had objected fiercely to the Tenth Penny, and they were increasingly critical of the effects of both the new taxes and the strategy of terror on the status of the Catholic faith. The opposition of Granvelle, Montano and Villavicencio has already been noted, but members of the Jesuit order were also vocal in their criticism. Franciscus Costerus, a Jesuit preacher, wrote in early 1573 that unless Philip came to the rescue, it would be 'game over' for the religion and the fatherland, while adding that the situation could not be remedied unless Alva was replaced. Once Alva finally left in late 1573, Father Schipman, rector at Douai, called him the scourge (*fléau*) of the country and hailed his departure as a deliverance.⁴⁵ A point stressed by several leading clergymen, such as Vicar-General Morillon, the members of the theology faculty at Leuven as well as Costerus, and echoed by civilians, was that the continued ill treatment of good Catholics was counterproductive; it only served to alienate people from both church and regime.⁴⁶

Alva's unpopularity at all levels of society was shored up by extensive rebel propaganda in several different forms. Already prior to the massacres of 1572, prints, pamphlets and songs about his tyranny had circulated and their credibility increased as Alva proved himself to be still more awful than previously thought. Although the massacres at Mechelen, Zutphen and Naarden and the sieges of Haarlem and Leiden remained largely absent from both pamphlets and prints, these events were all the more frequent in popular songs.⁴⁷ The songs not only drew attention to the atrocities committed by the royal army, but also elaborated on Alva's alleged tendency to trick people into believing they would be receiving clemency, only to break the promise and opt for butchery instead. As one song had it: 'We have certainly heard of his mercy, / Already the poor citizens of Naarden / Who were so sadly killed: / Men, women, children, they beat them all to death'.⁴⁸ Another song pointed out how Catholics were not protected by their faith and how the people of Mechelen were killed 'as though they were cattle' even though they had willingly received the Spaniards unarmed. Similar accounts were given for Zutphen and Naarden.⁴⁹ Clearly, then, rebel propaganda echoed the complaints raised at all levels of society within the loyal provinces, and this common platform of discontent suggests just how alienating Alva's terror was. Conversely, it also indicates Orange's great potential to win support when he presented himself as the king's true servant and a saviour offering liberation from Alva's taxes and military tyranny.⁵⁰

A new course?

The complaints against Alva worked in the end. Already in June 1572, the Duke of Medinaceli had arrived as a governor-general to be. Philip had originally appointed him to be Alva's successor, but when the Sea Beggars attacked, the king was loath to let go of Alva's military expertise, and Medinaceli's take-over was put on hold. Although the extent of his authority remained unclear, councillors who were becoming disillusioned with Alva appear to have viewed him as a counter-balance and conveyed their criticism of Alva to him. Medinaceli was certainly much more of a moderate, and during the campaign of 1572 he and Alva clashed over the use of terror. Medinaceli's criticism was conveyed directly to Philip, who kept up a secret correspondence with

him, and he continued to act as a spokesman for the native political elite upon his return to Spain in 1573.⁵¹ Although his ultimate take-over as governor did not happen, the continued corrective he provided to Alva's version of events, supported by the numerous protests from further down the political food chain, helped convince Philip that a strategy of greater conciliation was necessary, especially as the pressure in the Mediterranean had escalated after Lepanto. Philip's allies – Venice and the papal states – had both proceeded to secure peace deals with the Ottomans, and Philip was now facing the Turkish threat alone. For this he needed more resources, and the Low Countries was the obvious place from which to divert them.⁵²

Indeed, even before Medinaceli had returned to Spain, Philip had appointed another successor to Alva, Luís de Requesens, up until then the Spanish governor of Milan. Although, as had been the case with Medinaceli, the extent of Requesens' authority remained uncertain until Alva's definite recall, and although Philip failed to provide him with comprehensive instructions, the appointment was intended to herald a shift in strategy. Terror had failed and, as Philip wrote to his new governor, he wanted him to end the war 'by moderation and clemency'.⁵³

The new strategy relied fundamentally on public communication, in that in order for it to be effective it would have to change the unpleasant image of the regime that Alva had left behind. Only by clearly distancing itself from the kinds of policies that Alva had pursued and which had so damaged the relationship between regime and subjects would the 'moderation and clemency' that Philip called for be credible, and only then would it produce results. But Philip does not appear to have conceived of his new strategy as anything more than political window-dressing. Because there could be no question of withdrawing from the military struggle to regain the rebel-held territories, the new approach was based on a basic contradiction: the war effort, and the burdens it imposed on the population, would continue unabated while at the same time the regime would try and present itself with a friendlier face.

How could this awkward policy be communicated? The failure of Alva's punitive measures had put the regime in a situation that had become difficult to get out of without losing face, and an open admission of reversal or twenty-first century style public apologies were quite simply not 'the done thing'. The tendency does, in fact, appear to have been the opposite. Both the general pardon of 1570 and the decision to modify the Tenth Penny into a Thirtieth Penny in early 1572 were presented as anything but reversals of previous policy. Instead they contained affirmations that the previous strategy had been a good one, the new leniency being simply an indication of the exceptional goodwill that both the king and the regime were capable of. In the case of the modified taxes, this also meant that, rather confusingly, the regime continued to stress its claim to the previous, unmodified tax.⁵⁴

In keeping with this tradition, Requesens' governorship and his ability to appeal to the public were marred by a tendency to condone Alva's policies, even though these had been unequivocally discredited in both Madrid and Brussels. Thus, although one of Philip's first instructions to Requesens was to have the much hated statue of Alva dismantled, this operation was carried out in secret and did not amount to any kind of public disavowal of the former governor.⁵⁵ Indeed, Godevaert van Haecht, an Antwerp citizen, simply reported that the statue had been removed so that it could be taken to Spain.⁵⁶

The general pardon that was proclaimed on 6 June 1574 embodied the contradictory aims that Requesens was pursuing. Although Philip had refused to go along with Pope Gregory XIII's suggestion that even Orange be offered forgiveness, the new pardon was undoubtedly far more generous than the first one. This time, only 296 named individuals were excluded rather than whole categories of people, and the new pardon also allowed for the restoration of confiscated property.⁵⁷ Requesens himself also took steps to ensure that the regime's clemency appear as great as possible and, after consulting the collateral councils, ordered that the full list of 296 names should not be publicised in its entirety. Instead, the excluded individuals would be named only within their own home province in order to make their number appear as small as possible.⁵⁸

Despite the greater generosity and wide dissemination of the new pardon through proclamation and print, it still failed to communicate a new beginning after Alva, which was what the original idea had been all about. This was because the actual text of the pardon was, again, just as much a defence of past royal policy as an offer to forgive and forget. The blame for the conflict was laid squarely on those subjects and vassals who had estranged themselves from the Catholic faith and forgotten the loyalty and obedience they owed their sovereign prince and natural lord.⁵⁹ Philip had done everything possible to prevent the conflict from erupting and escalating, but had in the end been forced to resort to arms even though this went against his 'natural inclination to clemency and piety'. He could not, however, allow himself to disregard the obligation he was under to administer justice and uphold the honour of God, and so he had had no choice but to charge his governor with the task of persecuting the rebels. In fact, given the atrocity and enormity of their crimes and the great number of people involved, justice had been done 'with great temperance, moderation and clemency'.⁶⁰

The new pardon, then, was just like the one issued by Alva: it offered clemency as a proof of exceptional benevolence while continuing to insist that the previous policies had been justified. The insistence that the regime had acted justly and with moderation did not tally well with the outcry provoked by Alva's massacres less than two years previously, nor with the criticism that this kind of punitive action amounted to large-scale punishment of rebel and loyalist, heretic and Catholic subjects alike.

The assurances of restraint and moderation must also have had a hollow ring in view of Requesens' recent failure to deal with a band of Spanish mutineers who had taken control of Antwerp. For over a month the troops had held the city to ransom and only agreed to leave the day after they had been handsomely paid. Requesens' impotence was remarked upon by contemporaries, such as the nun in 's-Hertogenbosch who noted that the payment that finally ensured the troops' departure was achieved only thanks to the contributions made by the citizens and magistrates of Antwerp.⁶¹ Van Haecht was angry that more German soldiers arrived just days after the mutineers had gone, even though Requesens had promised they would be spared.⁶² Morillon went so far as to claim that not even Orange had caused as much damage to the royal cause as the mutineers were doing, whereas Jan de Pottre reported rumours that the mutineers were acting with the support of Requesens himself.⁶³

In the event, the pardon failed to put up a credible and persuasive positive image of the re-

gime, and Requesens himself noted the lack of popular enthusiasm and how only small numbers of people came forward to reconcile.⁶⁴ Despite locally organised celebrations, many remained sceptical about the regime's intentions. Both Van Haecht and De Pottre noted that few took up the offer to reconcile, and that most simply did not trust the regime.⁶⁵ An anonymous chronicler recorded that Bishop Richardot, in his sermon to celebrate the proclamation of the pardon, had told his audience, which included Requesens, that things should be conducted honestly and without ruse, 'as though he foresaw some perverse design on the part of the lord commander [Requesens] and the councillors'.⁶⁶ The chronicler himself certainly thought so: he noted that the pardon was popularly regarded as a trap, whereby the 'poor refugees' would be lured into returning only for the authorities to catch them and 'treat them at their pleasure' as had happened in the past.⁶⁷

The pardon was also taken advantage of by rebel pamphleteers who sought to remind their readers that Requesens was really no different from Alva. The sinister intentions of the Spaniards remained the same; Requesens only had a different way of fulfilling them.⁶⁸ One pamphlet was based on a wordplay between the Latin '*pardon*' and Pandora, the woman who had released all the evils of mankind into the world. Despite having been warned, Epimetheus fell for her, and all those who accepted Requesens' pardon would prove to be the descendants of Epimetheus.⁶⁹ Similarly, a popular song first written about the pardon in 1570 and reissued in 1574 summed up the main accusation: 'We have no faith in your pardon, / Because it is all treachery'.⁷⁰

For those doubting the sincerity of the pardon, there was no other pro-regime or pro-pardon communication that might have gone some way to counter their suspicions. The proclamation of the pardon was accompanied by both sermons and processions through which, as media events involving public participation, a positive idea of the pardon could have been advocated to the public at large. But many remained unconvinced and, despite the regime's awareness of the cool reception, they were left to keep their discontent intact. Nothing was done beyond the standard censorship measures to counter the accusations in the rebel pamphlets that continued to circulate. In fact, a draft pamphlet in defence of the pardon and the regime, written by Hopperus, was prevented from even reaching the press.⁷¹

It was not just with regard to the pardon that the regime refused to engage in print. Although the rebels' treatment of Catholics had hardly improved since 1572, there was still no attempt on the part of the regime to take advantage of ordinary Catholics' disillusionment with their new rebel rulers. Discontent with rebel troops, who were also billeted with civilians, was rife among the population in the rebel areas, and in 1574 there had even been attempts by local citizens in Gouda, Delft and Dordrecht to hand their towns over to the royal army, but the regime did nothing to boost this kind of loyalty.⁷² Indeed, the first Catholic account in print of a large-scale rebel hunt for alleged traitors in North Holland in 1575 did not appear until 1587.⁷³

In fact, instead of portraying itself as a better ruler for the Catholic majority than the rebels, the regime managed to advertise loud and clear that it was out of touch with popular feeling. In March 1575, the first peace talks of the conflict were begun at Breda. Although the rebels had far-reaching religious demands, Orange instructed his envoys to begin by focusing only on

the call to have the royal army withdrawn and the States General summoned. These were calls the loyal States had made already a year earlier, and so the rebels could count on significant support for their demands from within the loyal provinces.⁷⁴ This shared platform of opposition to the army's presence was reflected in prints published in the loyal provinces, which portrayed precisely the army as being the main obstacle to the conclusion of a peace. Of course, prints of loyal provenance did not explicitly blame the regime's unwillingness to recall the troops. What they did do, however, was to stress how the desire for peace and the suffering caused by the war were shared by rebel and loyal provinces alike by always depicting personifications of all seventeen provinces, including Holland and Zeeland. Religious differences or the regime's attempts to bring the wicked rebels to reason were not portrayed at all.⁷⁵

The existence of a shared platform of resentment against the army was also advertised in pamphlet form. The rebel demand for the troops' removal was even published in Ghent, thus assuring that the war-weary population in the loyal provinces were made aware of how sympathetic the rebels really were.⁷⁶ Although the regime offered full withdrawal provided the rebels first made a full surrender, Orange's strategy was successful in highlighting the Habsburg unwillingness to take the first step towards peace. Thus, he effectively branded Requesens as having sinister intentions and as being no different from Alva, who had had plenty of such wickedness tucked up his sleeve. In this way Orange could also demonstrate that the responsibility for the breakdown of the talks lay with the regime, as both rebels and loyalists alike agreed that the Spanish troops must go.⁷⁷ Jan de Pottre certainly reported that people were saying the peace depended on the Spaniards' willingness to leave the country.⁷⁸ In fact, the support for the rebel demand appears to have been near universal within the loyal provinces, and not even Requesens' own negotiators supported the regime's intransigence. Members of the Council of State had even advised Requesens to agree to the withdrawal of the troops and the summoning of the States General, and some had suggested that a peace would be worth even the tacit permission of Protestant worship.⁷⁹

Requesens proved powerless to counter the rebel accusations. The regime's demands, and therefore also its intransigence, had been advertised in print too, effectively making it the 'odd one out' in a situation where the native population on both sides agreed. What was more, the continued reliance on censorship alone to counter rebel messages was unsuccessful. Although a censorship edict specifically aimed at pamphlets concerning the ongoing negotiations was issued, this could not be sufficiently enforced.⁸⁰ The failure to issue counter-arguments, then, meant that the rebel messages that continued to circulate were free to do so unopposed. In fact, as if to substantiate the accusations of sinister intentions, the royal army began a quickly aborted offensive in North Holland while the talks were still going on, with the intention of completely burning down the countryside. When it proved impossible to break through the rebel's Northern defences, an offensive was instead launched further south, where Oudewater was sacked and several small towns in Gelderland were captured.⁸¹

Catholic revival

Although Requesens was unable to either pursue or communicate a strategy noticeably different from Alva in the field of war politics, his activities in the religious sphere were markedly different. Alva's religious policy had by and large focused squarely on the repression of heresy, and little attention had been given to reviving Catholic worship and devotion after years of Reformed challenge. It is true that he had forced through the final implementation of the deeply unpopular new bishoprics, a scheme for ecclesiastical reorganisation intended partly to ensure better pastoral care in line with the Tridentine decrees. But the reform the new bishops were meant to implement was tainted by the widespread belief, strengthened by pamphleteering, that the scheme, which established inquisitors for each diocese, had been instigated by the Spanish Inquisition as a way of ruining the Low Countries.⁸² After the religious upheavals, there had been attempts to increase the laity's knowledge and understanding of the Catholic faith, as in Ghent, where different monks had begun giving catechism classes.⁸³ But such projects appear to have been undertaken largely at the initiative of individual clergymen. Indeed, Alva does not seem to have provided any encouragement or support, and instead actively pursued his dislike of the Jesuit order, which had the most systematic plans for the revival of Catholicism. Unlike other orders, the Jesuits were not exempted from the Hundredth Penny, and Alva even prevented them from buying a house in Antwerp.⁸⁴

Such behaviour changed with the arrival of Requesens. The new governor was probably influenced by Archbishop Borromeo, whose projects he had witnessed firsthand during his time as ambassador in Milan. Immediately upon arrival in the Low Countries he summoned Father Trigoso, the superior of the Jesuits in Antwerp. Requesens offered to intercede with Philip in order that Jesuit colleges be established in the main towns, and he kept his promise: in the course of 1575, Jesuit classes started up in Antwerp, Maastricht and Bruges.⁸⁵ What was more, Requesens also instituted Sunday schools in Antwerp and classes, all non-compulsory, started up in October 1575.⁸⁶

Requesens' initiatives provided the regime with an extended arena for public communication. Through organised religious teaching, large masses could be reached on a regular basis. By strengthening people's knowledge of and devotion to their faith, they would be better able to withstand heresy, but it remains difficult to judge to what extent political messages of loyalty to the regime were conveyed as part of the instruction. Certainly, Dutch and French translations of Peter Canisius' catechism from 1560, published in 1574 and 1575 respectively, suggest that religious teaching was specifically and explicitly targeted against heretical errors.⁸⁷ In explaining the creed, for example, Canisius had included a call for true Christians to avoid all heresy and to hate it no less than 'certain deadly plagues'.⁸⁸ Although there is no proof that this catechism was intended for use in Requesens' Sunday schools, we cannot exclude the possibility. If it was, then the focus would have remained on loyalty to the faith rather than to the regime. From the regime's point of view at least, these two went hand in hand, but ordinary believers may have seen the connection less clearly in light of the indiscriminate collective punishment provided by the continued war and army presence.

In addition to the catechism, one unique pamphlet from 1574 suggests not only that the ongoing conflict formed part of the topics the clergy discussed in their teaching, but also that at least some people were convinced that the regime remained the obvious choice for Catholics. This publication was actually part of a lottery, approved by Philip, to raise money for the rebuilding of the badly damaged St Jacob's Church in Antwerp.⁸⁹ The pamphlet itself functioned as a lottery ticket, with the ticket number written in ink inside a frame on the title page.⁹⁰ Inside was an anthology comprising the best of people's responses to the statement 'How necessary and advantageous the church is' – a sort of competition that had received the approval (approbation) of the censorship authorities.⁹¹ This pamphlet does, in other words, provide a window not only on what the clergy encouraged their congregations to reflect on, but also on some of the thoughts people had on these topics.

From the verses in the pamphlet it is clear that heresy and rebellion featured prominently in people's minds. Although the bulk of the responses concerned how to live a good Catholic life and issues such as poverty and interpersonal relations, there were also direct references to heresy and rebellion. One verse claimed that the church was the best means of obstructing the 'enemy', although it was not specified who this was.⁹² Another reminded the readers that one should be content with one's lot and that rebellion against God would always be futile, as His wisdom and strength could never be toppled. The futility of seeking change was illustrated by analogy: a chamber pot ('*pispot*') could never successfully reproach the potter for not having made it into a more honourable vessel.⁹³ There was also an explicit warning against political rebellion: God had, in His wisdom, instituted a ruling prince and whereas to remain in peace was praiseworthy, not to do so would bring 'awful / war, discord and desolation, / rebellion, wrath and great alteration'.⁹⁴ It was by trusting in God and living in peace that all discord would disappear.⁹⁵

People's dislike for the rebel cause and the Church's role in championing loyalty were also demonstrated in Amsterdam. Surrounded by rebels, Amsterdam remained steadfastly loyal until 1578. To pray for the end to the rebel threat, the sacrament was carried in procession up to three times a week, with people walking barefoot.⁹⁶ And the loyalty was genuine: Amsterdam remained loyal even without a royal garrison, and rebel soldiers who entered the city under cover were reported on by loyal townspeople and executed.⁹⁷

The Church certainly had the potential to increase the reach and frequency of pro-regime messages, and Requesens' Sunday school initiative must have contributed in the same vein. But even within the Catholic Church there was strong discontent with the regime. As Costerus reported in June 1574, the preachers who enjoyed the greatest audiences in Bruges were almost all hostile to the Spaniards and even to Requesens himself.⁹⁸ Here, the clergy were instead using their authority and the platform the Church provided to spread criticism of the regime, thus also quite possibly enhancing the appeal of the rebels in the process. Organising religious education, then, may have gone some way to foster greater support for the regime, but it could not be enough when the underlying causes of discontent and opposition remained.

Conclusion

The outbreak of war in the spring of 1572 had a profound effect on the regime's ability to communicate with a large proportion of its subjects. Proclamations and ceremonial depended on the active cooperation of local authorities and, as more and more cities sided with the rebels, these two media, which the regime had relied on so heavily, were gone. Edicts were still issued, but as they could only be proclaimed and enforced in the remaining loyal areas, their ability to convey the regime's messages to people in rebel territory was lost, a situation that neither Alva nor Requesens was able to remedy. Bar one seemingly no longer extant pamphlet, there was no willingness to engage systematically with alternative media that could be disseminated through more informal channels and no attempt to systematically project positive images of the regime and its cause, nor to capitalise on the atrocities committed by the rebels against Catholics.

Alva's decision to pursue a strategy of terror was fundamentally based on the idea that massacres would convey fear and thus make rebel cities surrender. As illustrated by the immediate capitulation of Mechelen's neighbouring towns once news of the sack there spread, he could rely on the informal but fast spread of news for the message 'obey, or else' to reach his intended audience. The threatening broadsheet he commissioned at the same time shows that he was willing to engage with other media in order to amplify his threat. What Alva failed to realise was that his terror in the long run merely increased resistance, while also adding to the veritable hatred felt by rebels and loyalists alike towards the Spanish army. Rather than discrediting the rebel cause, Alva and his army had simply added to its appeal.

As criticism grew, Philip wanted to try a new approach of greater moderation. But he appears to never have conceived of the need to present the people with action rather than mere words. The second pardon and the regime's demands at the negotiations at Breda, both including justifications of past policy, did nothing to disprove continued suspicions about the regime's intentions. Requesens did not engage in the kind of terror that Alva had, but the simple absence of 'crimes against humanity' was not enough to change continued apprehension. Whereas Alva's strategy of terror, despite all its flaws, had made a very clear point ('obey, or else'), the absence of terror on its own was not communicative in the same way and did not serve to undo the harm caused by Alva's 'point' in the first place. Moreover, Requesens could not control the troops satisfactorily, as observed by contemporaries during the mutiny at Antwerp, and so the indiscriminate oppression associated with army presence continued, along with people's growing resentment.

The clergy's prominent role in the opposition first to the Tenth Penny and then to Alva's terror and the continued army presence meant that even Requesens' attempts to constructively engage with the Church to build up Catholic devotion did not necessarily make people less critical of the regime. Although the regime certainly had a strong profile as a defender of the Catholic cause, this was not enough to end criticism over the troops. Indeed, the clergy could do more harm than good in this respect: by preaching against continuing army presence they were both spreading and legitimising such criticism.

The outbreak of war, then, severely damaged the regime's public communication. Whereas Alva had been able to ensure a strong and persistent regime presence in the public sphere

through a stream of edicts, extensive public punishment and traditional ceremonial, the outbreak of war cut the reach of all these media. Moreover, the war also cornered the regime into a situation where it fast became very unpopular and where the rebels could easily capitalise on popular resentment. During Alva's repression of heresy and rebellion it had become clear that actions spoke much louder than words. The outbreak of war did not change this situation. On the contrary, the growing criticism shows that only satisfactory action – the withdrawal of the troops – would be enough to remedy people's views of the regime.

The Breakdown of Royal Authority, 1576-1578

On 5 March 1576, Don Luís de Requesens died in desperate circumstances. His governorship had coincided with the first major cycle of mutinies that were to hit the royal army during the Revolt, and the bankruptcy Philip had declared in September 1575 suggested there would be many more to come.¹ A month prior to his death, Requesens had estimated that there was not even enough money to buy an ounce of gunpowder, and in an act of desperation he had had to give the army's paymaster all his silverware. So certain was Requesens that the Habsburg regime would be defeated that he even told Philip he would be happy to die soon so that the task of informing the king that the Low Countries were lost would befall someone else. The provinces were, in his estimation, simply being given away for free because the necessary measures to protect them had not been taken in time.² Shortly afterwards, Requesens advised Philip that the situation was so hopeless that he had better agree to anything that could secure peace, provided only the Catholic faith and royal authority could be assured.³

Since the bankruptcy of September 1575, the regime's war effort had been living on borrowed time. The bankruptcy, and the consequent lengthy negotiations with the Crown's Genoese bankers over new terms, did not just mean that Philip was deprived of credit until the negotiations concluded in 1577. It also meant that the actual transfer of what money he still had became problematic, as his bills of exchange could no longer be accepted.⁴ Nor could funds be easily raised locally, as the provinces continued to refuse a return to traditional taxation unless their grievances, such as prompt payment of the troops in order to prevent further harm to civilians, were redressed.⁵ With no money forthcoming, the troops could not be paid and the ongoing mutinies could not be put down. The situation was so critical that fears of a general insurrection arose, as peasants were selling their livestock to buy arms for their own defence.⁶

Requesens' sudden death made the Habsburg position still more difficult. There was no successor waiting in the wings this time, and so the regime was left without a specially designated and trusted representative at a time when local political institutions were becoming more and more active. Government now devolved upon the Council of State, consisting mostly of native advisors, a measure Philip ratified.⁷ But in addition to this body there were the provincial States, which had continued to meet quite legally and which were now pressing for action against the mutineers and a resumption of peace negotiations with the rebel provinces.⁸ This chapter will investigate how the regime communicated its own position in the ongoing conflict at a time when its authority, along with control of all the traditional communication channels, was breaking down even in the provinces that had so far remained loyal.

Paralysis

The most striking feature of public communication during the Council of State's interim government was the Council's almost total absence from it. Requesens' letters to Philip had warned of the critical situation and people's dwindling confidence in the regime, but after his death the situation deteriorated further, something the Council of State repeatedly made clear to Philip in more and more desperate terms. In May, they feared a general insurrection; by June, the councillors were willing to sell their own plate to raise funds; by July, they went so far as to criticise Philip's indecisiveness; and in mid-August their desperation was such that they informed Philip they would have to resign unless he provided them with the necessary instructions and funds.⁹ They also repeatedly begged Philip to urgently appoint a governor of royal blood (no one else would enjoy the necessary authority) and in the meantime send them detailed instructions and sufficient money to deal with the escalating threat of still further mutinies.¹⁰ But Philip remained unresponsive. Although he did send an order for the recruitment of new choirboys for his chapel in Madrid, he persisted in keeping the identity of the new governor, his half-brother Don John, a secret for months. As for instructions, Philip contented himself with a simple order to ensure military discipline and the safety of the borders.¹¹

What, then, did the Council do? With neither money nor instructions, both their options and their clout with regard to the mutineers were limited. In a tame attempt to restore order, the Council issued an edict reminding both civilians and the mutinying light cavalry of what was appropriate behaviour and what exactly troops could demand of their civilian hosts.¹² No effective remedies were ordered, and so the edict served more to advertise the regime's impotence than anything else. People certainly did not have much faith in the regime's ability to restore order and impose military discipline: the provincial States were beginning to levy troops themselves, and civilians were also buying weapons. According to Morillon, peasants had armed themselves to such an extent that arquebuses and halberds no longer could be acquired for money.¹³

Although the Council conveyed and endorsed the provincial States' proposals for resuming peace negotiations and summoning the States General, they were left to their own initiative when Philip's response never amounted to much more than a blanket refusal. This initiative could only be a limited one, as too much freedom of action would risk offending the not yet communicated royal will. The Council took two decisions in an attempt to redress people's confidence in the regime.¹⁴ First, and in line with the promises Requesens had made the previous year in tax negotiations with the provincial States, the Council took the step of formally abolishing the Tenth and Twentieth Penny taxes. Although the silent death of Alva's taxation had been royal policy since the summer of 1572 and Requesens had promised the States General in 1574 that the tax would not resurface again, a formal abolition had not been issued.¹⁵ Grapperhaus sees Requesens' declaration as the final end to the taxes, but it is clear from the provincial States' continued insistence on a formal abolition act that they did not regard the regime's assurances as a sufficient guarantee.¹⁶ The Council now drafted an edict of abolition and forwarded it to Philip for his approval, which he gave.¹⁷

Secondly, the Council took steps to finally kill off the Council of Troubles. This had been

discussed previously, and under Requesens the Council had more or less ceased to operate, but again, a formal abolition had not taken place.¹⁸ This time the Council presented Philip with a proposal for precisely such a formal abolition and then, when no response was forthcoming, decided to take the king's silence for a yes and disband the Council of Troubles without further ado.¹⁹

Although the acts of abolition did nothing to remedy the ongoing mutinies, the loyal provinces' most pressing problem, the Council of State had still argued for the abolitions as a way of redressing public confidence. But the acts' publication, if they were actually publicised and not just circulated among local authorities for their information, appears to have grabbed no attention at all. No extant diary mentions any proclamation advertising their abolition, although most diarists made regular mentions of public proclamations and a number also detailed the opposition to the Tenth Penny. Nor does any print copy – if the acts were ever printed – survive, although it is clear that local authorities were sent parchment copies of both acts.²⁰ In view of the Council's own stated intention of regaining people's affections, the failure to ensure publicity is both surprising and difficult to explain. Even though Philip consented to the abolition of the Tenth and Twentieth Penny, it is possible that the councillors were so imbued with the tradition of not admitting fault that they made a more or less conscious decision not to proclaim the regime's reversal of policy publicly. With regard to the abolition of the Council of Troubles it is, in addition, possible that the councillors, despite their decision to go ahead with the abolition without royal consent, still regarded the act as provisional. The act did, after all, stipulate that the abolition would remain effective 'until His Majesty or my said lords [the councillors] order otherwise'.²¹ Whatever the Council's reasons, the acts of abolition were certainly prevented from ever becoming the regime's much needed publicity stunt, due to a simple absence of communication. Even had this been remedied, the acts' success in redressing public confidence would probably still have been limited because of the continued failure of the regime to deal with the mutineers.

It has been suggested that the Council of State quickly proved itself unequal to the task of government and that its paralysis was due to internal division.²² But this is to ignore their most severe handicap: Philip. The Council certainly did suffer from conflicts between some of its members, but it appears that many of the councillors, including those known not to get along, were in agreement on several points. In the official Council correspondence with Philip, the Council repeatedly conveyed the provinces' call for the States General to be summoned and also supported their demand with arguments of their own. Jerónimo de Roda, a Spanish councillor who kept up a separate correspondence with Philip, argued against his colleagues' demands for a meeting of the States General in his letters to the king. Nevertheless, he was certainly in agreement with them on several issues, such as the desirability of a peaceful settlement, the need for immediate and detailed instructions, immediate action to prevent further mutinies and the immediate appointment of a new governor-general of royal blood.²³ Even had the Council worked and argued as one, there was little they could do when Philip failed to provide them with anything beyond the most rudimentary instructions.

The Council's paralysis, largely caused by Philip, reached a breaking point in the sum-

mer. On 2 July, the town of Zierikzee surrendered on terms after a seven month-long siege and, deprived of a sack, the Spanish troops promptly mutinied. They then entered the province of Brabant and headed for Brussels, but were put off by the town's elaborate defences. Instead, they took possession of the little town of Aalst and put it to the sack. The reaction in nearby Brussels, where the citizenry had taken up arms and organised a continued watch, was so strong that Spanish councillors and advisors were kept locked up in the royal palace and a servant of Roda was killed in the street. But in response to the repeated calls to raise troops for defence against the mutineers, the Council could do nothing except convey the demand to Philip and beg him to use his sovereign prerogative to mobilise local troops.²⁴

What they did do was to issue a statement declaring the mutineers rebels and enemies of king and country. This was first issued in response to the explosive public mood in Brussels, and was followed by another statement a few days later.²⁵ This second statement repeated the declaration of outlawry but specified that it was only aimed at the mutineers in Aalst and not at Spanish troops in general. The preamble described the mutineers' crimes, which provided justification for the Council's decision to ban them. The Council was also presented as doing everything possible to satisfy the mutineers and as having proceeded to outlaw the rebellious troops as an absolute last resort. Such a self-presentation seems odd in light of an explosive public mood which the councillors were all too well aware of.²⁶ Instead of presenting themselves to the public as taking immediate and decisive action (as was usually done in edicts), the impression was instead that they had willingly bent over backwards to meet the troops' demands and that they were only reluctantly outlawing them when there was nothing else they could do. This reinforced the impression of paralysis and unconcern for the welfare of the general population, but there was also not much else the Council could have done. To satisfy the public would have meant disregarding Philip's order that no troops be levied to deal with the mutinies, and the councillors were not about to renege on their loyalty to their king. Their apologetic letter to Philip, informing him of their statement, might even suggest that the justificatory preamble was meant more to appease Philip than to respond to the popular mood. They certainly forwarded him a copy of their statement and, once again, stressed how the situation was so desperate they had not known what else to do.²⁷

The resulting public image of paralysis and lack of concern was particularly serious in light of the open discussion of grievances among the public. In April, the magistrates of Lille had mounted a general procession to implore God to persuade Philip to restrain the Spanish soldiers and appoint a native governor-general, and the Council of State itself had ordered processions and prayers for God to inspire the king with a good resolution for the administration of the Low Countries.²⁸ A few weeks later, an anonymous broadsheet was posted on the doors of each of the councillors' homes calling on them to fulfil their duties and secure peace.²⁹ In early June, the annual Brussels *ommegang* took place with a number of the *tableaux* illustrating the dire situation the country found itself in: one showed Peace lying sick in bed, whereas in another, people were searching high and low for Peace with lanterns, unable to find her.³⁰

While the presence of local magistracies and the Council of State itself in these proce-

sions legitimised the continued communication of war weariness and political grievances, provincial and local authorities were also increasing their own authority through action. Since Requesens' death, these had shown themselves most willing to carry out effective measures against the mutineers, both by disregarding royal orders and levying troops on their own account, and by organising the reinforcement of town defences.³¹ They had also put pressure on both the Council of State and on Philip himself for the resumption of peace negotiations and for a convocation of the States General.³² Whereas the Council of State was trapped in a situation where it was openly communicating its own powerlessness, these local institutions were instead showing themselves capable of taking effective political action.

Collapse of royal rule

On 4 September, a group of armed troops led by Jacques de Glymes, an officer in the service of the States of Brabant, arrested most of the Council of State members. Although it has not been possible to determine with certainty whose orders he was acting on, the indications are that he did so with the support of at least some members of the States of Brabant and quite possibly also at the instigation of William of Orange.³³ The arrests were an act of treason and, although most of the councillors were rapidly released, the event caused a total collapse of royal rule in the Low Countries. The line of command and instruction that ran from Madrid to Brussels was broken, as the reconstituted Council of State – officially still the king's council – now operated under the domination of and in close cooperation with the States General, summoned by the States of Brabant and Hainaut.³⁴ On the communications front, this meant that the regime no longer had any immediate mouthpiece in the Low Countries for its viewpoints; the proclamation of edicts and the ordering of public ceremonial were now in the hands of a body that did not enjoy a royal mandate.

Although the direct connection with Madrid had been broken, 'royal' edicts nevertheless kept being proclaimed as the Council of State, now acting on behalf of the illegally convened States General, issued all its orders in the king's name. Penny Roberts has suggested that, in the case of France, royal authority was strengthened at a time of weak kingship and civil war by the continued reliance on the enforcement of justice as a royal prerogative.³⁵ In proclaiming and ensuring the enforcement of law, the French monarchy was simultaneously securing and maintaining its own authority. With regard to the Low Countries, the question is whether the continued use of the king's name in law – standard practice in Holland and Zeeland even though they had opted for the rebel side in 1572 – had a similar effect even when it was conducted by the States General. This body argued it was acting for and on behalf of the king even though it had never enjoyed legislative power, had been convened illegally and now took measures, such as the levying of troops and the resumption of peace talks with the rebels, that were direct violations of the commands that Philip had issued a few months earlier. If the legal fiction of Philip's mandate was deemed strong enough to cover up a *coup d'état*, could the use of his name actually bolster the very monarch whose sovereign power was being usurped?

At first sight the edicts certainly had the potential to boost Philip's image among his subjects, as he was shown to be taking prompt action in order to protect the country and its people. Thus, one of the first edicts had 'Philip' proclaiming that as the Spanish mutineers were now 'enemies of us and of our lands', the people of the Low Countries should treat them as such and 'attack the bodies and property' of any mutineer that came their way.³⁶ Similarly, in another edict 'the king' noted that the States General in Brussels had requested that he forbid all contact with and assistance to the mutineers. The king had considered this request with the help of the Council of State, 'charged by us with the general government of our lands over here', and consented to it.³⁷ Philip, then, was presented not only as being completely *au fait* and even happy with a government led by the States General, but also as supporting the outlawing and marginalisation of parts of his own army.

But how credible was this legal fiction? The edicts' presentation of Philip as having consented to government by the States General appeared to solve the problem in that if such consent had been given, then the States General was free to deal with the problems at hand in the same way that a governor-general would have done, that is, through the proclamation of edicts in line with instructions that would arrive continuously from Madrid. But this, of course, was not what had happened, and the States General deputies themselves were most certainly aware that they were on very thin ice, legally speaking.³⁸ Indeed, the city of Douai at first refused to send deputies to Brussels, as this could not be done without 'offending His Majesty'.³⁹ Even months later, in January 1577, the illegality of the arrest of the Council of States remained such a sensitive topic that the deputies from Namur and Tournai felt compelled to stress that they did not condone what had happened.⁴⁰ The States General also wrote to Philip to defend their conduct. Although their letter to Philip did not explicitly acknowledge their violation of his orders, they sent Hopperus a copy together with a request that he make sure the king continued to regard and treat them as loyal and orthodox subjects who did not deserve any '*rigueur*'.⁴¹ They were obviously aware that the recent events could be seen as rebellious and as deserving a punitive reaction.

Furthermore, even though the few letters Philip sent to the Council of State in the autumn of 1576 may not have been communicated to the deputies of the States General, these were certainly aware of Philip's refusal to allow the assembly to gather, as this had been communicated to the provincial States via the Council of State in the spring.⁴² If the letters Philip wrote to the Council in the autumn were communicated to them, then they would also have been made aware that Philip wanted the troops raised by the provincial States to be disbanded straight away and that he ordered them to accept and obey Don John as governor-general immediately upon his arrival.⁴³ The Council of State certainly did know of their own illegality, as they explicitly acknowledged their continued violation of Philip's orders both with regard to the disbanding of the troops and the convocation of the States General.⁴⁴

The States General did not do much to persuade the public of their own legality. One edict, against the Spanish councillor Roda who had avoided arrest and, as the only free member of the Council of State, declared himself governor-general, suggested that the arrests had not actually happened at all. Instead, they were a pretext Roda used in order to have a stab at the gov-

ernorship.⁴⁵ This line of argument was not helped by the appearance of an anonymous pamphlet, published in both French and Dutch, seeking to defend the arrests. This justification advertised that the arrests had happened, and also made it clear that Philip had not known about them.⁴⁶ In light of this pamphlet, then, the States General's attempt to both sweep the arrests under the carpet and present Philip as supporting their government became problematic.

The public's views on the legality of the States General are difficult to gauge. The arrests were certainly common knowledge, as is clear from the way contemporary diarists wrote about the event in detail, such as in what order the councillors were marched through town to the so-called *Broothuis* on the Grand Place where they were incarcerated.⁴⁷ Of course, knowledge of the arrests did not necessarily imply that people saw the event as an act of treason or that the subsequently summoned States General were acting illegally. But the sceptical reactions in many provinces suggest that at least part of the population thought so. Members of local authorities were certainly well enough versed in traditional political practice to know that answering a summons from another province after the royal representatives had been arrested was far from standard procedure and that it amounted to treason, as is evident from the reluctance of Douai to send representatives. If influential members of local communities were thus aware, it seems likely that their views on the matter could have spread through their own communities, if not even further. Wouter Jacobsz., a monk living in Amsterdam, was certainly sceptical about the States General. He noted that they claimed to be acting for the defence of royal authority and the Catholic faith, but that good Catholics in Amsterdam did not trust their assertions. They saw the States General's claims as typical rebel promises that would never be kept, something several years of witnessing rebel rule in neighbouring cities had given them a keen eye for. According to Jacobsz., the arrests 'appear to be nothing else than a conspiracy, because it cannot be said that they are acting on the king's authority'.⁴⁸ As the only diarist to express views on the subject, it is impossible to decide whether his views were typical, but maybe it is not coincidental that they were expressed precisely by a Northern Catholic. Catholics in Holland and Zeeland had, after all, seen all too clearly for several years already just how little substance there was in rebel 'loyalty', although the scepticism in Douai would suggest that Southerners could be equally aware of what was really going on.

However, the States General's credibility may not have rested on legality at all, but on necessity. The States General deputies, in the words of Geoffrey Parker, were 'reluctant revolutionaries': they moved to take control because no other institution could stem the progressive destruction of the country by the king's mutinying troops.⁴⁹ The idea that they acted with royal approval facilitated the acceptance of their control. It was a convenient fig leaf that allowed for the easy acceptance of laws and emergency measures against the Spanish troops which both the rebel and loyal provinces wanted, as well as the resumption of peace negotiations.⁵⁰

Moreover, even though the States General deputies must have been aware that they were in session against royal command, they nevertheless believed in their ultimately loyal service. Rebel pamphleteers supported them in this view. Since the very beginning of the Revolt, they had stressed the essential political role played by the States General and also that this arrangement

was ordained by ancient privileges.⁵¹ In 1576, the justifications for the States General's freedom of action acquired an immediate practical dimension, as Requesens' death and the tension over the royal army created room for political initiative.⁵² At this point, Orange and the States of Holland orchestrated a letter campaign aimed directly at the loyal provincial States who were urged to act, precisely out of duty towards the fatherland and its privileges.⁵³

One treatise, published in the spring or early summer of 1576, sought to prove that it was not only the right of the States General to meet without royal convocation, it was also their duty.⁵⁴ The treatise left no doubt that they were within their rights even if the king were to be displeased, as the Joyous Entry that he had sworn allowed them to disregard the sovereign when privileges were being violated.⁵⁵ Interestingly, compared to previous rebel pamphlets this treatise was far less insistent on the fundamental goodwill of Philip and the idea that he was under the influence of evil advisors. It left no doubt that both Charles V and Philip II had themselves acted unlawfully when proclaiming the various anti-heresy placards and also criticised Philip for having declared the petition of 1566 to be an act of rebellion, which was a clear violation of his oath to always take seriously a supplication of his subjects.⁵⁶ Although the author was willing to 'assume' that the king had been led astray by evil advisors, the mere admission that this would have to remain an assumption illustrates how rebel thought had moved from the assertions of loyalty to the king in the late 1560s and early 1570s to a far more sceptical grey area.⁵⁷ Indeed, rebel politics had also become less cautious: although they would not act on the suggestion until July 1581, already in July 1575 the States of Holland and Zeeland had discussed the possibilities of formally abjuring Philip's sovereignty.⁵⁸

Unity and division

Although the States General professed much greater loyalty to the king than the rebellious provinces did, there was no doubting the common platform that all the provinces shared.⁵⁹ This had already become apparent under Requesens, when it became clear that both loyalists and rebels agreed that the foreign troops had to go, and the autumn of 1576 saw further expressions of this unity. New editions of the union between Flanders and Brabant of 1339 were published, and when the peace talks started in Ghent, it was decided to simply resume where they had ended at Breda just over a year previously.⁶⁰ In the space of three weeks an agreement was concluded, spurred on by numerous general processions making clear the public pressure for peace as well as the disastrous Spanish Fury.⁶¹ This was the sack of Antwerp, carried out by Spanish mutineers on 4 November, that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 8,000 people.⁶² More than anything, this must have spelled out the necessity of a joint front against the mutineers, and the agreement, the Pacification of Ghent, was signed four days later.

The Pacification represented the zenith of inter-provincial unity. It was a union for securing the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but it also set out a plan for how to resolve the problems of the Revolt.⁶³ It offered a general pardon without exceptions for any crime committed since the beginning of the troubles, and it was agreed to summon the States General for the settle-

ment of the religious issues.⁶⁴ In the meantime the heresy placards would be suspended, although the Catholic faith would remain the only one permitted outside Holland and Zeeland.⁶⁵ These measures amounted to strong criticism of the more or less completely opposite approach taken by the regime over the last decade, and as if to emphasise just how unsuited Habsburg policy had been, Article 13 ordered all monuments erected by Alva to be torn down.⁶⁶ Now the column commemorating the confederate nobles' 'treason' at the site of the Palace of Culemborg could be removed, and the Spanish ambassador to Paris reported that the citizens of Brussels had broken it into a thousand pieces while claiming they would have done the same to Alva had he been there.⁶⁷ Alva's statue, which had been removed from view in 1574, is likely to have been melted down in this period too.⁶⁸

The news of peace spread quickly, and the Pacification treaty was published in a variety of languages and in more than thirty different editions.⁶⁹ The treaty was also proclaimed and celebrated in towns that were not threatened by nearby foreign troops. In Lille, the local magistrates even burnt the papers relating to the past heresy trials in order to underline that these were now to be forgiven and forgotten.⁷⁰ But cracks in the unity quickly appeared. Acceptance of the Pacification was, despite its aura of concord, far from universal: the States of Artois took months to ratify it and only did so after the States General had sent reminders, whereas the States of Holland and Zeeland refused to ratify it at all.⁷¹ Although high-ranking members of the clergy had been among the negotiators in Ghent and the Faculty of Theology at Leuven officially confirmed that the Pacification was not prejudicial to the Catholic faith, many bishops remained opposed.⁷² Bishop Metsius of 's-Hertogenbosch thought the withdrawal of the Spanish troops would mean that Christ's lambs (Catholics) would be devoured by wolves (Protestants), even though Christ's lambs had already suffered badly at the hands of the Spanish soldiers during several mutinies, most recently during the sack of Antwerp. In December, the States General protested against religious violations of the Pacification in Holland and Zeeland, and in early January the so-called Union of Brussels was signed to reaffirm the main points of the Pacification. The only difference was that this time, the declaration contained a more explicit affirmation of obedience to the king and defence of the Catholic faith.⁷³

Perhaps the best illustration of the divisions between the provinces was the completely different attitude to royal power that split the States General from Orange and the rebel provinces. Although the States General were adamant that the foreign troops would have to leave, they were also actively working for the re-establishment of Habsburg rule. In line with the assurances of continued loyalty that they had issued in the aftermath of the coup in September, after the Pacification the States General entered into negotiations with Don John, who had arrived in Luxembourg on the eve of the treaty. Although Orange sent repeated warnings and sometimes even intercepted letters to demonstrate the sinister intentions of the regime in general and Don John in particular, the States General continued to persist in their efforts to secure both the withdrawal of all foreign troops and a return to royal rule.⁷⁴ To the States General, then, loyalty to Philip was not just empty talk, it was an essential element of how they wanted their political world to be organised.

A conditional return of royal rule

All through the autumn of 1576, the Habsburg regime was as good as gone from the public scene. The traditional channels of public communication, proclamations and ceremonial, were completely out of the regime's hands. In a memo on the conventions of royal mourning written in April 1657, it was noted that upon the death of Emperor Maximilian II in 1576, and in stark contrast to traditional practice, there appeared to have been no church services or ceremonies, and that this was probably due to the 'troubles of the time'.⁷⁵ In fact, the regime was not keeping up much of a profile behind the scenes, either: Philip sent only a few letters to the Council of State after he received news of the arrests, and there were no attempts to use pamphleteering to persuade either local and provincial authorities or the population at large not to engage in peace talks with the rebels.⁷⁶ Nor was there any publicly advertised reaction to the Pacification, or any attempts to raise support for Don John during the three months it took him to agree with the States General on the terms of his acceptance as governor-general.

It was only after the agreement between Don John and the States General, the Perpetual Edict, was concluded on 12 February 1577 and Don John could take up office as governor that the regime once again became involved in public communication. Although the Edict amounted to a wholesale acceptance by the regime of the Pacification and the concomitant withdrawal of all foreign troops, it provoked hostile rebel pamphleteering. The argument was that the agreement meant the death of the Pacification and that the regime's apparent acceptance of it had only been a Machiavellian trick.⁷⁷ Don John's response was a traditional one: he asked the States General to issue an edict against the anonymous circulation of pamphlets and rumours, but did not issue counter-arguments of his own.⁷⁸

Despite such hostile propaganda, the Perpetual Edict was far more celebrated and more easily ratified than the Pacification had been.⁷⁹ It secured both the withdrawal of foreign troops and the protection of the Catholic faith, thus echoing widespread sentiments in the loyal provinces. However, despite the firm loyalty of the States General deputies, the peace promised by the Perpetual Edict did not find universal favour. In Brussels, for example, Orange enjoyed strong popular support, and many of his supporters appear not to have regarded reconciliation with the Habsburg regime as good news.⁸⁰

Although people may have had their doubts about the acceptance of Don John, the celebrations that were staged for him in the few towns he had the time to enter during his short governorship presented him as a peacemaker. In Mechelen, they staged a *tableau* showing his victory over the Turks at Lepanto, but also one where war materiel was being melted down and turned into agricultural equipment, while a play was performed to express a clear call for peace.⁸¹ The melting down of weapons into farming tools also appeared in an engraving, this time with Don John's coat of arms on the hearth where the work was taking place.⁸² The celebrations in Brussels also focused on the recent end of the conflict, with local rhetoricians presenting an 'explanation of the peace'.⁸³

The same peacemaker image was also present in the prints published to celebrate the Perpetual Edict. One series consisted of three allegorical prints showing the transition from a

state of war and tyranny to one of peace and justice. Unlike in the prints expressing a desire for peace during the negotiations at Breda, this print did actually attribute blame for the situation: it was those who attacked the authority of the king who were responsible, although the print offered no direct clues as to who exactly they were.⁸⁴ The provinces were not personified on either of the prints in the series, and so the people responsible for the conflict could be both the rebels in Holland and Zeeland for refusing royal authority, or the king's allegedly evil advisors, in line with rebel propaganda. Both are possible, although the presentation of Don John as the country's peacemaker in the third print would suggest that those guilty of the conflict were indeed Orange and the rebels in Holland and Zeeland.⁸⁵ Although the rebels continued to rely on the idea of evil advisors up until the abjuration in 1581, they never portrayed Don John in favourable terms. The third print's inclusion of a direct reference to Romans 13 also suggests a royalist bias. Although Romans 13 was on occasion alluded to in rebel pamphleteering, it was never cited as an authority in its own right.⁸⁶

Even if satisfaction with the Perpetual Edict was not universal, what does appear beyond doubt is the general relief at the departure of the foreign troops. In Lille, the magistracy quickly began the process of dismantling the citadel to prevent the city from having to host any garrisons in the future.⁸⁷ Jan de Pottre noted how the soldiers who had caused such damage were now finally made to leave, and even addressed a potential reader with 'Think about it, you who read this, how we have been ruled by these tyrants'.⁸⁸ He also noted on what days the troops left different towns and ended with a sigh of relief: '*Amen dico vobis!*'⁸⁹

Proving the rebels right

But Don John's honeymoon as governor-general was of short duration. Frustrated about not having been allowed his own troops and advisors, in July 1577 he made a surprise attack on the citadel in Namur. The sudden recourse to arms from a governor who appeared to have accepted demilitarisation caused an outcry, and the States General, who remained in session, accused Don John of violating the Pacification and demanded that he return to Brussels.⁹⁰ While negotiations with the States were still going on, Don John took steps to recall the troops that were on their way to Lombardy and also to make an unsuccessful attack on Antwerp.

Don John's actions played straight into the hands of Orange. The rebel leader had been sidelined as a result of the Perpetual Edict, but Don John's capture of Namur proved all of Orange's warnings to have been well founded.⁹¹ And so the tables turned: Orange made a triumphant return to Brussels, and even the States of Walloon Flanders, a Catholic stronghold, immediately voted to raise money for troops to resist Don John.⁹²

But although all the provinces again appeared to be united against the Habsburg regime's evil tricks, the States General still objected to many of Orange's proposals and refused a military offensive against Don John. The deputies' position was in stark contrast to that of the Brussels citizenry, led by the extremely Orange friendly Committee of Eighteen, representatives of the guilds who played a vital role in town politics.⁹³ This Committee, seeing that the States General

were sceptical of Orange, began to put pressure on the deputies, even to the point of forcing their way into the assembly to intervene directly in the discussions.

At the same time, a group of leading nobles in the States General, including the Duke of Aerschot, took steps to limit Orange's influence and secretly invited Archduke Matthias, son of the late Emperor Maximilian II and nephew of Philip, to replace Don John and govern the Low Countries in the king's name. Orange did not openly object to the appointment, but proposed that the new governor's powers be strictly limited and that the Council of State's consent, appointed by the States General, and even in some cases that of the States General itself, be necessary for Matthias to take any decisions at all. Although these proposals were supported by the Northern provinces, they were opposed in the south. Here, especially the nobles and the clergy wanted Matthias to enjoy the same kind of wide-ranging powers as an ordinary governor-general, precisely so that he could limit Orange's influence. When Aerschot, who was governor of Flanders, went to Ghent to encourage resistance to Orange's proposal, he was arrested, along with the bishops of Bruges and Ypres and several other nobles, by Jan van Hembyze and the Lord of Ryhove, two Calvinist magistrates. With the conservative Aerschot out of the picture, they set about creating a new political order in Ghent: a Committee of Eighteen and a new militia drawn mainly from the working classes, both of which were militantly Calvinist. When Matthias arrived shortly afterwards, the influence of Orange, recently appointed governor (*ruwaard*) of Brabant after pressure from the Brussels Eighteen, was secured.⁹⁴

While Orange was strengthening his power base in Brussels and the first radical Calvinist city republic was being established in Ghent, Don John was isolated in Namur and Luxembourg. With regard to public communication, his isolation meant that the Habsburg regime had once again lost control of proclamations and ceremonial. Orange and his supporters, on the other hand, took full advantage of the breakdown in trust between the governor and his provinces and resurrected the idea of covert and sinister Spanish intentions.⁹⁵

A particularly effective way of demonstrating Don John's evil intentions was through the rebel publication of his allegedly intercepted correspondence. Publications such as these were the equivalent of the modern-day news leak in that the letters, regardless of whether they were authentic or not, would, if believed by the public to be genuine, provide a window on uncensored royalist policy.⁹⁶ Their sensationalist value may also have overridden doubts about their authenticity. The effect was invariably that the letter writers (Don John and his cronies) showed themselves in the worst possible light through the explicit expression of their sinister intentions. Thus, the pamphlet defending the States General's decision to actively resist Don John sought to authenticate the allegations of foul play by reproducing twenty-six letters written by both Don John and his Spanish advisors, some of which included details of Don John's attempt to take Antwerp by force.⁹⁷ Their value as proof was explicitly noted, and to substantiate their authenticity the letters were attached in both the (allegedly) original Spanish and in French and Dutch translation.⁹⁸

Accusations such as these had been levelled before, but this time the regime reciprocated. Pro-regime argumentative pamphlets were now issued in direct response to rebel ones, and for

the first time they actively engaged with rebel accusations. Thus, the author of the royalist response to the States General's justification for their resistance went to some lengths to throw doubts on the authenticity of the intercepted letters, drawing attention to features of literary style and denouncing the letters as having been tampered with.⁹⁹ The royalist recognition that intercepted correspondence was a powerful medium was also apparent in Don John's publication of some of his own and Philip's letters. These were prefaced by saying that the rebels had distorted the communication process between Philip and his subjects by preventing his real letters from reaching the States.¹⁰⁰ Don John was here trying to create his own news leak to remedy this situation, although the positive effect must have been limited by having himself play the roles of both revealer and the revealed.

While Don John was barred from official lines of communication and could no longer use printing presses within the territory controlled by the States General, pro-regime pamphlets may instead have been printed in royalist Luxembourg, where there had been no active political printing up until this point.¹⁰¹ After Leuven's return to the royal fold early in 1578, all royalist pamphlets were printed there.¹⁰² The seemingly close association between Don John's location and the pamphlets' place of publication suggests that members of Don John's circle were themselves behind the pamphlets, something that is confirmed by Don John's correspondence with Longueval, his representative at the French court. From Don John's letters it is clear that he was himself involved with the writing of a pamphlet, and that Longueval had compromising letters from the States General printed in Paris.¹⁰³ Longueval also received copies of Don John's pamphlet, intended for circulation at the French court.¹⁰⁴ The decision to circulate pamphlets in Paris may seem strange, but the regime was well aware that the States General had sent envoys to lobby for support at the French court. A major task for Longueval was to persuade Henry III and his mother, Catherine de Medici, that any assistance to the rebels would be unwise. It was particularly important to prevent any agreement between the king's younger brother, the Duke of Alençon (later Anjou), and the rebels, who wanted to offer him a degree of sovereignty in return for troops and money.¹⁰⁵

The overall theme of Don John's publications was the continued presentation of himself and the regime as virtuous peacemakers; it was the foul play of Orange and the rebels that had forced him to resort to arms. Don John had engaged himself with zeal and affection in the struggle to secure the most advantageous peace anyone could desire.¹⁰⁶ In fact, his affection for the Low Countries was such that he and the States General had become so united in the service of God and His Majesty that nothing could separate them. Even Orange had been happy with the arrangement!¹⁰⁷ One pamphlet, *Apologie contre certains discours emis sovbs le nom des Estats generaux des Pays bas*, denied the accusations that Don John refused to come to an agreement with the States, insisting that all he wanted was to restore his father's country of birth peacefully. This could be seen from the admirable way in which he had handled the mutineers and protected the inhabitants of the Low Countries.¹⁰⁸ Another pamphlet, *Remonstrance avx habitans dv Païs Bas*, claimed that the Pacification was the work of Don John only, even though he was not even in Ghent at the time. This pamphlet also elaborated on his many virtues, and even included a

letter of praise purporting to be from Selim II, the Ottoman sultan whose forces Don John had defeated at Lepanto.¹⁰⁹ There was nothing sinister about the move to the citadel of Namur, the author argued, as all the forts were subject to the governor; the rebels were only angry that he had slipped out of their hands.¹¹⁰ He had gone there solely for the safety of his own person because the rebels were scheming against him, even though he had put himself in their hands ‘like a lamb for sacrifice’.¹¹¹ Contrary to what the rebels claimed, the regime wanted only the restoration of Catholicism and obedience to royal authority, exactly what the States General claimed to be their own aims, and perfectly in line with what had been laid out in both the Pacification and the Perpetual Edict.¹¹²

The regime’s discourse was far from watertight. First, Don John’s claimed allegiance to the Perpetual Edict did not sit easily with the steps he took in the summer of 1577 to recall the foreign troops the Edict had forced him to send away. Nor did the insistence that Don John was seeking peace with the help of his army have the potential to cut much ice either, as it was precisely that army which had united the loyal and rebel provinces in their opposition to the regime in the first place.

Second, the pro-regime authors relied on a confusing choice of terms. On the one hand, their repeated insistence that Don John was acting out of concern for peace and the welfare of the country and its people created the impression that Don John and the people of the Low Countries were on the same side and struggling to achieve the same thing. But they also argued that he had been forced to take up arms by those who wanted to subvert these admirable plans, namely rebels who were intent on war. But who were these rebels? Don John was resisted by a united States General, including the majority of the high nobles, and so although his pamphlets suggested that the ‘rebels’ were a small group of warmongers, the ‘rebels’ he was referring to were actually the majority of the native political community.¹¹³ Although Orange was singled out as an evildoer, the States General was not presented as having been duped by him. On the contrary, the people of the Low Countries in general were accused of disobedience, and the causes of their troubles were their own sins.¹¹⁴

But the problematic labelling did not end there. A longstanding feature of royalist polemic was the identification of rebellion with heresy, and so the terms ‘rebel’ and ‘heretic’ frequently occurred as a pair.¹¹⁵ In the response to the States General’s defence of their active resistance, the royalist author made a lengthy identification with the type of government allegedly wanted by the rebels, on the one hand, and Calvinist heresy on the other.¹¹⁶ The rebels/heretics wanted to replace monarchical rule by ‘an aristocracy or common government’ where decisions were made by majority vote and not by the ‘good and absolute will of His Majesty’.¹¹⁷ These were Calvinist innovations designed to topple all well-governed legitimate monarchies and republics and subject them to the rule of an evildoer. The author may have intended to accuse a small minority of these crimes, but as the pamphlet was a response to the States General’s own defence, the implication was that this governing body was full of heretics. This, of course, was exactly the kind of indiscriminate labelling that had caused such resentment ever since the arrival of Alva.¹¹⁸

The identification of heresy with rebellion simplified the response required by the regime.

By ignoring the existence of Catholic support for the Revolt, loyalist authors were liberated from the need to acknowledge the complexity of the situation and the unpopularity of Spanish rule. If all opposition could be equated with or seen to be a consequence of heresy, which was illegitimate also in accordance with the Perpetual Edict, then there would be no need to concede that the opposition was multi-layered and demanded a nuanced response. Indeed, all the references in royalist publications that called for reconciliation did so on the simple premise that those who had 'erroneously' sided with the rebels would see their error and make amends. One pamphlet even spelled out that, just as conflicts between fathers and sons ended when the son accepted 'the obedience taught him by nature herself', so the best way to end this war was to have the provinces realise the obedience they owed their king.¹¹⁹ Never were concessions deemed necessary.

Royalist authors also undermined their own appeal in discussions of Alva and the Spanish army. Widespread collective resentment against Alva's methods and the presence of the foreign troops had been expressed time and again, both before and during Don John's governorship.¹²⁰ Although Don John's recognition as governor had itself depended on the withdrawal of the troops, royalist pamphlets were remarkably insensitive about this issue. One pamphlet did recognise that the mutinies had alienated the people from the king, but nevertheless went on to note how all rebel towns deserved to be sacked for their extreme stubbornness.¹²¹ Nor was there any shortage of praise for the Spanish troops: they were the 'good and triumphant soldiers of His Majesty' who were defending a just cause with their 'generous undertakings'.¹²² Another pamphlet laid the blame for the mutinies on the local population, as they had not paid the king's troops as well as they had paid their enemies, although the money to pay off the troops in order to make them leave in the spring of 1577 had in fact been raised by the provinces themselves.¹²³ There was also praise for Alva who, according to one pamphlet, had never done anything except in the service of justice, God and the king.¹²⁴ In view of the united opposition to the Spanish troops' presence, even among those who were not in favour of the Pacification itself, such praise amounted to a serious tactical mistake in that the praise, together with the recall of the troops, played directly into the rebel discourse of covert and sinister intentions.¹²⁵

On 7 December 1577, the States General declared Don John an enemy of the country, and Archduke Matthias was made governor in his stead. The provinces that had been joined by the Pacification a year previously were now fighting under a governor they had appointed themselves and who had agreed to rule in close cooperation with the States General, against the king's governor and his army. But in early 1578, the regime's prospects improved as Don John made some notable military advances: the rebels were soundly defeated at Gembloix in January, and thereafter royalist troops recaptured Leuven and the province of Limburg as well as a number of smaller towns. The situation became so threatening that Orange, Matthias and the States General were forced to withdraw from Brussels to Antwerp in order to be safely out of the firing line.

The improved military situation allowed Don John to play the clemency card, something he had not been in a position to do while remaining isolated in the Ardennes. Already in November 1577, he had proclaimed a general pardon to all Luxembourgers and Namurois who left the States, and in February 1578, after having retaken Leuven and threatened Brussels, he did

the same to any towns in Brabant returning to the king's side. In March, this was repeated, now including people and localities in Hainaut, and in August a general pardon was proclaimed for the inhabitants of the region of Outre-Meuse. In September followed an edict confirming the restoration of the privileges of all towns under royal control.¹²⁶

But was this enough to counter the tactical mistakes of the continued pamphleteering? Don John's grants of pardon do not appear to have been publicised in print, and although they were probably widely proclaimed within the area concerned in line with customary practice, news of them may not have travelled much further, as the areas concerned continued to be a warzone and many of the places, such as Nivelles, were returned to rebel rule before long.¹²⁷ The appeal of the pardons was also undermined because they were proclaimed in a context where warnings against the previous pardons could still be remembered. That Don John, the authority behind the new pardons, had already had his credibility shredded by his recall of the troops and his continued praise for the Spanish army, cannot have done anything to add to the appeal of his clemency. In fact, the only pardon that was printed – a papal indulgence for all royal troops – illustrates the point well. It was not the welfare of the population of the Low Countries that received the most extensive and enduring publication, but that of the very troops who were widely blamed for the conflict in the first place!¹²⁸

However, at the same time that the regime was making military advances, the unity within the States General was coming apart. The provinces had clubbed together to face Don John and the troops he had recalled, but the militancy of the Calvinist Gentenaars was causing tension. Already in 1577, the Catholic provinces had been alarmed at the rebels' efforts to force the remaining Catholic redoubts in Holland and Zeeland into submission and by Orange's declaration that the rebel provinces would not be bound by the States General's decision on the religious settlement as set out in the Pacification. In 1578, the tension increased as the Calvinist magistracy of Ghent initiated successful coups in several Flemish towns, notably Oudenaarde, Kortrijk, Hulst, Bruges and Ypres, as well as an unsuccessful one in Lille. Similar coups were effected in the north in Amsterdam, Haarlem, Ter Goes, Leeuwarden and several towns in Gelderland, even though both the coups themselves and the subsequent iconoclasm amounted to a blatant violation of the Pacification's promise to protect the Catholic faith.¹²⁹

Events such as these caused considerable anger in the Catholic provinces. Already in March, the States of Artois had proposed to make peace with Don John.¹³⁰ Although this was not followed up, the proposal itself illustrated both the severity of the divisions within the States General as well as the shared religious platform between the Catholic provinces and the regime. Indeed, in July 1578, Orange made a proposal for so-called *Religionsvrede*, an act of toleration allowing freedom of worship wherever at least one hundred families of any denomination so desired. Although Orange intended it as an attempt to appease the Catholic provinces, the States of Hainaut, Artois, Walloon Flanders, Tournai or Valenciennes were unwilling to accept it. The States of Hainaut even published their rejection in print, stating that they were not willing to contribute '*le moindre iota*' to anything prejudicial to their Catholic faith. They also noted how the promises inherent in the Pacification of Ghent to protect Catholics and the Catholic religion had not been delivered on.¹³¹

Conclusion

To conclude, then, we have seen how direct royal control in the Low Countries reached a nadir in the period after Requesens' death and how the breakdown of royal authority was mirrored in a similar absence of pro-regime public communication. Although the Council of State was loyal to Madrid, its authority on the ground was strongly undermined by its inability to deal with the problems caused by the foreign troops. Their paralysis was in large part caused by Philip's continued unresponsiveness, and their few edicts against the mutineers suggested that the councillors were far more eager to meet the troops' demands than to actively support the provincial States and local authorities' efforts to defend themselves against the marauding soldiers.

Paradoxically, the arrest of the Council of State and its re-emergence under the leadership of an illegally convened States General appeared to resurrect the image of the regime as resourceful and effectively responsive. Now multiple edicts were issued in the king's name, all ordering decisive action against the mutineers, even though the regime as such had lost all control of the traditional channels of communication. On the face of it, the favourable depiction of Philip served to boost his public image, but this seems unlikely in light of the widespread awareness that the States General was acting on its own initiative. Instead, the use of the royal name was a convenient fig leaf which covered up their illegitimacy while allowing for what deputies appear to have seen as a fundamentally loyal service: saving the king's country from the destruction wreaked on it by his own troops.

Madrid made no attempts to set the record straight, and ended virtually all communication with the new Council of State. Nor was there any official royal reaction to the Pacification of Ghent, which established a united front between the rebel and loyal provinces. Only when the acceptance of Don John as governor-general was a fact did the regime once again resume its involvement with public communication, again along the traditional lines of censorship and edict proclamation.

It was only when royal rule again broke down after Don John's capture of the Namur citadel that the regime's engagement with public communication changed significantly. With Don John isolated in Namur, he and his supporters began to engage systematically and argumentatively with rebel pamphleteering for the first time. They did so by publishing pamphlets of their own, the only medium that could circulate in territory controlled by the States General. The rebel responses and the ensuing verbal boxing match suggest that at least the physical spread of pro-regime pamphlets within the rebel-held areas was successful.

The success of their persuasive efforts, however, was more doubtful as pro-regime authors made several basic mistakes. They stepped straight into the quagmire of existing widespread grievances by relying on the same simplistic and offensive labelling that Alva had used, and which made even the most devout Catholic into a heretical rebel. They also repeatedly showed scant regard for local resentment against the Spanish army, which they praised and whose mutinies they blamed on the local population's failure to pay them.

As the regime's military position improved in 1578, more generous statements were forthcoming in the form of general pardons to people and areas that returned to the royal fold. But

even though there was a potential to appeal to Catholics in rebel areas, whose religious grievances were becoming more and more acute, the grants of pardon were not widely publicised. In fact, unlike Don John's praise for the royal troops, they were not printed and do not appear to have circulated in public at all. The appeal of the pardons may in any case have been limited as Don John's credibility was in pieces after his military antics. Alva and Requesens had both tried the path of public generosity by issuing general pardons, both of which had failed because people refused to trust that their offers were sincere. Although Don John was more actively promoting his own public image than either of his predecessors, the continued distrust with which people viewed him, and on which rebel propaganda capitalised, was ultimately no different.

Communicating Reconciliation, 1578-1585

'I predict that the disagreements and the confusion prevailing among the States will be good,' wrote Cardinal Granvelle to Alexander Farnese, the new governor-general of the Low Countries since Don John's death on 1 October 1578 and son of Margaret of Parma, the former governoress.¹ Granvelle was referring to the divisions between the different provinces of the Generality that had become more and more apparent during 1578. The Calvinist coups and the suggested *Religionsvrede* had profoundly antagonised the Catholic provinces, and in September a number of towns in Gelderland petitioned the States General that, in accordance with the Pacification of Ghent, there be no religious innovations.² In mid-October, the States of Hainaut invited the province of Artois to join them in a union for the defence of the Catholic faith, and a couple of weeks later they requested that the Duke of Anjou, who had been called upon by the States General to support the Revolt, undertake their protection against the Protestant threat. The States of Artois, for its part, requested that the Generality take action to prevent the destruction of Catholic places of worship.³

Both Granvelle and Farnese were hopeful about the chances of securing a reconciliation between the Catholic provinces and the regime as a result of these religious divisions. But they were also aware that the regime would have to demonstrate its own trustworthiness, as the discontented Catholic members of the Generality remained deeply suspicious of the king's intentions.⁴

The continued importance of the Pacification

The attacks on Catholicism within the Generality in 1578 provoked the Walloon provinces to engage in pamphleteering for the first time. The States of Hainaut had reacted virulently and publicly to the proposed *Religionsvrede* in the summer of 1578, and based their opposition on the Pacification of Ghent which disallowed any assault on Catholic worship.⁵ The States of Artois also rejected the *Religionsvrede* and protested against the continuing iconoclasm and anti-Catholic measures.⁶

Farnese was also confronted with the strong adherence to the Pacification of Ghent when he began making overtures to the Walloon provinces immediately upon his succession as governor. Although he had not yet received Philip's instructions, Farnese went ahead and proposed reconciliation to the Walloons on his own initiative.⁷ But his envoys to the States of Artois and

Hainaut reported that unless the Pacification was ratified a second time, the Walloons would continue to believe that the king's only reason for accepting it as part of the Perpetual Edict of 1577 had been for him to cover up some 'sinister design'.⁸ When Farnese suggested to Valentin Pardieu de la Motte, the first nobleman to leave the Generality for Don John in the spring of 1578, that the Pacification be made less demanding, La Motte's reply was that the Pacification would have to be accepted in its entirety and without amendments. Only once reconciliation had been secured did La Motte reckon it would be possible to have the treaty modified.⁹

La Motte was right. In January 1579, the city of Lille refused to sign the Union of Arras. The Union established a league comprising Artois, Hainaut and the city of Douai, united for the purpose of upholding the Pacification of Ghent and especially for the defence of Catholicism and reconciliation with the king. The Union amounted to a first formal step towards the dissolution of the Generality and was quickly followed by the Union of Utrecht, which established closer relations between the Northern provinces for the purposes of a joint defence, and which made no mention of either royal authority, maintenance of the Catholic faith or a future reconciliation with the regime. Although the city of Lille was staunchly Catholic and had protested vehemently against the activities of the Gentenaars, their refusal to join the Union of Arras was due to continued fears that Philip would not observe the Pacification and that the foreign troops would not be withdrawn in the event of a reconciliation.¹⁰

Farnese took such sticking points seriously and repeatedly asked Philip for instructions about how to deal with the deadlock. He had already made repeated and generous offers of reconciliation, presented largely as an opportunity for the Walloons to protect their Catholicism, but this had not been enough. Farnese made it clear to Philip that any removal of troops, as demanded by the Pacification, would leave both the Walloon provinces and the regime's position very vulnerable to a rebel attack. But the Walloons were nevertheless adamant that the troops must leave, and this was what the entire reconciliation depended on.¹¹ In order to demonstrate his willingness to abide by the Pacification, he had had his troops removed from the reconciled town of Gravelines whose inhabitants did not like them being there.¹² A month later, in another update to Philip, Farnese wrote that he was returning the letters Philip had written to confirm the reconciliation of the towns under Farnese's control. Instead of referring to the '*réconciliation*' of these towns, the king had used the word '*réduction*' (i.e., reconquest), a wording that Farnese did not think would be acceptable.¹³

As negotiations between Farnese and the Walloon provinces got underway, the other provinces in the Generality offered ominous warnings of what a return to Spanish rule would entail.¹⁴ There was also local opposition to a reconciliation with the regime, no doubt spurred on by the Generality's practice of publishing their accusations in print.¹⁵ In response to such opposition, the Walloon provinces consistently defended their decision to work towards a reconciliation on the grounds that they were merely doing what they had all agreed on in the Pacification.¹⁶ Once their reconciliation was concluded in May 1579, they also published a collection of letters in defence of their decision. As proof that their reconciliation would not violate the Pacification, they included letters from Philip and Farnese promising to ratify it in its entirety, in other words

a promise that the foreign troops would be withdrawn. To establish the point that the Walloon provinces were acting in good faith and not for the purpose of breaking up the Generality, Farnese's invitation for the Generality to reconcile with the regime, sent at the instigation of the Walloon provinces in March 1579, was also included.¹⁷

The Walloon provinces' tenacious insistence on the Pacification to defend their reconciliation is unsurprising. From a Catholic perspective, the Calvinist advances in 1578 came down to a point of legal infraction. The Generality had knowingly defaulted on its obligations by furthering the cause of Calvinism in contravention of the Pacification, their common platform, and its insistence on the maintenance of the religious status quo. The Walloon provinces could then, as the true defenders of the Pacification, seek better protection elsewhere while, importantly, remaining loyal to what they regarded as the true principles of the treaty. This was the line of argument pushed by the regime as the most likely to win the day with the Walloon provinces. It was also reflected in the reconciliation agreement itself, the Treaty of Arras, which was published with an appendix containing the Pacification.¹⁸

These arguments did not provide sophisticated theoretical underpinnings for the reconciliation. However, we need to allow for the possibility that simple arguments were sufficient to convey a strong political message. In the context of an explicit threat from militant Calvinists, the concern was simply to demonstrate how such crimes were unlawful on the basis of the shared legal platform that the Pacification represented. There was no need to elaborate further when the Pacification, which everyone had agreed was the yardstick of righteous political action, could be referred to with ease.

Deceit

But the defence of the reconciliation went further than to point out how the Generality was at fault. In addition to local authorities' own publications, the years of Farnese's reconciliation drive saw the emergence of anonymous pro-regime propagandists, and these put the Generality's failure to uphold Catholicism and abide by the Pacification in a larger and more sinister context. These pamphleteers emerged in the summer of 1580, around the time that Farnese, acting on Philip's explicit instructions, issued a ban on William of Orange, offering a reward to anyone who could kill or catch him.¹⁹ The most striking feature of the pamphlets was that, seemingly taking their cue from the ban itself, they based their pro-regime arguments on the idea that Orange had himself caused the conflict and that he had deceived people into joining his cause.²⁰ To demonstrate his deception, the authors sought to spell out the discrepancy between Orange's fair words and his tyrannical actions.²¹

The harassment suffered by Catholics despite Orange's religious policies of mutual Catholic-Calvinist toleration was particularly elaborated on.²² Although the edict of *Religionsvrede* had explicitly provided for the reintroduction of Catholicism in areas where it had been stamped out and the peaceful coexistence and freedom of worship for all faiths, it was condemned as

pure humbug, as events clearly showed that wherever Calvinists were given an inch, they would proceed, without fail, to take a mile.²³ No attempt was made to differentiate between Orange and the radical Calvinists even though Orange had tried repeatedly to impose moderation, including on the leaders of the Calvinist Republic in Ghent.²⁴ On the contrary, Orange was undeniably:

author, advisor and director of all the insolent excesses and rampant rage of the Gentenaars ... nothing has been committed or perpetrated by the said Gentenaars without the responsibility, consent and instruction of the said Prince.²⁵

Loyalist authors were mapping out a frightening picture of the future that would await all Catholics unless they put up an effective defence against Orange and his cronies. Readers were made aware of how, wherever Orange was in charge, Catholics ran the risk of persecution.²⁶ The crimes in Ghent were, after all, not the first of their kind: the same assaults on priests and regular clergymen, the confiscation of church property and the ban on public Catholic worship, even the downright persecution of Catholics, had already occurred in Holland and Zeeland in 1572 under the auspices of Orange's forces which had then taken control.²⁷

The charge continued. The patriot Orange had also been instrumental in bringing foreign troops back into the country, another flagrant violation of his obligations as a signatory of the Pacification of Ghent. Orange's violation of this point of the Pacification was twofold: not only had he brought in forces from Scotland, England and the Palatinate to serve his own cause, his very rebelliousness was providing the Spanish forces with the best imaginable *raison de rester*.²⁸ In direct contrast to the Pacification's concern to have the foreign forces removed, Orange was repeatedly accused of actually wanting the Spanish troops to remain in the country. It was their presence above all that guaranteed his false claim to be the people's saviour by providing him with an 'enemy'. The chaos ensuing from the continued war effort also served to enrich Orange at the country's expense and might even, it was claimed, serve to force through his appointment as sovereign, or even as 'tyrant of our consciences'.²⁹

These accusations of insatiable ambition were all couched within the theme of deceit. As with any conspiracy theory, the advantage here was, of course, that both the accusations and the actions intended to illustrate them were ultimately unverifiable. If there appeared to be no smoking gun, then that was simply because so far the deception had been working and Orange's words were speaking louder than his actions.³⁰ Conversely, promises that had not been delivered on, such as the protection of Catholics, could be taken as proof of insincere intentions rather than as resulting from divergences in the rebels' approach to religious diversity which were not the responsibility of Orange alone.

The focus on rebel deceit in loyalist publications was so strong that an actual vocabulary of deceit was generated. This vocabulary often served to direct the loyalist argumentation of the pamphlet in question. To begin with, the loyalist author's motivation for writing was frequently depicted in terms such as a need to 'uncover', 'disclose' and 'reveal' the real plans Orange was harbouring, so that the States General and the poor commonalty could 'open their eyes', step out

of their 'blindness' or, alternatively, 'remove the blinds' or the 'mask' that Orange had put in front of their eyes.³¹ The remainder of the text then took the form of, at least in part, a refutation of Orange's false rhetoric.

The vocabulary of deceit was not only a way of labelling Orange a fraudster, a fox, a master of trickery or a sad hypocrite, it was also the primary loyalist method of engaging with the rebel discourse of freedom and a return to the privileges.³² Against a background of Alva's heavy-handed military oppression, loyalists wanting to retain their credibility could not counter rebel calls for liberty and respect for the privileges by simply setting up the regime as an unproblematic and obviously better alternative, especially as Alva's terror continued to be drawn upon as an argument against reconciliation. One rebel pamphlet from 1581 provided a detailed description of the events surrounding Alva's sack of Mechelen in 1572 as an example of what could be expected from Spanish rule. The author also referred to the presence of Walloons in Alva's marauding army, thus tarnishing the reconciled population with the same brush that had previously been reserved for Spaniards alone.³³ Perhaps even more importantly, many royalist Catholics also retained a very low opinion of Alva and his policies, and so for the regime to continue in the same vein would be tantamount to alienating its most loyal supporters.³⁴ Detailed accusations of deceit against Orange presented a way out of this argumentative deadlock. If loyalist authors could demonstrate that Orange meant nothing by his fair words of freedom and privileges, then it would be Orange and his rebel regime that would be proven guilty of tyrannical crimes and ambitions, and the job of convincing people that they were, after all, better off under Philip would be half-done.³⁵

The vocabulary of deceit also allowed loyalist authors to reverse rebel discourse and appropriate parts of it for themselves. Orange's deceitfulness and ambition meant that loyalists could condemn him for being a false patriot who acted out of concern for his own interests only and, by implication, set themselves up instead as the real patriots.³⁶ Orange's German origins allowed loyalist authors to turn the rebel emphasis on the horrors of foreign rule back onto the rebels themselves by presenting Orange as a foreign usurper. More generally, however, his foreign origins appeared as a satirical shorthand for his name ('this foreigner', 'this German beggar' or 'German bastard patriot'), serving as a reminder of the insincerity of his patriotism rather than as a basis for a xenophobic argument.³⁷ And indeed, loyalist authors could only with difficulty have entered into an argument based on national origins. Philip's Spanish background would obviously have been too big a pill to sugar in light of the identification between 'Spanish' and 'tyrannical', and instead it was his legitimacy that was stressed, together with his and his predecessors' great beneficence and ability to secure prosperity.³⁸

Regime involvement

Although there is no hard evidence to link the anti-Orange pamphleteering of the early 1580s directly to members of the regime, a number of circumstances suggest that this propaganda campaign was orchestrated from within Farnese's own circle. First, both the pamphlets' discourse of

deceit and the various accusations made against Orange closely mirrored the views of the rebel leader that were repeatedly expressed in the correspondence between leading members of the regime. Cardinal Granvelle frequently referred to Orange's 'tricks and ... fair words', his 'guilty tricks' serving to ruin the Catholic faith, his aims of self-aggrandizement, how he had only ever acted to serve his own interests while giving the impression that he was guided by a concern for the public good as well as how he used peace as a lure while doing all in his power to prevent its conclusion.³⁹ There was also frequent use of terms such as the need to 'open eyes' and, conversely, how Orange had 'blinded the world', together with references to his foreign origins.⁴⁰ Moreover, both Granvelle and other leading loyalists noted the effect of propaganda, with Granvelle even making the explicit point that it would be necessary to 'regain the hearts of the subjects' should the reconciliation have a future. The cardinal also suggested to Farnese that he make known to the people of the country how much the king desired to show his clemency and open his arms to them.⁴¹

Secondly, the similarities between the ban against Orange, itself a propagandistic text emphasising Orange's deception, on the one hand, and the other anti-Orange pamphlets suggest that if these were not all authored by the same person, then the different authors were at least very aware of the anti-Orange arguments that were being made by others at the same time. What is more, the chronology of the ban's publication suggests that the author(s) of the two anti-Orange pamphlets, *Le renart decouvert* and *Le retour de la concorde*, published more or less simultaneously with the ban, may have been familiar with the text of the ban before it was actually publicly proclaimed.

The process to have the ban published was a lengthy one: Philip proposed the idea to Farnese in a letter dated 30 November 1579, and also provided details of the arguments he wanted used in the text. A draft was sent to Philip in the spring, and the king returned it to Brussels with a few amendments on 1 May 1580. Although the printed text of the ban bore the date 15 March 1580, Farnese's accompanying letter to provincial authorities was not dated until 15 June, and the ban and the letter were not dispatched until late August.⁴² By that time, *Le renart decouvert* and *Le retour de la concorde*, both of which echoed the charge that Orange alone was to blame for the conflict and elaborated on his deceit, had in all likelihood already been published. These two pamphlets were both composed between late July and early August, and although the exact moment of printing cannot be established, as pamphlets referring to the current political situation they are likely to have been printed quickly.⁴³

If this was the case, then we must ask whether it was pure coincidence that two pamphlets that backed up the accusations made in the ban were published to virtually coincide with it. Given that Don John's close advisors seem to have been responsible for the pro-regime pamphlets that appeared during his governorship and that some of them were now members of Farnese's circle, it is possible that the anti-Orange authors who published their pamphlets in the summer of 1580 were the very same men who had previously argued Don John's case. If so, the privy councillor Christophe d'Assonleville is one likely candidate. He is known to have encouraged the ban on Orange, and was believed by Granvelle to be the author behind the most extensive defence

of Don John already in 1577.⁴⁴ D'Assonleville is also believed to have composed an anti-Orange pamphlet that appeared shortly after the proclamation of the ban in 1580.⁴⁵ He also kept up a regular correspondence with Margaret of Parma and favoured her return to the government of the Low Countries, as was planned in the summer of 1580. It is possible, therefore, that he was the author behind *Le retour de la concorde*, which looked forward to Margaret's return and the peace and prosperity she would bring with her.⁴⁶ *Le renart decouvert*, on the other hand, has been attributed to Jean Richardot, a jurist who had recently reconciled and was trying to rehabilitate his image and position within the regime.⁴⁷ If these traditional attributions are correct, then it seems the anti-Orange pamphleteering campaign that began in earnest in 1580 had indeed originated from within the regime itself, and was designed to back up the ban.

The alternative would have to be that both *Le renart decouvert* and *Le retour de la concorde* were written by someone who picked up the same line of argument as used in the ban and coincidentally happened to get it printed just before the ban appeared. The late 1570s saw the emergence of several songs that ridiculed Orange and his moral high ground, and thus there may very well have been arguments in circulation that authors without connections with the regime could pick up on.⁴⁸ But the chronology makes this difficult to believe. Prior to the summer of 1580, no pamphlets with detailed accusations against Orange had been published. For different authors to publish highly similar pamphlets of this sort completely independently of each other at more or less the exact same time must therefore be said to stretch the limits of the probable.

The suggested close involvement of the regime with the anti-Orange pamphlets of the early 1580s cannot be proven definitively. But their active letter campaign to persuade Catholic nobles on the side of the Generality to reconcile certainly can be well documented. Both Farnese himself, his mother Margaret – for a while intended as governor-general for a second time – and Granvelle wrote such letters and it is also clear that they cooperated on how to write them.⁴⁹ Granvelle had already in June 1578 outlined the importance of appealing to the nobles' fears of Orange's reliance on commoners.⁵⁰ In Ghent and all the cities that had undergone a more or less forced Calvinist revolution, members of the local magistracies had been brought to Ghent by force while Calvinist burghers took their place.⁵¹ Among Catholics and nobles there were fears that Ghent was going to turn into a second Geneva where both Catholicism and aristocratic political influence were stamped out in one stroke.⁵²

Granvelle used these fears to the full in his three letters to the Duke of Aerschot, persuading him to reconcile. He explained his motivation for writing as being due to his affection for both Aerschot and 'the whole fatherland'.⁵³ There then followed an elaboration of the differences between the consequences of rebel rule and those of a reconciliation with Philip. Rebel rule would mean the loss of aristocratic and ecclesiastical authority, and the rise of every odd butcher and innkeeper along the lines of what had happened in Switzerland. Granvelle also said he was aware of how Aerschot and other nobles were held as slaves and would risk their lives if they did not comply with Orange's wishes.⁵⁴ Orange was a foreigner and a false patriot who was aiming at absolute power for himself and was tyrannising the country with his foreign troops.⁵⁵ This was in direct contrast to Philip who, although the Spanish troops would have been useful against the

tyrannical Orange, would take steps to have them withdrawn in order to prevent any cause for resentment.⁵⁶ The king was also offering to forget the past and confirm the privilege that foreigners would be excluded from office. The only two conditions were that Catholicism be upheld and the king's authority preserved, 'bridled and limited, as you know, by the privileges'.⁵⁷ Granvelle's persuasive tactics were conscious: in an update to Philip a few days after the first letter to Aerschot had been dispatched, the Cardinal mentioned that he had written to Aerschot, and that he had demonstrated Philip's willingness to forgive and forget.⁵⁸ Similarly, Farnese wrote to several nobles and offered rewards and offices in return for their reconciliation.⁵⁹

Given the similarities between the anti-Orange pamphlets on the one hand, and the correspondence between different members of the regime and the letter campaign to the Catholic nobles on the other, it seems possible that the regime was actively involved in a campaign of persuasion through different media. They had become involved in pamphleteering during Don John's short-lived governorship and, as rebel accusations did not cease, there can have been no reason why the involvement should not have continued, especially as there was considerable overlap between Don John's advisors, the probable authors of these early pamphlets, and those of Farnese. If this was the case, then it seems the regime's propaganda efforts had finally come of age: the anti-Swiss arguments were only used in the personal letters to the nobles, whereas the pamphlets available to the wider public put a greater stress on Orange's deceit and various crimes.

A critical test of the relationship between the regime and the reconciled aristocracy as well as the sincerity of Farnese's promises, came in the summer of 1580. In June, Guillaume Hornes, the Lord of Hèze, was discovered to be plotting to let the Duke of Anjou, by then the ally and protector of the rebel Generality, take control of Mons.⁶⁰ There were also strong indications that there had been plans to capture Farnese himself.⁶¹ Confronted with an aristocracy that was still sceptical towards the regime, it was important that the treatment meted out to Hèze did not become a cause for further alienation.⁶² This was, after all, a case where a high noble appeared to be guilty of nothing less than treason, exactly what they had all, strictly speaking, been guilty of prior to their reconciliation. It was therefore necessary to demonstrate that bygones were indeed bygones, and to not give any cause for suspicion that a desire for vengeance for past crimes was being allowed to interfere with the judgement of Hèze. At the same time it was important to make clear that in the new post-reconciliation relationship between the regime and the nobles, plans hatched against royal rule would still count as treason and would be treated as such.

Farnese was highly conscious of what was at stake. Although lamenting the patience he would have to demonstrate, he wrote to Philip that he was taking measures to prove that the promise to forget the past had been sincere.⁶³ He was therefore not relying on old loyalists in dealing with the case, as this could cause suspicion of revenge or injustice, a precaution that Philip approved of.⁶⁴ The tribunal that presided over the trial, which took place in Hèze's hometown of Le Quesnoy, did in fact consist only of men who were now members of the reconciled provincial councils but who, importantly, had all been on the side of the Generality up until the Walloon reconciliation.⁶⁵ Farnese not only bound himself to their decision, he also extended the formalities in order to establish Hèze's guilt beyond all doubt.⁶⁶ Once the investigation was

over, Farnese even had the whole dossier sent to the Privy Council and the Council of State in order that they might see that there had been no irregularities.⁶⁷ Thus, he also made a gesture of recognition with regard to the authority of these traditional institutions of government that the nobles liked to see as their domain, but which had previously had their wings clipped by Alva.

Farnese's fairness and circumspection were also advertised to a wider public with the publication of a pamphlet relating Hèze's plot, its disclosure and the ensuing trial, sentence and execution.⁶⁸ On the last page it was pointed out how the judgement, expressed in the king's name, had been reached on the advice of the president and members of the Grand Council (the highest tribunal in the Habsburg Low Countries), as well as the Councils of Flanders, Artois, Hainaut and the judicial authorities in Lille. Finally it had all been reviewed in the Privy Council, and a report had been made to the Council of State.⁶⁹ Hèze's trial, then, became an opportunity to showcase the regime's sincerity and trustworthiness, both of which were advertised on different levels: firsthand to the nobles, as a number of them were themselves personally involved in the trial, and indirectly to the public at large by means of a pamphlet.

Did these precautions work as ways to confirm the regime's goodwill with regard to its reconciled subjects? Farnese himself certainly thought so, as he reported to Philip that people had approved of the way justice had been done.⁷⁰ Although he may have been more positive about the results of his own endeavours than was actually warranted, the viewpoints of an independent contemporary support his positive report. A soldier in the royal army recorded the event in his diary and noted that Hèze was tried by men who were members of the king's councils and chosen because they were 'agreeable and in no way suspect to the reconciled provinces, in order to eliminate all suspicions of bias; so much did the prince [Farnese] endeavour to not give them any cause for discontent'.⁷¹

Clemency

Just as Farnese took pains during Hèze's trial to establish an image of the regime as fair and conciliatory, so the treaties he negotiated with the cities that were reconciled sought to do the same. Between 1578 and the fall of Antwerp in August 1585, more than seventy places were brought back into the royal fold.⁷² Far from all of these reconciliations were published in print, but they all followed a virtually identical pattern that had first been launched during the failed peace negotiations at Cologne in 1579.⁷³ To begin with, they all included a statement that the crimes committed in the previous troubles would be 'forgotten forever'. Everyone was forbidden to make any mention whatsoever of these crimes or to prosecute anyone for them on pain of punishment for violating the public peace.⁷⁴

This 'forgive and forget' strategy differed significantly from the massacres of deterrence that Alva had conducted ten years previously. Although most of the major cities that reconciled after 1579 did so only after a prolonged military siege and efforts to starve them into submission, Farnese did not generally allow his troops to sack the different towns. After the capture of Tournai in 1581, he had managed to persuade the Walloon states to allow the return of the foreign

troops, who had all been withdrawn after the Treaty of Arras, on the grounds that they could not adequately defend themselves. Despite the escalation of war, however, in public he continued to always refer to 'reconciliations' rather than 'reconquests' or 'reductions'.⁷⁵ At the start of the reconciliation campaign in 1578 and 1579, towns and villages were still being sacked (although not as a matter of course), as was the case with Maastricht in June 1579. But this dichotomy – repeated sackings in the early years coupled with a strong discourse of clemency – can be explained by the concern to establish a reputation of military strength. Paradoxically, the discourse of reconciliation was powerful precisely because Farnese's military power would have allowed him not to be reconciliatory should he have wanted to.⁷⁶ Granvelle, for one, understood this very clearly when he explained to Farnese why he thought a general pardon would be desirable: the people 'will recognise that the king's clemency is an effect of his pure goodness, given that he grants it to them at a time when he holds their fate in his hand'.⁷⁷ It was precisely the knowledge that the regime's reconciliatory approach hinged on Farnese and the king's word of honour, and only that, that made it powerful.⁷⁸

Farnese had great faith in his strategy of clemency and even expressed hopes for a reconciliation 'snowball effect' as more and more towns submitted. The town of Mechelen, for instance, declared itself willing to reconcile in the summer of 1579 on the same terms that had recently been granted to the Walloon provinces. In this case, Farnese had brought no military pressure to bear on the town. In fact, the Generality's forces were much closer than the royal army and, as the city authorities feared their reprisals, they asked the governor for his permission to reconcile in secret. Farnese, however, insisted reconciliation be immediate and public, and Mechelen ended up consenting.⁷⁹ Events were to prove him right: the Catholic reaction against the Calvinist magistracies in both Bruges and 's-Hertogenbosch was reported to have been triggered by the news of the fall of Maastricht and Mechelen.⁸⁰ This was exactly what Farnese had wanted, although it may very well be that in these two cases the violent capture of Maastricht was even more effective than the clemency shown to Mechelen.

Another practice that flew in the face of both rebel scaremongering and the example set by Alva were the periods of grace that the governor granted to the Protestants of reconciling cities. These were periods of varying lengths during which the resident Protestants were free to live in the city provided they did not cause any 'scandal'. If they wanted to remain in the city after the grace period was over, however, they would have to convert to Catholicism. Those who wanted to keep their faith were free to emigrate, in which case they could freely dispose of their property as they themselves saw fit. As Violet Soen has pointed out, Farnese's offers of periods of grace turned the previous pattern of reconciliation upside-down: whereas Catholicity had been taken to be the proof of loyalty *par excellence* under previous governors and no peace or pardon had been granted without that condition having first been met, Farnese now procured immediate cessation of hostilities by offering a political pardon without demanding religious proof.⁸¹ The pardon included in the reconciliation treaty was also more generous than either of the two general pardons that Philip had granted previously in the conflict. Whereas these had excluded both named individuals and entire categories of people, the reconciliation pardon did not. Even

in the city of Ypres, which was granted the harshest terms of all, the soldiers of the garrison were allowed to leave in peace and the population was granted a pardon while the local rebel leaders were handed over to be dealt with at Farnese's discretion. They also had to pay 100,000 florins to avoid the sack. And there was no sack. Farnese also spared the lives of the hostages and allowed them their liberty in exchange for loyalist prisoners.⁸² Even when he was strict, then, Farnese persisted in proceeding with clemency first and foremost, precisely in order to avoid being seen as another Alva.⁸³

There was, however, a steely edge underneath all the clemency. In the later reconciliation treaties, concluded with the biggest and most obstinate rebel towns such as Bruges, Ghent, Brussels and Antwerp, the 'forgive and forget' article also contained a list of which crimes exactly it was that were being forgiven. In the treaty with Bruges, for instance, this list included the abjuration of Philip and the acceptance of a new prince, all of which were crimes of *lèse majesté* and against divine and human law.⁸⁴ The treaty with Brussels even included something of a diatribe stating that although the excesses and abuses that had been committed deserved the most severe and rigorous punishment, His Majesty nevertheless wanted to demonstrate his clemency and outdo the offences of his subjects with his own goodness.⁸⁵ There could be no doubt, then, about the magnitude of the crimes that the populations of these cities were being forgiven for, but nor could there be any doubt about the magnitude of the clemency they were nevertheless allowed to enjoy.

As though to confirm the conciliatory and generous image of the regime presented in the treaties, several of the reconciliation offers that were made to different rebel towns, but which were not taken up, were publicised in print. The offer letters were similar to the treaties in that they emphasised the benefits of reconciliation and made references to Philip's great goodness. Printers working in rebel towns printed some of them, but in that case always together with the negative rebel reply that had been sent back to Farnese.⁸⁶ More often they were published by printers working in loyal cities.⁸⁷ These letters, upon publication, became not so much destined for their primary addressee – the authorities of the rebel city in question – as for the public readership that read them in print. Readers of these letters became their addressees too, and as such were ultimately in the position of judge and witness at the same time.⁸⁸ As judges they would formulate an opinion on the contents of the letter; as witnesses they would register that such letters were actually being sent. For Farnese, then, these letters served as proof of both his own and the regime's credentials, presented to different rebel town councils in private *and* to the population in public. Given that their publication and distribution within rebel territory were beyond Farnese's control, and all bar one of the loyalist publications appeared in French only, it seems that they functioned more to shore up the image of the regime as a force for good among the already reconciled population than as a means to sway sceptical rebels.

For printers, these letters were certainly a welcome source of money, as they allowed them to profit from people's hunger for news. But their actual ability to publish such letters depended on the regime's passing on a copy for them to print in the first place. Given that this occurred on several occasions, such publications must have conformed with a profile that the regime was happy to have of itself.⁸⁹

As was the case with the reconciliation treaties, the offer letters also had a steely bottom line. They were all offers to reconcile and the letters were clear that this would involve 'no hard feelings', but there was also an 'or else' clause. Significantly, the 'or else' did not involve a threat of massacres or destruction of the kind Alva had indulged in. On the contrary, Farnese would strongly regret having to continue the war, but would remain obliged to defend the king's subjects and so the conflict would continue.⁹⁰ More serious, but ultimately not in the hands of either Farnese or Philip, was the echo of Romans 13, namely the promise of the vengeance that divine justice would wreak on those not accepting their lawful and natural prince.⁹¹

Like all other loyalist pamphleteering, the offer letters also relied on a discourse of deceit. In conveying a reconciliatory image of the regime, the theme of deceit was useful in that it allowed for a distinction between Orange as the single evil genius on the one hand, and the rest of the rebel population, who were all just victims of his deceit, on the other, thus giving the illusion that the rebel population and the Habsburg regime had really been on the same side all along.⁹² The decision to single Orange out for blame was conscious. When Philip ordered Farnese to issue a ban on Orange, he stated that the purpose was to make clear that 'the war is against him alone' and that it would be an opportunity 'to make him [Orange] odious, as the one who is the cause of all the evil'.⁹³ Granvelle was even more explicit in a reference to the ban in a later letter to Vicar-General Morillon. Writing that they would have to see whether a similar ban could be issued against those who persisted in assisting Orange, he added: 'as it is against him alone that we address ourselves'.⁹⁴ Singling Orange out was obviously important enough to point out specifically, and the idea that other rebel leaders might also end up with a price on their head suggests that the regime was fully aware that these were equally guilty, but that they nevertheless consciously chose to target Orange on his own. As no similar bans were issued, the illusion of Orange's sole responsibility was kept up.

Indeed, to target Orange continued to be a useful tactic even after his death. Thus, in Farnese's offer letter to the Antwerp authorities, written a few months after Orange's assassination, he stated how it was obvious to even 'the most ignorant' that those who only sought their own interests were the cause of the troubles.⁹⁵ Unlike the anti-Orangist pamphlets published before Orange's death, the references to the actions that had caused the trouble and ruin of the country were all in the present perfect tense (*the passé composé*), used to indicate completed actions. In those written before Orange's death, such actions were referred to in the present tense – in other words they were seen to still be happening. The implication of the change in grammatical tense was that the rebel Antwerp city council was not itself responsible for the war. On the contrary: they were now finally free from the yoke and could seek their own '*salut*' in a reconciliation with the king.⁹⁶ The continued use of Orange as the scapegoat served the purpose of separating the rest of the population from Orange and his blame for the war. They could then come out of it as victims rather than as perpetrators, while the regime's conciliatory image was reinforced.

Response

Farnese's reconciliation discourse was strikingly novel compared to that of his predecessors, but was it persuasive? Farnese himself had great faith in his clemency strategy, and the regime's cause benefitted from several factors. First, several of the rebel cities that found themselves under siege by the royal army were internally divided, as local Catholics were more or less openly hostile to their rebel Calvinist magistracy. Thus, Guillaume Weydts, a Catholic tailor from Bruges, recorded the active resistance on the part of many Catholics when they were asked to swear an oath to resist Philip as an enemy of the country after the States General had issued the Act of Abjuration in July 1581. Many refused to reject their king even though they were then forced to leave the city within twenty-four hours and face the marauding troops in the countryside at their own peril.⁹⁷ Much the same happened in Ghent, although resistance appears to have been less intense here than in Bruges where the magistracy had to postpone the oath 'for fear of a popular riot'.⁹⁸

The divisions in rebel cities were largely due to Catholics' religious grievances, as the new Calvinist magistracies had pushed through bans on worship. In Bruges, both priests and laity continued to worship in secret, but this was dangerous and could even lead to a fatal end. In October 1578, for example, a couple secretly tried to marry according to Catholic rites, but during the ceremony they were discovered by a group of Calvinist soldiers. The priest was killed.⁹⁹ Weydts certainly despised the Calvinist lawmakers, and a couple of times he referred to their anti-Catholic measures as being the products of their 'arseholes' ('schytgad').¹⁰⁰ Jan van den Vivere, a Catholic in Ghent, repeatedly lamented the imprisonment and expulsion of Catholics and blamed the Calvinists for the entire conflict:

Think about, dear reader, the situation we are in because of the hard heads of the Beggars who rule over us, which the ministers or Beggar preachers brought about, eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the poor people ... For all these miseries, poverty and great troubles of war we must thank the Beggars, even though they want to lay the blame on the Spaniards or the clergy, ... because the clergy did not cause this; and the Spaniards were not the first reason for it, as they only came to the country after the Beggars had first caused trouble by plundering and destroying churches and monasteries.¹⁰¹

Secondly, acute war-weariness and the Generality's failure to improve their military situation made people susceptible to offers of peace. The diaries leave no doubt about the tremendous hardship suffered by the population in the rebel cities as Farnese's armies besieged them. Troops plundered and killed in the countryside, causing peasants to flee to the nearby cities which consequently became fuller at a time when supplies were short. There was also plague, food prices rose, and most of the new immigrants were living (or dying) in the streets.¹⁰² Strikingly, at least the Catholic diarists were blaming the Generality's own troops for these problems as much as they were blaming the royal army. Van den Vivere wrote several times that the Generality's own forces, meant to be their friends, were far worse than the king's troops.¹⁰³ His views were later echoed in a pamphlet written by Granvelle's brother, Frédéric Perrenot, Lord of Champagney.¹⁰⁴ In Brussels, Jan de Pottre was convinced the Generality's troops were only interested in plunder-

ing and that Tempele, the city governor, was the one responsible. After all, he was said to receive five percent of all booty himself. De Pottre was anything but impressed with Orange who had appointed Tempele, but noted, in French, that servants tended to behave like their masters.¹⁰⁵

Orange's popularity was certainly waning. De Pottre spoke of him as a thief and blamed him for the persecution suffered by Catholics. He was also not impressed by his military leadership, as Orange remained in Antwerp and far from the firing line.¹⁰⁶ For his part, Weydts was anything but persuaded by Orange's attempts to prevent Bruges from concluding a peace with Farnese: Orange warned them of Spanish tyranny, but he said nothing of the one they were already suffering under 'the Lutherans and ... Calvin'.¹⁰⁷

De Pottre and Weydts were both Catholics, but Orange's popularity was suffering even among Protestants. In August 1579, the magistracy in Ghent forbade anyone to publish pamphlets that ridiculed the prince, and it was also forbidden to spread negative rumours about him.¹⁰⁸ Orange's attempts to secure the Duke of Anjou's support were particularly damaging to his reputation.¹⁰⁹ The Duke had been courted as a way of securing French military aid against Philip, and there had also been attempts to get France to declare war on Spain. In August 1578, Anjou had been appointed 'Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries' by the States General in return for 12,000 troops, and in January 1581 he was sworn in as 'prince and lord of the Netherlands'.¹¹⁰ Although he was appointed to replace Philip, the Generality had refused to yield to the French negotiators' request that the word 'sovereign' be added to the title of 'prince and lord' on the grounds that the word 'sovereign' did not exist in Dutch and that it was an unnecessary addition. If 'sovereign' was taken to mean 'highest lord', then that was already covered by the title 'prince and lord'. If, however, 'sovereign' was to indicate that Anjou would possess absolute power, the deputies claimed that such a concession had never been granted to any prince, and that to do so would be contrary to their privileges.¹¹¹

But both Anjou's Catholicism, which his Calvinist host cities were required to accommodate, and the presence of French troops meant that his role remained unpopular. Holland and Zeeland simply refused to recognise him and instead contented themselves with entering into a union with the provinces under his rule.¹¹² Although he was sworn in with great pomp in February 1582 and celebrated as a peacemaker, his authority still did not equal that of Orange.¹¹³ In a desperate attempt to improve his own position, Anjou resolved to seize control of Antwerp and a number of Flemish towns. When the enterprise failed, his position was completely undermined. Orange's reputation also took a beating, as he was accused of having condoned Anjou's attack on Antwerp, which became known as the French Fury. The provinces now refused to admit French troops and, for the first time, committed Protestants also argued for a reconciliation with Philip, claiming that a French tyranny would be far worse than a return to Spanish rule.¹¹⁴ In his anonymous pamphlet, Champagney stated that he had as much faith in Anjou's so-called good intentions as he had in his chances 'of seeing a bull fly', and Orange's attempt to have Anjou rehabilitated was turned down on the grounds that it would be better to live under an 'old father' than a 'new betrayer'.¹¹⁵ In Bruges, Weydts had heard rumours that the citizens of Antwerp were shouting 'We will rather reconcile with the Walloons.'¹¹⁶

Farnese sought to take advantage of such discontent by sending more offer letters to the rebel cities. He stressed that they were no longer under any obligation to remain loyal to Orange, as he had forfeited their trust by supporting Anjou.¹¹⁷ Pro-regime pamphlets also blamed Orange for the French Fury, while arguing that this incident was just the latest in a long history of deceit.¹¹⁸

The discontent and internal divisions in the Generality's camp must have made people more susceptible to Farnese's offers of peace. But what were their reactions to the generous peace treaties he kept offering? The news of the different towns' reconciliation agreements certainly circulated, as can be seen from the way all the diarists specifically noted that they were surrendering on terms. Weydts noted that Farnese's generous terms to Tournai, the first city where they were issued, were met with astonishment.¹¹⁹ When Oudenaarde succumbed to Farnese's forces in July 1582, Van den Vivere thought it was a 'great mercy' that everyone, both inhabitants and rebel troops, had been spared.¹²⁰ What was more, he was particularly impressed by how Protestants were allowed to leave freely: many of those who could not accept an end to Calvinist worship came to Ghent:

not because they had to or because they were sent out of the city or banned in the same way as Catholics are tyrannically kicked out the gates here in Ghent, without even being allowed to speak to their wives and children, ... but [they] left because they could no longer practise their religion or because they were no longer allowed to plunder the churches and the property of the clergy or other Catholic people that was up for grabs. In short: they left of their own accord, each knowing his own reasons. Thus, they were treated more graciously than they [themselves] treated Catholics.¹²¹

In fact, rebel leaders appear to have been worried about people's positive reactions to the reconciliations. In Ghent, the local magistracy organised festivities to celebrate what they claimed was the relief of Tournai. The scam, probably organised to raise rebel morale by covering up yet another defeat, was only discovered two days later when Protestants from Tournai arrived in Ghent.¹²²

Farnese's consistent use of clemency won him extra support. The consistency was widely noted and strengthened the argument of the 'peace wishers' (*'peiswillers'*), as the prospect of a generous peace treaty became a powerful argument for surrender as sieges got underway. A pro-peace memo written in Antwerp in 1584 noted that Farnese had been offering peace again and again, but also that the regime had shown itself to be trustworthy. Unlike the rebels, it had stood by its promises.¹²³ The Protestants of Antwerp could expect the same leniency as had been granted the Protestants of Bruges.¹²⁴ Van den Vivere recorded that the decision in Ghent to finally negotiate for peace was received with joy, as Farnese 'had accomplished all his victories without bloodshed, for which he was much praised'.¹²⁵ The expectation was clearly that they would be granted the same treatment.

In some ways, the impact of Farnese's reconciliation policy is surprising. The royal troops were generally no better behaved than their counterparts in the States General's army, and Wey-

dts in particular noted the many times they plundered, killed peasants and burned down homes.¹²⁶ Given that such behaviour was systematic, and even a necessary part of Farnese's strategy of packing towns full of refugees before any given siege got underway, the great favour he earned by not putting surrendering towns to the sack seems almost paradoxical. After all, the troops that were behaving well at the end of every siege were the very same ones who would soon be ruining the lives of yet more peasants as the campaign resumed. But it seems people were well versed in the laws of war. They expected troops to behave badly (and knew that those of the Generality and their foreign allies were no better), and they also knew that active resistance could legitimately be punished by sackings. Indeed, Alva's practice had taught them that this was what they could expect. Against this background, Farnese proved to be exceptional. Not only did he completely go against the grain of legitimate military practice, his repeated use of clemency represented a clear departure from the example set by Alva which the rebels still relied on as argumentative fodder against reconciliation.¹²⁷

The immediate return of Catholic worship was obviously something that reinforced Catholic support for the regime. The quick return of the expelled clergy, monks and nuns absolutely delighted Catholics, and the masses that were celebrated once churches had been cleaned and reconsecrated were very well attended.¹²⁸ Judging from Weydt's diary, the cleaning of the churches in Bruges, full of 'shit and ... rubbish', was undertaken by community volunteers, presumably happy that their old churches could once again be used for Catholic worship.¹²⁹

The strengthening of Catholic religious institutions was a conscious policy. In 1580, the year after the Walloon provinces had reconciled, Farnese ordered the establishment of a comprehensive Sunday school system particularly aimed at children too poor to attend the normal schools.¹³⁰ The aim was not just to strengthen people's faith, but also to root out the possibility of future disobedience and rebellion. In the words of an edict from Valenciennes: there is no 'better, nor more prompt means of chasing away and exterminating the heresies (to tell the truth, the principal cause of the said disobedience) than by good instruction of the youth in the points and articles of our holy faith'.¹³¹ For this reason, the Sunday schools only taught reading and writing once the basics of the faith had been mastered. Children were not going to be given the occasion to read their own way into heresy, as explicitly pointed out in the Valenciennes school regulations.¹³²

The desire to restore Catholic orthodoxy in order to secure political obedience is also indicated by Farnese's practice of sending the clergy, often Jesuits, into the newly reconciled towns.¹³³ In 1579, he called upon the Jesuits to begin work in Maastricht after his victory there, and after the fall of Tournai he ensured the immediate reconstruction of the town's Jesuit house.¹³⁴ In 1581, the bishop of Ruremonde was ordered to go to Breda to investigate the state of Catholicism after Calvinist rule, and also to restore church services and pastoral care. This was necessary, Farnese wrote, as Breda had been 'badly corrupted by the tricks of the Prince of Orange and the seduction of the heretics'.¹³⁵ In June 1585, two months before Antwerp finally surrendered, he had meetings with the papal nuncio Bonhomini about how to proceed with the restoration of Catholicism in Antwerp once the siege was successfully concluded.¹³⁶ In fact, the number of Jesuit

colleges doubled during Farnese's governorship, and the new establishments were, unlike previously, mostly set up at the initiative of local municipalities actively encouraged by the governor. Thus, the newly restored Catholic magistracies of Ypres, Ghent and Kortrijk were among those who themselves requested a Jesuit college, whereas Brussels and Mons only did so after pressure from Farnese.¹³⁷ Clearly, then, the common platform shared by Catholics and the regime was to be strengthened, and the simultaneous voluntary emigration of large numbers of Calvinists to the rebel provinces must have facilitated this process by eliminating dissenting voices.¹³⁸

Political thought

Although the reconciliation period saw the first large-scale pamphleteering campaign on behalf of the regime, there was no attempt to either catch up with or systematically respond to the rebel political thought that had been developing since the mid-1560s. The rebels' slogans of freedom, privileges and a constitutionally condoned right to resist went unanswered, as did the debates on sovereignty that accompanied the process of abjuring Philip and replacing him with Anjou.¹³⁹ The only exception to this rule is an anonymous pro-reconciliation memo written in Antwerp in 1584. The memo argued strongly against the right to resist, and included a royalist analysis of the Joyous Entry of Brabant, the charter that rebel propaganda claimed condoned resistance against a legitimate sovereign. The author was adamant that they could only refuse obedience insofar as the sovereign had violated specific promises and only until such a time as he had mended his ways 'as is written word for word in Article 58 of the Joyous Entry', and which was indeed all the charter allowed.¹⁴⁰ But the memo, whose author and circulation remain unknown, was exceptional in offering this kind of detailed counter-argument, and although it demonstrates that royalists were aware of the rebel use and abuse of the Joyous Entry, they were not reflected in pamphleteering.

Instead, loyalist authors again resorted to the vocabulary of deceit. By pointing to Orange's trickery, they sought to prove that his rhetoric of regaining the freedom the country had always enjoyed was nothing more than a cover-up. His real ambition was to set himself up as an absolute power. The vocabulary of deceit allowed loyalist authors to appropriate the rebel discourse of liberty for themselves: although Orange talked about freedom, he was actually pursuing tyranny. The regime, on the other hand, had always upheld traditional liberty (what exactly this was remained vague), and Philip was no different in this respect.¹⁴¹ Freedom, then, was far better secured under Philip than under the rebel government, whose notions of liberty of conscience were both insincere (Catholics were being persecuted) and entailed nothing but chaos.¹⁴²

The closest loyalist authors came to providing a theoretical framework for their rejection of Orange and the rebel regime was by frequent references to Romans 13. This did not generally take the form of explicit mentions of the biblical verse and its assertion that 'the powers that be are ordained by God', but instead involved references to Philip's divine support and that loyalty to him was in accordance with the laws of God. There were a few exceptions to this rule: *Vant Swingelsche Calff* quoted Romans 13 in full in order to demonstrate that to reject Philip, 'our

most gracious king and natural lord', and instead appoint Anjou to replace him, was to violate this divine command.¹⁴³ Similarly, in 1582, Michael Baius, theology professor at Leuven, issued a pamphlet to argue against the oath against Philip which the rebel Antwerp authorities had begun to require of the city's Catholics as a condition for their continued right to worship. Although Baius did not name the biblical verse explicitly, he did say that 'all power comes from God even when it is tyrannical', thus taking Romans 13 to its ultimate conclusion.¹⁴⁴ The rebel authorities of Antwerp had thus been proved wrong by their own argument that Philip's tyranny forfeited him his rights as sovereign: Baius was clear that even had this been true, it would still not have sufficed as a way to legally depose Philip. To illustrate his argument he made the analogy that even when a woman was abused by her husband, it was her duty to stick by him.¹⁴⁵

In the pamphlet literature, Baius was exceptional in taking Romans 13 to its potentially unattractive conclusion. More often, loyalist authors remained content to simply connect resistance to Philip with crimes against God that could expect divine punishment sooner or later, or to stress that royal authority belonged to Philip by divine and human laws and that, this being the case, he could legitimately demand obedience.¹⁴⁶ The references to Philip's legitimacy were never elaborated on through any discussion of the nature and purpose of kingship that appeared in the monarchomach literature of the same period, possibly because loyalist authors thought the truth of the statement that kings enjoyed their authority by virtue of God's grace was obvious in its own right.¹⁴⁷

The logic behind Romans 13 was used as an axiomatic commonplace that did not demand any further discussion or elaboration in order to be convincing. The author of the anonymous memo shared Baius' fundamentalist understanding of Romans 13: rebellion 'against the authorities in order to uphold the Gospels ... is a false belief that goes against God'.¹⁴⁸ Even a tyrant enjoyed divinely ordained authority and was owed the same loyalty and obedience as a good prince.¹⁴⁹ From Van den Vivere's diary, it is also clear that the Catholics who ended up swearing the oath against Philip saw themselves as committing an act against God: 'I do it, but I do not mean it. God will forgive me this sin, which I commit against him', he reported them as saying.¹⁵⁰ Perhaps the strongest proof for the axiomatic position that Romans 13 occupied in people's minds comes from rebel communication practice. Right up until the abjuration in 1581, the States General continued to issue their orders in Philip's name, although the States of Holland and Zeeland had stopped doing this by 1578.¹⁵¹ The result could be confusing, as in 1579 when 'Philip' condemned La Motte, the first nobleman to reconcile, as a traitor for having reconciled with himself.¹⁵²

The strict and simple focus on Philip's legitimacy allowed loyalist authors to label Orange a tyrant. The grounds for the tyranny accusation were threefold. First, Orange was a usurper. Although the word 'usurper' itself was not always used, it was nevertheless clear that this was what made him a tyrant when the accusation of tyranny appeared in tandem with the stress on Philip's legitimacy, as it so often did. If Philip was the legitimate monarch, then any attempt on Orange's part to divest him of monarchical authority would automatically make him a usurper-tyrant.¹⁵³ The most elaborate presentation of Orange's tyranny came in a pamphlet from 1582,

whose author provided the reader with a full 'tyrant typology' along with a statement of what could be done against each of the three different forms. Both the typology and the remedies that were suggested were reminiscent of Theodore Beza's *Du droit des magistrats*, and just like Beza the author sanctioned any member of the public to kill a usurper.¹⁵⁴

Secondly, Orange was a tyrant on account of attempting to rule against God, as demonstrated by his many crimes against Catholics. The author conceded that a Christian might serve an infidel provided he did not obey the infidel against God, but there was no doubt that this was exactly what obedience to Orange would entail.¹⁵⁵ One pamphlet even likened Orange to Nero and other emperors who had persecuted Christians.¹⁵⁶ As for Beza's arguments that authority (the word 'sovereignty' was not used) ultimately resided with the people, this was dismissed on the grounds that if that had been the case then people would never bestow authority on someone who would punish the wicked, a primary task of any ruler.¹⁵⁷

Finally, Orange's tyranny was a natural consequence of the discourse of deceit. Although Orange kept proclaiming that he was fighting for freedom, he was really only using this as a cover-up to pursue his own ambitions of self-aggrandizement. As different loyalist authors pointed out, these ambitions were best served by keeping the country conflict-ridden and in a state of weakness. His aim was not freedom at all but rather an increase in his own power at the expense of the people, who would live in slavery and continued discord, the very characteristics that rebel authors used to identify Philip as a tyrant. Orange's deceit proved that his real aims were nothing but tyrannical, as he intended to rule purely for his own advantage and not in any way for the common good, although this was what he kept saying.¹⁵⁸ After 1581, when the rebel States General had formally abjured the sovereignty of Philip, the accusation of tyranny on the basis of usurpation became even clearer: the abjuration proved that the previous claims that Orange wanted to take Philip's place had been correct.¹⁵⁹

The use of political theory in loyalist publications, then, in no way equalled the sometimes elaborate discussions that featured in rebel propaganda. But did it matter? The need for elaborate theoretical underpinnings in rebel pamphleteering was indicative of their difficulty in establishing the legitimacy of their revolt, and should not necessarily be taken as proof of sophisticated persuasive strategies. Although rebel pamphlets did contain more carefully formulated political thought, they were generally completely bereft of any appeal to Catholics, who were harassed for their faith and even downright persecuted.¹⁶⁰ To point to their sophistication of argument alone is to neglect that these treatises were written as contributions to a fast-moving debate where the name of the game was to secure support for continued and united resistance to Philip's reconquest.¹⁶¹ In this context, the beauty of Romans 13 was precisely that it did not need any elaboration to be instantly understandable. It was a commonplace, but as such it could be relied upon to conform with the existing values of the target audience. In the context of Catholic grievances and war-weariness, the conservation of Catholicism and the restoration of order were far better trump cards than any discussion of the nature of the constitution and the virtues of concord.¹⁶²

Celebrating Farnese

Although the theme of legitimacy always focused on Philip, the fact that he himself was not actually in the Low Countries raises the question of whether the reconciliation discourse of clemency and magnanimity was associated with him or with Farnese. Farnese was, after all, the man who was responsible for the reconciliation process on the ground, whereas Philip, although sovereign and ultimately in charge, remained far away in Madrid. Beginning with the reconciliation treaties, which formalised the regime's friendly face, we see that these were, of course, in Philip's name and Philip was referred to as sovereign and natural prince. But these were formulaic phrases only. The headline on the front page of each pamphlet made it clear that the treaty in question had been concluded with Farnese, and the choice to behave with clemency was referred to as residing with him too. Thus, at the beginning of the treaty with Ghent we read that Farnese had decided, after hearing what the Gentenaar envoys had to say, to show greater clemency than they deserved out of the 'special concern' he had for the good of the city and its poor people.¹⁶³ The offer letters were even more explicitly associated with Farnese. Again, reconciliation ultimately resided with Philip and his benign rule was occasionally referred to, but Farnese stood as the man behind the initiative.¹⁶⁴

The reconciliation process also occasioned the publication of celebratory pamphlets. In the case of Brussels, this manifested itself in a booklet containing the various offer letters that had come from Farnese, stressing the usual willingness to forgive and forget, the replies by the Brussels authorities, and then two orations on how wonderful it was that Farnese had allowed them such a generous reconciliation.¹⁶⁵ But the author went further still: there was an explicit mention of how the negotiation envoys had wanted to report publicly all they had found to be good, especially Farnese's paternal concern for the city, and how they had wanted to thank him. Also mentioned was how great leaders, including Farnese's namesake Alexander the Great (the connection was explicitly pointed out), won more land by mercy than by force. The governor, then, was clearly in good company, and the fate of other cities showed that Farnese (there was no mention of Philip here) wanted neither blood nor money nor goods. The oration ended with a profuse promise to be so steadfast and loyal that all memory of the crimes of the past would disappear.¹⁶⁶ A pamphlet in rhyme published after Farnese's triumph over Antwerp was similarly celebratory. Here, Farnese was praised as a liberator sent by God, who commanded obedience with God's support.¹⁶⁷ Rather peculiarly, although the rhyme contained several explicit references to how God wanted loyalty for the prince, there was no mention of Philip at all; only Farnese was named, and the front page even included a woodcut of him on horseback outside Antwerp. The reader is left to wonder whether the discussion of obedience to the prince was, in fact, referring to Farnese rather than to the real sovereign in Madrid.

Such doubts are also provoked by another pamphlet, this time a didactic presentation of Antwerp's reconciliation treaty in the form of a dialogue between 'the well-meaning community' and Farnese.¹⁶⁸ In it, the community expressed its wish to greet Farnese and 'as old and faithful subjects offer and prove all obedience and allegiance', but they were offering this to the governor, not to their sovereign. In the pamphlet, Farnese thanked them and promised to receive them in

the name of the king and to treat them ‘with all sweetness and fatherly clemency’.¹⁶⁹ Although Farnese referred to his governing on behalf of the king, the obsequious gratefulness of the community was consistently directed at Farnese only.¹⁷⁰

Philip’s presence in the loyalist news publishing that was emerging in the 1580s was not much greater. The news pamphlets were short and limited to recounting one particular item of news – often loyalist victories in battle – and in these Philip remained absent. The battle accounts did not differ much from one another. They were short, to the point and without fail noted the great valour of the loyalist troops without generally elaborating on Farnese’s role, compared to the cowardice of the rebels.¹⁷¹ The loyalist troops had often marched for many hours without eating or drinking just prior to the battle but nevertheless put the enemy to immediate flight, slaughtering and capturing many of them in the process.¹⁷² But two extant news pamphlets are concerned with Philip only. One recounted Philip’s entry into the Portuguese town of Almada after the succession dispute had been settled in his favour, and offered a number of parallels (none of them explicit) to the situation in the Low Countries, pausing on Philip’s great piety and his pleasant manner, as well as on how readily he granted the town forgiveness and other favours.¹⁷³ In fact, he was so popular that even ships from Holland and Zeeland saluted him.¹⁷⁴ The other pamphlet purported to be a copy of a letter sent by ‘the great Turk’ to Philip, which made it clear that Philip was now so great that even his enemies were acknowledging his authority.¹⁷⁵

These publications all displayed a clear loyalist bias in the sense that they were celebratory about the loyalist cause, but without being argumentative about it. This does not necessarily mean that they did not contribute to the general reinforcement of loyalty to the regime that we have seen to be at work in other more propagandistic pieces. As transmitters of good loyalist news, they may have had an emotive effect on their readers, which in turn may have contributed to the establishment of a pro-regime mind-set.¹⁷⁶ Nor can there be any doubt that there was a market for such news pamphlets: one of them is known to have been published by different printers in different towns, presumably out of a desire to benefit from the available purchasing power, and all the major loyalist printers are known to have published news pamphlets.¹⁷⁷

Processions offer a measure of how Farnese and Philip were perceived on the ground. Unlike the publication of offer letters in print, the triumphal entries and other processions were organised locally. The form they took and the elements and figures that they involved were, in other words, not directly decided by either Farnese or other members of the regime, but by civic authorities themselves. Significantly, the processions mirrored the reconciliation discourse that was present in pro-regime pamphlets. For Farnese’s entry into Antwerp in August 1585, the new permanent inscriptions on the town hall likened him to a liberator and a bestower of privileges, although the fatherly forgiveness offered by Philip was also duly mentioned in other verses on a different, but impermanent, display.¹⁷⁸

In the portrayal of the king and his governor, Farnese was the only one to be personified as a hero. As part of Farnese’s entry into Antwerp, the Genoese community had erected a large column. On the top there was a statue of Farnese in the shape of Alexander the Great, probably produced by Jonghelinck, the same sculptor who had made Alva’s controversial statue years ear-

lier.¹⁷⁹ Near the end of the procession, by the citadel, spectators would have seen a similar set-up, a triumphal arch bearing the figures of Hercules, Alexander the Great, Fortitude and Temperance, as well as Farnese's and Philip's mottos, 'from virtue, honour' and 'neither hope nor fear', respectively. Here, then, were images of strength seen to be bridled by restraint.¹⁸⁰ But were they taken to apply to Farnese or to Philip? Philip was present, but only as a wallflower in the form of his motto. The visual impact was entirely directed at and coming from Farnese: he was playing the lead part in the procession and of the two images of strength, both easily taken to symbolise his six years of military success, one, Alexander, shared his name. In the ceremonial entry planned for Farnese in the newly reconciled Ghent in the autumn of 1584, the tendency was the same. Philip was present in the shape of coats of arms and initials, but only Farnese was represented in the *tableaux* by an actual human figure.¹⁸¹

Local authorities' portrayal of Farnese as the primary bringer of peace, and not Philip (whose orders he was complying with), suggests that they may have been trying to secure themselves a place in Farnese's good books. This was a commonplace concern when processions were staged for sovereigns and other dignitaries. What is significant is that their chosen way of flattering the governor was in direct line with the discourse the regime had been using to describe itself. Farnese's discourse of reconciliation, then, had successfully come to shape the understanding of the return to the royal fold that was presented at the local level and by local authorities themselves.

Publishing dynamics and the potential for persuasion

But the 'paper war' that accompanied the reconciliation process was not only about appeal and persuasion. Also important were the logistics behind the pamphleteering effort that determined how much of the public audience could be reached. To assess the potential for successful persuasion, it is crucial first to determine which audience the pamphlets were targeting. Although the element of persuasion that was a fundamental feature of the reconciliation pamphlets might lead us to expect loyalist propaganda to have been directed at rebels, the people most in need of loyalist persuasion, a consideration of the technicalities of loyalist publishing shows that this cannot have been the case.

The publication language of loyalist pamphlets supports the argument that the already reconciled population, and not the rebel one, was the main loyalist target audience. Most loyalist pamphlets were published in French only, although some were published in both vernaculars.¹⁸² Only as the large Dutch-speaking cities reconciled did more and more material begin to appear in Dutch. Indeed, the main loyalist printer, Rutgher Velpius, a native Dutch speaker, published virtually only in French between 1580 and 1585.¹⁸³ If Velpius was only publishing in French, that must mean that the loyalist propaganda that came off his presses was intended mostly for the loyalist heartland in Wallonia and not for the overwhelmingly Flemish speaking rebel regions, although members of the political and economic elite in Flanders would often have been able to read both vernaculars. The pamphlets were, in other words, functioning to reinforce support for the existing regime rather than to be spread far and wide in order to win over rebel hearts and minds.

Rebel publishing dynamics were more complex in that the linguistics involved were less straightforward. A significant number of rebel pamphlets, and certainly many more than loyalist ones, were published in both vernaculars. As the Generality used Christopher Plantin, the largest and most advanced printer north of the Alps, as their official printer, most of what the Generality printed could easily appear in both vernaculars, and it did. Rebel territory was overwhelmingly Dutch speaking in the period of Farnese's governorship, and although more provincial rebel printers published almost exclusively in Dutch, the overwhelming reliance on Plantin suggests that the double vernacular was employed deliberately in order for publications to be spread across the linguistic barrier and into the reconciled territories, or indeed abroad.¹⁸⁴

William of Orange himself was highly conscious of the importance of public communication, but in light of this awareness and the active use of both vernaculars in rebel printing, the failure of much rebel publishing to respond adequately to Catholic concerns is all the more surprising. For rebel propaganda to have stood a chance of winning anti-Spanish Catholics over, they would have had to go some way towards assuring Catholics that they and their faith were safe. This was all the more important given the series of anti-Catholic measures that had been taken in rebel areas ever since their territorial establishment in 1572. Although rebel propaganda may have been intended to be spread across the language barrier and act to persuade people to support the rebel cause, its actual contents suggest that large parts of it, just like loyalist pamphleteering, functioned more to confirm and boost rebel morale than to persuade sceptics and royalists.¹⁸⁵ The same can be said for loyalist authors, as these did not concede any sympathy for the Calvinist cause and instead sometimes portrayed the 'so-called Reformed' as having caused the conflict.¹⁸⁶

Propaganda printing was also a numbers game. By having numerous pamphlets say the same thing, the impression could be created that the opinions that were promoted enjoyed widespread and powerful support.¹⁸⁷ In this regard, rebel propaganda was at a distinct advantage, as rebel territory comprised many more printers than did territory under royal control. But although the rebel network of printers was much more extensive and their total production much larger than that of loyalist printers, this was not always a benefit. The Generality's inability to control the print output in the different cities meant that, as a consequence of the tension between Orange and the Ghent radicals, anti-Orangist material was being disseminated from within rebel territory itself. One such Ghent publication from 1580 began with two anti-Orange sonnets, the first of which kicked off with the following diatribe:

Promising liberty, exercising tyranny,
Acting as a patriot, preferring the foreigner,
Seeking his own safety, jeopardising everything,
Leaving his own to be butchered,
Wanting to be regarded as leading a chaste and holy life,
Speaking only of putting all in good order,
Changing wife and religion without scruples¹⁸⁸

The parallels to the presentation of Orange found in loyalist publications are remarkable. Pieter Dathenus, the Calvinist preacher in Ghent, was reported to be preaching that Orange was not of their faith but an atheist and that he was driven by pure ambition.¹⁸⁹ A rebel pamphlet published in 1579 relied on the same type of discourse of deceit that was at work in loyalist propaganda: Orange certainly did want to get rid of the Spanish forces, but his claim to be doing so for the sake of the freedom of the country was merely a pretext to make the people accept his own authority and command instead.¹⁹⁰

Rebel publications occasionally even served to spread loyalist material. Unlike loyalist printers, rebel ones would print pamphlets containing correspondence exchanges – that is, entire letters that were exchanged between Farnese and different rebel authorities. In this way, Farnese's letters were spread within rebel territory, even though they were refuted in the rebel authorities' response. Loyalist printers, on the other hand, never actually printed entire exchanges, but instead only helped spread the loyalist part of the correspondence.¹⁹¹ Similarly, Orange's Apology was published with a copy of the full text of the ban which could then be spread further.¹⁹² Ironically, this meant that Philip's concern to have the ban circulated within rebel territory despite the fact that it could not be published there (explicitly stated in the ban itself) was actually accommodated very well; not by loyalist printers and town criers, but by rebel printers.¹⁹³ Here, then, loyalist arguments were being propagated from within rebel territory, something that can hardly have contributed to greater unity within the Generality. Although rebel pamphlets were indeed more numerous, they did not all sing along to the same tune. In contrast, although the loyalist material was not nearly as internally diverse nor as numerous, it did to a greater extent speak with one voice, and one voice only.

Conclusion

The pro-regime propaganda that accompanied Farnese's spectacularly successful campaign of reconquest was a novelty in the Revolt. Although Don John's governorship had seen the emergence of pro-regime argumentative pamphleteering, these efforts had been plagued by a basic failure to appeal. This changed under Farnese, as royalist authors began actively responding to divisions and grievances within the Generality, helped by the Walloon provinces' new willingness to articulate their concerns in print. The regime was directly involved in this change, and Cardinal Granvelle appears to have been particularly well aware of the benefits of propaganda designed to respond to the audience's grievances. The reconciliation discourse itself was formulated and spread at the direct initiative of Farnese and his advisors, and it is probable that the venomous campaign against Orange also originated within the regime.

Unlike previous pro-regime communication, the pamphlets of the reconciliation period played on several different strings. There was no longer only a simple insistence on obedience, but instead an active engagement with existing grievances. The regime's Catholic profile was attractive in a situation where Catholics saw themselves threatened by militant Calvinists. Farnese presented reconciliation with the regime as a lifeline for the true faith, and the subsequent re-

construction of Catholic religious institutions and the reinforcement of religious education cemented the relationship while also providing a bulwark against future heresy and rebellion.

But the most significant element of the reconciliation propaganda campaign was precisely the reconciliation discourse. The consistent offers of clemency, the willingness to withdraw the foreign troops and the periods of grace offered to heretics undermined rebel warnings of a return to a tyranny '*à la Alva*'. Although all Farnese's predecessors had offered pardons, none had made clemency a foundation of policy. Whereas repeat massacres might have labelled Farnese a second Alva, the fact that he for several years managed to keep his troops in order after successful sieges made it easier for 'peace wishers' to argue their case. Contemporary diarists were clearly impressed by what they saw, and the references to the generous settlements featured as arguments for peace in the towns still on the rebel side. The reconciliation discourse was also particularly advantageous because it was inclusive. By specifically targeting Orange alone, it allowed ex-rebels to label themselves as victims of deceit rather than as traitors. The celebrations of the different towns' reconciliation in print and ceremonial suggest that this was exactly what happened, as they echoed Farnese's discourse in their own presentation of the conflict.

The prominence of Farnese, and not Philip, in pro-reconciliation propaganda may also have contributed to the reconciling towns' ready acceptance of the discourse of reconciliation. Farnese may certainly have wanted to further his own reputation by linking himself so strongly with the reconciliation policy and granting Philip a lesser position, but this appears to also have had distinct strategic advantages. Unlike Philip, Farnese was entirely free from damaging connections with Alva. Reconciling towns could thus more easily celebrate their own return to the regime's side because they could portray it as an alliance with the remarkably merciful governor, rather than with the king who had previously supported violent suppression.

Compared to the sometimes elaborate political theory in rebel pamphleteering, royalist propaganda relied on the simple assertion of the legitimacy of Philip's rule in accordance with all divine and human laws. This emphasis was certainly not original, but it allowed the regime to take advantage of the axiom – still alive and kicking – that the king's power was divinely ordained and, as such, should be obeyed. That the rebel authorities persisted in issuing their own orders in Philip's name only goes to show just how authoritative this understanding was. Nor did the smaller numbers of royalist pamphlets compared to rebel ones necessarily put the regime's cause in a weaker position. Unlike rebel pamphlets, produced by a printing industry that was relatively free of central control and which therefore also echoed tensions within the Generality, royalist pamphlets spoke with one voice. For the first time in the Revolt, the regime was communicating a message that was capable of appealing to a significant proportion of the population. And, also for the first time in the conflict, the propaganda hit home on a large scale, as the regime put its words into practice time and time again.

Losing the Peace, 1585-1595

'It is highly required and necessary that, from the moment of his arrival, His Highness work hard to find all the good and firm remedies to all these evils and calamities which have almost ruined and overwhelmed them [these lands].' Thus began privy councillor d'Assonleville's memo to the newly arrived Archduke Ernest, the new governor-general, in January 1594. The rest of the memo went on to describe a series of problems so severe that to find a solution seemed to require 'more divine work than human'.¹

The situation was indeed worse than it had ever been before. The harvest of 1586 was the poorest of the entire century and the price of grain rose to new heights.² Jan van den Vivere in Ghent reported that people were so hungry that they would go through other people's rubbish to see if they could find anything edible, and some would even eat fish entrails.³ Continued warfare and troop movements caused peasants to flee the countryside in large numbers, and agricultural production fell. Indeed, edicts allowing peasants to hunt wolves and wild boar suggest rural areas were reverting to a state of wilderness.⁴ In 1586, only between fifty and sixty percent of the land that had been cultivated north-east of Ghent in 1577 was still under cultivation, and during the course of the following decade the price level of agricultural land in the domain of Herzele, near Aalst, dropped by almost eighty percent compared to the 1570s. In fact, for the price of one single ox, it was now possible to buy between two and three hectares of agricultural land. Emigration from towns was also considerable, and it was not only because Calvinists left after the restoration of Catholicism and royal rule. The dramatic rise in grain prices and the collapse in trade meant that others were also forced to move in order to seek out better circumstances for their trade. The exodus of people took their toll on rent levels: in Ghent in 1585, they were only one sixth of what they had been prior to the reconciliation, and although rent levels recovered relatively quickly in both Ghent and Brussels, the pre-reconciliation levels in Bruges and Antwerp were not reached until 1606 and 1621, respectively.⁵

How had things become this bad in the decade since Farnese's triumphant victory over the rebels at Antwerp? In 1585, expectations on both sides had been that Farnese's advances would continue and that the provinces north of the rivers would also be facing the music before long.⁶ And for some time the success continued: 1586 saw the capture of the towns of Venlo and Grave as well as of the imperial town of Neuss. But by 1589 the Habsburg military focus had shifted abroad, first to the Armada and the attempted invasion of England and then to involvement in the French Wars of Religion, although even at this point the reconciliation discourse was revived

in the treaty with the newly conquered town of Geertruidenberg.⁷ However, instead of pursuing the re-establishment of royal authority north of the rivers, the royal army was mostly engaged outside the borders of the Low Countries altogether, whereas the rebels had seized the initiative and were advancing south. This chapter will examine how the Habsburg regime engaged with public debate at a time when the reconciliation campaign's promise of peace failed to be realised, and warfare instead continued to cripple the country.

The regime's cause disappears from view

A major change from the public communication of the reconciliation period was the virtual disappearance of Farnese from public media. The reconciliation period had seen him celebrated as the merciful restorer of peace as well as a military genius following in the footsteps of Alexander the Great. The celebratory propaganda continued after the victories at Grave, Venlo and Neuss in 1586, when news pamphlets elaborated specifically on Farnese's courage.⁸ But the winning streak ended when the focus turned towards the 'Enterprise of England'. In the year or so prior to the Armada of 1588, about 15,000 extra Spanish and Italian troops arrived in the Low Countries to take part in the invasion.⁹ Together with the troops that were already in the country, they made up a total of almost 65,000 soldiers, the largest force since 1574.¹⁰ Although destined for service elsewhere, these troops were maintained partly at the expense of the local population in the areas they moved through, and their thanks consisted of plundering and mistreating civilians and ruining crops. One of the main arguments for the reconciliation with Philip had been that it was the only way of ending the war, and so more troops and more war most certainly did not form part of people's hopes for life under royal rule.¹¹ What made the situation worse was that they were forced to sustain a war in another country while the Habsburg Low Countries themselves were left without sufficiently strong defences against the rebels, let alone enough troops to go on the offensive.¹²

The failure of the Armada brought an end to the 'good news pamphleteering' that had accompanied the reconciliation drive. Although Farnese was not responsible for the defeat, rumours that made him the scapegoat nevertheless circulated at different European courts, as well as within the Low Countries, in the autumn of 1588.¹³ At the court in Madrid, these new rumours added grist to the mill of those who already for some time had resented Farnese's tremendous successes in the Low Countries and accused him of getting too big for his boots.¹⁴ In rebel territories, numerous Dutch and English pamphlets, gloating about the Spanish defeat and God's intervention in the form of bad weather, were also published, and commemorative medals celebrating the Spanish defeat went on sale.¹⁵ The situation became so bad that Farnese judged it necessary to send off personal envoys to both Rome and Madrid in order to counteract the harmful stories.¹⁶ On the domestic scene, however, he took no such action apart from once personally issuing a public challenge to anyone blaming him for the Armada's failure. No pro-Habsburg battle accounts appear to have been printed in the Low Countries, although at least two were printed in France.¹⁷ In fact, the only royalist Armada publication coming from a printer based

in the Low Countries focused purely on the tremendous resources and supplies of the Armada, including the 50,000 'bundles of garlic from Andalucía' that were on board.¹⁸ It did spell out that Philip's reason for sending off the Armada was to serve God against the English heretics and not in any way to acquire 'a great name or title' because he had enough of those, but it did not include any account of the battle itself or indeed a single word on what the outcome had been, and thus failed to counter the satire coming off the Dutch and English presses.¹⁹

Apart from the obvious difficulty royalists would have had in making a positive case out of the Armada, it is possible that the failure of Farnese and his entourage to issue anything remotely like an adequate defence was actually a conscious decision. Paradoxically, when sending off his defence dossier to his cardinal uncle in Rome, Farnese had told him he did not want to defend himself in case it might appear that he actually did have something to be defensive about.²⁰ It may seem far-fetched to assume that Farnese would adopt such a passive attitude to public impressions of his role in the Armada enterprise, but when it came to military publicity the convention was to bypass defeats in complete silence and only advertise battles that had been victorious.²¹ Nor was Farnese in the habit of treating his reputation lightly. During the reconciliation period, he had proved himself highly adept at managing his own public image, and his correspondence is dotted with references to the effect this or that policy or event would have on his and the regime's reputation.²² Against such a track record it seems implausible that Farnese would have failed to make conscious decisions about how best to safeguard his image in the face of the post-Armada accusations, the most severe assault on his name to date.

A similar silence confronts us when we look at the public communication related to Farnese's campaigns in France. Philip had ordered Farnese to support the Holy League, which had been set up after the assassination of the childless Henry III in 1589, with the aim of ensuring a Catholic succession. As this involved disregarding the claim of Henry of Navarre, a Protestant but the closest in line to the throne according to Salic law, civil war broke out. Farnese did not agree with Philip's order that he intervene on the side of the League. He would have preferred to use the reinforced army against the rebel North, but had no choice but to go along with Philip's wishes.²³ Moreover, the intervention made him unpopular with the political elites in the Low Countries, who were fully aware of the problems caused by the presence of so many troops and who resented the burden of maintaining an army that was going to serve elsewhere, while they themselves were having to continue the war against the rebels without enough troops.²⁴

Against this background of widespread resentment, it is surprising to see that although the French Wars were by far the dominant topic of news pamphlets in the early 1590s, none of them did anything to elaborate on Farnese's heroic activities on behalf of the Catholic cause. In fact, most did not even as much as mention his name. Whereas the battle accounts of 1586 had emphasised the great risks Farnese took, how the bullets were swirling round his head without actually hitting him, and how God had preserved his life yet again, the fact that during the French campaigns he survived both being shot and the subsequent surgery went unmentioned in the press, as did his successful interventions in relieving the sieges of Paris and Rouen.

However, it seems that a large proportion of the pamphlets dealing with the French Wars

of Religion that were published by printers working in the Low Countries were merely reprints of pamphlets that had first been published by Catholic printers in France. At least four news pamphlets on the French Wars published by printers in the Habsburg Low Countries included an explicit mention that they were copies of pamphlets first published by French printers.²⁵ In addition, and far more commonly, pamphlets which did not acknowledge such copying very often had titles that were identical to ones first published by French printers.²⁶ As pamphlets written for a French Catholic audience, they had not been primarily intended for the public in the Low Countries at all, and given that French Protestant propaganda targeted the alleged Hispanophilia of French Catholics, it makes sense that pro-League pamphlets aimed at a French audience did not elaborate on the extent or benefits of Spanish support.²⁷ Of course, with no separate Habsburg pamphleteering effort, the audience in the Low Countries was not receiving any material that made the involvement in France more appealing either.

If Farnese did not make any attempts to publicly present the intervention in France in a favourable light, he also did not respond publicly to the accusations launched at him by Pierre-Ernest Mansfeld. The long-term governor of Luxembourg, Mansfeld had been appointed interim governor while Farnese was on campaign in France, but the two did not get on well. The sour relationship dated back a number of years and appears to have been largely due to jealousy over appointments and influence as well as a general resentment of Farnese's reliance on his Italian favourites.²⁸ But whereas this factional conflict had previously been contained, now that Farnese was away and Mansfeld was given a higher appointment, he and his son Charles gave their animosities free rein.

Internal government faction was obviously not something that the regime would have been keen to advertise in the form of public accusations and counter-accusations. But given that the Mansfelds did actually go public with their discontent, a response from Farnese might have been warranted. The Mansfelds do not, however, appear to have used print to air their antagonism. Instead we find that complaints and grievances were aired more in private media, such as memos and letters, and also that these complaints were reported to be circulating in the form of rumour. In one report Farnese received while in France, Mansfeld was said to be spreading vicious rumours about him, especially on his doings in France, and claiming – both in private and in public – that he was wasting the king's money and that he did not care for the welfare of the country. Mansfeld also kept vilifying the Italians who made up Farnese's entourage, while glorifying himself for the measures he had undertaken to put an end to rebel pillaging in the countryside.²⁹

What Farnese's contact did not elaborate on was on what occasion, to whom and how Mansfeld was meant to have spread these rumours, and it may be that the reports were exaggerated. Certainly, no pamphlets that may have been published as part of the factional conflict survive. In Farnese's own letters to Philip, there are general references to rumours and pamphlets circulating. But these references were used as support for complaints against the Mansfelds as well as to underscore the strength of the opposition against the intervention in France, and so it was obviously in Farnese's interest to portray the discontent as being as serious as possible.³⁰

It is nevertheless clear that the Mansfelds' scheming amounted to more than just talk. When Farnese returned to Brussels from Spa in the autumn of 1592, the Mansfelds came by carriage to meet him, only to rudely refuse to ride along with the procession into the city by the Leuven Gate as was customary, returning instead to their mansion on the Rue aux Laines by a different route.³¹ This public insult came in addition to three satirical drawings that Charles Mansfeld had posted outside his garden gate in Brussels. Two of the drawings presented Farnese as humiliating or treating the Mansfelds unfairly, while the third put the factional conflict into a larger context with the Mansfelds guarding the country against the destruction brought by the Spanish and Italians with whom Farnese surrounded himself.³²

The factional struggle continued after Farnese's death in December 1592, when the Spanish Count of Fuentes took over as governor-general.³³ Although the Italians quickly left the Low Countries after Farnese's death, the Spanish cohort remained, and the complaints against them continued under the following two brief governorships of the Count of Fuentes and Archduke Ernest. Indeed, in January 1595, towards the end of Ernest's one-year stint in power, the Duke of Aerschot gave a speech where he called for the withdrawal of the Spaniards, blaming them for the state of the country, and the return of native advisors to government in accordance with the Treaty of Arras of 1579.³⁴

Although Farnese appears to have been unwilling to stimulate celebratory pamphleteering about his achievements in France, such publications made a reappearance after his death. Both Fuentes and Charles Mansfeld had their military exploits celebrated in pamphlet form – Fuentes for his victories in France and Charles Mansfeld for his successes against the Turks in Hungary. In Fuentes' case, two pamphlets survive, but only one of them included a flattering description of Fuentes himself, namely for his victory at the fortress of Doullens, which had served as a refuge for brigands pillaging in Artois.³⁵ Charles Mansfeld was far more celebrated. One of the pamphlets detailing his service in Hungary explicitly linked the fight against the Turks to the fight against heretics in both France and the Low Countries. It even drew attention to the great hopes that Philip's army besieging Cambrai would be successful, but did not mention Fuentes, who was in charge of that siege. Further, it described the great valour Mansfeld and his army had shown at Strigonia to the point where he had defeated the whole Turkish force and could congratulate himself that 24,000 enemy troops were dead. The pamphlet connected Mansfeld's victory directly to the good of the whole of Christendom and also presented it as a victory against the heretics at home who had put their hopes in a Turkish victory.³⁶

The factional strife that became more apparent after the campaigns in France began was not systematically played out on the public scene. Getting pamphlets containing criticism of Farnese, Fuentes or their foreign advisors past the censors would have been difficult, but the Mansfelds managed to display their attitudes through more informal channels. The flattering descriptions of Charles Mansfeld's military exploits, which could be published without fear of censorship, were simply a different and more positive way of strengthening their personal profile. Farnese's failure to do the same is puzzling, especially in light of his concern for his own reputation and the celebratory material that had circulated just a few years previously. But given the

negative rumours that were circulating about him in Madrid, it may be that Farnese saw any further public self-glorification as counter-productive. After all, the rumours were accusing him of getting too big for his boots, so any more focus on his personal achievements might have made the damage worse.

Expressing discontent

A major grievance in the factional struggle between Farnese and the foreign members of the regime, on the one hand, and Mansfeld and the other native nobles, on the other, was the continued war and the presence of a large foreign army. The fact that these troops were deployed elsewhere and that the rebels were now advancing south made the situation even worse. But these were not just concerns that were voiced by the Mansfelds in their attempts to discredit Farnese; they were also criticised by other nobles and members of the public at large.

Such criticism appears to have been mostly in the form of rumours and memos. These were informal and personal channels of communication which could contain criticism while bypassing censorship restrictions. Most of the memos were written by members of the political elite and were intended for Philip's eyes. In them, the authors elaborated on the causes of particular problems and what could be done to remedy them. Philip did of course keep in regular touch with both Farnese and Mansfeld, who in their letters to the king both complained about each other and offered different versions of the same events, but the memos tended to come from men who did not have either regular or direct contact with the sovereign.

Thus, Frédéric Perrenot wrote three memos for Philip in the period 1589 to 1591. In them, he expressed venomous criticism of Farnese, his Italian entourage and what he saw as their corrupt practices, serving only their own self-enrichment at the expense of the country and its native inhabitants.³⁷ Perrenot had a personal axe to grind against Farnese, who had not given him back his appointment as governor of Antwerp after Perrenot was released from rebel imprisonment upon the reconciliation of Ghent.³⁸ But critical memos were also written by people who were not personally hostile to Farnese. Bishop Torrentius of Antwerp, who enjoyed a very good relationship with the governor, also wrote memos intended for Philip, sent to him via Benito Arias Montano. Torrentius voiced his concern about the problems caused by the royal army, the effects on the civilian population and his opposition to the campaign in France, complaints that were echoed by Jesuit preachers in their sermons.³⁹

But complaints were voiced further down the social ladder too. In 1590, a certain Adrien Zoetine wrote a memo to Philip. It is not known who he was, but the army corruption that he detailed, and which he claimed to have witnessed happening himself, suggests he was either employed as an officer and was more honourable than his colleagues, or that he was attached to the financial administration. According to Zoetine, officers would trade soldiers with each other before general musters so that they would all be paid for the maximum number of soldiers although in reality the same soldiers were being registered several times to make up a higher total.⁴⁰ The result was that Philip was spending money on soldiers who did not actually exist, and the fighting

prowess of his army was much reduced as a result. Worse still, such practices alienated honourable men from the king's service and might even force them to seek work elsewhere, for instance in Holland and Zeeland. He also remarked that the ill treatment of civilians was changing them from lambs into 'hardened wolves'.⁴¹

Philip read these letters of advice. In fact, the copy of Zoetine's memo that survives in Brussels is the copy that Philip sent to Farnese precisely because he thought the governor might find it useful.⁴² The effect of the memos coming from far out in the political periphery may have reinforced the credibility of both Mansfeld's and Perrenot's accusations against Farnese and the negative rumours that circulated about him in Madrid.⁴³ As the authors did not hold political power themselves and were probably not even personally acquainted with Farnese, they could not be said to be pursuing personal ambitions in writing them. Instead, they may have furnished just the kind of proof that Philip required to believe Mansfeld's accusations.

Philip's response was to order an enquiry. His instructions make it clear that he had taken on board the criticism against Farnese, as he wanted a discussion of suitable remedies to the 'disorders, abuses and faults' that not only the course of time but also his own ministers and officers had introduced into the administration of justice, policing, finances and military discipline.⁴⁴ The enquiry was to involve all the councils and provincial authorities in pooling together their suggested remedies, and the clergy also contributed.⁴⁵ This of course served to escalate the discussion of Italian corruption and the problems of military indiscipline among both central and regional authorities.

But the enquiry did not serve to improve the situation, nor did Farnese's death. The next three years saw the eruption of nine mutinies, most of which lasted more or less a year, and two of which lasted almost two years.⁴⁶ In addition, grain prices remained very high and trade was paralysed, and so more memos continued to be written.⁴⁷ Upon the much hoped for arrival of Archduke Ernest in 1594, the States of Luxembourg presented him with a report detailing the enormous problems caused by troops and brigands.⁴⁸ The States of Luxembourg had already written repeatedly to the central authorities to remind them that they had yet again broken the guarantees given in 1589. According to these, the province would be exempt from the passage and billeting of troops for five years in return for an extraordinary tax levy. The troops, however, had continued to cause problems in the province, and through their bitter complaints the deputies expressed strong disagreement with a policy that pursued war elsewhere while neglecting defence at home.⁴⁹

Such complaints were echoed by members of the public, again in the form of memos. Thus, during the course of Ernest's one-year governorship, a man called Jan Willot, probably employed in the financial administration, presented a memo on the miseries of the time to both Philip and Ernest as well as provincial and local authorities.⁵⁰ While Willot's memo did not contain direct criticism of any named individuals, he was still both specific and critical in his complaints. He suggested, just as Perrenot and Zoetine had, that the reason why there was not enough money for the payment of the troops was that those in charge of the distribution of funds within the army were corrupt and only concerned with their own private enrichment. This

practice was what impoverished soldiers and destroyed military discipline, which in turn was the cause of all the problems the country was experiencing.⁵¹ In remarks that echoed Zoetine, he also noted that although the rebel brigands were treating people badly, the royal troops were actually far worse and that this caused people to be 'distracted' from their loyalty to the king and turn to the rebels, who were enjoying prosperity and good order.⁵² This complaint was also made in a report by the political elite, summoned to debate the country's problems, in January 1595.⁵³

But Willot went further still: he remarked that it would be better if rulers thought more about the consequences of war before actually engaging in one, and that the reason God allowed mutinies to happen was to demonstrate to princes the great care they must take to ensure the payment of their troops.⁵⁴ Philip and his governors had, in other words, shown scant regard for the interests of the Low Countries and also failed to respond to God's repeated warnings. Willot's attribution of blame for the current problems demonstrates that the same complaints that were aired in confidential government communication, such as Perrenot's memos, were echoed and aired openly by members of the public. Willot did not single out either Italians or Spaniards as particularly worthy of blame, but given that part of his solution to the problems of military indiscipline was the establishment of a native army, he must have shared the resentment against foreign troops that contemporary reports refer to.⁵⁵

How did opinions emanating from both within the political elite and among the population at large interact? First of all, it is important to note that actual events themselves, be they repeated mutinies, failed harvests, soaring grain prices or widespread brigandage, were equally obvious to members of the regime, local authorities and ordinary people alike. Also obvious was that the presence and continual movement of large numbers of troops were damaging agricultural productivity. In addition, there was an existing tradition of ill feeling towards the presence of foreign troops going back to the very beginning of Philip's reign when he had been forced to withdraw 3,000 Spanish soldiers. What is more striking is how complaints voiced by members of the public reflected those voiced in government circles when it came to accusations of corruption on the part of an isolated group of people (first Farnese's Italian favourites and later army officers and paymasters), as these were not men who were officially or publicly identified with government policy. Their association with the problems people experienced may therefore have been a result of government complaints, such as those made by Mansfeld and Perrenot, leaking into the public domain.

If we are to believe the reports of Mansfeld's schemes, such leaks certainly occurred, as Mansfeld was reported to be loudly voicing his complaints against Farnese and his Italian entourage left, right and centre. The case of Francisco Verdugo, governor of Friesland for thirteen years and also Mansfeld's son-in-law, offers another clue as to how detailed and specific complaints against particular members of the regime could be made public. Verdugo's governorship in Friesland was marked by constant military threats from the rebels as well as a never-ending lack of funds that, in his opinion, was due to Farnese's Italian favourites who were retaining money that should really have been sent to Friesland.⁵⁶ Verdugo corresponded with Mansfeld and may have had his anti-Farnese sentiments reinforced by his father-in-law.⁵⁷ But after he had

been recalled south, he also repeated his complaints in his memoirs, copies of which circulated among his friends and children. One copy even ended up in Italy where it was translated into Italian and published in Spanish in 1610.⁵⁸ Verdugo's memoirs, in other words, illustrate one way in which complaints, arguments and rumours circulating at government level could make their way through the system and into the public domain.

Another example is the scholar Justus Lipsius' 1595 missive on Spanish foreign policy in which he worried about the continued mutinies and blamed Philip for paying too much attention to matters not related to the Low Countries. Although the wars in France were not mentioned, it is likely that they were what Lipsius had in mind. Although the letter was written to his friend Francisco de San Víctores de la Portilla, a Spanish nobleman who had married into an Antwerp family, Lipsius encouraged San Víctores to share the contents with others as he saw fit, and the letter soon circulated in manuscript copies and was even printed in several languages.⁵⁹

The concerns that were voiced in memos and letters were hardly reflected in pamphleeting at all. This is hardly surprising, as any intention to publish such critical viewpoints would in all likelihood have failed to get past the standard censorship regulations.⁶⁰ In fact, what seems to be the only extant pamphlet discussing the severe problems of the early 1590s appears to prove this point. Written by the poet courtier Maximilian de Wignacourt in 1593, *Discours sur l'Estat des Pays Bas* acknowledged that the country was experiencing severe problems.⁶¹ But unlike the authors of the memos, who blamed this on military overstretch and corruption, Wignacourt repeated the interpretation of the Revolt that had been launched during the reconciliation period, namely that the people had been fooled by the rebels and that these, intent on subverting both religion and the state, were to blame for everything that had gone wrong. Also, and in complete opposition to the memo writers, Wignacourt praised the military involvement in France, which he viewed as a service to the Catholic faith.⁶²

Wignacourt's pamphlet is peculiar for two reasons. First, the viewpoints he voiced were in complete contradiction to those offered by the memo authors, making his the 'odd one out' in documentable public opinion of the early 1590s. Second, it was rare to publish commentary on the political situation under one's full name, and Wignacourt even went so far as to include a personal letter of dedication to Philip. In it, he praised Philip's greatness and piety, which made him a true heir of the House of Habsburg.⁶³ He then went on to mention his happy years in royal service under Farnese, before making a badly veiled job application: his appointment had come to an end, but his will to serve had not. To make the most of his unwanted leisure time, he had composed this pamphlet as a voluntary service to the cause of Church and State.⁶⁴ It seems likely, then, that the pamphlet was Wignacourt's attempt to bring himself to royal attention, in much the same way as the privy councillor Jean Richardot, likely author of an earlier anti-Orange pamphlet.⁶⁵ Wignacourt appears to have mixed with members of the regime and may therefore have been particularly well aware of the kind of criticism and complaints that were coming Philip's way in the form of memos.⁶⁶ If so, he may have intended his pamphlet specifically to counteract these pieces of bad news by condoning royal policy since the outbreak of the Revolt. If Wignacourt did indeed have such patronage-seeking intentions behind the pamphlet, then it matches his pattern of writing verses for members of the regime in return for protection and money.⁶⁷

Wignacourt's pamphlet could be published because it did not contain criticism that could be construed as offending those in power. But ceremonial and the accompanying commemorative festival books also presented a way of articulating views on the sad times without falling foul of the censors. Thus, the entries of the Archduke Ernest into Brussels and Antwerp provided an opportunity for local authorities to articulate their hopes for the new governorship, typically by presenting Ernest as their problem solver. Ceremonial, then, could identify problems inversely by drawing attention to their solutions rather than the troubles they caused. The entry into Brussels appears to have focused mostly on domesticating Ernest as an Austrian Habsburg and descendant of the Burgundian dukes, but one of the decorations also showed him saving the Low Countries from a dragon. Ernest himself certainly took home the message that people hoped he would solve the country's problems, and wrote to his brother, Emperor Rudolph II, that he was moved by their hopes in him.⁶⁸

In Antwerp, the call for peace and an end to the problems of war formed the main theme of Ernest's entry. In fact, the only new decoration that featured in the procession – the others having been recycled from previous entries – was the 'Theatre of Austrian Peace' on the Meir. The Theatre, a three-storey-high half-circle amphitheatre structure, featured the figures of Apollo, the classical peacemaker, along with the figure of Peace herself.⁶⁹ One of the inscriptions called on Ernest to join all the seventeen provinces together in peace.⁷⁰ The festival book, which conveyed the organisers' intended meaning with the different decorations, spelled out the call for peace in no uncertain terms. Even the date chosen for Ernest's arrival in Brussels, 31 January, was a sign: it was the day of the ancient Roman peace festival and so highly appropriate in light of people's hopes that Ernest would finally be able to bolt the doors of Janus' temple, the ancient ritual conducted when peace was restored.⁷¹ Even the 'unexpectedly mild weather' was 'a happy omen of public tranquillity'.⁷² The effects of warfare on agricultural productivity were also inversely alluded to by expressions of what the peasants would be grateful for:

Farmer, put your hands to the demanding fields:
No hostile fury will hinder the citizens,
Nor fear of dangerous soldiers the fearful farmers in the fields.⁷³

Other decorations included representations of the maritime trade, which had plummeted as a result of the rebel blockade of the Scheldt.⁷⁴ One of these depicted the Scheldt as a river god, lying shackled next to a large urn. As Ernest approached the stage, six nymphs quickly loosened his chains and water began to pour from the urn in great bursts 'as if the mouth of the river had been reopened by the fortitude and prudence' of the new governor.⁷⁵

Through such explicit calls for Ernest to redress the problems of war and economic ruin, the organisers of the ceremonial were also identifying the main problems of the time. No explicit criticism was voiced, but the inscription which referred to farmers' fears of marauding troops left no one in any doubt about why agricultural production remained low. But as references to problems that Ernest would surely solve, such statements could safely be made.

The festival book was an exquisite folio volume containing numerous engraved illustrations.⁷⁶ As such, it would have been out of reach for the majority of people who witnessed the entry ceremonial. But exactly the same pro-peace messages were also conveyed in the much cheaper pamphlets that were published to celebrate Ernest's arrival. Thus, one pamphlet called on Ernest to deliver Belgium from the pain she was in, whereas another predicted the peace and tranquillity that Ernest's careful government would bring about.⁷⁷ The meaning of the ceremonial welcome for Ernest, then, would in all likelihood have been eminently understandable to the spectators, not just through the *tableaux* themselves and the speeches made during the procession, but also through the festival book and the several different pamphlets celebrating his arrival.

The regime's response

The burdens of continued warfare, troop movements, military indiscipline and incursions of rebel brigands were issues that caused much discontent. But how did the regime respond to these problems? Was it able to present itself as dealing effectively with the problems caused by the ongoing war?

This period saw the publication of a large number of edicts seeking to deal with the problems of high grain prices and the effects of brigandage and military indiscipline on civilians. At least twelve different edicts seeking to address the problems of brigandage and military indiscipline were published between 1586 and 1593.⁷⁸ In all of these, the regime allowed for drastic measures: if at all possible, brigands should be killed on the spot when encountered, and if they were taken alive they should be hanged without any chance of having the punishment commuted.⁷⁹ Edicts on military discipline called for deserters (from the forces taken to France) to be imprisoned and hanged, and there were also edicts of central and local provenance on the organisation of guard duty for the defence of towns against brigands.⁸⁰

Reading edicts alone, then, suggests both that the regime took its people's grievances seriously and that it wasted no time in actively seeking to remedy the problems. But the edicts were not uniformly successful in transmitting a positive image of the regime as the protector of its people. For example, the measures ordered against brigandage were partly based on the assumption that a big reason why brigandage continued to be a problem was that local authorities were actually conniving with the brigands, and releasing them rather than sending them straight to the gallows.⁸¹ Although such conniving may certainly have occurred, these edicts failed to note that peasants, burghers and local authorities alike often had little opportunity to resist '*brandschatting*' unless, of course, they actually wanted the brigands to set their farm, hamlet or village on fire. The regime appears not to have taken this into account. On the contrary, the anti-brigandage edicts went so far as to order the death penalty in any case where a civilian was caught carrying a letter threatening '*brandschatting*', let alone handing money over to the brigands.⁸²

In much the same way, grain edicts failed to acknowledge that the main reason why prices remained high was that the countryside was no longer safe for peasants to live and work in. Instead, there was a continuous focus on merchants buying up grain and monopolising the trade in

order to push prices up.⁸³ Although wealthy merchants no doubt took the opportunity to buy up grain and then resell it later when prices had gone up still further, the reduced overall production would in any case have meant high prices. Instead of the regime demonstrating its capacity to act on behalf of its subjects, then, many of the edicts demonstrated a continued failure to do so.

In addition, the frequent reissuing of the same edicts addressing the same continual problems due to the same unchanging causes told their own story. Anti-brigandage edicts continued to make explicit reference to previous edicts concerning the same issue and how the proposed remedies had not been carried out.⁸⁴ The possibility that the remedies were unhelpful was not admitted, but the failure to make headway in dealing with the problem was implicitly advertised every time the edict was reissued. Such an interpretation is borne out by the example of an edict of April 1592. Issued by Mansfeld with explicit reference to the anti-brigandage edict of November 1591, it was effectively a supplement designed to facilitate the implementation of the November edict by providing the inhabitants with native military assistance against the rebel brigands.⁸⁵ Mansfeld's edict, then, amounted to an admission that previous measures had not been sufficient and that new and more drastic measures were called for, while at the same time serving to promote himself as the bringer of these new and effective remedies. Farnese's name, on the other hand, remained associated only with the previous, ineffective edict.⁸⁶

The Brussels burgher Jan de Pottre's diary entries for the years 1591 and 1592 suggest that it was noted that Mansfeld had succeeded where Farnese had failed. In 1591, he reported that rebel brigands had come as close to Brussels as the Coudenberg Gate (the city gate nearest the palace) to steal horses and had been spotted by Farnese, who had wondered 'what kind of thugs' they were. 'Otherwise one did nothing,' wrote De Pottre, who was clearly unimpressed with Farnese's efforts on the home front.⁸⁷ By the summer of 1592, however, De Pottre noted that Mansfeld helped the peasants to defend themselves so that one could now go everywhere, even places where 'before one had hardly dared go out the door'.⁸⁸

Confronting heresy

Aside from troubles associated with the ongoing war on two fronts, the decade after the fall of Antwerp saw the beginning of a Catholic revival in the Habsburg Low Countries. Religious revival was not something the ecclesiastical authorities undertook entirely on their own initiative, nor something they were free to organise as they saw fit. On the contrary, the firm re-establishment of Catholic worship and pastoral services had been an explicitly endorsed security policy on the part of Farnese, as is evident from his support for Sunday schools and active encouragement of Jesuit growth. Such a policy made perfect sense in a situation where the political and the religious enemy continued to be the same, but at a time when Catholic militancy was being built up, it is striking that the clamp-down on heresy remained rather patchy.⁸⁹ The rebel cities that had been forced to reconcile in the 1580s had all been granted periods of grace during which heretical belief and private religious practice would not be at risk of either investigation or prosecution as long as no one engaged in scandalous behaviour. Although this was effectively a grant of religious

toleration, it was marketed simply as 'clemency'. There was no question that this was going to be a permanent arrangement as the duration of the grace periods was advertised in the different peace treaties. In the case of Brussels, the text of the treaty made it clear that the grace period was granted to avoid depopulating the city, and when Antwerp's four-year grace period was up in 1589, there were strong calls to have it extended on economic grounds.⁹⁰ The regime had, in other words, not granted heretics a respite out of either respect for or belief in the principle of toleration.

Nevertheless, no steps were taken to establish any kind of religious watchdog institution to keep an eye on the remaining heretics, not even after the different grace periods had come to an end. This did not mean that heretics were not in some way 'marked' citizens. All the city magistracies had been purged and re-formed with Catholics only, and Calvinists were expelled from the city militias.⁹¹ In addition, the censorship legislation had occasional religious supplements proclaimed, also with strong punishment attached, but the general prosecution of religious crimes after 1585 resulted in manifestly milder punishments than those that had been meted out before.⁹²

Instead, the emphasis was on preventative measures, such as preaching and education. Farnese's governorship saw a spectacular growth of the Jesuit and Capuchin orders in the Habsburg Low Countries, with the number of Jesuit schools doubling.⁹³ The Walloon provinces had organised Sunday schools since 1580, whereas those set up by Requesens in Antwerp in 1575 had had to stop when the Calvinists took power.⁹⁴ The church was now having to confront a 'lost generation' of children and young adults who had only been subjected to heretical influences and whose knowledge of the Catholic faith was dismal. Measures had to be taken to get these people back on the right track, and catechism classes were organised in six to eight of Antwerp's churches. Frequent and accessible preaching was also provided, with the Capuchins even taking to the streets in order to reach Protestants and Catholics who failed to come to church.⁹⁵ There was also a drive to persuade as many of the remaining Protestants as possible to convert to Catholicism.⁹⁶ In Antwerp, the Jesuit Marian sodality organised daily interactive conversion sessions from Advent until Easter in 1586 and 1587. Members were encouraged to bring local Protestants with them to meetings so that the preacher, Franciscus Costerus, could (hopefully) make them see the error of their ways. The result was about fifty conversions.⁹⁷

In addition, there was an upsurge in religious material that confronted heresy head on. In line with the Tridentine decrees, there were now explicit efforts to make ordinary Catholics more knowledgeable about their own faith.⁹⁸ This was new: writings against Protestantism from the 1560s, when the last anti-heresy drive had taken place, had often been written in Latin and so had been largely inaccessible to the average reader, let alone the average believer. One translator even acknowledged explicitly that the previous reliance on Latin had been a problem, as the people did not understand this language, so he had taken it upon himself to translate a useful work, detailing where the recently emerged heresies were in error, as 'an agreeable service' to God and the Christian community.⁹⁹

Previous writings also very often focused on internal, moral responses to heresy instead

of the more pedagogical and polemical approach that the pamphlets from the 1580s and 1590s displayed.¹⁰⁰ Thus, 1591 saw the publication of a Dutch catechism in song. The preface recognised the mnemonic value of music, and hopes were expressed that these songs would replace the 'dirty, unclean and useless songs' that could be picked up in the streets. The author then went on to recognise that this, of course, was precisely how the rebels had argued for their psalms, only to use it as a cover for their introduction of heresy 'through the sweetness of song'.¹⁰¹ Then followed the parts of a normal catechism in song complete with musical notation, such as Our Father and Hail Mary, whereas another catechism pamphlet provided the same basics in dialogue form.¹⁰²

None of these pamphlets contained explicit lessons of loyalty to the regime. But there could be no doubt about who the very strong anti-heresy rhetoric was targeted at. Previously in the Revolt, there had been a tendency to blame the conflict on heresy, and Farnese had been the first governor to avoid labelling everyone in rebel territory a heretic. Against this background and the continuing war against the rebel provinces, the repeated and explicit references to the need for steadfastness against the heretics could only be understood to refer to the Calvinist rebels. And if anyone was slow on the uptake, there were enough references to 'the enemy' and 'the Beggars' to drive the point home.¹⁰³

There was also a tendency to internationalise the religious conflict. By pointing to what heretics had done in other countries, it was possible to identify them more clearly and also indicate the kinds of horrors that could be expected of them in the Low Countries, should they be allowed to rule the roost again. Richard Verstegan, an English Catholic exile living in Antwerp and an active author of Catholic polemic, wrote what is probably the most famous of these works. His *Theatre des Cruautez des Hereticques* provided a richly, albeit gorily detailed account of the many crimes the heretics had committed in England, France and the Low Countries.¹⁰⁴ It was by providing readers with 'a sample of the horrible acts that they have committed' that they would be better able to gauge what might come next.¹⁰⁵ Costerus also made the same point: to discover that heresy was the source of all sins required nothing else than 'for you to open your eyes and see what is happening in England, Scotland, Holland, Zeeland and other heretical countries'.¹⁰⁶ The English Protestants, for all their objections to the veneration of images, were actually worshiping their own queen: every St George's Day, the nobility and bishops would kneel for her while shouting 'Godt sauve de Queen'.¹⁰⁷ And the French Huguenots were no better: their ambassador in Turkey had openly admitted that their faith was not so different from that of the Muslims. For Costerus, therefore, the Beggars' cries of 'Rather Turk than Papist' were obviously more ominous than was at first apparent.¹⁰⁸

Also reinforcing the awareness of the international religious situation were the many pamphlets bringing news about Catholicism from other parts of the world. With the significant exception of the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, this was all good Catholic news. The annual reports from Jesuit missionaries in China and Japan detailed the progress of the faith, despite the persecution that was unleashed a few years after their arrival.¹⁰⁹ Another pamphlet described how the Algerian queen had escaped to Rome in order to be able to live according to her new Christian beliefs.¹¹⁰ The news pamphlets relating to the wars in France may not have been very

celebratory about Philip's involvement on the side of the League, but they certainly did rejoice in the League's successes. The young Duke of Guise's escape from Tours, where he had been imprisoned, was hailed as a divinely inspired miracle, and victories against Henry of Navarre were also publicised.¹¹¹

The execution of Mary Queen of Scots was obviously not an event that Catholic publishers celebrated. But her sad end made the Scottish queen something of an iconic figure. In the year after her death, she was hailed as a martyr for the Catholic cause, and several pamphleteers devoted much ink to describing her saintly life.¹¹² In fact, there was a growing focus on martyrs in Catholic worship in these years: Verstegan's *Theatre des Cruautez* celebrated the Catholics killed by the Sea Beggars in 1572 as martyrs, and the celebrations of Balthasar Gerard, William of Orange's assassin, had been of the same mould.¹¹³ Indeed, Gerard became a hero among Catholic refugees in Cologne, where Sasbout Vosmeer, who had managed to get hold of his head (which he kept as a relic), repeatedly attempted to have him beatified in the 1580s and 1590s.¹¹⁴ Many of the new altarpieces commissioned for Antwerp cathedral's side chapels to restore them to new splendour after the Calvinist iconoclasm were also centred around martyrs. Whereas saints previously had had several different scenes of their lives portrayed, now their horrific deaths became the sole focus.¹¹⁵ But, as Brad Gregory has pointed out, martyrs strengthened as they divided: the focus was not so much on how their saintliness could inspire ordinary Christians to live better lives. Rather, their deaths deepened the divisions between the Catholic 'us', on the one hand, and the heretical and rebel 'them' on the other by encouraging a combat mentality against the threat of heresy.¹¹⁶

The venomous rhetoric used in the catechising pamphlets contributed to the same 'us' versus 'them' mentality. Although the preachers claimed that their hatred was directed at heresy and not at the heretic, there was little mercy on display whenever these unfortunates were referred to.¹¹⁷ Thus, one catechism began by making clear that heresy was the worst of all sects, and that believers should guard themselves against heretics as though they were 'grabbing wolves or poisonous snakes' and against their books as though they were 'the deadly plague'.¹¹⁸ Such tendencies suggest Guido Marnef has been correct in his conclusion that the polemical literature made very few converts and that it instead served to reinforce the faith of ordinary Catholics.¹¹⁹ The violent vocabulary destroyed the possibilities for appealing to Protestants, while the presence of international Catholic news emphasised how Catholics everywhere were involved in the struggle against the same foe of heresy. As an expression of such Catholic community spirit, we find that Catholics in Antwerp printed a broadsheet to offer thanks for the help they had received in Cologne and other places while they had been exiled from their hometown.¹²⁰

Although the religious printed material of this period generally offered only implicit support for the regime as the obvious defender of Catholicism, urban ceremonial was more explicit. First, ceremonial promoted the understanding that the reconciliation with the king and the restoration of Catholicism amounted to a new beginning. Commemorative processions were organised on an annual basis to offer thanks for the return of both Catholicism and royal rule, while the ceremonial also emphasised that the new loyal and Catholic magistracies had been

established with God's help.¹²¹ Like martyr rhetoric, they also served to keep alive the memories of the damage done by the heretics, in this way perpetuating a certain 'crusader' mentality on the part of the citizens that kept alive their aversion to heresy. This certainly appears to have been the intention behind the annual processions held in Lille to commemorate the discovery and thwarting of a Calvinist plot to take over the city in May 1581.¹²² The annual celebration of the reconciliation amounted to an explicit reaffirmation of loyalty to both the king and the faith, and it would probably have been spelled out both in the sermons and in the ceremonial decorations that were part of the festivities.

Secondly, the dual political-religious nature of urban ceremonial meant that processions could not help but associate the regime and Catholicism with one another.¹²³ All reconciled cities had had their magistracies re-formed with only Catholic members after their reconciliation, and when these appeared in procession it was nothing less than a demonstration of Catholic power.¹²⁴ In Antwerp, the new Catholic magistracy was obliged to attend no less than nineteen processions every year.¹²⁵ This meant that the citizens would have seen their magistrates in procession, together with the clergy, more than once every three weeks on average and each time been reminded of the Catholic loyalties of the local authorities. In addition, extraordinary processions could be called and these often marked occasions that served to underline the connections between the regime and the Catholic cause. In February 1587, for instance, at the initiative of the Marian Sodality, the statue of Brabo, the mythical local hero, was moved from the front of the town hall and replaced with the Virgin Mary.¹²⁶ Although the proposal had come from the Sodality, the city authorities were fully behind it: surviving records show that numerous officeholders and other dignitaries, including Mondragon, the governor of Antwerp, and Frédéric Perrenot contributed money to the statue, and the whole magistracy attended the ceremonial unveiling of it.¹²⁷ As if to properly emphasise that Antwerp had now entered an alliance with the Virgin, a sermon was given to call upon Her to stand by the city for all eternity.¹²⁸

Similarly, the wider Habsburg association with the Catholic cause was also promoted through ceremonial. In August 1590, for instance, there was a procession in Lille to pray for the success of Farnese and the League at the siege of Paris, whereas in Antwerp, the ever active Marian Sodality organised a whole week of prayer for the benefit of the campaign. In 1595, the Lillois offered thanks for Fuentes' capture of Cambrai.¹²⁹ At a local level, then, processions managed to explicitly celebrate the connection between the regime and Catholicism in a way that was not attempted in print.

Conclusion

To sum up, then, we have seen that the channels of communication, the media and the genres that were employed and the views that were expressed in the decade after the fall of Antwerp differed from those of the reconciliation period that had gone before. Whereas the reconciliation discourse had been positive, even celebratory, and had successfully monopolised loyalist printed media, loyalist news and views from around the time of the Spanish Armada of 1588 onwards

did not together make up a cohesive pro-regime discourse. Instead, it reflected the emergence of conflict within the regime where one faction – Mansfeld and the native nobles – blamed Farnese and the Italian and Spanish contingent, both at court and in the army, for the problems associated with continued warfare and military indiscipline. Such criticism was expressed through different media than those employed to advocate and celebrate reconciliation. There was relatively little pamphleteering and instead we are confronted with a body of material that appears to be more 'private' in nature. Nonetheless, criticism that was expressed in correspondence, memos and memoirs made its way into the public domain, where it reinforced existing public grievances.

The virtual disappearance of Farnese in the media tells us something about the Habsburg approach to public communication. They clearly needed an occasion that they could take advantage of. The reconciliation period had provided that, but Philip's decision to pursue war abroad rather than against the rebels meant that the appealing image of a reconciliatory and merciful regime could not be taken further. The only method of spreading this idea among the rebels was by a military offensive, and that was also the only way the already reconciled population could see Farnese's rhetoric proved in practice. The defeat of the Armada instead gave the rebels a propagandistic asset. Unlike some modern totalitarian regimes, the Habsburgs were not in the business of manufacturing happy news, and defeats and setbacks were only dealt with through silence.

Farnese's silence on his successes in France is therefore peculiar. Here, there was good news in the form of battles won and sieges relieved, but this was not taken advantage of. This failure illustrates that the regime's propaganda efforts were still highly dependent on personal initiative, that they were not in any way systematised, and that individuals' concerns for their own honour and reputation may have been an important driving force in the production of propaganda. If publishing good news came down to Farnese himself, then he may have decided that, in view of the negative rumours about him that circulated in Madrid, any further self-celebration would be counter-productive, although this remains speculation.

The regime as a whole did not prove able to fully counter this negative trend and offer a convincing positive image. Edicts that were issued as a response to the ongoing problems of brigandage, military indiscipline and grain shortage did not target the real causes of the problems and thus failed to portray the regime as an institution that could deal seriously and successfully with its subjects' concerns.

Where the regime did manage to offer both a positive and a celebratory image of itself was as part of the revival of Catholic worship. Although religious printed material remained largely free from arguments stressing the advantages of loyalty to Philip, the regime occupied a central place in urban ceremonial. This was not least in newly instituted processions commemorating the reconciliation and the consequent revival of Catholicism but also in religious processions more generally, which occurred regularly and which the new Catholic magistracies were obliged to attend. In this scenario, the regime came closer to offering an attractive image of itself, at least to its Catholic subjects, by portraying the revival of the true faith as a Habsburg victory secured with divine aid.

But the upsurge of religious printed material in this period was not without loyalist value.

The identity of the much maligned heretics was obvious in a situation where war was ongoing against Calvinists in both the Northern provinces and in France. The bellicose rhetoric and the 'believer friendly' format of these pamphlets meant that people's religious identity could be strengthened. International Catholic news, mostly positive, contributed in the same way by highlighting that the struggle for the true faith was shared by people in other countries or even other continents. Conversely, the shocking news of the execution of Mary Queen of Scots as well as the new focus on martyrs in worship contributed to a Catholic siege mentality, where religious identity was the foundation of all solidarity.

It seems, then, that the Habsburg regime as a whole offered a somewhat schizophrenic image of itself to the general public. On the one hand, public communication reflected conflict within the government, which served to perpetuate traditional grievances against the presence of a foreign army while also making clear that a number of the king's interests were completely incompatible with the well-being of his subjects in the Low Countries. On the other hand, Philip's regime was inextricably linked to the re-establishment of Catholicism, and for this he and his government continued to be celebrated.

A New Beginning, 1596-1609

Archdukes Albert and Isabella occupy a special place in Belgian historiography. When Albert arrived as Philip's new governor-general to succeed his deceased older brother Ernest, the country was devastated after almost thirty years of continual warfare, for part of the time on more than one front. Yet, within fifteen years, peace had been successfully negotiated with France and England, and the conflict against the rebel Northern provinces had also come to a negotiated, albeit temporary, conclusion. With the end of these conflicts, economic recovery could begin in earnest, and trade, industry and agricultural production increased after years of decline. It is little wonder, then, that the Archdukes' reign has received so much good press.¹

The Archdukes' involvement in public communication, especially the carefully thought-out religious profile that they projected of themselves, is relatively well known. Luc Duerloo has examined the different strategies at work behind their conscious selection of which religious cults and shrines to support, and Margit Thöfner has detailed their involvement in and conscious use of public ceremonial.² What remains less well known is how the Archdukes' efforts in the field of public communication related to the efforts of their predecessors, as well as the public's response to their endeavours.

Forging sovereignty

The major difference between the Archdukes and their predecessors was their sovereignty. They were the first sovereigns to permanently reside in the Low Countries since Charles V had departed from Spain in 1517, and their arrival finally provided a positive answer to the repeated calls for royal presence in the Low Countries. The States of Brabant had called for Philip's return as late as April 1576, and a 'prince of the royal blood' had been requested by various advisors and the Council of State throughout the interim that followed Requesens' death.³ Although Don John, Farnese and Ernest had all been close relatives of Philip, as mere governors-general none of them had enjoyed the kind of authority that the Archdukes could now lay claim to.

But the Archdukes' claim to sovereignty was far from straightforward. Before his death in 1598, Philip had given the Low Countries as a dowry to his daughter Isabella, for her and her husband Albert to rule the provinces together. The plan was publicised in the Act of Cession in May 1598, and consented to by the loyal States General, which were convened especially for this purpose.⁴ Although purporting to declare Archducal sovereignty, the Act also made it clear

that the Low Countries would forever remain closely tied to Spain. If the Archdukes were to die without issue, the country would revert to direct rule from Madrid, and if they did have children then these would only be able to marry with the consent of the Spanish king, preferably within the Spanish royal family itself.⁵

But the Act did not tell the whole story, and the most significant limitations on the Archdukes' ability to freely rule their country remained secret. Although they were free to decide domestic policy as they saw fit, their say in military and foreign affairs was subject to restrictions. First, there was the matter of the Spanish army, which was to remain in the Low Countries. It would be paid for by Spain (although this would always be conditional upon the hazards of Habsburg finances), but military strategy would be decided in Madrid, and commanders and troops would swear loyalty to the Spanish king. Secondly, the Archdukes were enjoined to both persecute heresy and recover the rebel provinces. All these conditions not only severely curtailed the Archdukes' actual sovereignty; they also made peace with the rebels virtually impossible to achieve unless it came as a result of a wholesale reconquest.⁶

The degree of sovereignty enjoyed by the Archdukes has been much disputed by historians.⁷ Ernest Gossart, in line with his general focus on Spanish domination in the Low Countries, argued that the Archdukes were really no more than governors given the significant restrictions on their power.⁸ Victor Brants, to Charles Carter's amusement, posited that the appearance of sovereignty may have outweighed the limitations the Archdukes were under, whereas Carter himself has echoed Joseph Lefèvre's argument that the Archdukes were both mere governors and real sovereigns depending on the situation.⁹ Elias and Van der Essen, on the other hand, have argued against a total reliance on the formal restrictions placed on the Archdukes. By focusing on how the Archdukes ruled in practice and how they coped with the Spanish constraints, they have instead viewed them as remarkably capable of forging their own political course, even in foreign affairs and contrary to Spanish wishes. This emphasis is also borne out by the more recent work of Paul Allen.¹⁰

Although Lefèvre and Carter's position appears to best reflect the different degrees of sovereignty exercised by the Archdukes, Brants' insistence on the importance of appearances is not without merit. The Archdukes' formal position as independent rulers opened up ways of relating to their subjects and profiling their regime that had not been available to their predecessors. The very fact that as sovereigns they would have to be formally and publicly sworn in allowed the Archdukes to benefit from something like the early modern equivalent of prime time television advertising, namely extensive public ceremonial in as many towns as they chose. There was no better way of creating a connection with the public at large. Although the Archdukes' predecessors had been welcomed with public celebrations, these had not included the oath required of sovereign rulers. It was only through this oath to uphold the privileges that rulers could receive public approval by way of acclamation. The oath and the accompanying ceremonial formed a mechanism that brought ruler and people closer together by formalising the terms of their relationship and allowing the public to give its consent.¹¹ The Archdukes' predecessors had not been able to benefit from this mechanism. The different governors-general had enjoyed their

office as a royal appointment only, and the lack of a formal personal commitment on their part towards their subjects, as provided for by the oath, may have been one reason why they remained vulnerable to accusations that they were 'evil advisors' that were deliberately misinforming the king and acting for their own private interests rather than for the good of the country, all of which perverted the relationship between the sovereign and his people.¹²

As much of the joyous entry's significance was due to its public character and the common agreement and public consent that it entailed, the number of such entries that the Archdukes undertook mattered a great deal. Quantity was certainly as important as quality: the face-to-face, real-time nature of the public consent that was given meant that no city could consent on behalf of another. The whole point of the entry was that the sovereigns and their people were personally joined together, and so the more joyous entries the Archdukes undertook, the greater the number of local communities that would be personally bound to them and the greater the number of people who would remember the event. The Archdukes appear to have realised this very clearly. In the space of three months, they swore their oaths in at least thirteen different cities and were celebrated in several more.¹³ This was in stark contrast to their predecessors, most of whom had only been ceremonially welcomed in a couple of cities each, and who may therefore have remained more abstract figures in people's minds than was the case with the Archdukes. Among their predecessors, Farnese was in some ways the exception in this respect. Thanks to his city-by-city conquest, he had been welcomed and celebrated as victor in a whole host of towns all over the country. But, despite the strong elements of a personality cult in some of these entries, his relationship with the citizens was never made official nor publicly consented to, and he, like the others, therefore remained without a formalised and direct bond with the population at large.

The oath domesticated the Archdukes, but so did much of the joyous entry ceremonial. By emphasising their straight descent from the Burgundian dukes and the Austrian Habsburgs, local ceremonial organisers presented Albert and Isabella as natural sovereigns by virtue of their connections with the native dynasty. Thus, upon the Archdukes' entry into Brussels in 1599, Isabella's ancestry, part of which she shared with Albert, was displayed on an enormous arch, with each set of parents, grandparents and great-grandparents represented in effigy, and also including Rudolph I and Philip the Bold, the founders of the Habsburg and Burgundian dynasties, respectively. On top of the arch was the coat of arms of the House of Burgundy, making the native dynasty their point of origin.¹⁴ Several other towns, such as Arras, Lille and Valenciennes, also focused on the Archdukes' connections with the Burgundians.¹⁵ In Kortrijk and Douai, the ancestry that was portrayed was even more local: instead of their Burgundian lineage, it was the succession of counts of Flanders that was displayed, only the last few of whom had also been Burgundian dukes.¹⁶ The Archdukes, then, were not just sovereigns by virtue of appointment, they actually belonged in the Low Countries as direct descendants from the country's own native rulers.

As events that were organised and paid for locally, we can treat the entries largely as expressions of local sentiment and agendas.¹⁷ Indeed, Théophile Louïse's work on the Archdukes' entry into Valenciennes in 1600 makes it clear that the local magistracy – and indeed significant parts of the city's population – were closely involved in the planning, preparation and execution

of the entry festivities. Different suggestions for how to decorate the city were, for instance, submitted to and discussed by the magistracy, and three master carpenters were sent on a study trip to Brussels, which had already welcomed the Archdukes, to see what kind of decorations they had used there.¹⁸ Such interaction with other towns goes some way towards explaining the many common features in the different joyous entries of the Archdukes, but it does not explain why local authorities wanted to enhance Archducal sovereignty by domesticating them with a display of their dynastic connections.

Although local authorities were no doubt interested in currying favour with their new rulers, which a celebration of their sovereignty would probably have contributed to, they too had every interest in promoting the Archdukes' status. With fresh memories of forced exile after the Calvinist coups of the late 1570s, the Catholic magistrates would have been particularly well aware of the importance of political stability in general, and of a good relationship between subjects and sovereigns in particular. Both their own position and the continued need to safeguard the Catholic faith therefore made it necessary that the new rulers be made as palatable as possible to their subjects. In the Archdukes' case, the connection with the native dynasty made them 'homegrown' sovereigns, the same strategy that had been employed upon the arrival of Ernest in 1594.¹⁹ Although Ernest had not been a sovereign ruler, local magistracies' wish for a stable and good relationship with him as their governor would have been the same. Ernest's Austrian and Burgundian family connections, then, provided an ideal way of dissociating him from the general discontent with the continued Spanish presence and influence in the early 1590s, while turning him into a near native governor.

Local authorities may have strengthened the Archdukes' claim to sovereignty by their willingness to associate the new rulers with the native House of Burgundy, but they also used their control of the ceremonial organisation to express their own view of what that sovereignty entailed. Margit Thøfner has shown how, although the Act of Cession made Albert and Isabella equal sovereigns, a number of the cities where they were sworn in chose to portray Isabella alone as the ruling power and to demote Albert to a mere consort.²⁰ This sole focus on Isabella, a female ruler, at the expense of her husband was in stark contrast to an element of the traditional joyous entry ceremonial in which the town, personified as a maiden, would offer the keys to the city (in other words, herself) to her new ruler, a man, in a kind of parallel act of marriage.²¹ Whereas this focus alluded to traditional gender relations whereby women were in need of male guidance and dominance, the sole focus on Isabella as the new sovereign softened the relationship between the city and its new ruler. The conspicuous neglect of Albert's sovereignty suggests that these towns were deliberately wanting to impress on the Archdukes that what they wanted was feminine – in other words, soft – rule.²²

But the Archdukes did not stop articulating their sovereignty once they had been sworn in. On the contrary, they continued to promote their own claim to rule not just the ten loyal provinces, but also the seven rebel ones. Indeed, Isabella herself spoke of her domain as 'all of the Low Countries'.²³ Their insistence on this point was what made the rebel States General reject the Archdukes' annual peace proposals even when, in 1601, they were offered freedom of worship

in return.²⁴ The same insistence on the unity of the Low Countries under Archducal sovereignty was also demonstrated when the States General was summoned in August 1600. Although it was clear from the outset that no representatives from the rebel provinces would be attending, their seats were prepared in the same way as for their loyal counterparts, only to remain empty throughout the duration of the assembly.²⁵

The different edicts regarding trade with the rebel provinces also put forward the interpretation that these fell under Archducal sovereignty. Thus, when forbidding all trade with the rebels in 1599, Isabella presented the ban as a punitive measure against a rump of wicked individuals who were profiting from the desolation and suffering of her other, good and loyal subjects in both loyal and rebel provinces.²⁶ Equally, when trade relations were restored in 1603, this was presented as an act of affection and generosity on the part of the Archdukes towards their 'subjects and vassals of the islands of Holland and Zeeland, and of our other provinces, distracted from the obedience that they owe us as their sovereign and natural princes'.²⁷ The Archdukes were aware that their subjects' ability to obey them was being prevented by a group of people with evil intentions who 'for their own ends and interests have held and hold them in oppression', while demanding 'intolerable taxes' from 'our said good subjects'. It was in order to prove to their subjects in the rebel provinces how much they loved them that the Archdukes were now permitting them to trade with the loyal provinces again.²⁸

The interpretation of the conflict the Archdukes were putting forward here was a repeat of Farnese's reconciliation discourse. Just as Farnese had excused virtually the entire rebel population of any wrongdoing by arguing that they had all been deceived and tricked into rebellion by William of Orange, so the Archdukes now professed to know that their rebel subjects' failure to obey stemmed from the oppression and evil intentions of a small group of people who had usurped sovereignty and were abusing them with 'tricks and lies'.²⁹ In so doing, they were, in theory at least, opening up the prospect of a restoration of unity although, unlike Farnese, this discourse was not followed up with public offers of reconciliation and forgiveness.

Nor was it the only view that was in circulation. Indeed, the Archdukes themselves also promoted an interpretation of the conflict that ran completely counter to their own reconciliatory approach. Although the trade edict stressed the unity of the Low Countries and the Archdukes' concern for all their subjects, many of the Archdukes' other edicts stressed the seriousness of the divisions between the North and the South, while indiscriminately blaming the rebels for the conflict. These edicts sought to address some of the problems caused by the ongoing war and presented the Archdukes as full of empathy with the plight of their subjects. But the reconciliatory tone was gone: the rebels were labelled enemies of both God and the common good and were also charged with responsibility for ruining the country's unity.³⁰ One edict proclaiming the collection of a tax to finance the war effort, for instance, referred to the 'ravaging enemy' who caused 'the destruction and ruin of our good subjects'. Indeed, blanket references to 'the enemy' were standard in most edicts dealing with the effects of the war.³¹ Here, there was certainly no suggestion that the Archdukes felt even remotely inclined to behave with any kind of generosity towards their rebellious subjects, although the trade edicts saw them restore trade relations precisely for their benefit.

Did this dichotomy damage the Archdukes' claim to sovereignty? Although their repeat of Farnese's reconciliation discourse may be regarded as the best way of convincing people living in rebel areas to return to the royal side, the Archdukes cannot have been under any illusions about their chances of persuading the rebels to end the war and peacefully return to Habsburg rule. The early 1590s had seen the rebel army advancing south, and the rebel States General were repeatedly rejecting the Archdukes' invitations to peace talks. Although the rebels were also beginning to feel the strain of war by the first years of the Archdukes' reign, they nevertheless managed to attempt a surprise attack on Antwerp in 1605.³² With no realistic prospect of exercising their claimed sovereignty over the rebel provinces, then, the Archdukes' choice to rely only selectively on the reconciliation discourse probably did not have any negative consequences. In fact, in a situation of continued war it made perfect sense to denigrate the rebels. Although it may have made the Archdukes less appealing to the rebels themselves, it was likely to bind them closer to their subjects in the loyal provinces, and this may have been more important.

Unity or division?

Although the locally organised entry ceremonial in many towns had stressed the unity of the Low Countries, such ideas were far less central in pamphleteering. As part of Albert's entry into Brussels in 1596, several *tableaux vivants* stressed the hope that he would unite and pacify the warring provinces. Early on in the processional route, Philip II was depicted as handing Albert the caduceus of Mercury, an ancient symbol for the restoration of concord (nowadays more famous as a symbol for commerce and apothecaries). The Albert figure, carrying the caduceus, then reappeared in different scenes along the route, always coming to the rescue of the distressed provinces, personified first as a maiden in need and then as a ship in rough seas. To hammer home the point that Albert was meant to rescue all of the Low Countries and not just the area under Habsburg rule, the ship had been adorned with the coats of arms of all the seventeen provinces.³³ Similarly, for the Archdukes' joyous entry almost four years later, the Brussels celebrations included the recital of verses of praise in honour of the Archdukes by seventeen young girls, each representing a separate province. In Antwerp, too, seventeen girls recited verses, but here those representing the rebel provinces were dressed in mourning. In Valenciennes, the division among the seventeen was also recognised: this time, they called on the Archdukes to restore their unity.³⁴

Pamphlets, however, pointed overwhelmingly to division. Unlike the entry decorations, pamphleteers devoted particular attention to the religious divisions between North and South, and no effort appears to have been spared in sowing hatred for the rebel-heretic. One pamphlet included, quite apart from a separate characterisation in verse of the heretic's many bad traits, a thirteen-page-long description of all the crimes the rebel Protestants had committed in the Low Countries, where they had behaved like devouring wolves.³⁵ The tendency among pamphleteers to point to heresy as the cause of the conflict also meant a clear departure from Farnese's reconciliation discourse. Instead of excusing the general population of the rebel territories for their involvement in the conflict because they had been taken advantage of by a small group of men with

sinister motives, pamphleteers were instead blaming all heretics.³⁶ Even *Complaincte et doleance de la paix*, a pamphlet which began by making a strong case for unity between all the seventeen provinces, included sharp criticism of the rebel-heretics: it was their heresy and their refusal to obey their lawful sovereign that had caused the division in the first place: 'How will you be able to justify, in front of God ..., such a rebellion and revolt ... against your own merciful princes, without cause or reason?'³⁷ Unity, then, could remain an ideal also in pamphleteering, but even when it did, it was still the divisions that grabbed the attention.

Different anti-Catholic measures in the Northern provinces also provoked hefty responses from Southern authors. The restrictions on people who had been to Catholic schools or universities, the execution of a Southerner for allegedly planning to assassinate Maurice of Nassau, and rebel pamphlets calling for Southerners to rise up against the Archdukes were met with aggressive pamphleteering in the loyal territories. For example, one pamphlet (in rhyme) called for each rebel-heretic to be given a rope so they could be hanged; another wondered whether it was 'Reformed manners' to 'rage and roar' like wild animals; and still others heaped scorn on the rebels' much hailed religious freedoms.³⁸

What was more, this heretic was not merely some abstract personification of an evildoer: no, he was very specifically a Hollander. One pamphlet from 1602, for example, made it clear that the Hollanders were the leaders of the unlawful rebellion, the others were mere 'adherents', although this does not appear to have made the writer any more favourably disposed towards them as they were all operating as a team.³⁹ But this was not all: just as a number of pamphleteers from the 1580s and 1590s had already done, so the trend of associating the rebels with the crimes committed by their fellow Calvinists in other countries continued. Examples from France and England proved beyond doubt that Catholics living in the rebel provinces were at the mercy of a pack of ravaging Calvinist wolves looking for blood.⁴⁰ Things had become so bad that Holland could now call itself Angleterre (England), or rather Sangleterre (Bloodland) for all the crimes that were being committed there.⁴¹ Hollanders, then, were guilty by virtue of their own heresy, but the characterisation was reinforced by their association with other heretics elsewhere, of whose crimes they were guilty by association.

In addition to sowing hatred for the rebels in the Northern provinces, pro-Habsburg pamphleteers were also staunch defenders of the Archdukes' claim to sovereignty. This took exactly the same form as defences of royal rule had done under Albert and Isabella's predecessors, namely a reliance on St Paul's letter to the Romans, chapter 13 – 'the powers that be are ordained by God'. The rebels' continued refusal to recognise the rights of the Archdukes thus meant that they had not only made all the Archdukes' loyal subjects their enemy but also God Himself.⁴² As had been the case before, the logic behind this assertion was not elaborated on, but was instead referred to as a self-evident axiom that readers were expected to understand.

Who were these pamphleteers? A significant proportion of the pro-Habsburg publications issued during both Don John and Farnese's governorship had been written by men who belonged to the two governors' close circle of advisors. This involvement does not appear to have been continued under the Archdukes. First, whereas most of Don John and Farnese's pamphlet-

eering was published in French, with the occasional Dutch translation, the tendency under the Archdukes was more often that explicitly anti-rebel propaganda was published in Dutch and translated into French.⁴³ Dutch was not a court language and although some of the Archdukes' courtiers probably spoke it, it is doubtful whether they would have made use of the vulgar tongue should they have engaged in print. Indeed, even William of Orange kept French as his preferred language even though the rebel provinces had decided to use Dutch for all official purposes.

Second, although a large proportion of the anti-rebel propaganda continued to be published without the name of the author, many more pamphlets than was previously the case were now published with the author's name. In the cases where we do know the author's name, these appear to have been either poets writing poems of praise to acquire patronage or, more often, clergymen.⁴⁴ The ever active Jesuits Franciscus Costerus and Johannes David wrote several pamphlets in Dutch, often including venomous attacks on heretics.⁴⁵ It may of course be that this zealous pair was not representative of the anonymous pamphleteers, but if they were, then this apparent rise of clergy pamphleteers certainly mirrors that of Calvinist preachers in the rebel provinces, where pamphlets published by nobles, officials and official bodies also declined.⁴⁶ Although the situation on the two sides of the border was very different, the Catholic revival reflected in printed material in the loyal provinces after 1585 may very well have encouraged greater participation on the part of the clergy.

Furthermore, the same attention to the deep division between North and South was in evidence in other media, where the Archdukes did not act as commissioners. The new focus on martyrs that began in the decade prior to the Archdukes' arrival continued.⁴⁷ Catholics living under the harsh conditions imposed on them in rebel territories were identified as 'martyrs', as they were prevented from living and bringing up their children in accordance with their faith.⁴⁸ The veneration of Balthasar Gerard as a martyr continued, and he was even likened to an early Christian saint, St. John of Nicomedia, who had suffered a painful death after ripping apart the emperor's edicts against Christians.⁴⁹ The nineteen Franciscans and priests who had been captured at Gorcum in Holland in 1572 and tortured and hanged at Brill, became the subject of both artistic and literary interest and the example *par excellence* of how horrible the rebels were.⁵⁰

It appears, then, that rather than being instrumental in the propagation of a venomous anti-rebel discourse, the Archdukes' own condemnation of the rebels in their edicts was a reflection of opinions that others were articulating far more strongly. Sowing hatred for the heretics in the rebel provinces had begun well before their own arrival, with the publication of books such as Richard Verstegan's *Theatre des Cruautez* in 1587. Compared to the accusations levelled in texts such as this, the Archdukes' own anti-rebel discourse remained highly moderate in tone, but the strong popular antagonism towards the rebels meant that they could in any case count on support from the public, who did not need persuading about the evils of heresy, war and rebellion. Such sentiments were in stark contrast to the displays of unity that had greeted the Archdukes in various towns, but ceremonial was a very different medium from pamphlets. Whereas ceremonial presented relationships and situations in their ideal and positive form, pamphlet authors were free to point out the problems of their time, 'warts and all'.⁵¹ As the unity of the Low Countries

remained an ideal, and would continue to be revered as such for years after the Truce had established two separate countries, it belonged in the hopes for an idealised future that were expressed through ceremonial decorations, not in pamphlets responding to rebel threats and anti-Catholic measures.

Demonstrating divine support

Rather than relying on print to convey their own self-image, the Archdukes instead constructed an elaborate religious profile. Again, this was something their sovereignty, however imperfect, allowed them to carry out in a way that their predecessors would not have been able to. The systematic religious offensive that Luc Duerloo has shown that the Archdukes engaged in, including large-scale building projects, was only possible because they were sovereigns. Although Farnese had encouraged the growth of the Jesuit and Capuchin orders, he had not been able to finance the construction of new colleges and churches to better display his own piety. The Archdukes were free to do just that, and in the process of constructing their carefully thought-out religious profile, they managed to boost the image of both their own sovereignty and the Habsburg cause in the Revolt.

Just as local ceremonial organisers had tried to domesticate Albert and Isabella by drawing attention to their Burgundian ancestry, so the Archdukes also associated themselves with the same Burgundian ancestors in their own religious worship. Ever since Rudolph I, the first Habsburg emperor, had offered his horse to a priest carrying the host to a dying man, the House of Habsburg had shown a particular devotion for the sacrament. The piety shown by Rudolph on this occasion, years before he was elected emperor, had allegedly caused the priest to prophesy that the Habsburgs would achieve world domination and was since used to promote the idea that Habsburg success was thanks to divine favour, secured by continued acts of piety like the one first displayed by Rudolph.⁵² The Habsburg association with the host was so strong that they were on occasion referred to as the '*Huis van Hostyreich*' (House of Hostland) instead of the '*Huis van Oostenrijk*' (House of Austria).⁵³

The Archdukes continued this tradition by closely associating themselves with the cult of the Blessed Sacrament of Miracles, based in the Cathedral of Saint Gudula in Brussels. This cult centred on three hosts that had been stolen and vandalised by a group of Jews in 1369 only to miraculously begin to bleed, and had been the subject of an annual procession ever since. The Archdukes elevated this procession to a veritable state event and were so conscientious about attending it that they not only returned from their summer residence at Mariemont every July to take part, but also left the supervision of the siege of Ostend for the same reason in the years 1601 to 1603.⁵⁴ In addition to personally and devotedly attending the procession, they also bestowed expensive donations on the sacrament such as a new altar and an order to have it lit up in perpetuity, at their expense.⁵⁵

In so actively associating themselves with this cult, the Archdukes were killing several birds with one stone. First, their support for the cult made them party to the pact between the

Habsburgs and God, whereby their devotion, especially to the host, would be repaid in divine favour and worldly success. Second, the cult of the Blessed Sacrament had been particularly favoured by the Valois dukes of Burgundy, and so the Archdukes' decision to pick up where their ancestors had left off amounted to yet another domesticating mechanism.⁵⁶

But the Blessed Sacrament had a further significance. The three hosts had not only miraculously begun to bleed in the fourteenth century, they had also miraculously been saved from the iconoclastic Calvinist regime that had taken power in 1579. After Farnese's victory in the spring of 1585, the restored Catholic magistrates had marched through town, together with the clergy and citizens, to retrieve the hosts from their hiding place and return them to the cathedral.⁵⁷ The celebration of the host from then on was as much in commemoration of this last miracle of anti-Calvinist significance as of the first one against the vandalising Jews. Together, the first and second miracles suggested both that the Habsburgs would continue to enjoy divine favour thanks to their devotion to the host and that, just like the hosts had triumphed over Calvinist evil, so the Catholic fight against the rebel-heretics would eventually be victorious.

Even more closely associated with the Archdukes' fortunes in the conflict against the rebels, however, were the miraculous capacities of Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel. Scherpenheuvel was originally just a hill in the Brabantian countryside near the town of Zichem, but on this hill there was an oak tree with a statue of the Madonna. In January 1603, the Madonna started bleeding and the news spread that she was bleeding on account of the sins committed in the rebel provinces.⁵⁸ Streams of pilgrims followed, and even a number of miracles. The Archdukes promptly took note, and as early as November 1603 Albert credited Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel with the rescue of 's-Hertogenbosch, which had managed to withstand a rebel siege. Both he and Isabella then went on a pilgrimage there to give thanks, and also to pray for help with the still ongoing siege of Ostend.⁵⁹ Once Ostend finally surrendered, after what had been the longest ever siege in European history, Albert again credited Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel with the success.⁶⁰

But the Madonna's association with the Habsburg side, and the divine support she implied, went further still. The fact that her miracles were happening not just on the frontier with rebel territory, but within the domains of the princes of Orange was imbued with significance, even though the risks of being near the front became very clear when Scherpenheuvel was sacked by rebel forces in 1604.⁶¹ Indeed, the pope himself echoed this in 1606 when, in a letter of indulgence, he noted that it was precisely because Scherpenheuvel was in a land troubled by heresy that God had allowed miracles to occur there.⁶² Moreover, the location of Scherpenheuvel by the town of Zichem echoed the events at the Old Testament town of Sichem, where God's chosen people had renewed their covenant with God. The miracles and their location were a sign that God now wanted a new covenant with the people of the Low Countries.⁶³

These were all indications, or even proof, that God was on the Catholic side.⁶⁴ Investment in these cults, by way of pilgrimage, donations and buildings, therefore made perfect sense as part and parcel of the war effort. If battles could ultimately only be won with divine support, then any effort to attract such support, the most powerful weapon imaginable, was obviously worthwhile. And the Archdukes invested: Scherpenheuvel went from having been a lonely tree

on a hill to being a specially designed town with its own specially designed basilica to house the Madonna figure. This town, in the form of a heptagon, was designed by Albert himself, each corner commemorating one of the Virgin's seven joys and seven sorrows.⁶⁵ And, as was the case with the Blessed Sacrament in Brussels, Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel also received costly gifts from the Archdukes on a regular basis, such as precious clothing.⁶⁶ The Madonna was also given presents to commemorate the favour she had bestowed on the Archdukes, such as the plate on which the keys to Ostend had been presented to them after their victorious siege. The new town was also granted a charter of incorporation, allowing it to share in the privileges of Ostend. Once the truce with the rebels had been signed in 1609, the first stone to the new basilica was laid as part of the many celebrations that year, thus associating the Virgin with the Archdukes' success once again.⁶⁷

The Archdukes took their religiously inspired war effort still further. In the late fourteenth century, the Confraternity of Our Lady's Seven Sorrows had been established by court clerics in Brussels and had quickly acquired the princely patronage of Philip the Fair, Emperor Maximilian I and Margaret of Austria. By the end of the sixteenth century, the confraternity had lost some of its prominent position, but had retained its reputation for saving the Low Countries from internal strife during Maximilian's disputed regency.⁶⁸ The Archdukes must have been taken by the parallels with their own reign, as they promptly enrolled as members, only to be followed by virtually all the nobles.⁶⁹ The confraternity, then, like the cult of the Blessed Sacrament and the construction of Scherpenheuvel, articulated a militantly Catholic position in the ongoing conflict against the rebels and their heresy. The Archdukes' continued willingness to credit the Virgin with their successes allowed them to portray her as their primary ally in their struggle against heresy, while at the same time acquiring a reputation of extreme piety. In turn, this piety also served to substantiate their claim to the same divine favour that the Habsburg tradition maintained the entire dynasty had been blessed with.⁷⁰

The Blessed Sacrament, Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel and the Confraternity of Our Lady's Seven Sorrows were only three of the multiple religious devotions actively supported by the Archdukes. There were also numerous others, all consciously promoting both the Archducal claim to sovereignty on the grounds of divine support and dynastic tradition, as well as their alliance with the Virgin Mary. The Marian devotion, for instance, was not restricted to Scherpenheuvel and the Confraternity of Our Lady's Seven Sorrows. On the contrary, the Archdukes were regular pilgrims to Our Lady of Halle, who was believed to have saved the town from Calvinist attack in 1580 by catching cannon balls in her lap. Our Lady of Halle was also a dynastic shrine, as the effigy had originated with St Elizabeth of Hungary, the mother of one of the duchesses of Burgundy and Isabella's namesake. The Archdukes were also frequent visitors to Our Lady of Laeken, who was reputed to help women wanting to get pregnant. The Archdukes were themselves having difficulties producing an heir and were reported by the papal nuncio to be visiting Laeken weekly over a period of a couple of months in 1601 alone.⁷¹ The continued use of the number seven in their Marian worship also drew attention to the importance they credited Our Lady of Seven Sorrows with.⁷² In addition to the heptagon shape that Albert gave Scher-

penheuvel, the Archdukes also celebrated seven Marian festivals a year, and perpetual lighting was provided for seven shrines.⁷³ Other than the Virgin Mary, the Archdukes devoted most of their worship of saints to their own namesakes, Saint Albert and Saint Elizabeth. Again, this was not an accidental choice: while viceroy in Portugal in the 1580s, Albert had been particularly devoted to St Adalbert, an important saint in both Portugal and the Empire. After his move to the Low Countries, however, he quickly swapped allegiances to St Albert of Leuven, and in 1612 even managed to get the saint's relics moved from Rheims to Brussels.⁷⁴

Reception

The Archdukes' religious profile was multilayered and sophisticated. For people to fully understand the case for Archducal sovereignty and their militantly Catholic position in the war against the rebels, they would have required extensive exposure to the Archdukes' religious devotion as well as some knowledge of former Habsburg and Burgundian traditions. How successful were the Archdukes in presenting their religious profile, and all that it entailed, in a way that could be understood and appreciated by their subjects?

Although Albert had not been able to engage in the same kind of religious profiling that he pursued as a sovereign while he was still a governor, his piety had certainly been well advertised from early on. The fact that he was an archbishop and cardinal prior to his marriage may have made a religious profile easier to project, and the celebratory accounts of his victories at Hulst, Calais and Ardres had taken on a far more religious tone than the battle accounts of his different predecessors. Whereas previous battle accounts had stressed the cowardice of the enemy, there was now a tendency to include a mention of their heresy and treason as well. Thus, one reference went 'these little tyrants, rebels against the Church of God and traitors to their king'.⁷⁵ Conversely, the divine favour enjoyed by Albert and the loyalists was noted, as was Albert's own personal piety.⁷⁶ Indeed, one pamphleteer portrayed him as a kind of St George who had come to kill the seven-headed serpent that was heresy, whereas another mentioned the Archduke's participation in the procession for the Blessed Sacrament in Brussels.⁷⁷

Although the Archdukes' religious profile was far more elaborate than any self-image that Albert had been able to project in his two years as governor, the image of a particularly pious ruler may already have been well established. The fact that the Archdukes were highly public about their religious commitments can only have reinforced any such pre-existing impressions of Albert. They conscientiously attended a large number of religious festivals, including all the Marian feast days at Scherpenheuvel and the annual procession in honour of the Blessed Sacrament, as well as the Corpus Christi processions in Brussels, again emphasising their traditional Habsburg devotion to the host. Many of the public ceremonies the Archdukes participated in, either in person or by proxy, were occasioned by the inauguration of new churches. At the laying of the foundations of the new Jesuit church in Brussels in 1606, both the Archdukes were there, as they were to be at the church's inauguration in 1621.⁷⁸ Also in 1606, the first stones of both the new Jesuit monastery and the new Jesuit church in Lille were laid. Although the Archdukes

did not attend either ceremony themselves, a Lillois diary writer noted that the first stone of the monastery had the Archducal coat of arms on it and that Albert's arms were depicted on the altar when mass was celebrated outdoors on the site of the new church.⁷⁹ In addition, there were their regular pilgrimages to Halle and Laeken, and also numerous trips to other Marian shrines around the country. Although many of these only received a single Archducal visit, the costly gifts the Archdukes left behind would bear testimony to their visit and their piety for those who could not themselves witness the couple at prayer.⁸⁰

Albert and Isabella also associated themselves closely with the reconstruction of religious infrastructure. Although religious restoration had begun in the 1580s, continued warfare had meant that there had not been the means to pursue it wholesale. In the diocese of Bruges as well as in certain areas of the dioceses of Ghent and Antwerp, most churches were still in ruins in 1600, and less than half the parishes had pastors.⁸¹ The Archdukes' personal initiative, in terms of high profile support and donations, and the economic recovery resulting from the gradual end of armed conflict meant that the process of educating the clergy and reconstructing and re-adorning the churches could be sped up.⁸²

The general impression of two particularly pious sovereigns must, it seems, have been fairly easily conveyed and understood. But what about the finer points of the arguments the Archdukes' religious profile made about dynastic connections and divine favour? Sadly, the number of extant diaries for this period is significantly lower than for the earlier Revolt, when many appear to have started writing in order to record the escalating conflict. It is therefore far more difficult to retrieve information on what ordinary citizens thought of the world around them. The two diaries that do cover the early part of the Archdukes' reign, those of Mahieu Manteau in Lille and Jan de Pottre in Brussels, do not offer many details on their understanding of what the Archdukes stood for, although some impressions can be gleaned from them. Manteau certainly appears to have been aware of his new sovereigns' great piety. He noted that after their entry into Lille in 1600 they had gone straight to Our Lady of Los, a local Marian shrine, and also when their coat of arms was depicted on altars and first stones of churches.⁸³ No mention, however, was ever made of Habsburg pious traditions, the Archdukes' devotion to their dynastic saints, or Our Lady of Scherpenheuvel's help in securing victory at Ostend, although he did record details about the public celebrations on this occasion.⁸⁴

Jan de Pottre's diary offers fewer clues. Although he lived in Brussels and took note of public celebrations, including the procession for the Blessed Sacrament, he never acknowledged the Archdukes' devotion, nor is there ever any indication that he understood why the cult was so significant to them. Their resumption of Burgundian and Habsburg worship was also not mentioned. There is, of course, the possibility that both De Pottre and Manteau were perfectly on board with the multilayered nature of the Archdukes' religious devotion, but that they simply chose not to discuss it in their diaries. De Pottre's diary ends in 1600, with his son carrying on the recording through 1601. This, of course, means that the diary came to an end before the miracles that made Scherpenheuvel so special had even occurred, and probably also before the Archdukes joined the Confraternity of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows. If the Archdukes' agenda was not clear

to De Pottre in 1600, then, maybe it would have been a few years later? We will never know.

However, other sources detailing the public response to the Archdukes' piety indicate that local communities, or at least elements within them, were tuned into Albert and Isabella's dynastic Catholicism from the beginning. For example, one of the events put on to honour the Archdukes during their entry into Antwerp was a play on the life of St Elizabeth, Isabella's namesake, and in both Lille and Tournai there were representations of Saints Clara, Elizabeth and Eugenia, the saints of each of the Archduchess's three names.⁸⁵ For the joyous entry in Douai, local organisers had put up a *tableau* showing the story of Rudolph dismounting his horse and lending it to a priest carrying the sacrament. In Arras, there were displays showing Habsburg piety, although the chronicler did not mention what form this took. As perhaps the most famous act of Habsburg devotion, it may be that the *tableau* in Arras showed the same scene as in Douai, but as the details were not recorded this remains pure speculation.⁸⁶ Even if it was another act of piety, the overall message that the Archdukes came from a long line of devout rulers should still have been the same. More generally, this may also have been the message that the many pilgrims to Scherpenheuvel went back home with, as their trip would have allowed them to see the shrine the Archdukes were building.⁸⁷

Judging from the locally organised festivities, then, it seems that the dynastic element in the Archdukes' piety was fairly well known. Of course, the existence of such local displays cannot be taken to imply that all local residents understood what they were meant to say. But Louise's work on the entry in Valenciennes illustrates to what extent the planning and preparation of a joyous entry was a cooperative effort with a high degree of public participation.⁸⁸ Although participants in the different *tableaux* may not necessarily have been told what the idea behind the display was, the participation must at the very least have increased their chances of accessing such information, either from the choreographer's instructions, or from fellow better informed participants.

Furthermore, the dynastic element in the Archdukes' worship was not proclaimed only through ceremonial: books also explicitly discussed the piety shown by both the Archdukes themselves as well as their ancestors. Thus, Justus Lipsius' book on Our Lady of Halle, published in numerous editions and languages, noted that the Madonna figure had been a gift from St Elizabeth, and later stressed both the devotion of the Archdukes' ancestors as well as how 'extremely' ('extremement') devout they themselves were.⁸⁹ Similarly, Estienne Ydens' book on the Blessed Sacrament included a dedicatory epistle to Isabella, which noted not only her many visits and presents to the cult, but also how the traditional Habsburg devotion to the host went all the way back to Rudolph's first act of piety, which had secured them the divine favour they had since enjoyed.⁹⁰ With regard to Scherpenheuvel, Philip Numan's work on the miracles that had occurred there included a clear explanation of why Scherpenheuvel was so significant. The repeat of the name of the town mentioned in the Old Testament was a sure sign that God wanted a new covenant with the people of the Low Countries, the miracles were His proof that the Southern Low Countries enjoyed His support, and His choice of a location so close to rebel territory was clearly intended to both strengthen Catholics in their faith and recover heretics from

their path of error.⁹¹ Numan's book first appeared in 1604 in Dutch, French and Spanish. By 1606 the third edition of the Dutch version was already out, as was the second Spanish edition, and an English edition was also published. The first supplement appeared in 1613-14, again in different languages.⁹²

The publication of these books did not, of course, mean that the ideas contained in them reflected generally held beliefs, that buyers were persuaded by or agreed with what they read, or even that they read the books at all. Nevertheless, it must at least have contributed to some spreading of the ideas contained within them, as some buyers must have read the books, some must have believed what they read and some must have agreed. The controversy they sparked in the rebel provinces, where counter-evidence against Our Ladies of Scherpenheuvel and Halle was published, suggest that they were certainly read by Protestants, so a Southern, Catholic readership must also be expected. As fairly substantially sized books (both Ydens and Numan's books are roughly 300 pages, whereas Lipsius' was about 200), few may have read them from cover to cover, but individual chapters may have been. As religious works, the clergy may also have repeated some of the content in sermons, although without any extant information on the contents of sermons, this is difficult to determine.

The absence of sources on sermons also makes it difficult to decide whether or to what extent the Archdukes' militant Catholicism was elaborated on in the popular celebrations of military victories, which traditionally included sermons. Although Albert had lost his army leadership in 1602, he nevertheless appears to have been explicitly associated with the military victories of Ambrosio Spínola, the new captain general from 1605.⁹³ After the fall of Ostend, a broadsheet celebratory song was issued which echoed Romans 13 by stressing the Archdukes' legitimate sovereignty and labelling the rebellion against them as an act against God, much as the pamphleteers responding to continued rebel attacks and anti-Catholics measures were also doing.⁹⁴ In October 1606, a *Te Deum laudamus* was celebrated in Lille after Albert's success at Venlo against Maurice of Nassau. In recording the event in his diary, Mahieu Manteau, normally very reluctant to express any kind of personal opinion, labelled Maurice a 'great pillar of heresy'.⁹⁵ As we simply do not possess information on the content of the sermons given on occasions such as these, it is difficult to say whether this opinion on Maurice originated from Manteau himself or whether he was repeating what he had been told in church, or read or heard elsewhere. We saw that under Alva, public celebrations of military victories did include the proclamation of a battle account in church, and if this was still standard practice then it is possible that criticism of the rebels' heresy and mention of the Archdukes' piety would have been made. After all, these were themes that had already surfaced in the battle accounts from Albert's governorship. If such topics were included in the proclamation, then the Archdukes' militant Catholic profile and their interpretation of the conflict against the rebels as a struggle against heresy would have reached a very large audience indeed.

Working for peace

The most prominent message that was conveyed to the Archdukes during their numerous entries in 1599 and 1600 was the desire for peace. Peace had already been the general theme on the occasion of Ernest's entries in 1594, and also upon Albert's arrival in 1596 when he had been portrayed as the country's saviour.⁹⁶ In the Archdukes' joyous entries, the hope for a return to peace and prosperity was again articulated with full force. In Leuven, a play was performed where the subject was the causes of the war and the hope that the Archdukes would bring it to an end.⁹⁷ In Antwerp, an enormous cone-shaped theatre that was several stories high had been set up, displaying first the misfortunes of war and then turning as the Archdukes rode past to show the blessings of peace.⁹⁸ In Ghent, a *tableau* showed the god Vulcan melting down weapons and turning them into agricultural equipment; in Douai there was a display showing the horn of plenty, whereas in Mons the figure of Hope called for the country to be saved.⁹⁹

In Valenciennes, numerous different decorations expressed the hope for peace. Figures representing the Archdukes were shown fighting the causes and the effects of war, such as heresy, hunger and poverty, and recitals and inscriptions presented the Archdukes as the country's newly arrived saviours.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps most strikingly, the organisers had decided to hold a repeat of the contest between Neptune and Pallas Athena over who should give their name to the city of Athens. Just like in the ancient story, the contest would be won on the basis of the best present the two gods could offer. But there was a twist: Neptune was in fact a figure of Albert dressed as the god, whereas the figure of Isabella personified Pallas Athena. Whereas Albert/Neptune offered a battle horse for use in war, Isabella/Pallas Athena offered an olive branch, the symbol of peace, and with this she won the contest.¹⁰¹

Isabella's victory in the contest was just one of the ways in which the town of Valenciennes suggested their preference for female rule. As had also been the case in Antwerp and Douai, it was Isabella who was given the keys to the city, and it was she who swore the oath required of the new sovereigns.¹⁰² In Antwerp, Isabella was portrayed as the Goddess of Love, invited to govern in peace and concord, while in Arras the inscription on her effigy declared that she was full of love and mercy.¹⁰³ This female focus stressed the cities' wish for soft rule and a more equitable relationship between sovereign and local communities, but it also served to emphasise that the aim of the reign should be the restoration of peace. Feminine qualities were clearly deemed to be better suited to peace-making than any show of masculine belligerence.

These repeated calls for peace were taken seriously by the Archdukes, and they too portrayed themselves as the much desired peacemakers. The years 1599 and 1600 saw the appearance of several new medals, most with the image of the Archdukes. One of them also depicted ears of corn and the inscription 'Under the auspices of Christ' (AUSPICE CHRISTO), whereas another hailed them as Flanders' second hope (SPES ALTERA FLANDRIS).¹⁰⁴

And the Archdukes delivered on their promise. Already in June 1598, during Albert's governorship, he had been associated with the conclusion of the Peace of Vervins, which ended the war with France. Although the treaty had been brokered by Pope Clement VIII, Albert's involvement was explicitly noted in the treaty's preamble, along with the great faith that Philip II



Processions could be elaborate affairs, as demonstrated by this enormous *tableau vivant* from the Archdukes' joyous entry into Antwerp. Several stories high, the cone-shaped structure turned upon the Archdukes' approach to first show the misfortunes of war and then the blessings of peace. From Johannes Bochius' book *Historica narratio profectionis et inaugurationis serenissimorum Belgii principum Alberti et Isabellae, Austriæ archiducum* (Jan Moretus, Antwerp, 1602)

had in him.¹⁰⁵ Of direct and immediate relevance was the treaty's Article 2, which stipulated that both parties would refrain from supporting leagues and alliances damaging to the other party, and French support for the rebel Dutch would have to come to an end, even though it did not stop altogether.¹⁰⁶ In Lille, the celebrations do not appear to have included any portrayals of Albert, but the proclamation of the text of the treaty would have made his association clear.¹⁰⁷ Also, a song published in celebration of the peace noted that both peasants and merchants could now go about their business safely without fear of soldiers and brigands. The hopes expressed upon Albert's arrival two years previously were now, in other words, in the process of being fulfilled, at least for the population of Walloon Flanders.¹⁰⁸

The active pursuit of peace continued with greater vigor once the Archdukes were installed as sovereigns. Again, that sovereignty proved to be a key advantage. First, unlike their predecessors, the Archdukes had their own ambassadors at foreign courts and could thus more easily establish relations with other powers, as they did with James VI and I, than if they had had to go through the Spanish ambassadors.¹⁰⁹ Second, their official status as sovereigns meant that they could, and did, force Philip III's hand when they judged that this would bring the conclusion of peace closer, without running the immediate risk of recall and disgrace.¹¹⁰

This mostly happened through the Archdukes' willingness to offer wide-ranging concessions, something that ran completely counter to their instructions from Madrid. Aside from the overtures of peace talks made to the rebels every year from 1595 onwards, Albert agreed to hand over Calais to Henry IV in 1598, despite Philip II's explicit instructions to the contrary.¹¹¹ Two years later, and again in direct opposition to instructions from Madrid, Albert allowed the loyal States General to negotiate for peace with representatives from the rebels, and in August the following year the court learned that not only was Albert secretly negotiating with the rebels, he had even offered them the free exercise of Protestantism, a share in government and the removal of troops should they be willing to formally return the provinces to Habsburg sovereignty.¹¹² The negotiations with the English followed a similar pattern. Whereas Philip III and his council worked to safeguard Spanish honour and reputation by not conceding anything too lightly, Albert sought ways of conveying to James VI and I that the Habsburg side was willing to secure a permanent peace. Thus, in 1603 and following James' proclamation of an edict ordering the cessation of hostilities against Spain on sea, Albert immediately allowed the free passage of British ships and the release of English prisoners. He also removed references to English and Irish Catholics from a trade edict coming from Madrid in order to avoid offending James.¹¹³ Far from the die-hard militancy that was expected of them in Spain and which they too projected of themselves, the Archdukes' peace diplomacy was an exercise in bending over backwards.

But they did not have much leverage to do anything else. Subsidies from Spain had reached a critically low point, as the Spanish economy had been battered by a series of bad harvests in the 1590s, and in 1599 a particularly severe plague wiped out about ten percent of the entire population.¹¹⁴ As if that were not enough, Henry IV's invasion of Savoy in September 1600 closed off the so-called Spanish Road, the military corridor along France's eastern border which the Spanish used to move troops to the Low Countries. Money was already in short supply, and

now there could be no shipments of men for almost a year.¹¹⁵ When what was to be the longest mutiny of the entire conflict broke out at Hoogstraten in September 1602, the rebels were free to secure their recent conquests without fear of a Habsburg counter-attack.¹¹⁶

Paradoxically, the obvious Habsburg military weakness made the Archdukes' efforts to initiate peace more difficult. Although the mutiny at Hoogstraten meant that the Habsburg army was in no state to conduct a new offensive or to even adequately defend Habsburg possessions, Philip III nevertheless decided to prioritise his reputation and ordered an end to all discussions of a cease-fire. For further discussions to be possible, it would first be necessary to redress the image of military strength.¹¹⁷ Although this attitude echoed that of Farnese, who had sought to establish a reputation for military strength with the capture of Maastricht in 1579, the situation in 1602 was noticeably different: Farnese had enjoyed large-scale Spanish funding during his reconciliation drive, but now there was none. Although the situation improved sufficiently for Spinola to conduct a successful offensive against the rebel provinces in the summer of 1605, in June 1607 he wrote to Philip that there was now neither sufficient money nor men to fight even a defensive war.¹¹⁸ And Spinola was right; in November that year Spain was forced to declare a bankruptcy, thus making payments to the army in the Low Countries even more difficult than before.¹¹⁹

Luckily for the Habsburgs, things were not going too well for the rebels either. Although the late 1590s had seen some spectacular advances, the military stalemate of the first years of the seventeenth century forced them to expand their army from 35,000 men in 1599 to 51,000 in 1607 as well as to build new and costly fortifications.¹²⁰ After the peace treaties between Spain and France in 1598 and Spain and England in 1604, there was also much less financial aid forthcoming from the rebels' former allies. In addition, the peace treaty with England involved a new trade embargo banning Dutch ships from trading with both the loyal provinces and the Iberian peninsula. This embargo was especially hard-hitting for the rebel provinces, as English vessels were now free to trade with the Iberian peninsula provided they did not carry Dutch goods.¹²¹ Unlike previously, therefore, Spanish needs could be satisfied without relying on rebel shipping at all, and in trading with the English the Spanish managed to undermine the rebels' 'market share' in European bulk shipping.

But problems such as these still did not make peace an easy option for the rebel authorities. On the contrary, important interest groups in the rebel provinces had strong vested interests in a continuation of the conflict. Stadholder Maurice had consolidated his position largely because of his good military leadership; committed Calvinists saw the conflict in religious terms and refused to accept that any agreement could be concluded with the tyrant in Madrid; and a proportion of the mercantile community earned good money through trade (and piracy) in the Indies.¹²² Pitted against them were Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Advocate of the States of Holland, the landed provinces and the majority of the cities. Oldenbarnevelt was aware that the Republic could not afford to keep up the level of military expenditure that a continuation of the war required, and the cities were less and less willing to pay up for the army's costs. Provincial arrears were high, and in Utrecht local discontent reached such heights that a tax riot erupted in 1606.¹²³

Although Oldenbarnevelt's economic arguments managed to win the day with the Hol-

land regents, this was no thanks to pamphleteering.¹²⁴ Despite strong support on the ground, pro-peace pamphlets appear to have amounted to less than one-tenth of all those discussing the ongoing negotiations.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the sheer number of pro-war pamphlets was not enough to convince provincial deputies. Maurice's supporters bombarded the pamphlet market with warnings against the ulterior motives the Habsburgs were bound to have, and how the Spaniards would lure them with peace until they were ready to launch a surprise attack (which, incidentally, was the exact argument used in favour of a peace deal in Madrid). Provincial deputies, however, listened more carefully to Oldenbarnevelt's economic arguments, even though these hardly ever surfaced in the pamphlets.¹²⁶

In stark contrast to the debates in the rebel provinces, in the South the prospect of peace was looked upon with great favour. Jonathan Israel has argued that the reason there was more public debate on the topic of the peace talks in the rebel territories was that the rebels took a greater interest in reaching 'unsophisticated folk' than was the case in the loyal provinces.¹²⁷ But this had nothing to do with reaching out to the population. Instead, the lack of actual debate and proclamation of different viewpoints in the South can be explained by a total public support for peace. Unlike in the North, no social groups managed to make money off the conflict. Instead, trade had plummeted and infrastructure had been destroyed as a result of blockades, mass emigration and hordes of troops constantly on the move. Agricultural productivity also continued to suffer, as both peasants and harvests found themselves at the mercy of passing troops who helped themselves to what they wanted, and incursions and violations by rebel brigands. It was not that peace was not publicly talked about in the South; rather there was no debate because everyone agreed that that was what they wanted.

Indeed, the conclusion of the peace treaties with France and England occasioned massive public celebrations. In Brussels, the Peace of Vervins was celebrated for three days.¹²⁸ Although Mahieu Manteau of Lille rarely devoted more than a single paragraph to any event he described in his diary, his description of the festivities occasioned by the peace with France takes up more than seven pages in the printed edition.¹²⁹ If we treat his diary as a record of what this man thought was significant, then the conclusion of peace with France becomes nothing less than the most important political event of his life. The peace with England in 1604 was also the subject of public celebrations, although Manteau was less detailed here, probably because the war with England did not represent a direct threat to his city in the same way that war against France, just a few miles away, had done.¹³⁰ Even so, the peace with England carried significance for the continuing war against the rebels, as the treaty ruled out continued English support for them.¹³¹ Certainly, the treaties with both France and England confirmed the Archdukes as successful peacemakers well before the final conclusion of the Twelve Years' Truce. As such, they had shown themselves capable of standing up for their subjects' interests in a way that none of their predecessors had managed to do.

Conclusion

The key difference between the Archdukes and their predecessors in terms of public communication was their sovereignty. This difference in status allowed the Archdukes access to a whole array of 'PR tools' that had quite simply not been available to ordinary governors-general. The oath required of them as new rulers was particularly significant because it functioned as a mechanism of bringing the Archdukes and their subjects closer together from the very beginning. By providing an occasion for direct, personal contact between rulers and people, by formalising the terms of their relationship without officially paying heed to any outside power, and by allowing for public consent to be expressed, the oath alone meant that, already from their very arrival as sovereigns, the public image of Albert and Isabella was of a different kind than that of any of the previous governors-general, none of whom had had to be sworn in.

The Archdukes' sovereignty was also fundamental to their ability to project a sophisticated and comprehensive religious profile of themselves. With greater control of domestic funds and with the freedom to engage in majestic building projects, the Archdukes could fashion their own public image to a far greater degree than any governor, whose funds were more limited and who had to defer to the higher power in Madrid that they were representing. The Archdukes' sovereignty also added particular prestige to their patronage of religious cults, and they appear to have used this to actively promote their own piety as well as the connection between themselves as 'homegrown' sovereigns and their Burgundian and Habsburg ancestry. This connection amounted to a further reinforcement of their claim to sovereignty: they were independent rulers not just by virtue of Philip II's cessation, but also because they belonged in the Low Countries as true successors of the native dynasty which, in turn, enjoyed divine support.

Although the details of the Archdukes' connection with their pious forebears may indeed have been lost on a significant proportion of their subjects, local ceremonial organisers are nevertheless on record as having promoted both the idea of the Archdukes as extraordinarily devout sovereigns and of their place within the Habsburg tradition of piety. Their efforts were echoed in the best-selling books on the Archdukes' favourite cults, thus perpetuating the message for any readers who may not have witnessed the ceremonial.

There is no doubt that the most significant aspect of the Archdukes' popularity and personal appeal was their ability to secure an end to the different conflicts that, by 1609, had ravaged the Southern Low Countries for over forty years. Although ego-documents detailing these events are relatively few, it is nevertheless clear that the different peace deals occasioned tremendous joy and celebration. Pamphlet authors proved more than ready to defend the sovereigns' position from early on in the reign, and the Archdukes' successful peacemaking must have served to reinforce their subjects' loyalty to them. Albert and Isabella's popularity as sovereigns was not just due to the oath they had sworn or their native ancestry, but because they proved themselves worthy of the office.

Conclusion

We began this book by noting the tendency to dismiss Habsburg public communication during the Dutch Revolt as non-existent or of bad quality. It should now be clear, however, that the Habsburg regime remained highly visible on the public scene, and that there was considerable awareness among members of the regime of what was said in rebel pamphleteering and what the effects of this might be, as well as concerns about how best to respond to it.

But awareness of dissident pamphleteering took a full ten years to translate into active pamphleteering on the part of the regime. When it finally did happen, it was because all the traditional channels of communication were no longer in Habsburg control. Initially, the regime had fallen back on its tried and tested multimedia tradition, which was overwhelmingly centred on oral rather than written communication. Thus, the problems of heresy and rebellion were continually tackled in public through edicts, punishment rites and public festivities whenever there was a success to celebrate. All these channels allowed the regime to proclaim its position with regard to religious and political dissent, and to make clear what types of behaviour it did not regard as compatible with obedience to the king and God. If William of Orange made a big point of claiming to be fighting for king and country, then Alva's frequent proclamations made it very clear that that was no more than a criminal illusion.

The first decade of the Revolt was marked by the two sides arguing their respective cases on completely different platforms. Orange and the rebels could rely on no other mass medium than pamphlets (although manuscript letter campaigns also figured), and as they had no institutional or territorial power base of their own, they had to actively solicit support. This required them to *persuade* people of their just cause and meant that they had to find arguments that would *appeal* to the public. The regime, on the other hand, found itself at the opposite end of the spectrum: until the spring of 1572 it was in control of all territory and all institutions and was not concerned with amassing popular support. Instead, it simply wanted to enforce continued obedience. The emphasis was therefore on command and authority, and certainly not on persuasion and appeal. In this context it should also be kept in mind that the Dutch Revolt, although a challenge that shook the regime deeply when it broke out, was to begin with nothing more than a rebellion of a group of dissatisfied nobles and religious troublemakers. Pitted against them was the Spanish monarch, the ruler of the largest empire the world had ever seen, and his formidable multinational army who were intent on crushing a rebellion (something they had accomplished before), not on winning a drawn-out war against an equal opponent.

Resorting to its traditional communication apparatus meant that the regime could draw on several advantages. The regime's messages were legal and were proclaimed left, right and centre. The necessary involvement of local authorities in the proclamations added authority to the messages that were being conveyed, thus enhancing the regime's ability to command the obedience it was looking to restore. This was an advantage the rebels could not achieve through their far more anonymous pamphlets, except in circumstances when local authorities had been discredited. Thus, the Sea Beggars' rallying cry against the Tenth Penny in the spring of 1572 met with widespread support from townspeople, who found themselves disillusioned with their magistrates' support for Alva's tax even though this had been forced upon them. However, despite the tremendous unpopularity of the Tenth Penny, people's willingness to turn against their own magistrates was far from total, something that illustrates both the degree of authority that magistrates continued to enjoy despite increasing local opposition as well as how great that authority must have been earlier in the Revolt before the taxes had been introduced.

So much for the advantages of the regime's communicative tradition. There were also some non-negligible disadvantages, such as the regime's refusal to engage in genuine argument. Although its position with regard to heresy, William of Orange and rebellion must have been more than clear and the custom of commanding and frightening people to obedience could be, and was, effective for a while, the first decade of the conflict saw no real build-up of genuine support for the regime. The *causes célèbres* championed by the rebels – respect for the privileges granted to the Low Countries, moderation in religious affairs and an end to the Tenth Penny – were never addressed as legitimate public grievances by the regime, which continued to simply push for unquestioning obedience. The result was that the regime was effectively giving the rebels all the persuasive power they needed by letting their arguments, which they were aware continued unhindered by censorship, go unopposed.

Moreover, there was also the contested issue of who exactly was behind Alva's numerous edicts and the punishment offensive. Although the message calling for obedience and an end to all heresy must have been clear to everyone, people needed to be convinced that it was coming from the king himself if it was to be effective. That was not at all obvious, especially as the grievances with regard to the persecution and punishment of heretics, the assault on local privileges and the attempted enforcement of the Tenth Penny suggested that the king, if presumed to be honourable and standing by his oath from 1549, could not have consented to them. The fact that the rebels did their utmost to nourish such doubts did not make the regime's communication weigh any heavier. When Philip himself did not come to the Low Countries in person and Alva resorted to full-scale massacres at Mechelen, Zutphen and Naarden, these doubts were allowed to fester indefinitely.

But the regime's communication efforts evolved during the course of the conflict, largely as a result of the individual governors' personal initiatives, or lack thereof. Thus, the contributions of both Requesens and the interim government of the Council of State to the regime's public communication consisted largely of refraining from Alva's methods rather than in providing any innovations. Once again, the emphasis was on edicts and proclamations, with the occasional

public celebration, such as after the battle of Mook. But this period also demonstrated the weakness of the Habsburg communicative tradition: in periods of no good news, there was little that could be and was communicated. In other words, the regime's self-presentation was largely hostage to real successes that could be communicated as pieces of good news. There was no tradition of communicating setbacks and defeats, nor how to promote loyalty to the regime without there being a real occasion for doing so.

On the contrary, the continued mutinies of the mid-1570s instead emphasised what a burden the presence of the army was, and the attempts of both Requesens and the Council of State to settle with the mutineers labelled them as being more concerned with the welfare of the king's ravenous troops than with his long-suffering subjects. And herein lay the strength of the illegally convened States General and their puppet Council: their resolute action against the mutineers proved their ultimate 'loyalty'. Whereas the marauding troops appeared to prove right the rebels' argument that the king was being misled by evil men wishing to ruin the country, the States General was now saving the king's dominions on his behalf.

The pervasive belief in the duty of loyalty to the king among Catholics was amply demonstrated upon the arrival of Don John towards the end of 1576. Despite continued warnings from William of Orange, negotiations with the new governor continued until he was accepted. Only when he broke the terms of his acceptance were the ties broken once again. The marginalisation of Don John brought about the regime's first active involvement in argumentative pamphleteering, and evidence from correspondence makes it clear that both Don John himself and members of his inner circle of supporters were involved in the actual writing process. This scenario confirms a key advantage of pamphlets as a medium: they were the ideal mode of communication for anybody who was politically marginalised and without control of the traditional oral media, and it was only when the Habsburg regime found itself in this situation that the need to engage in pamphleteering became urgent.

The appointment of Alexander Farnese as governor marked a real watershed in the Habsburg approach to public relations. Although Don John had pursued argumentative pamphleteering, his efforts had been marred by a failure to promote the regime's cause in line with the audience's own values and attitudes, *the* number one criterion for successful propaganda. This changed under Farnese who, rather than harping on about the virtues of the Spanish army, presented loyalty to the regime as the obvious solution for the Catholic population, who found themselves more and more at odds with their new militant Calvinist rulers. Moreover, Farnese proved capable of appealing to different groups on different issues: the civilian population at large was wooed publicly by guarantees of Catholic worship and offers of clemency which, importantly, were kept, whereas more private letters were sent to nobles, emphasising instead the loss of influence they had suffered with William of Orange in the driving seat and their chance of recovering it under Philip. Moreover, common to both the public and the private offensive was a consciously designed and fantastically appealing 'loophole', which allowed virtually everyone except for Orange to claim that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, and that they had merely been tricked into rebellion by the rebel leader.

Despite his flair for public communication, Farnese in no sense institutionalised or systematised the regime's new approach to public relations. The shift in military focus from the pursuit of further reconciliations with the remaining rebel towns and provinces to, first, the Armada and, second, the war in France, instead provided a repeat of the situation under Requesens and the Council of State. Again there was little good news to celebrate for the loyal population, although there were victories in the French campaign, and so the regime returned to the relative silence of the mid-1570s.

Again, this seems to demonstrate the importance of personal initiative in Habsburg communication. Rumours accusing Farnese of self-glorification and over-ambition had been circulating in both Madrid and elsewhere since the failure of the Armada, and it seems he could not take the risk of adding fuel to the fire by advertising his successes in France. When no such initiative was forthcoming, printers found that they could best satisfy their customers' hunger for news by printing copies of pamphlets aimed for the French Catholic market. As the Catholic League sought to minimise rather than advertise its connections with the Spanish Habsburgs, the very large corpus of news pamphlets on the wars in France ended up reflecting the propagandistic concerns of the League rather than of Farnese and Philip II.

Nevertheless, this period also saw the emergence of pro-regime publications not stemming from the regime itself. Despite the unpopular war in France, the ever greater problems associated with the presence of so many troops, and the advances of the rebel army taking advantage of the deployment in France, Catholic authors actively published material in support of their, and their regime's, cause. Thus, Mary Queen of Scots was celebrated as a veritable martyr for the faith, as was Balthasar Gerard, William of Orange's assassin. There was also an explicit tendency to associate the fight against heresy and rebels at home with similar conflicts abroad: the French League's news pamphlets pointed out the vile nature of their Protestant opponents, and English Calvinists were also the object of demonisation. So, paradoxically, although the civilian population was suffering more than ever as a result of the ongoing wars, and grievances were repeatedly addressed to the regime in the form of private memos, elements within that same population were proving more and more willing to actively champion the cause the regime stood for.

The final evolution of Habsburg communication in this period was provided by the Archdukes. Their contribution resided more in a re-appropriation of the tools available to them as sovereigns than in an innovation of public relations. Thus, they capitalised heavily on the enthusiasm their arrival was met with, and made the most of the opportunity to meet and greet their people, an opportunity that their predecessors had not enjoyed to anywhere near the same extent. The Archdukes' oath of sovereignty also domesticated them in a way that their predecessors had never been by explicitly making the Low Countries their focus of loyalty and not, officially, Madrid. Both local authorities and the Archdukes themselves sought to reinforce this domestication by repeatedly referring to their connection with the Burgundian dukes, the last full-time resident native rulers. What was more, the Archdukes added to their authority by an elaborate, personally designed, religious profile which, again, connected them with the Burgundians and the Austrian Habsburgs while also closely associating them with divine favour.

Considering how much mileage the Archdukes got out of their status as sovereigns, one is left to wonder what might have happened if Philip had actually made the trip to his northern dominions in 1568. It seems clear from the success of his daughter and her husband that sovereignty on its own bestowed such an unparalleled degree of authority on the regime that a personal visit from the king might have completely taken the wind out of the rebels' sails before even Orange's first invasion could have occurred.¹ It would certainly have given the credibility of the 'evil advisor' argument a big dent.

But this did not happen. What is clear from the efforts of Philip's governors, however, is that control of the traditional and most public channels of communication was not in itself sufficient to secure obedience to or support for the regime. The content of the message that was being conveyed, and its appeal, remained important, as members of the public proved more than capable of discerning discrepancy between words and action. Alva's policies caused acute conflicts of loyalty among ordinary Catholics who saw themselves as loyal subjects: they opposed heresy, recognised that heretics must be punished and rejoiced in victories over the rebels, but they were still horrified by Alva's approach and remained sympathetic to the people who were directly affected by the persecution. Their ability to compare the regime's talk of pursuing the guilty ringleaders while showing mercy to those who had been misled, with the executions of people for what was often perceived to be insignificant offences, was a major reason why the two general pardons failed to secure an enthusiastic popular response. The discrepancy that had been perceived between what the regime said and what the regime did meant that any offer of clemency could ultimately only be trusted at the risk of one's own life.

In fact, matching words and actions turned out to be a long-term problem for the regime. Alva failed spectacularly, but Requesens' failure to stem the mutinies of the 1570s did not tally well with the new and restrained approach he was meant to take either. Similarly, Don John's acceptance of the Perpetual Edict appeared to concede that the grievances against the army had been legitimate, but this was an illusion of short duration: the capture of Namur and the recall of the troops more than anything served to confirm the evil intentions the governor was really harbouring. Such discrepancies proved easy targets for the rebels, who were quick to turn them into new argumentative ammunition.

If the story of Habsburg public communication during the Revolt has a hero, it has to be Alexander Farnese. Aware that it would be disastrous to do an 'Alva', Farnese proved more than capable of finding common ground between the regime and the Catholic majorities in the militant Calvinist cities. When he in addition managed to match merciful words with merciful action, he was guaranteed appeal. At long last, the regime's words and action were speaking in unison. Although there was no happy ending to his own governorship, Farnese's periods of grace also established, bloodlessly and without causing resentment, a degree of religious uniformity that Alva had had to have over a thousand people killed for. By simply allowing Protestants to leave in peace, the regime got rid of most of them without antagonising the Catholics in the process. Although the next decade and a half were marked by military setbacks and yet more civilian suffering, there were, amazingly, repeated expressions of support for the regime's religious cause

which may have compensated somewhat for the simultaneous criticism of the virtual destruction of the country.

Like Farnese, the Archdukes also succeeded in matching words and action. Having taken the call for peace seriously, they managed to restore peace and the possibilities for renewed prosperity with backbreaking diplomacy (which the public knew nothing about) and their tireless religious devotion. In so doing, they increased their own authority as truly benign sovereigns, while also adding to the status of the religious worship that had helped them on their way.

Little of the various messages conveyed by the regime in support of its own position at different stages of the Revolt amounted to sophisticated political argumentation. But did it matter? Our views on what constitutes good opinion-forming have been too influenced by the approaches taken in rebel argumentative pamphleteering. For a while, this was the only mass medium that was available to the rebels, and the only one where argument took pride of place. The Habsburg communicative tradition, however, suggests that there was value in the display of power, strength and piety as well, especially if it was seen to serve a cause with which people could agree and identify. Communication in this form did not work to persuade so much as to impress and command influence, but that need not have made it less effective.

Moreover, the regime's continued and sole reliance on Romans 13 as a theoretical foundation for its position and claim to authority suggests that sophistication was not what the use of theory ultimately hinged on. The focus on Romans 13 may appear simplistic, but evidence from Catholic diarists suggests that St Paul's statement continued to remain a foundation stone in ordinary Catholics' understanding of how the political world should be organised. Moreover, this understanding was not about to tumble upon the presentation of elaborate analyses of the nature of the privileges and the constitution; in the minds of many, the king remained the only one to enjoy divine approval. Romans 13 was not argumentative; it was hardly ever elaborated on or explained in detail, but it nevertheless matched people's pre-existing values and attitudes. It did, in other words, fulfil the number one criterion of all good propaganda.

Notes

Notes introduction

1 J. L. Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, revised edn. (London, 1856), p. v.

2 Ibid. pp. v-vi; H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (London, 1911), pp. 36-8.

3 For a discussion of both, see J. Romein, 'Het vergruisde beeld: over het onderzoek naar de oorzaken van onze Opstand', in *Opdracht van de tijd* (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 80.

4 G. C. Gibbs, 'The Dutch Revolt and the American Revolution', in R. Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997).

5 H. Dunthorne, 'Resisting Monarchy: the Netherlands as Britain's School of Revolution in the Late Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in *ibid.*

6 Q. Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), see volume ii.

7 G. Griffiths, 'The Revolutionary Character of the Revolt of the Netherlands', and G. Nadel, 'The Logic of the *Anatomy of Revolution*, with Reference to the Netherlands Revolt', both in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (1959-60); I. Schoffer, "The Dutch Revolt Anatomized". Some Comments', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3 (1961).

8 E. H. Kossmann, 'The Development of Dutch Political Theory in the Seventeenth Century', in J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands* 1 (London, 1960); E. H. Kossmann, Popular sovereignty at the beginning of the Dutch *ancien régime*', *The Low Countries History Yearbook* 14 (1981).

9 Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ii, 337-8; N. Mout, 'Van arm vaderland tot een-drachtige republiek. De rol van politieke theorieën in de Nederlandse Opstand', *BMGN* 101 (1986), p. 365.

10 M. van Gelderen, *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 274-5. A far less substantiated rejection of French influence can be found in A. C. J. de Vrankrijker, *De motivering van onzen opstand: de theorieën van het verzet der Nederlandsche opstandelingen tegen Spanje in de jaren 1565-1581* (Nijmegen, 1933), pp. 78-9, 87.

11 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, transl. T. Parsons, 2nd edn. (London, 1976).

12 Cf. Ph. Benedict, 'The Historiography of Continental Calvinism', in H. Lehmann and G. Roth (eds.), *Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Contexts* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 315-16, 323-4.

13 De Vrankrijker, *De motivering van onzen opstand*; Mout, 'Van arm vaderland'. Van Gelderen at least acknowledges his own neglect, see *idem*, *Political Thought*, p. ii.

14 C. E. Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture in the Early Dutch Republic* (Dordrecht, 1987).

15 R. Kaper, *Pamfletten over oorlog of vrede: Reakties van tijdgenoten op de vredesonderhandelingen van 1607-1609* (Amsterdam, 1980). For an article investigating the communication efforts of both sides in this period, see M. Stensland, 'Peace or no Peace? The Role of Pamphleteering in Public Debate in the Run-up to the Twelve-Year Truce', in F. Deen, D. Onnekink and M. Reinders (eds.) *Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic* (Leiden, 2011), pp. 227-52.

16 B. A. Vermaseren, *De katholieke Nederlandsche geschiedschrijving in de XVIe en XVIIe eeuw over de Opstand* (Maastricht, 1941).

17 P. A. M. Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten 1566-1584* (Nijmegen, 1956). For the second half of the Revolt, Maurits Sabbe has provided a study of pro-Habsburg pamphleteering, see his *Brabant in 't verweer. Bijdrage tot de studie der Zuidnederlandse strijdliteratuur in de eerste helft der 17e eeuw* (Antwerp, 1932).

18 For discussions of literacy, see Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, pp. 59–62; G. Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis 1550–1577* (Baltimore, 1996), pp. 33–7. For a discussion of the importance of oral communication, see H. van Nierop, ‘And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars’: rumour and the revolt of the Netherlands’, in J. Pollmann and A. Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands: Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke* (Leiden, 2006).

19 Harline, *Pamphlets, Prints, and Political Culture*, p. 3.

20 Ibid., p. 191.

21 *Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands*, ed. E. H. Kossmann and A. F. Mellink (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 31–2; A. Duke, ‘Posters, Pamphlets and Prints: The Ways of Disseminating Dissident Opinions on the Eve of the Dutch Revolt’, *Dutch Crossing* 27:1 (2003), pp. 37–8. An exception is Sabbe, *Brabant in 't verweer*.

22 J. G. Smit, *Vorst en onderdaan: Studies over Holland en Zeeland in de late Middeleeuwen* (Leuven, 1995).

23 W. Prevenier and W. Blockmans, *Les Pays-Bas bourguignons* (Antwerp, 1983); H. Soly, ‘Plechtige intochten in de steden van de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens de overgang van Middeleeuwen naar Nieuwe Tijd: communicatie, propaganda, spektakel’, *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis* 97 (1984); P. Arnade, *Realms of Ritual: Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late Medieval Ghent* (Ithaca, 1996); A. L. van Bruaene, ‘The Habsburg Theatre State: court, city and the performance of identity in the early modern Southern Low Countries’, in J. Pollmann and R. Stein (eds.), *Networks, Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries, 1300–1650* (Leiden, 2009). I am grateful to Dr Van Bruaene for having let me read her article prior to publication.

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25 J. C. d’Amico, *Charles Quint maître du monde entre mythe & réalité* (Caen, 2004); F. A. Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975).

26 P. Burke, ‘Presenting and Re-presenting Charles V’ and F. C. Cremades, ‘The Image of Charles V’, in H. Soly (ed.), *Charles V 1500–1558 and His Time* (Antwerp, 1999).

27 The only study to systematically consider people’s responses is M. Thöfner, *A Common Art: Urban Ceremonial in Antwerp and Brussels during and after the Dutch Revolt* (Zwolle, 2007).

28 Ibid. The lack of detailed research on the Revolt after 1585 is in fact such that the best book available today on the last ten years of Philip II’s reign was first published in 1857, namely R. Fruin, *Tien jaren uit de tachtigjarige oorlog 1588–1598* (Leiden, 1857). Numerous revised editions have appeared since, and the book was last reprinted in 1984 by De Bataafsche Leeuw.

29 L. Duerloo, ‘Archducal Piety and Habsburg Power’, in idem and W. Thomas (eds.), *Albert & Isabella 1598–1621: Essays* (Turnhout, 1998); idem, ‘Pietas Albertina. Dynastieke vroomheid en herbouw van het vorstelijke gezag’, *BMGN* 12 (1997); idem and M. Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel; Het Jeruzalem van de Lage Landen* (Leuven, 2002); P. Arblaster, ‘The Press Image of the Infanta Isabella’, in Duerloo and Thomas (eds.), *Albert & Isabella*; P. Arblaster, *Current-affairs Publishing in the Habsburg Netherlands, 1620–1660, in Comparative European Perspective* (Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1999); idem, ‘Policy and publishing in the Habsburg Netherlands, 1585–1690’, in B. Dooley and S. A. Baron (eds.), *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2001).

30 V. van Zuilen, ‘Propagande royale: les placards de Philippe II en Flandres et au Brabant (1585–1598)’, in B. Ertlé and M. Gosman (eds.), *Les écrits courts à vocation polémique* (Frankfurt am Main, 2006); M. Weis, *Légitimer la répression des troubles: Les correspondances du pouvoir espagnol avec les princes allemands au début de la Révolte des Pays-Bas (1566–1568)* (Brussels, 2003).

31 Duke, ‘Posters, Pamphlets and Prints’; C. M. Klinkert, *Nassau in het nieuws: nieuwsprenten van Maurits van Nassau’s militaire ondernemingen uit de periode 1590–1600* (Zutphen, 2005).

32 Although most diarists tended to record proclamations, the one providing the most detail on the form they took is Nicolas Soldoyer, see *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer pour servir à l’histoire de Tournai 1565–70*, ed. A. Pinchart (2 vols., Bruxelles, 1865), ii, 264, 388.

33 Arblaster, ‘The Press Image of the Infanta Isabella’, pp. 337–8.

34 *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 306–7, 339, 388.

35 Cf. Van Zuilen, ‘Propagande royale’, p. 115.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 118.

³⁷ See, for instance, *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 258, 260, 264; *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, ed. F. de Potter (Ghent, 1870), pp. 55, 85-6.

³⁸ Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 59.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 46-8, 161, 255-6.

⁴⁰ Cf. ibid., pp. 11, 22.

⁴¹ A. Lottin, *Etre et croire à Lille et en Flandre XVIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Arras, 2000), pp. 245-8.

⁴² For an example, see the diary of the Lillois textile worker Mahieu Manteau who, although limiting himself to a small paragraph for most of the events he recorded, spent several pages describing the big ceremonial events of his life. *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau et de Pierre-Ignace Chavatte*, ed. E. Debièvre (Lille, 1911).

⁴³ Cf. Soly, 'Plechtige intochten', p. 348.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 349; M. Soenen, 'Fêtes et cérémonies publiques à Bruxelles aux Temps Modernes', *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis* 68 (1985), p. 50.

⁴⁵ Cf. Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, p. 6; Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 20.

⁴⁶ *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, pp. 89, 107.

⁴⁷ J. P. D. Cooper, 'O Lorde save the kyng: Tudor royal propaganda and the power of prayer', in G. W. Bernard and S. J. Gunn (eds.), *Authority and Consent in Tudor England: Essays Presented to C. S. L. Davies* (Aldershot, 2002).

⁴⁸ M. U. Edwards, Jr., *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther* (Berkeley, 1994), p. 27; L. Taylor, *Soldiers of Christ: Preaching in Late Medieval and Reformation France* (Oxford, 1992), p. 55.

⁴⁹ M. Sherwood-Smith and P. Stoop, *Repertorium van Middelnederlandse preken in handschriften tot en met 1550* (Leuven, 2003).

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the differences between a printed and preached sermon, see A. Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 14-15. For the Catholic clergy's variable response to Protestantism in the Low Countries, see J. Pollmann, 'Countering the Reformation in France and the Netherlands: Clerical Leadership and Catholic Violence 1560-1585', *Past & Present* 190 (2006).

⁵¹ F. Deen, 'Handwritten Propaganda, Letters and Pamphlets in Amsterdam during the Dutch Revolt (1572-1578)', in idem, D. Onnekink and M. Reinders (eds.), *Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic*, pp. 207-26.

⁵² Cf. Duke, 'Posters, Pamphlets and Prints', p. 29.

⁵³ Cf. J. Salman, 'Het nieuws op straat: Actueel drukwerk in het vroegmoderne distributienetwerk', in J. de Kruif, M. Meijer Drees and J. Salman (eds.), *Het lange leven van het pamflet: Boekhistorische, iconografische, literaire en politieke aspecten van pamfletten 1600-1900* (Hilversum, 2006).

⁵⁴ For evidence of reading habits, see Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion*, pp. 117-19.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 116, 157-9. Such alternative purposes would seem to be proven by publication statistics from the early Reformation in Germany, where it appears one pamphlet was published for every two people (literate and illiterate) in the Holy Roman Empire, or twenty copies per one literate person. See Edwards, *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther*, p. 39.

⁵⁶ Cf. Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion*, p. 163.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 106; D.R. Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit: Propagandaprenten uit de Nederlandse Opstand 1566-1584* (Zutphen, 2003), pp. 12-13.

⁵⁸ G. van Loon, *Beschryving der Nederlandsche historipenningen: Of beknopt Verhaal van 't gene sedert overdracht der heerschappye van Keyzer Karel den Vyfden op Koning Philips zynen zoon, Tot het sluyten van den Uytrechtschen Vrede, In de zeventien Nederlandsche Gewesten is voorgevallen* (4 vols., The Hague, 1723-31), i.

⁵⁹ Horst's *De Opstand in zwart-wit* and Klinkert's *Nassau in het nieuws* are rebel centred, whereas J. B. Knipping's *Iconography of the Counter Reformation in the Netherlands: Heaven on Earth* (2 vols., Leiden, 1974) concerns Catholic painting more than the cheaper media of prints and engravings.

⁶⁰ G. S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 3rd edn. (Thousand Oaks, 1999), pp. 2-3, 6.

⁶¹ P. Matheson, *The Rhetoric of the Reformation* (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 45; M. U. Chrisman, 'From Polemic to Propaganda: The Development of Mass Persuasion in the Late Sixteenth Century', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 73 (1982), p. 173, echoed in Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion*, p. 183.

⁶² Edwards, *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther*, pp. xi-xii; Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. 17; J. K. Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century*

Century France (Berkeley, 1990), p. 2; R. W. Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1994), p. xxii.

Notes Rooting out Heresy and Rebellion, 1567–1572

- 1 For the use of Alva's image to personify tyranny, see A. Sawyer, 'The *Tyranny of Alva*: the creation and development of a Dutch patriotic image', *De zeventiende eeuw* 19:2 (2003), especially pp. 181, 185. Schama stresses the importance of the so-called black legend of Spain in the popular culture of the Dutch Republic, but does not illustrate this in general or the role played by Alva in particular, in the same detail as Sawyer. See S. Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 53, 86ff, 102.
- 2 L. Smolderen, *La statue du duc d'Albe à Anvers par Jacques Jonghelinck (1571)* (Brussels, 1972), p. 6.
- 3 There are, however, instances of Alva accepting the brunt of popular hatred in order for it not to taint anybody else's image. See the report of Alva's meetings with Margaret of Parma, governess-general, of 26 August 1567; Alva to Requesens, Brussels, 14 September 1567, in Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 566, 576–7.
- 4 G. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, revised edition (London, 1985), pp. 44–5; A. Duke, *Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries* (London, 1990), p. 183; H. van Nierop, 'The Nobles and the Revolt', in G. Darby (ed.), *The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt* (London, 2001), p. 53.
- 5 Ibid., p. 55.
- 6 A. Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux 1520–1633* (2 vols., Brussels, 1997–8), i, 30; Duke, *Reformation and Revolt*, p. 74.
- 7 Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 53; Duke, *Reformation and Revolt*, p. 164; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 61–2.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 53–4.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 63ff.
- 10 Cf. ibid., pp. 69–70; Van Nierop, 'The Nobles and the Revolt', pp. 51–2.
- 11 Duke, *Reformation and Revolt*, p. 153; J. Woltjer, 'Public Opinion and the Persecution of Heretics in the Netherlands, 1550–59', in Pollmann and Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities*, pp. 87, 103.
- 12 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 70. For a discussion of the Confederates' choice of name and use of symbolism, see H. van Nierop, 'A Beggars' Banquet: The Compromise of the Nobility and the Politics of Inversion', *European History Quarterly* 21 (1991).
- 13 Although the exact nature of the participation in the *Beeldenstorm* remains debated, the general impetus came from people sympathetic to the Reformed movement. P. M. Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands 1544–1569* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 2–3.
- 14 Cf. G. Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer: Loyale oppositie tegen Spanje's bewind in de Nederlanden van Alva tot Farnese 1567–1578* (Kortrijk-Heule, 1989), p. 119.
- 15 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 82.
- 16 H. Kamen, *The Duke of Alba* (New Haven, 2004), p. 82; W. S. Maltby, *Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Third Duke of Alba 1507–1582* (Berkeley, 1983), p. 151.
- 17 G. Janssens, 'Cardinal Granvelle and the Revolt in the Netherlands – the evolution of his thought on a desirable political approach to the problem, 1567–1578', in K. de Jonge and G. Janssens (eds.), *Les Granvelle et les anciens Pays-Bas* (Leuven, 2000), p. 138; Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 76; Maltby, *Alba*, p. 135. Noircarmes to Philip II, unidentified day in July 1567; Granvelle to Philip II, 17 August and 11 September 1567; Requesens to Philip II, 29 September 1567; in Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 558, 562, 575, 581.
- 18 Philip II to Requesens, Madrid, 22 September 1567, in ibid., pp. 579–80.
- 19 Gachard's French summary of Requesens' Spanish letter to Philip, written in Rome on 29 September 1567, uses the term 'gagner les coeurs' to describe the purpose of the clemency to be bestowed by Philip upon his return. See ibid., p. 581.
- 20 See Alva to Requesens, Brussels, 14 September 1567, in ibid., pp. 576–7. See also Philip's own letter to Requesens of 22 September 1567, explaining why his trip had to be postponed, pp. 579–80.
- 21 Cf. Gachard, *CPhII*, ii, 626–7; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 106.

22 Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, ii, 160; A. L. E. Verheyden, *Le Conseil des Troubles* (Flavion-Florennes, 1981), pp. 42, 46, 70-1.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 103.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 112.

26 For one such exception, see *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 240. For the drama of executions, see Duke, *Reformation and Revolt*, p. 51.

27 *Ordonnance edict et decret du Roy nostre Sire sur le fait de la iustice criminelle es Pays-Baz* (Antwerp, 1570) (BT2562), p. 13.

28 For mentions of this for the period of Alva's governorship, see *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 272, 282-3. Philip van Campene noted a similar symbolic practice in Ghent upon the execution of a counterfeiter when the condemned was made to wear a necklace of false coins around his neck for his own execution. *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 191-2.

29 *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 284.

30 *Histoire des troubles advenues à Valenciennes à cause des hérésies 1562-1579 tirée de plusieurs écrits, en 1699 par Pierre Joseph le Boucq*, ed. A.-P.-L. de Robaulx de Soumoy (Brussels, 1864), p. 28. In Tournai, two preachers were meant to have been hanged on the location of their preaching on Margaret's orders, but the local authorities decided against this for fear of popular unrest. Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm*, p. 76.

31 Alva to Philip II, Brussels, 6 January 1568, in Gachard, *CPHII*, ii, 4.

32 Granvelle to Philip II, Rome, 11 September 1567, in Gachard, *CPHII*, i, 575.

33 BT2562, p. 3.

34 'terreur & exemple', *ibid.*

35 See for example *Ordinantie sConincs ons gheduchts Heeren / daerby alle Officieren beuolen is / dat si binnen den bedrijue van heure Officie ende Jurisdictie / goede ende zorcheduldighe toesicht nemen / ende doen vertrecke[n] alle vremde ende wtlanders aldaer wesende / ofte dier alsnoch souden moghen co[m]men: up peyne etc* (Ghent, 1568) (BT2518), A2r; *Copie. Don Fernando Aluarez de Toledo Duc d'Alua &c. Lieutena[n]t Gouverneur & Capitaine general* (Ghent, 1569) (BT2528), A2v; *Placaet en[de] Ordinantie ons Heeren des Conincx / op tstuc van het Crijchsvolck zoo wel te voete als te peerde / loopende den Huysman afteeren / verdrucken ende oppresseren* (Ghent, 1572 o.s.) (BT2650), A3r-v.

36 *Ordonnance, statut et edict provisionnal du Roy nostre Sire, sur le fait & conduyte des Imprimeurs, Libraires & Maistres d'escole* (Brussels, 1570) (BT2553), C1r-v.

37 *Ordinantie sConincs ons gheduchts Heeren / waer by beuoulen is / dat alle ondersaten en[de] ingheseten vanden lande ende Graefschepe van Vlaenderen: hen sulckx versien en[de] ordene stellen [?]* / dat den Gheestelicken personen (diemen alreede groot ouerlast gedaen heeft) beschut / beschermt en[de] bygestaen worden / op dat zy geen inconuenient / ouerlast / oft schade an liff/ etc. (Brussels, 1567) (BT2515), A2v.

38 *The Fugger News-letters: First Series. Being a Selection of unpublished letters from the Correspondents of the House of Fugger during the years 1568-1605*, ed. V. von Klarwill (New York, 1970), p. 10. I have used Von Klarwill's translation.

39 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 140.

40 The order has been reprinted in its entirety in *Sententien en indagingen van den hertog van Alba, Uitgesproken en Geslagen in zynen Bloedtraedt: Mitsgaders die van byzondere Steden, Tegen verscheide zo edellieden als voornaeme burgers en inwoonders van Hollandt, Zeelandt en andere provincien, Van den Jaere 1567 tot 1572*, ed. J. Marcus (Amsterdam, 1735), pp. 432-4. I am grateful to Dr Geert Janssen for drawing my attention to this source.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 440.

42 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 144.

43 *Ibid.*

44 *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, p. 37.

45 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 156.

46 Alva to Philip, 2 October 1567, quoted in Kamen, *Alba*, p. 92.

47 Alva to the Council of State, 22 July 1568, *Correspondance du Duc d'Albe sur l'invasion du Comte Louis de Nassau en Frise en 1568, et les batailles de Heyligerlée et de Gemmingen*, ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1850), pp. 158-9.

48 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 236-7, 363-5.

49 *Ibid.*, pp. 367-8.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 368. For the various terms used to denote the Low Countries, including 'the lands over here', see A. Duke, 'The Elusive Netherlands: The question of national identity in the early modern Low Countries on the eve of the Revolt', *BMGN* 119:1 (2004), especially p. 13.

51 For calls for public action for the Catholic cause, see for instance *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 94, 98-9, 147, 152, 191, 200-1, 206-7; *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 275, 279-80, 304-5, 308, 343; *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster van het voormalig bossche klooster "Marienburg" over de troebelen te 's-Hertogenbosch e.e. in de jaren 1566-1575*, ed. H. van Alfen ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1931), p. 23; *Eerste bouck van beschryfvinghe van alle geschiedenesse (1562-1572)*, ed. A. L. E. Verheyden (Brussels, 1978), p. 82.

52 *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, pp. 23, 104-5.

53 Alva to the abbots of Parc, St Michel and Dieleghem, 13 December 1568. AGR, *État et Audience* 2815, un-numbered folio.

54 *Eerste bouck van beschryfvinghe*, pp. 81-2; *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, pp. 26, 112.

55 D'Assonville to Alva, 28 July 1568, reproduced in its entirety in *ibid.*, p. 101.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 21; *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 163. Van Hernighem described the procession in quite some detail and noted the differences in fatalities on both sides but did not record exact numbers, see *Eerste bouck van beschryfvinghe*, p. 69.

57 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 363.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 368. At least two news pamphlets included the word, see *Copie. Don Fernande Aluarez de Toledo, Duc d'Alue &c.* (Ghent, 1571) (BT9525), A2v; *Va[n]de seer schoone gheluckige Victoria / die de Christenen ghehadt hebben / op die Armeye vande Turcken: wt Venegien hier ouergheschreuen den neghenthiensten dach van Octobre xvC. lxxi.* (Antwerp, 1571) (W227), A2v.

59 *Ibid.*; *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 368.

60 *Eerste bouck van beschryfvinghe*, p. 86.

61 *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, pp. 31-2.

62 BT9525, A1r-v.

63 W227.

64 Soly, 'Plechtige intochten', p. 348.

65 Cf. *Mémoires anonymes sur les troubles des Pays-Bas 1565-1580*, ed. J. B. Blaes (5 vols., Brussels, 1859-66), i, which passes over the autumn of 1571 without mentioning Lepanto.

66 *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

67 *Eerste bouck van beschryfvinghe*, p. 81.

68 Thöfner, *A Common Art*, p. 86.

69 P. K. Monod, *The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe 1589-1715* (New Haven, 1999), p. 26.

70 Cf. Edwards' discussion of Catholic reluctance to engage in argumentation in the context of the German Reformation in his *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther*, pp. 79-80. See also Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, p. 113.

71 Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 89-91; Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, pp. 110-15.

72 *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 121-2.

74 Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm*, pp. 116-17; Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. III.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 84; Sawyer, 'The Tyranny of Alva', p. 181; Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamfletten*, pp. 167-70.

76 K. W. Swart, 'The Black Legend during the Eighty Years War', in J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands*, Vol. V (The Hague, 1975), p. 42.

77 I. Weekhout, *Boekencensuur in de Noordelijke Nederlanden: De vrijheid van drukpers in de zeventiende eeuw* (The Hague, 1998), p. 25.

78 Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. 29.

79 See edicts of 1 and 16 April, 1 and 2 May and 26 June 1566, cited in Ch. Terlinden (ed.), *Liste chronologique des édits et ordonnances des Pays-Bas: Régne de Philippe II (1555-1598)* (Brussels, 1912), pp. 67-8, 70.

80 *Placcart et ordonnance, contre ceulx qui composent, controuent, sement, diuulent, impriment, mettent en lumiere,*

ou tiennent soubz eulx, aucuns libelz, articles, ou escriptz fameux, schandaleux, ou seditieux, ou font courre mauuaise
bruitz & mensongiers (Brussels, 1568) (BT2523), A2r.

81 Ibid., A2v.

82 Ibid., A3r.

83 Ibid., A3v.

84 BT2553, A2r-v. The same logic was presented in the preambles to the catalogues of forbidden books and
forbidden passages of otherwise acceptable books; see *Philippe II. Regis catholici edictum de Librorum prohibitorum Catalogo obseruando* (Antwerp, 1570) (BT2544) and *Par le Roy* (s.l., 1571) (BT2598).

85 Article 2, BT2553, A3r.

86 Articles 6-8, BT2553, A4r.

87 L. Voet, *The Golden Compasses: A History and Evaluation of the Printing and Publishing Activities of the Officina Plantiniana at Antwerp in Two Volumes* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1969-72), ii, 255; Articles 28 and 29 in
BT2553, B3v-4r.

88 Voet, *The Golden Compasses*, ii, 258.

89 Ibid., 259.

90 Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, pp. 41-3; Voet, *The Golden Compasses*, ii, 277.

91 Duke, 'Posters, Pamphlets and Prints', p. 26; Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, p. 31 (see p. 40 for
prosecutions not resulting in execution). The death penalty for these offences went back to 1540, cf. Goos-
ens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 60-1.

92 E. van Autenboer, *Volksfeesten en rederijkers te Mechelen (1400-1600)* (Gent, 1962), p. 105; *Mémoires de Pas-
quier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 330, 337, 339; *Dagboek van Cornelis and Philip van Campene*, p. 212.

93 Ibid., p. 228; Weekhout, *Boekencensuur*, p. 24.

94 *Execution de la sentence & iugement donnez, contre les Contes d'Aiguemont & de Horne, & autres seigneurs
declarez seditieux, rebelles à la maiesté du Roy Catholique, en ses pays de Flandres* (Lyon, 1568) (KBR: 30106).

95 Ibid., A2r.

96 Ibid., B1r, B3r.

97 Ibid., B2v.

98 Ibid., B3v-4r.

99 A. de Ulloa, *Commentaire premier du Seig. Alphonse d'Uloa, Contenant le voyage du Duc d'Albe en Flandres,
avec l'armee Espagnole* (Antwerp, 1570) (BT6929) and *Ad ... Ferdinandum Alvarum Toletum Albae ducem,
encomium* (Antwerp, 1573) (BT5360). The latter survives only as a Plantin proofreader copy and it therefore
remains uncertain whether it actually reached final publication.

100 Cf. the listings of edicts for these years provided in *Liste chronologique*. Although probably not complete,
Terlinden's catalogue is based on both collections of printed edicts as well as extensive archival sources, and
it remains the single most comprehensive list of the edicts issued during the reign of Philip II.

101 BT2523, A2r; *Ordonnance placart et defence du Roy nostre Sire, faite contre ceulx qui à cause des troubles &
alterations passees, vouldroyent se retirer & absenter des pays de pardeça, ou transporter & emmener hors d'iceulx,
leurs biens & meubles* (Brussels, 1567) (BT2510), A2r-v; *Copie, des lettres patentes du Roy nostre Sire, endroit la
prorogation du terme, donné par le Pardon general de sa Maiesté* (Brussels, 1572) (BT2605), A2v; *Placart et or-
donnance du Roy nostre Sire, touchant l'annotation, saisement & denunciatio[n] des biens Meubles & Immeubles,
ensemble des Droitz & Actions, competans aux Rebelles & aultres, tenans parti contre à sa Maiesté & leurs
adherens* (Brussels, 1572) (W233), A2r; *Grace et pardon general, donne par le Roy nostre Sire, A cause des troubles
passez* (Brussels, 1570) (BT2537), A3r.

102 BT2523, A2v.

103 BT2510, A3r.

104 BT2537, A3r-v.

105 *Copie. Don Fernande Aluarez de Toledo, Duc d'Alue, &c. Lieutenant, Gouverneur, & Capitaine general* (Ghent,
1571) (BT2604), A1r, A3r-v; BT2650, A1v-2r, A3r.

106 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 83, 86, 91-3, 97, 131.

107 H. van Nierop, 'The Nobility and the Revolt of the Netherlands: Between Church and King, and Prot-
estantism and Privileges', in Ph. Benedict, G. Marnef, H. van Nierop and M. Venard (eds.), *Reformation,
Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555-1585* (Amsterdam, 1999), p. 3.

108 BT2510, A2r; BT2537, A2r-v; W233, A2r-v.

109 For the sentences against Orange, Louis of Nassau, Henrik van Brederode, Van den Bergh, the Count of Culemborg, the Count of Hoogstraten, the Count of Hornes and the Count of Egmont, see *Sententien en indagingen van den hertog van Alba*, pp. 70-2, 82-6; *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 57; *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 102.

110 BT2523, A2v.

111 BT2523, A2v, A3v.

112 BT2510, A3r.

113 BT2523, A2r; BT2537, A3r.

114 Letter to the Romans, 13:1-4.

115 See *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, ed. H. Höpfl (Cambridge, 1991), pp. xv-xvi, xvii, xxi, xxxix, 6, 11, 13, 18, 52, 55, 61, 72, 74; Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, ii, 66-8, 113.

116 For the responses of Luther, Calvin, Bucer, Knox, Goodman and Ponet to Romans 13, see *ibid.*, pp. 195-6, 200-1, 205, 207, 211, 227-30. The only person to deny the validity of Romans 13 altogether was the Scottish Protestant and humanist George Buchanan, who saw Paul's injunction as a historical statement without much contemporary relevance. See R. A. Mason and M. S. Smith (eds.), *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan's De Iure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. xlvii-xlviii, 117, 123.

117 The engraving was made by Hieronymus Wierix and published by Hans Lieffrinck in 1568.

118 1 Peter 2:13-15.

119 Made by Pieter Nagel.

120 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

121 *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 56; Van Gelderen, *Political Thought* p. 122.

122 The engraving was again by Hieronymus Wierix.

123 Cf. R. W. Budd and B. D. Ruben (eds.), *Beyond Media: New Approaches to Mass Communication*, revised edition (New Brunswick, 1988), pp. 8-9. This view has also been repeated in Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion*, p. 163.

124 *Mémoires de Fery de Guyon*, ed. A.-P.-L. de Robaulx de Soumoy (Bruxelles, 1858), p. 150. Del Rio, a Jesuit and ultra royalist, did note that the king had received his power from God, but as both a Catholic theologian and a remarkably Spain-friendly commentator he may not have been entirely typical, cf. *Mémoires de Martin Antoine Del Rio sur les Troubles des Pays-Bas durant l'Administration de Don Juan D'Autriche 1576-1578*, ed. A.D. Delvigne (3 vols., Brussels, 1869-71), i, 63. See also J. Andriessen, *De Jezuïeten en het samenhorigheids-besef der Nederlanden 1585-1648* (Antwerp, 1957), pp. 40-1; J. Spaans, 'Catholicism and Resistance to the Reformation in the Northern Netherlands', in Benedict, Marnet, Van Nierop and Venard (eds.), *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War*, p. 157.

125 Weis, *Légitimer la repression des troubles*.

126 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

127 Cf. F. G. de León, 'Soldados pláticos and caballeros: the Social Dimensions of Ethics in the Early Modern Spanish Army', in D. J. B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2003), pp. 240-1.

128 Alva to Philip II, 9 June 1568, in Gachard, *CPhII*, ii, 28.

129 Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. 132; Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, pp. 117-8; Smolderen, *La statue du duc d'Albe*, p. 9; J. Smolderen, *Jacques Jonghelinck : Sculpteur, médailleur et graveur de sceaux (1530-1606)* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1996), pp. 28-9.

130 For full details, see Smolderen, *La statue du duc d'Albe*, pp. 31-2, 36-7; Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, pp. 132-3.

131 Cf. B. Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), pp. 7, 283-5, 330; Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, pp. 87-8; Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm*, p. 24, footnote 78.

132 Smolderen, *La statue du duc d'Albe*, p. 44; Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, pp. 130-3, 135-6.

133 Cf. V. Soen, '“C'estoit comme songe et mocquerie de parler de pardon” Obstructie bij een pacificatiesmaatregel (1566-1567)', *BMGN* 119:3 (2004), p. 312.

¹³⁴ *Liste chronologique*, p. 81.

¹³⁵ Van Loon, *Beschryving der Nederlandsche historopenningen*, i, 90-1.

¹³⁶ Mansfeld to Philip II, 9 September 1567, in Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 574. For similar calls by other men, see pp. 565-6.

¹³⁷ E.g. Granvelle to Philip, 23 March 1576; Council of State to Philip, 31 March 1576; States of Brabant to Philip, 17 April 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 2, 18, 85; A. Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus dans les anciens Pays-Bas: Établissement de la Compagnie de Jésus en Belgique et ses développements jusqu'à la fin du règne d'Albert et d'Isabelle* (2 vols., Brussels, 1927), i, 155, 261, 264.

¹³⁸ As also concluded in G. Parker, 'What If ... Philip II Had Gone to the Netherlands?', *History Today* 54:8 (August 2004).

¹³⁹ J. J. Woltjer arrived at the same conclusion on the basis of earlier material in his 'Political Moderates and Religious Moderates in the Revolt of the Netherlands', in Benedict, Marnef, Van Nierop and Venard (eds.), *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War*, especially pp. 186-9. See also Woltjer, 'Public Opinion and the Persecution of Heretics'.

¹⁴⁰ BT2528, Arv-2r.

¹⁴¹ *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 224-5.

¹⁴² Examples of edicts include *Placaet ons Heeren des Conincx / opt feyt vanden Rebellighen / seditieuosen / ende wederspanninghen in onsen landen van herwaerts ouer / ontlancx gebuert* (Antwerp, 1568) (BT2519), A2r; BT2510, A2r; BT2523, A2r-v; BT2537, A3r-v.

¹⁴³ *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 307.

¹⁴⁴ *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 65-6. For details of a later summons, see p. 96.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 121-3, 144. See also *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 54-5, for the same thing happening in Brussels.

¹⁴⁶ *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁷ For calls for pardon, see the account of the meeting between Margaret and Alva, 17 December 1567, in Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 610-11; undated anonymous memo (credited to Hopperus) urging a pardon and justification of exemplary punishment; Granvelle to Philip II, 10 January 1569, both in Gachard, *CPhII*, ii, 31, 53-4; Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 117-18; G. Janssens, 'Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium: The homily of François Richardot on the occasion of the solemn announcement of the general pardon in the Netherlands (Antwerp, 16 July 1570)', in Pollmann and Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities*, pp. 109-10. For popular hopes for a pardon, see *Eerste bouck van beschryvinghe*, p. 81. For Alva urging postponement, see Alva to Philip II, 6 January 1568, in Gachard, *CPhII*, ii, 4. For the reasoning behind and the circumstances of the general pardon, see Soen, 'C'estoit comme songe'.

¹⁴⁸ *De kroniek van Godevaert van Haecht over de troebelen van 1565 tot 1574 te Antwerpen en elders*, ed. R. van Roosbroeck (2 vols., Antwerp, 1929), ii, 129.

¹⁴⁹ Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, p. 128; *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, pp. 25-6; *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 266-7.

¹⁵⁰ BT2537, Bir.

¹⁵¹ BT2537, A3v.

¹⁵² Ibid., A3r-v.

¹⁵³ See *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 213-14, for an account of people taking pity on the widows and children of the condemned who lost all they owned. For a discussion of Richardot's sermon, see Janssens, 'Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium'.

¹⁵⁴ BT2537, A4v; Janssens, 'Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium', p. 120.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. BT2537, A3v-4v; *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 89-90, 96-7; Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 118.

¹⁵⁶ Although Verheyden did not consider the re-issuing of the heresy legislation, he too concluded that the publication of the pardon so shortly after the new code of criminal justice must have influenced its reception. Verheyden, *Le Conseil des Troubles*, p. 149.

¹⁵⁷ *Histoire des troubles advenues à Valenciennes*, p. 86.

¹⁵⁸ 'Utrechtse kroniek over 1566-1576', ed. H. Brugmans, *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 25 (1904), pp. 101-2.

¹⁵⁹ *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 365.

¹⁶⁰ *Chronijcke van Ghendt door Jan van den Vivere en enige andere aanteekenaars der XVIe en XVIIe eeuw*, ed. F. de Potter (Ghent, 1885), p. 264; 'Utrechtse kroniek over 1566-1576', p. 101.

161 Van Autenboer, *Volksfeesten en rederijkers*, pp. 68–9; Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, p. 128; *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, pp. 364–5.

162 Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 118.

163 Alva to Philip II, 9 August 1570, in Gachard, *CPhII*, ii, 145.

164 For this conclusion on an earlier period, see Woltjer, 'Public Opinion and the Persecution of Heretics', p. 104.

165 *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, p. 281.

166 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 131.

167 Ibid., p. 214.

168 Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 92.

169 Verheyden, *Le Conseil des Troubles*, p. 112.

170 Valenciennes and Utrecht, for example, had their privileges totally revoked. See *Histoire des troubles advenus à Valenciennes*, pp. 66–72; F. H. M. Grapperhaus, *Alva en de tiende penning* (Zutphen, 1982), p. 116.

171 A. Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs: «un povre temps»', in J.-J. Duthoy, A. Lottin, H. Oursel and L. Trenard (eds.), *Histoire de Lille: de Charles Quint à la conquête française (1500–1715)* (Toulouse, 1981), p. 120. For Lille's previous protests, see Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, ii, 57–8.

172 Swart, 'The Black Legend', p. 48.

173 This was the brunt of the argument the Bishop of Tournai used against Alva in a successful attempt to have troops withdrawn from Lille, whose authorities had taken steps to ensure that no iconoclasm occurred. It was also the argument Margaret had offered on behalf of the city of Brussels, where there had been no iconoclasm either, but in this case it was unsuccessful. Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 123; Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 566, 601–2, 604. For diarists who saw reaction as necessary, see *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 67, 72; *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 307. For laments that many were punished for the crimes of a few, see *Histoire des troubles advenus à Valenciennes*, p. 14.

174 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 70–2, 80, 83, 87–8. For more and similar details on the tension between troops and civilians, see pp. 91–3, 114–15, 128, 148, 394. For the outrage felt by the nun in 's-Hertogenbosch, see *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, p. 39.

175 *Mémoires de Pasquier de le Barre et de Nicolas Soldoyer*, ii, 276–8.

176 Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 123.

177 Cf. Contador Mendivil to Philip II, 29 August 1567, in Gachard, *CPhII*, i, 568.

178 For a detailed account of this process, including the reactions in different provinces, see Grapperhaus, *Alva en de tiende penning*, chapters 4–6.

179 These were the excuses of the collectors in Arras and 's-Hertogenbosch, see *ibid.*, p. 213. For refusals to publish the edicts and appoint collectors, see pp. 210, 219, 239.

180 For a detailed account of the continued resistance, see *ibid.*, chapters 7–8.

181 For instances of this happening in Antwerp, see *ibid.*, p. 228. The practice does in fact appear to have been so widespread that Morillon, Vicar-General in Mechelen, found it necessary to ban his clergy from preaching against the taxes, see p. 254.

182 *Ibid.*, pp. 227–8.

183 *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, p. 394.

184 Woltjer, 'Political Moderates and Religious Moderates', p. 191.

185 *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 82.

Notes From Rebellion to War, 1572–1576

1 Maltby, *Alba*, pp. 226–7; H. ten Boom, *De reformatie in Rotterdam 1530–1585* ('s-Gravenhage, 1987), p. 138; H. van Nierop, *Het foute Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 2000), p. 11; C. C. Hibben, *Gouda in Revolt: Particularism and Pacifism in the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572–1588* (Utrecht, 1983), pp. 30–1, 35–6, 48, 55–7.

2 Maltby, *Alba*, p. 226.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 228; J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 170–2; G. Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, 1998), p. 126.

4 Cf. the list of edicts given for 1567 and 1572, respectively, in *Liste chronologique*, pp. 76–85, 112–18.

5 *Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire, Par lequel est deffendu & inhibe, si bien aux estra[n]giers que aux subiectz de sa Maiesté, de conuerser, traicter ou negotier avecq aulcuns Rebelles* (Brussels, 1572) (BT2645); *Copie* (Ghent, 1573) (BT2651); *Ordinantie ende verbodi ons hee-ren des Coninckx / dat niemant met de vyanden en zal handelen / oft correspondentie hebbe[n]* (Ghent, 1574) (BT2659); *Placaet / Ordinantie ende Ghebodt onss Heeren des Conincks / datmen ververschen ende repulicieren sal de Placcaten daer by verboden wordt mette rebelle te communiceren / noch yet van hen commde te doen ouerbringhen* (Ghent, 1574) (BT2664); *Placaet byden welcken alle goed / coopma[n]schap ende waerren / gheconfisquiert / verbeurt ende van goeden prysen worden verclaert / dat naer onze vyanden ende rebelle ghevoert werdt* (Ghent, 1574) (BT2669); *Liste chronologique*, pp. 114–15, 117–18, 124–7, 135.

6 These thirteen edicts can be documented either through extant printed copies or specific references either in other edicts renewing the ban on contact with the rebels, or in the archival material consulted by Terlinden for his *Liste chronologique* for this period.

7 *Kroniek eenen kloosterzuster*, pp. 35, 43; *Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz.*, ed. I. H. van Eeghen (2 vols., Groningen, 1959–60), i, 47–9, 59, 69, 73, 81; K. W. Swart, *William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1572–1584* (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 34–7; A. Th. van Deursen, ‘Holland’s Experience of War during the Revolt of the Netherlands’, in A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands VI* (The Hague, 1977), pp. 29–30; H. van Nierop, *Het verraad van het Noorderkwartier: Oorlog, terreur en recht in de Nederlandse Opstand* (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 153–4.

8 Alva to Philip, 18 July 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 268.

9 Philip to Alva, 5 September 1572, in *ibid.*, 274.

10 Although Catholics’ willingness to compromise on religion for the sake of peace would be in clear evidence in the run-up to the Pacification of Ghent. Morillon to Granvelle, 22 December 1572, cited in Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 237.

11 *Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz.*, i, 49, 113.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 96; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 47.

13 *Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz.*, i, 19.

14 J. Pollmann, *Religious Choice in the Dutch Republic: The Reformation of Arnoldus Buchelius (1565–1641)* (Manchester, 1999), p. 30.

15 G. Marnef, *Het calvinistisch bewind te Mechelen 1580–1585* (Kortrijk-Heule, 1987), p. 80.

16 Alva to Philip, 2 October 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 282–3; De León ‘*Soldados platicos and caballeros*’, p. 241. About fifty cities, many of which enjoyed Italian-style defences, had declared for the rebels, and to besiege them all was obviously not physically possible; see Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 127.

17 Alva to Philip, 19 November 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 294–5; M. Dierickx S. J., ‘Nieuwe gegevens over het bestuur van de hertog van Alva in de Nederlanden’, *Bijdragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanden XVIII* (1963–4), p. 191.

18 Alva to Philip, 19 December 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 300–1.

19 Alva to Philip, 13 October and 28 November 1572, in *ibid.*, 286, 296–7; Maltby, *Alba*, p. 240; Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 127, endnote 40 (p. 341).

20 Morillon, who had not read the statement himself, thought Alva’s statement might have been written as a reply to the criticisms of the Duke of Medinaceli after the sack, but this appears unlikely considering how these criticisms were apparently made only after Medinaceli returned to Brussels, at which point the statement had already been composed and printed and the printed copies returned to Alva. See Morillon to Granvelle, 17 October 1572, in Piot, *CGr*, iv, 459; F. de Nave and D. Imhof (eds.), *Christophe Plantin et le Monde Iberique* (Antwerp, 1992), pp. 168–9; Marnef, *Het calvinistisch bewind te Mechelen*, p. 81.

21 Bertin to Plantin, 5 October 1572, in *Correspondance de Christophe Plantin*, ed. M. Rooses (9 vols., Antwerp, 18–83–1918; reprint, Nendeln, Lichtenstein, 1968), iii, 183.

22 See Jan Moretus’s reply letter to Alva of 6 October 1572, AGR, État et Audience, *Lettres missives 1690*, fol. 50.

23 For details of Sonnius’s aid operation and a discussion of whether this was done with honest intentions or not, see Th. Goossens, ‘Franciscus Sonnius’, *Bossche Bijdragen: Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis van het bisdom ’s-Hertogenbosch XXV* (1960–1961).

24 Cf. Grapperhaus, *Alva en de tiende penning*, pp. 101, 103, 105.

25 *Vercleringe der rechtverdiger saecken vande plunderinge geschiet der stadt van Mechelen* (s.l., 1572) (BT4722).

26 See Bertin to Plantin, 5 October 1572, in *Correspondance de Christophe Plantin*, iii, 183.

27 Moretus to Alva, 6 October 1572.

28 For the original purpose of this arrangement, see Duke, *Reformation and Revolt*, p. 176.

29 Cf. Alva to Philip, 2 October 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 282-3. He was still a believer in the strategy of terror a year later; cf. letter from Alva to Philip of 30 August 1573, quoted in Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 122.

30 For a copy of the only French language edition of the broadsheet, see *Declaration des iustes causes du saccagement de la ville de Malines* (s.l., 1572) (K196).

31 The addressees were greeted simply as 'honourable individuals', *Verclaringe der rechtverdigne saecken vande plunderinghe gheschiet der stadt Mechelen* (s.l., 1572) (BT4723).

32 Ibid.

33 Parker, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 129, 132.

34 *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 144; Maltby, *Alba*, p. 243; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 160; Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 123. For an analysis of why the towns of Holland and Zeeland responded with resistance, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 179-80.

35 For diarists convinced of Spanish foul play, see *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 52; 'Utrechtse kroniek', p. 122; Maltby, *Alba*, pp. 243-5; E.T. Kuiper (ed.), *Het Geuzenliedenboek* (2 vols., Zutphen, 1924-5), especially pp. 139-44.

36 *Discours de la trahison de la ville de Malines* (Antwerp, 1572) (BT928). Although this broadsheet could have been written during the month-long rebel occupation before the sack took place, the censorship approval dated 15 December 1572 suggests that this was not the case.

37 *Mémoires de Martin Antoine Del Rio*, i, 49.

38 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, pp. 50-2.

39 *Kroniek eenen kloosterzuster*, p. 40.

40 Morillon to Granvelle, 17 October 1572, in Piot, *CGr*, iv, 457-9.

41 R. S. DuPlessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt: Urban Stability in an Era of Revolution, 1500-1582* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 247-8; Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', pp. 123-4; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 151-3; G. Janssens, 'Het oordeel van tijdgenoten en historici over Alva's bestuur in de Nederlanden', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* LIV (1976), p. 479-81. For Alva's attempts to stop them, partly with the argument that they would only annoy the king, see his declaration to the States of Brabant of 13 March 1572, reproduced in Piot, *CGr*, iv, 596-9.

42 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 162-3; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 178, 198; Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, i, p. 266. For further examples of growing criticism, see also Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 125; G. Janssens, Joachim Hopperus, een Fries rechtsgeleerde in dienst van Filips II', in G. Asaert et al. (eds.) *Recht en instellingen in de oude Nederlanden tijdens de Middeleeuwen en de Nieuwe Tijd. Liber Amicorum Jan Buntinx* (Leuven, 1981), pp. 424-5; Morillon to Granvelle, 31 March 1572, in Piot, *CGr*, iv, 159.

43 A. E. M. Janssen, 'Elbertus Leoninus (1519/20-1598), temoin de son temps', *Lias* IV (1977), p. 160.

44 Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, pp. 117-19; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 202-3; idem, 'Cardinal Granvelle and the Revolt in the Netherlands', pp. 141-2; G. Janssens, "Barmhartig en rechtaardig". *Visies van L. de Villavicencio en J. Hopperus op de taak van de koning*', in W. P. Blockmans and H. van Nuffel (eds.), *État et religion aux XVe et XVIe siècles: actes du colloque à Bruxelles du 9 au 12 octobre 1984* (Brussels, 1986), especially p. 29; Esteban Prats to Philip; Brussels, 30 Nov. 1572, in Gachard, *CPbII*, ii, 299.

45 For the growing Jesuit criticism, see Andriessen, *De Jezuieten en het samenhorighedsbesef*, pp. 7-8; Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, pp. 154-6, 262.

46 Ibid., pp. 263-4, 266; *Histoire des troubles advenues à Valenciennes*, p. 96. See also Van Deursen, 'Holland's Experience of War', pp. 24-5.

47 Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. 146.

48 *Geuzenliedenboek*, p. 139. See also p. 143, for another example of broken promises of clemency.

49 Ibid., pp. 142-3.

50 For discussions and examples of Orange's pamphlets, see Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten*, Chapter II; Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, pp. 127-9; Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, pp. 124-5, 137-9.

51 Janssens, *Brabant in he verweer*, pp. 180–2; Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 111; Maltby, *Alba*, pp. 232–3; A.W. Lovett, ‘Some Spanish Attitudes to the Netherlands (1572–1578)’, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 85:1 (1972), pp. 20–1; Morillon to Granvelle, 17 October 1572, in Piot, *CGr*, iv, 459.

52 Cf. Lovett, ‘Some Spanish Attitudes’, p. 22; Parker, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 92, 134; G. Parker, *Spain & the Netherlands 1559–1659: Ten Studies* (London, 1979), pp. 30–1.

53 Philip to Requesens, 30 January 1573, quoted in Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 132; Lovett, ‘Some Spanish Attitudes’, p. 24, footnote 35; idem, ‘A New Governor for the Netherlands: the Appointment of Don Luis de Requesens, Comendador Mayor de Castilla’, *European Studies Review* 1 (1971), pp. 98, 101.

54 BT2537, A3r–v; *Placart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire sur le fait de la leuee & collectation du x^{me} & xx^{me} denier de la vente de tous biens meubles & immeubles* (Antwerp, 1571) (BT2589), p. 7.

55 Smolderen, *La statue du duc d’Albe*, pp. 54–5; Kamen, *The Duke of Alba*, p. 119.

56 *De kroniek van Godevaert van Haecht*, ii, 307.

57 V. Soen, ‘De reconciliatie van “kettters” in de zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanden (1520–1590)’, *Trajecta* 14 (2005), p. 353.

58 Requesens to Philip, 15 June 1574, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iii, 99–100.

59 *Exemplaire des lettres patentes du Roy nostre Sire. Par lesquelles sa Majesté donne Grace absolute & Pardon général, tant à Estatz, Pays, Villes & Co[m]munaultéz, que tous particuliers voires proscriptz & banniz de ces Pays bas & autres, ayans offensé & fourfait, acuse des Troubles, emotions, & reuoltes, tant passées que présentes, aduenues en iceulx Pays* (Brussels, 1574) (W252), Aiv.

60 Ibid., A2r–v.

61 *Kroniek eenen kloosterzuster*, pp. 54–5.

62 *De kroniek van Godevaert van Haecht*, ii, 307.

63 Morillon to Granvelle, 1 June 1574, quoted in Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 219; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 59.

64 Requesens to Philip, 15 June 1574, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iii, 101. For a discussion of people’s reasons for coming forward, see V. Soen, *Geen pardon zonder paus! Studie over de complementariteit van het koninklijk en het pauselijk generaal pardon (1570–1574) en over inquisiteur-generaal Michael Baius (1560–1576)* (Brussels, 2007). I am grateful to Dr Violet Soen for letting me read her book prior to publication.

65 *De kroniek van Godevaert van Haecht*, ii, 305; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 62.

66 *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 160–1.

67 Ibid., p. 163. See *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 122–3 for an account of people being persuaded to return only to end up on the gallows.

68 Geurts, *De Opstand in de pamphletten*, pp. 48–9.

69 Ibid., pp. 49–50.

70 *Geuzenlieden*, p. 85.

71 The circumstances of the pamphlet’s rejection are not entirely clear. Philip had approved Hopperus’ pamphlet for publication on the condition that the Spanish Council of State did the same. As nothing is known of Hopperus’ pamphlet after this, it appears the Council’s approval was not forthcoming. Philip to Requesens, 10 March 1574, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iii, 34; Geurts, *De Opstand in de pamphletten*, p. 50.

72 Cf. Van Nierop, *Het verraad van het Noorderkwartier*, pp. 113–14, 158, 161.

73 For a full account of this event, see *ibid.* For the first Catholic treatment of it, see *ibid.*, p. 257.

74 Swart, *William of Orange*, p. 85.

75 See Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, pp. 153–9.

76 *Copie. Translat de la responce des deputez du Prince d’Oranges & des Nobles & Villes de Hollande & Zelande sur les offres & présentation faictes par les Commissaires de sa Majesté* (Ghent, 1575) (BT2673).

77 Ibid., A2r; Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 86–8; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 254.

78 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 63.

79 Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 221, 247–8; J. J. Woltjer, *Tussen vrijheidsstrijd en burgeroorlog: over de Nederlandse Opstand 1555–1580* (Amsterdam, 1994), p. 70; Swart, *William of Orange*, p. 88.

80 Cf. Weekhout, *Boekencensuur*, p. 29.

81 Van Nierop, *Het verraad van het Noorderkwartier*, pp. 103–4; Swart, *William of Orange*, p. 89.

82 Pollmann, ‘Countering the Reformation’, pp. 112–14; Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, p. 98; Swart, ‘The Black Legend’, pp. 38–42.

83 See *Dagboek van Cornelis en Philip van Campene*, pp. 198–200.

84 Andriessen, *De Jezuïeten en het samenborigheidsbesef*, p. 6; Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, p. 153.

85 Ibid., pp. 156, 229, 245, 257; Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, p. 131.

86 Ibid., pp. 126–7.

87 P. Canisius, *Petit Catechisme pour les Catholiques tres-necessaire av temps present pour instruire la Jeunesse* (Antwerp, 1575) (BT3984); *Catechismus oft een ghemeyn christelijck onderwijs, om die jonckhelyt bequamelijck te onderwijsen ... Nu overgeset uit den latijn in nederlantschen duytsche* (Antwerp, 1574) (BT6526). In addition, a Dutch translation had already been published in 1561, see *Een ghemeyn christelijck onderwijs om die joncheyt bequamelijck te onderwijsen ... Nu overgeset uit den latijne in nederlants duytsche* (Leuven, 1561) (BT6527).

88 BT3984, B3v.

89 *Diuersche Reféreyen ende Liedekens, seer playsant om lesen* (s.l., 1574) (BL: 11555.b.23.), [A2r]–[A2v]. The pamphlet is not paginated and the signatures have not been indicated.

90 One of the two extant copies, held in the British Library, has the number 'Q. vijue. N° 62111'.

91 *Diuersche Refereynen ende Liedekens, seer playsant om lesen*, [A2r].

92 Ibid., [A3v].

93 Ibid., [E8r].

94 Ibid., [Fr1].

95 Ibid., [Fr1].

96 H. van Nierop, *Het foute Amsterdam*, p. 15.

97 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

98 Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, p. 244.

Notes The Breakdown of Royal Authority, 1576–1578

1 Cf. G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 2004), p. 157.

2 Requesens to Philip, 30 January 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iii, 427–8.

3 Requesens to Philip, unidentified day in February 1576, in *ibid.*, p. 439.

4 Cf. A. W. Lovett, 'The Castilian Bankruptcy of 1575', *The Historical Journal* 23:4 (1980), p. 899; H. G. Koenigsberger, *Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments: the Netherlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 262; Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 127.

5 Requesens to Philip, 3 February and unknown date in February 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iii, 428, 436.

6 Rassenghien to Philip; Roda to Philip, both dated 10 March 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 456, 463; Morillon to Granvelle, 10 March 1576, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 31.

7 For details of Council of State membership in the period of interim government, see M. Baelde, *De Collaterale Raden onder Karel Ven Filips II (1531–1578)* (Brussels, 1965), pp. 205–6. For Philip's confirmation of the Council of State's governing authority, see Gachard, *CPbII*, iii, 473.

8 Koenigsberger, *Monarchies*, p. 262.

9 The Council of State to Philip, 2 May, 22 May, 31 May, 1 June, 15 July, 6 August and 17 August 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iv, 123, 152–3, 184, 238, 271–5, 278, 315–17.

10 The call for instructions was a constant in the Council's letters to Philip; see for instance: the Council of State to Philip, 31 March, 22 May, 31 May, 15 July 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 20, 152, 184, 238. See also Viglius to Secretary d'Ennetières, 21 May 1576, p. 150.

11 Philip to the Council of State, 25 March and 14 May 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 5, 139.

12 *Placart prouisionnal du Roy sur Lordre & Riglement à tenir doresenauant, par la Cauallerye Legiere de sa Maiesté pardéça* (Brussels, 1576) (BT2698).

13 Morillon to Granvelle, 19 March and 16 April 1576, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 31, 56–7.

14 The Council of State to Philip, 2 April and 8 May 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iv, 27, 128; J. Versele, *Louis del Rio (1537–1578): Reflets d'une période troublée* (Brussels, 2004), p. 80.

15 See Requesens' proposal to the States General, 7 June 1574, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iii, 531.

¹⁶ Cf. Grapperhaus, *Alva en de tiende penning*, pp. 261-2, 266-7, 277.

¹⁷ Philip to the Council of State, 15 July 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 237.

¹⁸ For Requesens' assurances with regard to the Council of Troubles, see his declaration to the States General, 7 June 1574, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iii, 532. Verheyden distinguishes clearly between the declaration made to the States General and a formal abolition, see Verheyden, *Le Conseil des Troubles*, pp. 173-4, 191-3.

¹⁹ Versele, *Louis del Rio*, p. 80.

²⁰ Cf. I. L. A. Diegerick (ed.), *Inventaire analytique et chronologique des chartes et documents appartenant aux Archives de la Ville d'Ypres* (7 vols., Bruges, 1853-68), vi, 232-4.

²¹ Quoted in Verheyden, *Le Conseil des Troubles*, p. 193.

²² P. Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555-1609*, 2nd edn. (London, 1958), p. 142; Versele, *Louis del Rio*, pp. 77-8. For a more positive view of the Council of State's efforts, see Baelde, *De collaterale raden*, p. 207.

²³ Roda to Philip, 1 April, 13 April, 14 April and 21 May 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 23, 65, 69, 147.

²⁴ Council of State to Philip, 27 July 1576, in *ibid.*, p. 261.

²⁵ W285; *Discours véritable sur ce qui est advenu touchant l'alborote & esmotion des Espaignolz mvinez es isles de Zelande incontinent après la prise de Ziericzee, le second de Juillet 1576* (Brussels, 1576) (BT2700).

²⁶ Council of State to Philip, 15 April, 2 May, 22 May, 26 June and 27 July 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 83, 123, 152-3, 206, 259ff.

²⁷ The Council of State to Philip, 6 August 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 278-9.

²⁸ Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 128; DuPlessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 255; *Liste chronologique*, p. 139.

²⁹ Morillon to Granvelle, 26 March 1576, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 30.

³⁰ *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, pp. 65-6.

³¹ Council of State to Philip, 31 March 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 8; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, pp. 64, 69; Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, p. 146.

³² Council of State to Philip, 31 March, 15 April, 2 May 1576; the States of Brabant to Philip, 17 April 1576; the States of Hainaut to Philip, 15 June 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 11-12, 79-80, 83, 85, 123, 199-201.

³³ Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, p. 146; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 293-7.

³⁴ Cf. Koenigsberger, *Monarchies*, p. 266.

³⁵ P. Roberts, 'Royal Authority and Justice during the French Religious Wars', *Past & Present* 184 (2004), especially pp. 3, 11.

³⁶ *Placcart sur la rebellion des Espaignolz & leurs adherens & la resisté[n]ce alencontre d'iceulx, & ce qu'en depend* (Brussels, 1576) (W287), Arv.

³⁷ *Placaet byden welcken van nieus yghelicken verboden wert eenige intelligentie ofte onderling verstant te houden / ofte handelen met de ghrebelleerde Spaengnaerden ofte heure[n] aenhangheren* (Ghent, 1576) (BT2727), A2r-v. See also *Edict et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire, sur le fait de la leuee & collectation d'un Centiesme denir des biens meubles & immeubles, accordé par les Estatzz de pardeça* (Brussels, 1576) (W301), A2r-v, A3v.

³⁸ Koenigsberger, *Monarchies*, pp. 265-6; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 180.

³⁹ Quoted in P. van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent: Triomf van de herwonnen eenheid?', in *Opstand en Pacificatie in de Lage Landen: Bijdrage tot de studie van de Pacificatie van Gent* (Gent, 1976), p. 106.

⁴⁰ Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 328.

⁴¹ Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, i, 26.

⁴² Cf. Philip to the Council of State, 3 April 1576, in Gachard, *CPhII*, iv, 31.

⁴³ Philip to the Council of State, 11 September and 28 October 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 363, 448.

⁴⁴ The Council of State to Philip, 22 September and 17 October 1576, in *ibid.*, pp. 386-7, 429ff.

⁴⁵ Both the term 'Soubz vmbre' ('on the pretext') and the use of the conditional past tense suggest that the arrests were a make-believe. *Placcart sur l'indeue usurpatio[n] de Hieronimo de Roda, au faict du gouernemet des pays de pardeça* (Brussels, 1576) (BT2710), Arv.

⁴⁶ For the justification, see *Justification du Saisissement & sequestration d'aulcuns Srs. du Conseil d'Estat & aultres au pays baz* (Brussels, 1576) (BT1673), A3v-4r.

⁴⁷ *Mémoires anonymes*, i, 202ff; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, pp. 67-8; *Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz.*, ii, 594-7.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 597.

⁴⁹ Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 180.

50 Cf. H. G. Koenigsberger, *Politicians and Virtuosi* (London, 1986), p. 71-2.

51 For a discussion of Jacob van Wesembeeke's treatises, the first to establish the role of the States General as a political principle and not just a practical solution, see Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, pp. 118-19.

52 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 133.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

54 *Vertoog ende openinghe, om een goede, salighe, ende generale vrede te maken in dese Nederlanden, ende deseluen onder de ghehoorsaemheyt des Conincx, in haere oude voorspoedicheyt, fleur, ende weluaert te brenghen, By maniere van Supplicatie* (s.l., 1576) (BT4731), A3v, B3r-v. For the dating of this pamphlet, see Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, p. 133, footnote 86.

55 BT4731, A6v, B3v-4r, C5r-v, Err.

56 *Ibid.*, C1r-2r, C3r.

57 *Ibid.*, D7v.

58 Koenigsberger, *Monarchsies*, p. 258.

59 Cf. M. Baelde and P. van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent (1576)', in *Opstand en Pacificatie in de Lage Landen: Bijdrage tot de studie van de Pacificatie van Gent* (Ghent, 1976), pp. 14-15.

60 *Letteren Van Verbande, tusschen Brabant ende Vlaenderen: Ghedaen ende besloten int Jaer derthienbondert ende neghenendertich* (Ghent, 1576) (K244) and *Letteren Van Verbande, tusschen Brabant ende Vlaenderen, Ghedaen ende besloten int Jaer derthienbondert, en neghenendertich* (Delft, 1576) (K245); Koenigsberger, *Monarchsies*, p. 271.

61 Baelde and Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent', pp. 24-5, 57, endnote 181.

62 Koenigsberger, *Monarchsies*, p. 273; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 178.

63 *Traicté de la Paix, faicté conclude & arrestée entre les estat de ces pays bas, assembliez en la Ville de Bruxelles, & le Sr. Prince d'Oranges, Estatz de Hollande & Zelande, auecq leurs associez* (Brussels, 1576) (BT2719), A3r.

64 *Ibid.*, A3r-v.

65 *Ibid.*, A4r.

66 *Ibid.*, B1v.

67 Baelde and Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent', p. 28.

68 L. Smolderen, 'La statue du duc d'Albe a-t-elle été mise en pièces par la population anversoise en 1577?', *Jaarboek 1980: Koninklijk museum voor schone kunsten-Antwerpen* (1980), pp. 127-8.

69 Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent: Triomf van de herwonnen eenheid?', p. 116.

70 Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 129.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 109; Baelde and Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent', p. 38; Koenigsberger, *Monarchsies*, p. 273.

72 Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, i, 78-9.

73 Baelde and Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent', p. 36. Rather peculiarly, the Union of Brussels was signed by the newly arrived deputies of Holland and Zeeland too, despite their reservations about the Catholic emphasis, cf. *Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands*, p. 133.

74 For some of Orange's warnings, see Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamfletten*, pp. 59-62.

75 AGR, État et Audience 2814, memo of 29 April 1657, unnumbered folio.

76 See Gachard, *CPHII*, iv and v, for the absence of replies to the letters that continued to be sent by the Council of State.

77 Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamfletten*, pp. 61-3.

78 *Ibid.*, p. 64; Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, i, 201.

79 Although towns with royal garrisons like Breda, 's-Hertogenbosch and Bergen-op-Zoom were again prevented from publicly celebrating; see R. van Moer, *Het Eeuwig Edict van 1577: Reacties in het hertogdom Brabant* (Universiteit van Gent, licentiaatverhandeling 1977-8), pp. 91, 99. See also Baelde and Van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent', p. 38; Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 129; Van Autenboer, *Volksfeesten en rederijkers*, p. 69.

80 Cf. Van Moer, *Het Eeuwig Edict van 1577*, pp. 88-9, 104. For the Orangist sympathies of the Brussels citizenry, see Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, i, 41-2.

81 Van Autenboer, *Volksfeesten en rederijkers*, p. 65.

82 Cf. Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, p. 217.

83 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 73.

84 Horst, *De Opstand in zwart-wit*, pp. 201-3.

85 Ibid., pp. 206-7.

86 As in BT4731, A5v.

87 Lottin, 'D'Albe aux Archiducs', p. 130.

88 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 72.

89 Ibid., p. 73.

90 Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 340.

91 Cf. Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten*, p. 64.

92 DuPlessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt*, p. 264.

93 For the crucial role of the Eighteen, see Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 39.

94 Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 132-4; Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 185-6.

95 *Discours sommier des iustes causes et raisons qui ont contrainct les Estats generaulx des Païs bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Iehan d'Austrice* (Antwerp, 1577) (K309). The whole pamphlet was written to spell out Don John's evil intentions; see especially pp. 5, 7-8, 12-13, 34, 49, 63; Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten*, p. 65.

96 Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 49.

97 K309, p. 55ff.

98 Ibid., pp. 34, 73. K309 is the French edition, whereas K310 is the Dutch. The same intention to disclose Don John's evil intentions by means of his own intercepted letters can be seen in *Lettres d'advertissement a la noblesse et avltres depvtez des Estats generaulx du païs bas, esrites par vn serviteur du Seigneur Don Iehan d'Autrice* (s.l., 1578) (K349), especially A2r.

99 *Apologie contre certains discours emis sovbs le nom des Estats generaux des Pays bas* (s.l., 1577) (K316), pp. 98-9, 203 (note that the pagination in this pamphlet jumps from 99 directly to 200 so that p. 203 is really p. 103. As the error is consistent through the remainder of the pamphlet, I have kept the erroneous pagination in citations). See also K394, B3v, Eir; and *Remonstrance avx habitans du País Bas, declarant amplement les vrays moyens pour les induire à demeurer consta[n]s en leurs deüe obeissance* (s.l., 1578) (K383), p. 38.

100 *Lettres patentes de Monseigneur Don Iehan d'Austrice* (s.l., 1578) (K336), A2v; *Veritable recit des choses passeees és Pays Bas, depvis la venue du Seigneur Don Iehan d'Austrice, Lieutenant, Gouuerneur & Capitaine general pour le Roy, en iceulx* (s.l., 1578) (K394), Eir-v.

101 Thus *Verclaeringhe Vande meynunghe des Doorlvchtichsten Heere Don Iohan van Oistenrycke, stadhovdere, Gouuerneur ende Capiteyn generell vanden Nederlanden, al voor ende eer te trekken ouer die Maeze, ende te versuecken den vvech van vwapenen, Vervveckende alle die ondersaeten om hun te bekeeren tot Godt, ende Conincklycker Maiesteyt* (Luxembourg, 1578) (K330) and *Remonstrance faicte par le Sieur de Gomiecourt, de la part de son Altesse, aux Gouuerneur, President, & gens du Conseil de sa Maiesté, Estatz du Pays & Duché de Luxembourg* (Luxembourg, 1577) (W318) were published by Martin Marchant, as was a previous edition of K394, allegedly in Luxembourg. There is, however, no proof that this printer, normally based in Verdun, actually had a press in Luxembourg, and so it may be that the work was actually carried out in Verdun and that Luxembourg was just a fictitious place of publication. Cf. *Die Luxemburger Drucker und ihre Drucke bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts: Eine Bio-bibliographie*, ed. E. van der Vekene (Wiesbaden, 1968), pp. 1-5, 520; Piot, *CGr*, vi, 578, footnote 1.

102 *Lettres patentes du Roy nostre Sire, contenantes, que ses subiectz de pardeça ne obeissent à nul aultre, que au Seigneur Don Iehan d'Avstrice, comme Lieutenant, Gouuerneur, & Capitaine general és pays bas* (Leuven, 1578) (BT2795), K336 and K394.

103 Don John to Longueval, 13 November 1577, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 578; Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten*, p. 67.

104 Longueval to Don John, 22 December 1577, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 605.

105 For the debates on what to offer Anjou and the later negotiations with him, see M. P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 93-105. For Longueval's instructions, see Don John to Longueval, 13 November 1577, in Piot, *CGr*, vi, 577.

106 W318, A2r.

107 Ibid., A3r.

108 K316, pp. 16-17, 37-8, 41, 72.

109 Selim II expressed admiration for Don John's valour, which had caused the sultan the greatest loss he had ever sustained, see K₃₈₃, pp. 31-2. For Don John's innumerable virtues, see pp. 29-31.

110 Ibid., p. 39.

111 K₃₈₃, p. 34. See also K₃₁₆, pp. 90-2, 94-5, 216; K₃₁₈, A_{3r}; K₃₃₀, A_{2r}; K₃₉₄, B_{4v}; W₃₁₈, B_{1r-v}.

112 K₃₁₈, A_{2r-3r}; K₃₃₀, p. 3; BT₂₇₉₅, A_{2v-3r}; K₃₃₆, A_{2r}.

113 BT₂₇₉₅, A_{2v}; K₃₈₃, p. 16. See also K₃₃₀, p. 2.

114 See, for instance, blanket statements such as 'Flemings ungrateful towards their king', K₃₈₃, pp. 10-11.

115 K₃₁₆, pp. 7, 45, 69, 202, 219, 258; K₃₃₆, A_{3r}.

116 K₃₁₆, p. 45ff.

117 Ibid., pp. 46-7.

118 For protests against labelling, see BT₂₆₇₃, A_{2r-v}; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 164. See also K₃₈₃, p. 6.

119 *Epistres belgiques* (s.l., 1578), E_{3r-4r}. See also K₃₁₆, pp. 250, 260-1, 269; K₃₃₆, A_{3r-v}, B_{1v}.

120 Cf. K₃₀₉, p. 45, where a point of accusation against Don John was that he had asked Philip to reward the Spanish captains for their excellent services. See also pp. 2, 34, 3²; *Copie de la requeste présentée au Conte de Lalaing gouverneur et grand baillié de Hainault &c. par les bons Patriotes de la Ville de Bruxelles. Ensemble Leur Requeste présentée aux Députés des Estats généraux, pour auoir Justice, execution des Placcartz, & accomplissement du Traicté de la Pacification faict a Marche en Famine* (Brussels, 1577) (K₃₀₄), A_{3v}; K₃₂₃, p. 1; *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 72; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, pp. 105, 318.

121 Contrast pp. 36 and 82 in K₃₁₆.

122 K₃₁₆, pp. 83-4.

123 Koenigsberger, *Monarchies*, p. 274; K₃₈₃, pp. 20-1. K₃₈₃, pp. 16-18 and 28-9, blames the local population for the troubles in more general terms.

124 Ibid., p. 16. See also *Epistres belgiques*, G_{3v-4r}.

125 The feeling on the ground appears to have been in line with the rebel discourse. Jan de Pottre certainly referred to Don John as a traitor, see *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 77; Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer*, p. 318.

126 See *Liste chronologique*, pp. 147, 154, 157-8, 163-4.

127 They survive only in manuscript form, cf. *Liste chronologique*, pp. 157-8, 163-4.

128 *Copie de l'indulgence envoyée de Rome pour Don Ioan d'Avstrice et son armee, avec le translat en françois* (Brussels, 1578) (K₃₉₆).

129 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 189-90; J. Decavele, 'Genève van Vlaanderen', p. 50.

130 Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, i, 346.

131 *L'advertissement et responce des Estats de Hainault sur la requeste faict pour la liberte de la Religion, et l'exercice d'icelle* (s.l., 1578) (K₃₇₂), A_{2r}, A_{3r-v}.

Notes Communicating Reconciliation, 1578-1585

1 Granvelle to Farnese, 1 December 1578, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 221.

2 Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, ii, 47.

3 Ibid., p. 16, 55-6, 66-6; DuPlessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt*, pp. 278, 292; A. Lottin, *Lille, Citadelle de la Contre-Réforme? (1598-1668)* (Dunkirk, 1984), p. 145; Decavele, 'Genève van Vlaanderen', p. 50.

4 Granvelle to Farnese, 1 and 19 December 1578, Granvelle to Antonio Perez, 17 and 19 December 1578, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 221-2, 230, 235, 239; Farnese to Philip, 27 November 1578, unspecified day in January 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 400-4, 432.

5 K₃₇₂, A_{2r-v}. For a Calvinist interpretation of the Pacification and the argument that the treaty condoned religious toleration, see *Discours contenant le vray entendement de la Pacification de Gand, de l'union des Estats, & aultres traictez y ensuyuiz, touchant le fait de la Religion* (1579) (W₄₁₂), especially pp. 85-6.

6 Gachard, *AEG 1576-85*, ii, 48, 65-6, 81.

7 Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 63-4.

8 Mouilar and Valhuon to Farnese, 13 December 1578, quoted in ibid., p. 117. On the regime's sinister use of the Pacification as a pretext for war, see W₄₁₂, p. 87.

9 La Motte to Farnese, 25 January 1579, cited in Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 128. Cardinal Granvelle offered much the same opinion in a letter to Farnese of 5 February 1579, Piot, *CGr*, vii, 306.

10 Duplessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt*, pp. 289–90. And a few months later, the reconciliation agreement that brought the Baron of Montigny and his troops over to the royal side was partly conditional upon the removal of foreign troops. *Traicté et accord faict et passé entre Monsieur le baron de Montigny &c. et le Seigneur de la Motte* (K437) (Douai, 1579), A2v; *Mémoires sur Emmanuel de Lalaing Baron de Montigny: Récit des causes qu'ont meu le seigneur de Montigny à se retirer de l'union des Estats généraux*, ed. J.-B. Blaes (Brussels, 1862), pp. xxvii–xxviii.

11 Farnese to Philip II, 27 November 1578, unspecified day in January 1579, 17 April 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 400–1, 404, 442, 448. Van der Essen also refers to letters from Farnese to Philip of 4 December 1578 and 16 April 1579 saying much the same thing, Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 119, footnote 78, and p. 201.

12 Farnese to Philip, unspecified date in January 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 433–4. In the autumn of 1579 he did the same in Beaumont, Chimay, Philippeville and Namur, Piot, *CGr*, vii, 473.

13 Farnese to Philip, 21 February 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, p. 437. Farnese's circumspection in this regard was in direct contrast to Alva, who referred specifically to the 'reconqueste & reduction' that he was undertaking, see K196.

14 Gachard, *AEG 1576–85*, i, 94, 99–100.

15 Duplessis, *Lille and the Dutch Revolt*, pp. 295–6; Lottin, *Etre et croire*, pp. 293, 295.

16 This was the argument used by the States of Artois in their letter to the Generality of 5 December 1578, Gachard, *AEG 1576–85*, ii, 94–5.

17 *Recueil des lettres, actes, et pieces plus signalees du progres et besongne faict en la ville d'Arras & ailleurs, pour paruenir à une bonne paix & reconciliation avec sa Maiesté Catholique, par les Estatz d'Artois & deputez d'autres Prouinces. Par ou chascun peult cognostre la bonne & sincere intention desdites Prouinces reconciliées* (Douai, 1579) (W410), B5v–B6r, C1r, C3r–v, C4v, C6r, C7r–8r, D8v–E2r, E7r–E8v. Two months later, the city of Mechelen presented its own decision to reconcile in much the same way. See *Copie d'une lettre escripte par les gouverneur, bournemastres, escheuins & Conseil de Malines au Prince d'Oranges le xx. du mois de Iuillet. l'An. M.D.LXXIX.* (1579) (BT5479), A2r–v. The same points were repeated in 1580: *Discours véritable touchant plusievers affaires d'Estat, pour la iustification des bons et fideles subiectz de Sa Maiesté catholique* (Douai, 1580) (K544), I1r–I3r.

18 Granvelle to Farnese, 7 April 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 361–2; *Edict perpetuel sur l'accord, fait entre le Prince de Parme ... de la part & au nom du Roy Catholique des Espaignes, &c. d'une part, Et les Estatz generaulx des Prouinces de Haynnault & Artoys, & villes de Douay, Lille, & Orchies d'autre part* (Mons, 1579) (BT2879).

19 *Ban et edict en forme de proscription, fait par la Maiesté du Roy nostre Sire à l'encontre de Guillaume de Nassau, Prince d'Oranges, comme chef & perturbateur de l'estat de la Chrestienté; & speciallement de ces pays bas: Par lequel chacun est autorisé de l'offenser & oster du mo[n]de, co[m]me peste publicque, avec pris à qui le fera & y assistera* (Leuven, 1580) (BT2910). See also the summary that was published separately: *Sommaire et substance du ban et proscription contre Gvillamme de Nassau Prince d'Oranges* (Mons, 1580) (BT4375).

20 For the chronology of the ban and other anti-Orange pamphlets, see C. Pierard and P. Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers livres imprimés à Mons: Facsimilés de la Kakogeitnia de Libert Houthem et du Renart decouvert attribué à Jean Richardot, sortis des presses de Rutger Velpius, en 1580* (Mons, 1966), pp. 25–6.

21 K544, A2r, A4r–v; *Lettre d'un gentilhomme, vray patriot, a messieurs les Estatz Generaulx* (1579) (K467); *Le renart decouvert* (Mons, 1580) (K546); *Ode in Gvilielmvm a Nassau regis catholici in Inferiori Germania Vasal-lum, Perduellem* (Mons, 1581) (W494).

22 K467, B1v; K544, A2r, B8v, D1v, E2v, F2rff.

23 See *Religioensvrede* (1578) (K368), especially Articles 3, 7, 9 and 11; A.C. de Schrevel, 'Remi Drieux, évêque de Bruges, et les troubles des Pays-Bas', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 3 (1902), p. 355.

24 Gachard, *AEG 1576–85*, ii, 52–3, 57; Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 34, 36, 38–41, 151, 153.

25 K467, A4r–v.

26 Ibid., B2r; *Brief discours de certaines victoires spirituelles advenues en Hollande & Zelande* (s.l., 1579) (K195b).

27 Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 112, 152; K195b; K467, B1v.

28 *Le retrouvr de la concorde aux Pays bas* (Mons, 1580) (K543), A3vff, B2r; K544, B4r–B5r; *Vraye relation de ce que Monseigneur le prince de Parme & de Playsance. &c. Lieutenant Gouuerneur, & Capitaine General pour le Roy*

nostre Sire és Pays de pardeça, a fait proposer aux Estatz des Prouinces reconciliées, touchant le retour des forces estrangiers (Mons, 1582) (BT4814), p. xv.

29 *Lettre intercepte dv prince d'Oranges av duc d'Alençon* (s.l., 1580) (K538), A3v, B3v, D4v; K467, A2r-v; K544, B8r.

30 K546, A2v, B4r.

31 K538, A1v-A2r, D3v; K467, A2r; K543, A3v, B2r; K546, A2v; BT4814, p. ii.

32 BT2910, p. 22; K538, B1r-v; K546, B1r.

33 *VVarachtige / ende ghetrouwē beschryuinghe vande alteratie ende veranderinghe / gheschiet inde Stadt Mechelen / ende oock vande groote Tyranny / ende onghēoorde wreethet vande Spaingnaerden / daer near ghevolcht / inden Jare XVc.LXXII.* (Mechelen, 1581) (W520), A2r, A3r, B3r, B4v. Other pamphlets where Alva was used as an argument against reconciliation include W412, p. 13; *Lettres des Estats de la ville de Lille, & Chastellenies dudit Lille, Douay & Orchies: à Messeigneurs les Estats généraux assemblés en la ville d'Anuers. Avec la responce et resolution desdits Estats généraux sur icelles* (Antwerp, 1579) (W419), B1v; *Advertissement à ceulx du pays Bas* (Antwerp, 1579) (K423), p. 20.

34 Thus, Pontus Payen, a Catholic citizen of Arras who wrote his memoirs of the period 1559-1578, blamed Alva for the troubles. *Mémoires de Pontus Payen*, ed. A. Henne (2 vols., Brussels, 1861), i, xi.

35 Cf. K467, B3r, which includes an appeal to the States General to recognise that it is time to reconcile with Philip rather than remaining slaves under an heretical vassal. See also W494, A1v; BT4814, p. iii-vi. Before it was known that the 1582 assassination attempt on Orange had been unsuccessful, Farnese wrote to the authorities in Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, Mechelen, Dunkirk and Bergues-Saint-Winoc that now that Orange was dead they would surely realise how he, for the sake of his own interests, had played tricks on them. See Van der Essen, *AF*, iii, 63.

36 See K467, A2r for an explicit distinction between the real patriots and those who claim to be patriots but whose actions betray them.

37 K546, A3r; K538, A3v, C4v, E1v.

38 *Les articles donnez de la part dv roy catholicque* (Leuven, 1579) (BT174), A2r, B2r; BT4814, pp. v-vi; W410, A3v-A4r.

39 Granvelle to Philip II, 11 June 1578; Granvelle to Margaret of Parma, 14 June 1578; Granvelle to Antonio Perez, 17 December 1578; Granvelle to Farnese, 5 February and 7 April 1579; Granvelle to Philip II, 24 April 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 104, 110, 230, 305, 361, 381. See also De Selles to d'Assonleville, 15 February 1579, and d'Assonleville to Granvelle, 9 August 1579, pp. 310, 426-7. Philip wanted this kind of wording to be particularly emphasised in the ban against Orange: Philip II to Farnese, 30 November 1579, *AGR*, *État et Audience* 176, fol. 133.

40 Morillon to Granvelle, 26 February 1578; Granvelle to Antonio Perez, 17 and 19 December 1578; Granvelle to Farnese, 19 December 1578; Granvelle to Aerschot, 18 April and 8 November 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 49, 230, 235, 240, 366-7, 491, 493. Philip II to Farnese, 30 November 1579, *AGR*, *État et Audience* 176, fol. 133.

41 Granvelle to Antonio Perez, 19 December 1578 and d'Assonleville to Granvelle, 9 August 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 240, 426-7; Granvelle to Farnese, 20 December 1580, in Piot, *CGr*, viii, 223-4.

42 For a full chronology of the process leading up to the proclamation of the ban, see L. P. Gachard, 'Proscription de Guillaume le Taciturne par Philippe II', *Bulletins de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, 2nd series, I:3 (1857).

43 Pierard and Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers livres imprimés à Mons*, pp. 25-8.

44 For d'Assonleville's attitude to the ban, see H. de Schepper, 'Assonleville, Christoffel d', heer van Haulteville', available online at <http://dutchrevolt.leidenuniv.nl/Nederlands/default.htm>. For d'Assonleville's probable authorship of K316, see Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamphletten*, p. 69.

45 K538; Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, p. 46.

46 Cf. De Schepper, 'Assonleville'.

47 Pierard and Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers livres imprimés à Mons*, pp. 42-3.

48 See *Politieke balladen, refereinen, liederen en spottdichten der XVIe eeuw: naar een gelyktydig handschrift*, ed. Ph. Blommaert (Ghent, 1846), pp. 3, 211-17, 299-304.

49 For examples of Margaret consulting Granvelle about these letters, see L. van der Essen, 'L'intervention de Marguerite de Parme dans le mouvement de réconciliation des provinces wallonnes (1579): Un docu-

ment inédit des Archives farnésiennes de Naples', *Bulletins de la Commission Royale d'Histoire* 88 (1924), p. 8. The cooperation between Farnese and Granvelle in this regard was less explicitly laid out, but Granvelle certainly made very clear suggestions about how the native nobility could be persuaded to reconcile, and Farnese's policies have been recognised to largely follow his advice. See Granvelle to Farnese, 1 and 19 December 1578, 7 April 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 221-2, 235, 361; Granvelle to Farnese, 20 December 1580, in Piot, *CGr*, viii, 223-4. For Farnese's persuasive letters, see Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 390-1.

50 Granvelle to Philip II, 11 June 1578, in *ibid.*, p. 105; Decavele, 'Genève van Vlaanderen', p. 61.

51 Decavele, 'Genève van Vlaanderen', pp. 50, 52.

52 Cf. Morillon to Granvelle, 26 February 1578, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 49-50; Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 139, 149; H. de Schepper, 'De mentale rekoversie van de Zuidnederlandse hoge adel na de Pacifikatie van Gent', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 89:3 (1976), p. 422; G. Griffiths, *William of Hornes Lord of Hèze and the Revolt of the Netherlands (1576-1580)* (Berkeley, 1954), p. 42. For a discussion of anti-aristocratic rebel pamphleteering in this period, see Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in the pamphletten*, pp. 194-201. For rebel discussions of whether or not to follow the Swiss model, see A. A. van Schelven, 'De Staatsvorm van het Zwitsersche Eedgenootschap den Nederlanden ter naolging aanbevolen', in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen* II (Brussels, 1947).

53 Granvelle to Aerschot, 18 April 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 365.

54 Granvelle to Aerschot, 18 April and 8 November 1579, in *ibid.*, pp. 366-7, 490-1.

55 Granvelle to Aerschot, 18 April and 8 November 1579, in *ibid.*, pp. 367, 490. See also Granvelle's second letter to Aerschot dated 8 November 1579 for a parallel statement, p. 493.

56 Granvelle to Aerschot, 8 November 1579, in *ibid.*, p. 491.

57 Granvelle to Aerschot, 18 April 1579, in *ibid.*, pp. 366-7.

58 Granvelle to Philip II, 24 April 1579, in *ibid.*, p. 382.

59 Farnese to Philip II, 3 November 1578, in Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 390-1; cf. K437.

60 Farnese to Philip II, 3 and 13 June 1580, in Lefèvre, *CPhII*, ii, 27, 33-4.

61 Farnese to Philip II, 14 June 1580, in *ibid.*, p. 35.

62 Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 260, 266; A. Cauchie and L. van der Essen, *Inventaire des archives farnésienne de Naples au point de vue de l'histoire des Pays-Bas catholiques* (Brussels, 1911), p. CLXXXVI.

63 Farnese to Philip II, 3 June 1580, in Lefèvre, *CPhII*, ii, 27.

64 Farnese to Philip, 13 June 1580, and Philip II to Farnese, 15 August 1580, both in *ibid.*, pp. 34, 60. Philip was later to stress the importance of having allowed Hèze a defence lawyer in order to shut the mouth of those who would always take a pessimistic view of things. See Philip to Farnese, 13 January 1581, in *ibid.*, p. 117.

65 Farnese to Philip II, 13 June and 16 November 1580, in *ibid.*, pp. 34, 88. Granvelle was also convinced this was a good move and approved wholeheartedly of conducting the trial with the cooperation of the reconciled States as proof that the past really had been forgotten. Granvelle to Morillon, 6 July 1580, in Piot, *CGr*, viii, 97-8.

66 Cf. Farnese to Philip II, 28 and 31 August and 7 October 1580, in Lefèvre, *CPhII*, ii, 66, 70, 79.

67 Farnese to the States of Artois, 23 October 1580, in *ibid.*, p. 82. Similar letters were also sent to the States of Hainaut, Lille, Douai and Orchies, cf. footnote 1, p. 82.

68 *Pointz et articles des charges proposées contre Guillaume de Hornes, Seigneur de Heze. Avecque la sentence criminelle, & capitale sur icelles rendue* (Mons, 1580) (K548).

69 *Ibid.*, D4r-v.

70 Farnese to Philip II, 13 November 1580, in Lefèvre, *CPhII*, ii, 86.

71 *Mémoires sur le Marquis de Varemboen*, ed. J. Borgnet (Brussels, 1873), p. 16.

72 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 205.

73 BT174.

74 *Pointen ende conditie[n] op de welcke de Stadt van Brugghe ende Tlant vanden Vrijen veraccoerdeert ende gherconsilieert zijn met den Prince van Parme plaissance &c. vut de naeme van zijne Maiesteyt* (Bruges, 1584) (K686), A2r; *Pointz et articles sovz lesquelz Les Magistratz, Consaulx & Doyens de la Ville de Gand, se sont reconciliez à Sa Mate.* (Mons, 1584) (BT3204), pp. iii, iiiij; *Articles et conditions du traité, arresté & co[n]clu, entre Monseigneur le Prince de Parma Plaissance &c. Lieutenant, Gouverneur & Capitaine General, de sa Majesté, es pays de pardeça, au nom d'Icelle, comme Duc de Brabant, d'une part, Et la ville de Bruxelles de l'autre, le xe Mars. 1585*

(Mons, 1585) (W8757), A2v; *Articulen ende Conditiën vande[n] Tractate / aenghegaen ende ghesloten tusschen de Hoocheydt vanden Prince van Parma, Plaisance, &c. Stadthoudere, Gouverneur ende Capiteyn Generael vanden Lande van hervvaerts ouere, inden name vande Conincklycke Maiesteyt van Spaengien, als Hertoghe van Brabant, ende Marckgrae des heyluchs Rijcx ter eenre, ende de Stadt van Antwerpen ter ander syden* (Antwerp, 1585) (W635), A2v.

75 For the return of the troops, see Van der Essen, *AF*, iii, ch. 2.

76 Farnese to Philip II, 22 November 1578, quoted in J. Massarette, *La vie martiale et fastueuse de Pierre-Ernest de Mansfeld (1517-1604)* (2 vols., Paris, 1930), ii, 34. See also Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 225; De León, 'Soldados platicos and caballeros', p. 255.

77 Granvelle to Farnese, 7 April 1579, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 361.

78 The point is recognised in the celebration of the reconciliation of Brussels, *Hiernae volghen de Sentbrieuen van zyne Hoocheyt / ende Antwoorden opde selue. Midtsgaders de Co[m]missie vande voorsz. Ghedeputeerden / eensamentlijck de verthooninghe ende afscheydt van wegen der stadt van Bruessel dedaan ende ghenomen* (Brussels, 1585) (K729), B3r.

79 Farnese to Philip II, 19 July and 3 August 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, pp. 465-6, 469; Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 223-4.

80 Cf. Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 225; iii, 203-4; De León, 'Soldados platicos and caballeros', p. 254. See also Farnese to Philip II, 12 October 1579, in Gachard, *CAF*, p. 486.

81 Soen, 'De reconciliatie van "kettters"', p. 355.

82 Van der Essen, *AF*, iii, 188.

83 Farnese to Granvelle, 14 April 1584, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 189.

84 K686, A2r. The treaty for Antwerp is less detailed but also includes the mention of 'misdaden Crimen lesae Maiestatis', see W635, A2v.

85 W8757, A2r.

86 Thus, Plantin printed both a French (BT1113) and a Dutch (BT1115) edition of Farnese's offer of reconciliation to the States General in March 1579; G. vanden Rade in Antwerp (BT1116, BT1118 and BT1119), A. Hendricxz. in Delft (K712 and K713), J. Canin in Dordrecht (W608) and C. Claeszoon in Amsterdam (W609) all printed the offer letter to the authorities in Antwerp in November 1584.

87 Rutger Velpius published the offers made to both the States General in 1579: *Copie d'une lettre de l'Exce dv Prince de Parme, envoyee aux deputez des Prouinces de ces Pays Bas, estans assemblez en la ville d'Anuers, Le dousiesme de Mars, M.D.LXXIX.* (Leuven, 1579) (BT1112), Brussels in 1580 *Lettres de Monseigneur le Prince de Parme, Plaisance, &c. Lieutena[n]t, Gouverneur, & Capne. general pour le Roy, en ses pays d'embas, Addres-santes Aux Bourguemaistres, Escheuins, Conseil, Ghuldes, & Bourgeois manans & habitans de la Ville de Bruxelles* (Mons, 1580) (BT1117) and Cambrai in 1580 *Copie de certaine lettre close escripte par son Ex.ce. Aux Preuost, Doyen, Chapistre, Prelat, & autres Ecclesiastiques : Preuost, Iurez, Escheuins, Borgéois, Corpz & Communauté de la Cité de Cambray. Les exhortant de se reco[n]cilier & remettre soubz la protectio de sa Mate suiuant les sermens qu'ilz ont à icelle* (Mons, 1580) (W482). Jan Maes in Leuven also published a Dutch edition of the offer to the States General (BT1114).

88 Cf. M. Angenot, *La parole pamphlétaire: Contribution à la typologie des discours modernes* (Paris, 1982), p. 58.

89 BT1112 (also published in Dutch, see BT1114); W482; BT1117. Presenting the same reconciliatory image of the regime was the pamphlet containing the terms of reconciliation offered by Philip at the ultimately unsuccessful negotiations at Cologne in 1579, see BT174.

90 W482, B2v-3r; BT1117, B3r. A similar message was presented in BT1112, A1v.

91 W482, B3v.

92 In his letter to the rebel authorities in Brussels, Farnese even went so far as to say that Orange had been tyrannical '*speciallement contre vous*', and that the only reason they were resisting the king was obviously that Orange was exercising his malicious influence on them. BT1117, A2r, B1v-2r.

93 Philip II to Farnese, 30 November 1579, AGR, *État et Audience* 176, fol. 133.

94 Granvelle to Morillon, 6 July 1580, in Piot, *CGr*, viii, 97.

95 BT1117, A2v.

96 *Lettre envoyee par le Prince de Parme aux Bourgmaistres, Escheuins & Magistrat de la ville d'Anuers, ensemble & au grand conseil, dit, den Breedene Raedt, & aux Confreries d'icelle* (Antwerp, 1584) (K710), A2r-3r. The very same arguments were used in an offer letter sent by Farnese to the authorities in Gouda immediately after the fall of Antwerp. Cf. Hibben, *Gouda in Revolt*, p. 228.

97 *Chronique flamande 1571-1584*, ed. E. Varenbergh (Ghent, 1869), pp. 39-42, 53-6.

98 *Ibid.*, p. 42; *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, pp. 323, 336-7.

99 *Chronique flamande*, p. 11.

100 *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 38.

101 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 361.

102 *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9, 332-3; *Chronique flamande*, pp. 16, 76-7, 97-8, 109-10, 118.

103 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, pp. 309-10, 332-3, 338.

104 *Advis d'vng bon bovrgois de la ville de Gand, qui resent amerement des calamites de sa ville, du comté de Flandres, & en fin de tous les Païs bas translaté de Flamen en Francois* (s.l., 1583) (W549), A2r; Swart, *William of Orange*, p. 235.

105 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 93.

106 *Ibid.*, pp. 82-5, 93.

107 *Chronique flamande*, p. 140.

108 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 274.

109 Swart, *William of Orange*, p. 199.

110 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 191, 197.

111 See G. Griffiths, *Representative Government in Western Europe in the Sixteenth Century: Commentary and Documents for the Study of Comparative Constitutional History* (Oxford, 1968), p. 497; Holt, *The Duke of Anjou*, pp. 134-5.

112 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 197, 201; M. E. H. N. Mout, 'Ni Prince ni Etat', in A. Stegmann (ed.), *Pouvoir et institutions en Europe au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1987), p. 123.

113 For a discussion of the attempts to convince people of Anjou's legitimacy, see A.-L. van Bruaene, 'Spectacle and spin for a spurned prince: Civic strategies in the entry ceremonies of the Duke of Anjou in Antwerp, Bruges and Ghent (1582)', *Journal of Early Modern History* 11:4-5 (2007). For Anjou's entry into Antwerp, see Thöfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 125-41.

114 Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, pp. 205-6; Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 233-6.

115 W549, Brv; Swart, *William of Orange*, pp. 235-6.

116 *Chronique flamande*, p. 76.

117 Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamfletten*, pp. 118-19.

118 *Claer Bewijs / dat den Prince van Orangien de oorsake ende iersten oorspronck is gheweest van dese langduerighe allende ende tweedrachiticheyt: Oock mede culpabel ende deelachtich gheweest te zijn van den growelijcken aenslach by den Francoysen opde stadt van Antwerpen voorts. ghekeert den xvij. Ianuarij / int Iaer M.D.LXXXIII.* (s.l., 1583) (BT1707); *Verhael van de warachtige ghelegentheyt des growelijcken aenslachs / by den Francoysen gedaen op de stadt van Antwerpen / den xvijsten. Ianuarij stylo nuovo, In den Iaer M.D.LXXXIIij.* (Leuven, 1583) (BT4716); Geurts, *De Nederlandse Opstand in de pamfletten*, pp. 117-18.

119 *Chronique flamande*, pp. 47-8.

120 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 341.

121 *Ibid.*, pp. 341-2.

122 *Ibid.*, pp. 331-2.

123 A. Erens, 'Een 'Apologie van de Vrede' te Antwerpen in 1584', *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis* XXIV (1933), pp. 153-4, 177.

124 *Ibid.*, p. 165.

125 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 366.

126 *Chronique flamande*, pp. 20-1, 23-6, 42, 46, 80-1, 85, 90, 93, 115-17, 119-20.

127 W520; *Eersame goede manne[n] / het is nv hooch tijt dat ghy lieden eenmael bestuyt oft ghy het Spaensch toek wilt teenemael afgelghen ofte niet* (s.l., 1579) (K427).

128 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, pp. 369-70.

129 *Chronique flamande*, pp. 143-4.

130 Instruction d'Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, pour les commissaires chargés de la conduite et de l'enseignement de la jeunesse catholique. 1580', *Analectes pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique X* (1873), p. 114ff.

131 Quoted in Lottin, *Etre & croire*, pp. 378-9.

132 Ibid., pp. 383-4.

133 L. van der Essen, 'Enige dokumenten betreffende de betrekkingen tussen Parma en de Jezuïeten (1584-1590)', in *Huldeboek Pater Dr. Bonaventura Kruitwagen O.F.M.* (The Hague, 1949), p. 138.

134 Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, pp. 309, 312-13.

135 'Instruction d'Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, pour les commissaires chargés de la conduite et de l'enseignement de la jeunesse catholique', p. 218.

136 M. J. Marinus, *De contrareformatie te Antwerpen (1585-1676): Kerkelijk leven in een grootstad* (Brussels, 1995), p. 42.

137 Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, pp. 352-3, 362-3, 380, 396-7.

138 In Antwerp, an estimated 20,000 people had left within nine months of the capitulation, M. J. Marinus, *Laevinus Torrentius als tweede bisschop van Antwerpen (1587-1595)* (Brussels, 1989), p. 159.

139 Cf. Mout, 'Ni Prince ni Etat', p. 123.

140 Erens, 'Een "Apologie van de Vrede"', pp. 168-9.

141 K467, A3r; K538, A2r; *Les cruels horribles torment de Balthazar Gerard, Bourguignon, vray martyr, souffertz en l'execution de sa glorieuse et memorable mort, pour avoir tué Guillaume de Nassau, Prince d'Orange, ennemy de son royaume et de l'eglise catholique; mis en françois d'un discours latin envoyé de la ville de Delft, au Comté de Hollande* (Paris, 1584) (K695), p. 13; *Origine des troubles et remouvement d'affaires es Pays de Flandres pendant le gouvernement du duc d'Alençon, don Loïs de Requesens, du Comte de Mansfeld, & de l'illustre don Iean d'Austrie, grand profligateur des Rebelles, naguères décédé en la ville de Namur* (Paris, 1578) (W382), Aiv; W482, A3r-v; *Advertissement chrestien contenant une déclaration sommière de l'effet d'aucunes causes, sur lesquelles l'on a jeté tart l'oeil suffisantes à retarder le progrès du Repos général de ces déplorables Pays bas* (Mons, 1582) (BT207), D2r; BT1707, A3v.

142 BT2910, p. 7; W410, F8r.

143 *Vant Swingelsche Calf / Off descriptie des swingelsche Calf / waer inne bewesen wordt voorden simpelen menschen / met vijff redenen off vaste argumenten / dat die caluinisten predicanen Gods wordt / noch godts kercke niet en hebben / met sommige ander stukkens hier naet op dander sijde ghenoempt / tsamen profijtelick om lessen* (s.l., 1580) (W492), Cir.

144 *Cort ende clae bevvijfs* (Leuven, 1582) (K607), A2r.

145 Ibid., A3r.

146 BT1117, A3r, A4v-B1r; K543, B3v-4r; K544, E7r, F1r; K546, D4r; W410, A3v; W482, B3r-v; *Lettres patentes du Roy nostre sire, Par lesquelles l'Autorité, que usurpent présentement les quatre membres de Flandres, est abolie, & déclaré nul ce qu'ilz ont fait, & feront durant ceste leur rebellion* (Mons, 1581) (BT2966), A2v-A3r; *Van die verlossinghe der vermaerde Coopstadt van Antwerpen / ende van die groote goedertierenheit des Heeren / een zeer schoone Onderwysinghe tot ghemeyn ruste ende Weluaren des Landts* (s.l., 1585) (BT4603), A2v-3r; *Apologie chrestienne contre aucunes proposition[s] pernicieuses, mises en avant en la ville d'Anvers, par quelques factieux perturbateurs de la vraye Religio[n] & du repos publicq* (s.l., 1582) (W541), p. 8.

147 Andriessen arrives at the same conclusion on the basis of material produced by Jesuit writers. See Andriessen, *De Jezuïeten en het samenborighedsbesef*, p. 41.

148 Erens, 'Apologie van de Vrede', p. 161.

149 Ibid., p. 178.

150 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 337.

151 Cf. Koenigsberger, *Monarchies*, p. 296.

152 *Placaet byde welcke Valentin de par Dieu / verclaert wert voor rebell / vyant en[de] verrader vande Landen van hervertsouere* (Ghent, 1579) (BT2862).

153 K538, B3v, D4v.

154 W541, p. 32; Th. Beza, *The Rights of Magistrates*, in J. H. Franklin (ed.), *Constitutionalism* (New York, 1969), p. 107.

155 W541, pp. 8-9, 20, 23-4.

156 *Historie Balthazars Gerardt, alias Serach, die den Tyran van t'Nederlandt den Prince van Orangie doorschoten heeft: ende is daerom duer growelijcke ende vele tormenten binnen de stadt van Delft openbaerlijck ghedoodt* (s.l., 1584) (K693), B1v.

157 W541, pp. 36-7.

158 BT1707, B1r, E1v; K467, B1v, B3r; K543, B2r-v. For rebel authors' use of definitions of tyranny, see Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, p. 158.

159 W541, pp. 29, 32-6. See also BT2966, A3r.

160 See A. Viaene, 'Vlaamse Vluchtelingen de Douai', *Annales de la Société d'émulation de Bruges* XCIII (1956) for Flemish Catholic refugees to Wallonia, and Decavele, 'Genève van Vlaanderen' for the persecution and execution of Catholics in Ghent. For rebel pamphlets that were explicitly anti-Catholic, see *Le Vray Patriot Aux Bons Patriots* (s.l., 1578) (K392), B3r; W412, especially pp. 8, 23, 69; *Les lamentations du Pape de Rome sur la Mort de Don Jean d'Austrice avec les reponses de la Mort et l'Epitaphe dudit Don Jean* (s.l., 1578) (K385); *VVaerachtich verhael vanden Oproerigen beleyde, dwelck Broeder Anthonis Ruyskensveld Predikere met zijnen aenhanck hebben aengericht binnen der Sadt [sic] van Bruessel* (Brussels, 1581) (K570). In the response to Walloon Flanders' defence of their reconciliation, the States General tellingly did not address their religious concerns, W419, B1rr.

161 On the immediacy aspect of pamphleteering, see Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, p. 3.

162 For a discussion of the rebel emphasis on concord in the late 1570s and early 1580s, see Van Gelderen, *Political Thought*, pp. 193ff, 219ff.

163 BT3204, p. ij. See also Article 9, p. xijj, where Farnese decides to grant a general pardon after having been made to understand that the troubles in Ghent were due to a small number of seditious people who were from elsewhere. The treaty with Brussels also presents the grant of reconciliation as coming from Farnese, together with his intention to never abolish or pervert the local privileges; see W8757, A1v-2v, A4v-B1r. The treaty with Bruges is less explicit, but the Mons edition includes an account of how Farnese refused the offer of hostages as surety for peace and was content to take the Bruges envoys at their simple word, *Les articles du traicté des Ville de Bruges, & País du Francq* (Mons, 1584) (W588), C4v.

164 The letter to the rebel authorities in Antwerp explicitly presents Farnese as being behind the initiative and even elaborates on his connections and the particular affection he has had for the country since his youth. Philip's goodness and the fact that he is ultimately the one offering the generous terms are not mentioned until later, although the letter ends with a reference to Farnese's goodwill and the offer *he* is presenting them with. K710, A2v-3v. The letter to the authorities in Brussels includes more references to the generous terms offered by Philip, but here too the initiative is clearly described as being Farnese's, see BT1117, A3r, A3v, B1r-v.

165 K729.

166 Ibid., B1v, B2v-3r, B4r.

167 BT4603, A2r.

168 *Sekere Redenen tusschen die goetwillighe Ghemeynte van Antwerpen / ende de Hoocheydt vanden seer Doorluchtinghen Prince van Parme* (Antwerp, 1585) (BT4922).

169 Ibid., A1v.

170 Ibid., A2r, A4r-v.

171 *Copie de la lettre envoyée par l'Exce du Prince de Parme a Monsieur le Baron de Lielques, Gouverneur pour sa Maste. de la Citadelle de Cambray, & à présent de la ville de Louain, sur le bon & heureux success que sadicte Exce a eu à la poursuyte des ennemys léz la ville d'Anuers* (Leuven, 1579) (BT1117) is an exception, as is an undated broadsheet map showing and celebrating the progress of Farnese against the 'hæresiarchis' (KBR: VB 10204 VI A).

172 *Advertissement de la victoire obtenue par l'armee de Sa Maiesté a la conduicte de Messire George de Lalaing, Conte de Renneburch, Baron de Ville, &c. Gouverneur & Capne general des Pays de Frise, Ouerissel, Gruninghen, & Lingen. Contre les ennemis de Dieu & de sadicte Mate au mois de Septembre, 1580* (Mons, 1580) (W483), A4rff, *Vray discouvr et relation de la bataille donnée le 17. de Iung. 1580 entre Hardenbergh & Gransbergh, pays d'Ouryssle, à tro[is] heures après mydi, par les gens de guerre de sa Maiesté, conduictz par Martin Schenck de Nydeghen, au secours de Groeningen. Et le Conte de Hol-lac Chiref des ge[n]s de la nouuelle vniou[n] d'Vtrecht* (Mons, 1580) (W470), A3r-v; and *Extract de deux lettres* (Mons, 1581) (BT1759), A2r-v, A3v-A4r. *Translat de l'espagnol en francois de ce qu'est succédé à l'armée de sa Ma.té, à laquelle commandoit co[m]me Capitaine general le Marquis de Sa.te Croix, par la bataille donnée à celle que conduysoit Don Antonio, es Isles de los Acores* (Douai, 1582) recounts a Spanish victory in a naval battle off the Azores and stresses the valour of Philip's navy (KBR: LP957A).

173 *Briefve relation de larrivée de sa maieste a Almada* (Mons, 1581) (BT410), see especially pp. vi, ix-x, xii-xiii.

174 Ibid., p. iii.

175 *Copye van den brief, die den groten Turck ghesonden heft, aen de Coninclijske Majesteyt van Spaegnien* (Antwerp, 1585) (BT548o).

176 For a discussion of the contemporary concern on the importance of managing the perceptions of others, see Sawyer, *Printed Poison*, p. 15.

177 Thus, *Vray discovr et relation de la batai[ll]e donnée le 17. de Iung. 1580* was published in Mons (BT4808), Leuven (BT9356) and in Cologne (W470).

178 Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 155.

179 Smolderen, *Jacques Jonghelinck*, p. 150.

180 Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 156.

181 Because of the demands of the siege of Antwerp, Farnese was in the end unable to go to Ghent and attend the celebration. See H. Waterschoot, 'Vorstelijke intochten 1577-1584', in Decavele (ed.), *Het eind van een rebelse droom*, especially p. 124.

182 BT1112 and BT1114 are the French and Dutch versions of Farnese's offer letter to the Generality of 12 March 1579; K538 and K539 are the French and Dutch editions of the same pamphlet; K527 is a 's-Hertogenbosch reprint of the ban in Dutch. Of the pamphlets that were issued from Jean Bogard's presses in the period 1579-1585 and which are now extant in the KBR, seven are in Dutch whereas nine are in French.

183 M. Stensland, 'Not as bad as all that: the strategies and effectiveness of loyalist propaganda in the early years of Alexander Farnese's governorship', *Dutch Crossing* 31:1 (2007), pp. 103-4; Pierard and Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers imprimés à Mons*, p. 28.

184 For provincial printing production in this period, see the records for, for instance, Mechelen, Ghent and Kortrijk in BT, iv, pp. 456-7, 461-3, 465, 468-9, 476, 503-4; and for Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht and Leiden in TB, ii, 407, 411, 445-6, 465, 478-9, 482, 553, 562.

185 K392; W412; K423; K570; *Sommaire discovrs sur le moyen de conserver, et maintenir la vraye religion chistiene, & garder & asseurer les prouvinces unies, contre toutes apparentes entreprises, trahisons, & inuasions, de l'Ennemy de la Patrie. &c.* (s.l., 1581) (K574). Harline correctly identifies Dutch Revolt pamphlets as being intended to persuade, but as he bases his conclusions on a collected body of both rebel and loyalist material, he stops short of considering the relations between the different pamphlets' content, on the one hand, and their audience on the other. Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, p. 3.

186 W492; K544; *Discovrs sur les troubles et miseres de ce temps: et des moyens qu'il faut tenir pur les appaiser, & y mettre fin* (Douai, 1579) (K513); *Vraghe en[de] Antwoort zeer profytyck ende genoecelyck om lesen, waer inne ghedebatteert wordt waer de bose menschen nu meest al bleuen syn* (s.l., 1580) (K548c).

187 For a discussion on the importance of high numbers of publications in pamphleteering, see Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion*, pp. 162-3.

188 *Advertissement et conseil av pevple des Pays Bas* (Ghent, 1580) (K546a), Aiv.

189 D'Assonleville to Granvelle, 26 November 1578, in Piot, *CGr*, vii, 249.

190 *Advertissement et conseil av pevple des Pays Bas* (Roucelle, 1579) (P285), A3v.

191 K710 (Exchange between Farnese and the Antwerp authorities); W419 (Exchange between the States of Lille, Douai and Orchies, and the States General). *Clare Belydinge des Christen Ghelofs, tweekl alle oprechte Catholike menschen tot allen tijden / daer toe versocht zijnde / schuldich zijn te belijden* (1585) (s.l., K756) contains an oath to uphold Catholicism that Farnese required of different cities, reprinted in its entirety with a rebel preface. Similarly, Farnese's offer of reconciliation to the city of Antwerp in November 1584 was reprinted with the Antwerpenaars' reply in Antwerp, Delft, Dordrecht and Amsterdam. See footnote 86 above.

192 *Apologie* (Leiden, 1581) (TB257: Dutch edition; TB262: French edition).

193 Cf. BT2910, p. 29.

Notes Losing the Peace, 1585-1595

1 *Aduertissem.t touchant le redressement des affaires des Paÿs de pardeca donne à l'Archiduc par le Cons. d'Assonleville au Mois de Janvier 1594*, AGR, État et Audience 1415/2, first page of unpaginated booklet.

2 C. Verlinden and J. Craeybeckx, *Prijzen- en Lonenpolitiek in de Nederlanden in 1561 en 1588-1589. Onuitgegeven adviezen, ontwerpen en ordonnanties* (Brussels, 1962), p. 24.

3 *Chronijcke van Ghendt*, p. 378.

4 *Liste chronologique*, pp. 219-20, 224.

5 E. Scholliers, 'De eerste schade van de scheiding. De sociaal-economische conjunctuur 1558-1609', in J. Craeybeckx, F. Daelemans, F. G. Scheelings (eds.), *1585: op geschieden wegen. Handelingen van het colloquium over de scheiding der Nederlanden, gehouden op 22-23 november 1985, te Brussel* (Leuven, 1988), pp. 39-44, 47-8.

6 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 205; Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 15; Hibben, *Gouda in Revolt*, especially pp. 209, 217.

7 *Pvncten ende articulen by mynen Heere den Hertoch van Parme, en[de] Plaisancie, Ridder vande[n] Gulde[n] Vliese, Stadthouder Gouuerneur, ende Capiteyn Generael vande Landen va[n] hervuertsouer Geaccoerdeert aende Borgers en[de] Inwoonders der Stadt S. Geertruyen Berghe* (Brussels, 1589) (BT3534).

8 *Beschrijvinghe Oft cort verhael vande harde belegheringhe ende inneminghe vande Stadt ghenaemt de Graue* (Antwerp, 1586) (K768), A2r-v, A4r; *Beschrijvinghe Der stadt van Venloo / ende haer stercke / hoe ende in wat maniere de selue beleighert / beschoten ende victorieuselijck ghewonnen is* (Antwerp, 1586) (K770), A3r; *Discours ov briefve description du siege & prise de la Ville de Nuyts* (Antwerp, 1586) (K773), A3r.

9 C. Martin and G. Parker, *The Spanish Armada*, revised edn. (Manchester, 1999), p. 127.

10 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 24.

11 Cf. BT112, Arv-2r; BT117, A2r, A3r, A4v, B2v-3r.

12 Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 311, 323-4; De Schepper, 'De mentale rekonversie', p. 425; *Mémoires de Martin Antoine del Rio sur les troubles des Pays-bas durant l'administration du comte de Fuentes 1592-1596*, ed. A. Delvigne (Brussels, 1892), pp. 7-8, 21.

13 For a full account of both Farnese's preparations in Flanders and of the different problems with the Armada operation, see Parker, *Grand Strategy*, chapters 7 and 8, and Martin and Parker, *The Spanish Armada*. After the Armada, accusations circulated at the courts in Milan, Naples, Rome, Venice, Paris and Madrid, and Farnese's son, Ranuccio, reported that the same was the case in Parma. Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 236-7; Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 230.

14 Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 236.

15 Van Loon, *Beschrywing der Nederlandsche historipenningen*, i, 390-2. For pamphlets see, for example, *Cort verhael vande groote Victorie die Godt almachtich de Conincklyke Mayesteyt van Enghelant verleent heft, ouer de Spaensche Armade* (Amsterdam, 1588) (K845) and *Heylige Bulle, Ende Krusade des Paus van Roomen* (Middelburg, 1588) (K834).

16 Privy councillor Jean Richardot was sent to Madrid with a dossier of collected correspondence serving to exculpate Farnese for any blame in the Armada's failure. In October 1588 Farnese wrote to Don Juan de Idiáquez, secretary of state at the Spanish court, asking him to speak his case, and Count Niccolo Cesi was sent to Italy to defend Farnese's conduct there. See Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 230 and Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 236-8.

17 B.T. Whitehand, *Of Brags and Boasts: Propaganda in the Year of the Armada* (Stroud, 1994), pp. 102, 104, ch. 7; Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 235-6; Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 229.

18 *Die wonderlyke groote Armade die zijde Magt. den Coninck van Spaengien heeft toegherust op Engelandt* (Ghent, 1588) (BT9400), A2r.

19 Ibid., Arv.

20 Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 236-7.

21 K. van Damme, 'Slecht nieuws, geen nieuws: Abraham Verhoeven (1575-1652) en de *Nieuwe Tijdinghen*. Periodieke pers en propaganda in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens de vroege zeventiende eeuw', *BMGN* 113 (1998), pp. 1-22.

22 Farnese to Granvelle, 13 October 1579, quoted in Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 249; Farnese to Philip, 10 January 1587, quoted in Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 83; Cauchie and Van der Essen, *Inventaire des archives farnésiennes de Naples*, pp. LXXIII-LXXIV.

23 Farnese to Philip, 23 December 1589 and 3 August 1590, quoted in Van der Essen, *AF*, v. 285, 311.

24 Cf. Farnese's letters to Philip of 22 July and 3 August 1590 detailing the Council of War's opposition to the intervention, and how public sentiment held that Philip had abandoned the Low Countries. Ibid., pp. 285, 290.

25 *Declaration de la volonté du roy, depuis ... Paris* (Brussels, 1588) (BT1410) was a copy of a pamphlet first published in Chartres; *Exhortation de Monseigneur l'ill.me Cardinal de Plaisance legat de N.S.P. le Pape Clement VIII. & du S. Siege Apostolique, au Royaume de France. Aux Catholiques du mesme Royaume qui suivent le party de l'Heretique* (Brussels, s.d.) (BT4313) was a copy of a pamphlet published by Robert Nivelle in Paris; *Defaite des Hugenots albigeois devant la ville de Lautrech, par Monseigneur le Duc de Joyeuse, avec les noms des Chiefs & Principaux de l'Armee Huguenotte, qui apres le combat ont esté trouuees morts ou pris prisonniers* (Velpius, Brussels, s.d.) (BT840) was a copy of a pamphlet first published by Jean Pillehotte in Lyons; P. Corneio, *Bref discours et véritable des choses plus notables arruées au siège memorable de la renommée ville de Paris, et défense d'icelle par Monseigneur le Duc de Nemours, contre le Roy de Nauarre* (Velpius, Brussels, s.d.) (BNF: LB35-249(C)) was a copy of a pamphlet first published by Didier Millot in Paris.

26 For example: *Articles accordez av nom du Roy, entre la Royne sa mer d'une part, Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon, & Monsieur le Duc de Guyse, tant pour eux, que pour les autres Princes, Prelats, Seigneurs, Gentilzho[m]mes, Villes, Co[m]munautez, & autres quy ont suiuy le party, d'autre part* (Velpius, Brussels, 1588) (BT1412), also published by Jean Pillehotte in Lyons in 1588 (BNF: LB34-495(B)); *Propos tenus av Roy a la presentation de la requeste des Princes Seigneurs & Communautéz de l'U[n]ion pour la déffense de la Religion Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine* (Mommaert, Brussels, 1588) (BT4066), also published by Nivelle in Paris in 1588 (BNF: NUMM-79617); *Discours véritable de la deliurance miraculeuse de Mon-seigneur le Duc de Guyse nagueres captif au chasteau de Tours* (Velpius, Brussels, 1591) (BT933), also published by Jean Pillehotte in Lyons in 1591 (BNF: NUMM-79817).

27 For French Protestant satire on Farnese's role in France, see, for example, *Discours sur la venve en France, progrez, et retraiete du Duc de Parme, & des grands haults, & genereux exploits d'armes par luy faits, pour le secours des Ligueurs rebelles du Roy* (Tours, 1590) (BNF: 8-LB35-298); *Mémoire de ce qui est advenu en la retraitte & deslogement du Duc de Parme & de ses forces hors de France* (Tours, 1590) (BNF: 8-LB35-300); *Discours de ce qui s'est passé av siege de Roven, de la retraiete du Duc de Parme, & de son retour pour le secours de ladite ville iusques au 21. d'Auril 1592* (Tours, 1592) (BNF: RES 8-LB35-146 (A, 13)) even warned that Farnese would give the French crown to the King of Spain, see p. 14. See also R. Descimon and J. J. Ruiz Ibáñez, *Les Ligueurs de l'exil: le refuge catholique français après 1594* (Seyssel, 2005), pp. 117-20.

28 Cf. Van der Essen, *AF*, ii, 61.

29 Camillo Monguidi's report, quoted in Van der Essen, *AF*, v, 364.

30 Farnese to Philip, 31 August and 12 November 1591, quoted in Van der Essen, *AF*, v, 323-4.

31 B. J. García García, 'Mansfeld contre Farnèse. Dessins satiriques de Charles de Mansfeld contre le gouvernement du duc de Parme Alexandre Farnèse', in J.-L. Mousset and K. de Jonge (eds.), *Un prince de la Renaissance Pierre-Ernest de Mansfeld (1517-1604)* (2 vols., Luxembourg, 2007), ii, 130.

32 Ibid., pp. 131-3.

33 For a pro-Fuentes account of these, see *Mémoires de Martin Antoine del Rio sur les troubles des Pays-bas durant l'administration du comte de Fuentes*, pp. 14-16, 22-4.

34 R. Fruin, *Tien jaren uit den tactigjarige oorlog*, 5th edn. (The Hague, 1924), p. 170; De Schepper, 'De mentale rekonversie', pp. 426-7.

35 *La valereuse expugnation des Ville & Chasteau de Dourlens en Picardie, faict par les ge[n]s du Roy nostre Sire, le dernier de Iuillet 1595* (Brussels, [1595]) (BNF: 8-LH5-1816), A2r. The pamphlet on his victory at Cambrai contained no flattering descriptions, cf. *Discours véritable de la rendition de la Ville & du chasteau de Cambrai, entre les mains du Roy Catholique d'Espagne, Par le victorieux Seigneur le conte de Fuentes* (Brussels, 1595) (K930).

36 *Certaines nouvelles de la bone & heureuse victoire, que par l'ayde de Dieu, le Comte Charles de Mansfeld a obtenu en Honguerie, pres la ville de Strigonia. 1595.* (Brussels, 1595) (BT611). *Brief traicté de la Victoire que le Compte Charles de Ma[n]sfelt, Prince du Saint Empire, Capitaine Lieutenant General en Hungarie à l'encontre du Turc, devant la ville de Strigonia, a par la gracs [sic] de Dieu obtenu, le 4. iour d'Aougst, l'An 1595* (Antwerp, 1595) (W8795) also celebrated Mansfeld's victory at Strigonia, presenting them as victories of Christendom against 'la malheureuse secte & doctrine Mahometaine' but did not draw any parallels to the situation in the Low Countries. *Relation véritable du succès de la guerre, de sa Maiesté Imperiale au Royaume d'Honguerie après le trespass de haute memoire de Prince Conte Charles de Mansfelt, recuillly des a'duertences données de jour a autres a sa Maiesté tant du siege de Strigonia, qu'aleurs* (Brussels, 1595) (BT4123) concerned the Habsburg victories

in Hungary after Mansfeld's death there, but the title nevertheless included a positive mention of him even though he did not feature in the battles described.

37 See Perrenot's memos of both 1589 and 1590, *Mémoires de Frédéric de Perrnot Sieur de Champagney 1573-1590*, ed. A. L. P. de Robaulx de Soumoy (Brussels, 1860), pp. 266-70, 272, 307-9.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. xc-xci.

39 Andriessen, *De Jezuïeten en het samenhorigheidsbesef*, p. 117; Marinus, *Laevinus Torrentius*, p. 178.

40 AGR, *État et Audience 1415/2, Remonstrance touchant les affaires des Pays bas 1590*, pp. [4]-[5].

41 *Ibid.*, pp. [1], [5]-[6], [8]-[9].

42 Philip to Farnese, 23 May 1590, unmarked front page of booklet containing the memo, AGR, *État et Audience 1415/2*.

43 Cf. Van der Essen, *AF*, v, 236-7; Parker, *Grand Strategy*, p. 230.

44 See Philip to Mansfeld, 24 March 1592, reproduced in its entirety in *Actes des États généraux de 1600*, ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1899), p. lxxvi, footnote 1.

45 The Privy Council sent its views to Philip in July 1592, see Van der Essen, *AF*, v, 360. For an example of ecclesiastical participation, see E. Poulet, 'Mémoire dressé en 1592 par le clergé du diocèse de Ruremonde sur la situation des Pays-Bas et les moyens d'y porter remède, et destiné à être mis sous les yeux de Philippe II', *Bulletins de la Commission royale d'Histoire*, 4th series, VI (1878-9), p. 86.

46 Cf. Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, Appendix J, p. 254.

47 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 191; Gachard, *Actes des États généraux de 1600*, p. lxvii.

48 Massarette, *La vie martiale*, ii, 103.

49 M. Weis, 'Un enjeu de politique intérieure: Pierre-Ernest de Mansfeld face au problème des armées indisciplinées', in Mousset and De Jonghe (eds.), *Un prince de la Renaissance*, ii, 119.

50 Cf. *Discours sur les excessives misères qu'endure le pauvre Pays-Bas*, ed. Ch. Ruelens (Brussels, 1874), pp. xi, 1-11.

51 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

53 Gachard, *Actes des États généraux de 1600*, p. 438. Another, almost identical report written at about the same time is discussed in Van der Essen, 'Un «cahier de doléances»'.

54 *Discours sur les excessives misères*, pp. 30, 32.

55 The same resentments were echoed by Renon de France, president of the Council of Artois, in his account of the Revolt. As his account was only written in the period 1606-13, we cannot know whether he voiced, or even held, these opinions in the 1590s, but these resentments were obviously sufficiently widely shared for him to frame his understanding of the 1590s in line with them. *Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas par Messire Renon de France*, ed. Ch. Piot (3 vols., Brussels, 1886-91), iii, 225, 227, 232.

56 *Commentario del Coronel Francisco Verdugo de la Guerra de Frisa en XIII años que fue gobernador y capitán general de aquel estado y exercito por el rey D. Philippe II, nuestro señor*, ed. H. Lonchay (Brussels, 1899), p. xxxi.

57 Verdugo did at least feel free to air grievances against Farnese and his Italian entourage in his letters to Mansfeld. See Verdugo to Mansfeld, 17 December 1591 and 22 March 1592, reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 200-1, 215-17.

58 *Ibid.*, p. ii.

59 Several Dutch editions from 1595 onwards and Latin editions following in 1608, see e.g. *J. Lipsii Send-brief, in ... antwoorde ... aen een seker groot Heer, op de vraghe, welck van dryen den Coninck van Hispaengien best gheraden ware, oorloge oft Peys, oft liever Bestant niet den Fransman, Engelsche ende Hollander* (s.l., 1595) (BL: 573.f.26); *J. Lipsii Epistola, qua respondet cuidam viro Principi deliberanti bellum ne an pax, an potius Induciae expediant Regi Hispaniarum cum Gallo, Anglo, Batavo. Scripta III. Januarij MDXCV. nunc primum edita* (s.l., 1608) (BL: 106.d.21.(r.)). N. Mout, 'Justus Lipsius between war and peace. His public letter on Spanish foreign policy and the respective merits of war, peace or truce (1595)', in Pollmann and Spicer (eds.), *Public Opinion and Changing Identities*, pp. 142, 157.

60 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of these.

61 M. de Wignacourt, *Discours sur l'Estat des Pays Bas* (Arras, 1593) (K898a), p. 2.

62 *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 8-9, 16, 30-1, 39.

63 *Ibid.*, A2v-3r, A5r.

64 *Ibid.*, A4v-6r.

65 Richardot is the assumed author of *Le renart decouvert* (K546), possibly written to prove his credentials after his own reconciliation, Pierard and Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers livres*, p. 43.

66 Cf. Vermaseren, *De katholieke Nederlandsche geschiedschrijving*, p. 133.

67 Some of his efforts are detailed in *ibid.*, pp. 132–3, 145.

68 For a discussion of Ernest's entry into Brussels, see Thøfnér, *A Common Art*, pp. 169–80, Soenen, 'Fêtes et cérémonies publiques', pp. 56–8. For Ernest's letter of 7 February 1594, see Thøfnér, *A Common Art*, p. 178; A. Doutrepont, 'L'archiduc Ernest d'Autriche, gouverneur-général des Pays-Bas (1594–1595)', in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen* (Brussels, 1947), p. 628.

69 Thøfnér, *A Common Art*, pp. 181, 187.

70 'Description of the Public Thanksgiving, of the Spectacles and the Games at the Entry of the Most Serene Prince Ernst Archduke of Austria, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Prefect of the Belgian Province to His Royal Majesty on 14 June 1594', in J. R. Mulryne, H. Watanabe-O'Kelly and M. Shewring (eds.), *Europa Triumphans: Court and Civic Festivals in Early Modern Europe* (2 vols., Aldershot, 2004), i, 537. This is an English translation by J. Stevenson, P. Gwynne and P. Liebregts of the original Latin festival book, and I shall be referring to their translation throughout.

71 'Description of the Public Thanksgiving', p. 497. See also p. 547 for an inscription echoing this sentiment.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 503.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 515. See also p. 517 for a similar inscription.

74 Cf. Thøfnér, *A Common Art*, pp. 191–2.

75 'Description of the Public Thanksgiving', p. 559.

76 Thøfnér, *A Common Art*, p. 170.

77 L. de Meyere, *Prosopopee d'Anvers à la bien-venne du serenissime Prince Ernest par la grace de Dieu Archiduc d'Autriche, Duc de Bourgogne, &c.* (Antwerp, 1594) (BT2122), G2v–3r; *Den willecomme en congravlatie vanden hooghgeboren, machtigen, ende seer doorluchtighen Vorst Ernesto* (Brussels, 1594) (BT1534), Bir. For similar hopes, see *Op de Gheluckiche ende heerlyke in-koomste des hooghgeboren Vorstes Ernesto / by der gratien Godts / Eerdt-Hertogh van Oostenrijck / Hertogh van Bourgoignen. Graue van Tyrol / etc. Gouverneur ende Capiteyn general der Neder-landen* (Antwerp, 1594) (BT4627), p. [2].

78 There may have been more that were either not published in pamphlet form but only proclaimed or that were issued in print but that do not survive. From the BT indices it is clear that there are copies of twelve different edicts of this type currently extant in Belgian libraries, see BT, iv.

79 Cf. *Placcart du Roy nostre Sire. Par lequel est pourveu que tous censiers, paysans & autres pourront librement laborer & cultiuer leurs terres sans estre oultragez par les souldatz & gens de guerre ny leurs cheualx, bestials & aultres instrumens de labeur arrestés, ny executez* (Antwerp, 1586) (BT3332), A4r–v; *Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire. Contre les Voleurs & Vrybuters, Deffendant a tous de prendre Saulue-gardes d'iceulx, & de leur payer aucune Contribution ou composition, Aussi de les mectre a rançon, quand ilz seront pris prisonniers, Auec plusieurs aultres pointez concerna[n]s ceste matiere* (Brussels, 1591) (BT3626), A2r.

80 *Copie. A noz treschiers & bien amez, les President & gens du Conseil du Roy Monseigneur en Flandres. Pierre Ernest Conte de Mansfelt, Cheualier de l'ordre, Lieutenant, Gouverneur & Capitaine general, en absence de S.A.* (Ghent, 1592) (BT3635); *Om goede ordre te stellen* (s.l., 1586) (BT3389) was issued by the authorities in Leuven; whereas *Ordinantie ende instruvtie Ons Heeren des Coninckx, nopende de Wacht ten platten lande* (Brussels, 1593) (BT3686) was issued by the central government.

81 BT3332, A4r–Bir; BT3626, A2r–v.

82 Cf. BT3626, A4v.

83 *Ordonnance du Roy contenant commandement de faire Recerche des grains tant es villes que plat plat pays* (Ghent, 1587) (BT3424); *Nouveau placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire. Pour plus pres pourueoir contre les appertentes chiertez du grains, Monopoles, & aultres excess & abuz* (Brussels, 1587) (BT3447).

84 Cf. BT3626, A2r, which referred to two previous edicts.

85 *Placcart et ordonnance de Son Excellence pour l'affranchissement du pays, contre les Volleurs, Vrybuters & autres Brigans* (Brussels, 1592) (BT3646) concerned the area around Nivelles and the 'Roman' lands of Brabant, whereas *Ordinantie ghemaect by Syn Excellentie tot beurydinghe vanden Lande, tegens die Vrybuyters, Kneuelaers, Straetsche[n]ders, ende andere dyergelyke quaetdoenders* (Brussels, 1592) (BT3645) concerned the country-side north of Brussels, Mechelen and the region of Kampen.

86 BT3626 was formulated in Philip's name, with Farnese's name mentioned. BT3645 and 3646, however, were issued in Mansfeld's name only.

87 De Pottre even quoted Farnese in French: 'Que laerin sont sela?' (or in modern French: 'Quels larrons sont ceux-là?'). *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, pp. 186-7.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 188.

89 Cf. Lottin, *Lille*, p. 44.

90 W8757, Article 10, B1r-v; Marinus, *De contrareformatie te Antwerpen*, p. 51; Marinus, *Laevinus Torrentius*, p. 162.

91 Lutherans were allowed to remain in Antwerp; their status in Brussels remains unclear. Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 161.

92 *Par le Roy. A noz Chiers & feaulx les President & gens de nostre Conseil de Flandres* (1588) (BT9704) against the import of 'corrupted' Bibles from Hamburg; and an edict of 19 February 1593 forbidding pasquils and other writings damaging to the Catholic faith on pain of hanging, cited in Goosens, *Les inquisitions modernes*, i, 125; Lottin, *Lille*, pp. 147-8.

93 Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, p. 352.

94 Lottin, *Etre et croire*, pp. 274-5; 'Instruction d'Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, pour les commissaires chargés de la conduite et de l'enseignement de la jeunesse catholique', pp. 114-20.

95 A. K. L. Thijs, *Van geuzenstadt tot katholiek bolwerk. Maatschappelijk betekenis van de kerk in contrareformato-
risch Antwerpen* (Antwerp, 1990), p. 65.

96 *Ibid.*, pp. 39.

97 *Ibid.*, p. 8; G. Marnef, 'Protestant Conversions in an Age of Catholic Reformation: The Case of Sixteenth-
century Antwerp', in A.-J. Gelderblom, J. L. de Jong and M. van Vaeck (eds.), *The Low Countries as a
Crossroads of Religious Beliefs* (Leiden, 2004), p. 38.

98 Thijs, *Van geuzenstadt tot katholiek bolwerk*, p. 61.

99 BT739, 4v-5r; Pollmann, 'Countering the Reformation in France and the Netherlands', p. 98. Other examples of this type of literature include: J. David, *Kettersche spinnecoppe waer inne (deur de natuere der spinne-
coppe) claeरlyck bewesen wort hoe degelick ende orborlick een saecke een ketter is* (Brussels, 1595) (BT811), which appeared in multiple editions, and F. Costerus. *Het Boecxken der broederschap, dat is, vijf boecken der Christ-
elijcker leeringhen, voor de Broederschap der H. Maghet Maria* (Antwerp, 1596) (BNF: 16-MANDEL-33).

100 For a discussion of anti-heresy publications from the 1560s, see Pollmann, 'Countering the Reformation in France and the Netherlands', pp. 99-111.

101 *Die Christelycke Leeringhe* (Brussels, 1591) (BT618), first page without number or signature.

102 *Corte christelyke leeringe, In maniere van tsamensprekinghe / tusschen den Meester ende den Discipel* (Brussels, 1590) (BT736).

103 E.g. R. Verstegan, *Theatre des Cruautez* (Antwerp, 1588) (BT4727), where the whole chapter on the heretics' atrocities in the Low Countries uses the term 'Gueus' to refer to them. See also BT618, unnumbered first page; BT732, p. 214.

104 For the international character of Counter-Reformation printing, see P. Arblaster, *Antwerp & the World:
Richard Verstegan and the International Culture of Catholic Reformation* (Leuven, 2004).

105 BT4727, A1r-v.

106 *Bewijs der ouder catholiicker leeringhe, met antwoorde op sommighe teghenstellinghen* (Antwerp, 1595) (BT732), p. 64.

107 *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13. The English spelling is Costerus' own.

108 *Ibid.*, p. 296.

109 For the generally good reception and initial progress the Jesuits made in China and Japan, see *Nouvelles de l'an M.D.LXXXVII* (Douai, 1588) (KBR: VB 11.327 A) and *Nouveaux advertisementz des choses qvi se sont
passeees en la Chine, et av Iapon* (Douai, 1589) (KBR: VB 11.327 A2). For the growing persecution but continued progress, see *Annales indiques, contenantes la vraye narratiot advis de ce qu'est aduenu & sucedé en Iapon, & aultres lieux voisins des Indes* (Antwerp, 1590) (BT112), especially pp. 62, 65, 79, 87, 151-2; *Sommaire des lettres
dv Iapon, et de la Chine de l'an M.D.LXXXIX. & M.D.XC* (Douai, 1592) (KBR: VB 11.327 A4), especially pp. 7-8, 11, 187.

110 *Discours ov briefve description de la venue de la Royne d'Algire à Rome* (Antwerp, 1587) (BT6409).

III BT713; BT933, D3r, D4v; *Copie d'une lettre enuoyee a Sedain au Vico[m]te de Touraine, qu'on pensoit estre audict lieu par le Prince Dombre, filz du Ducq de Monpensier: Laquelle a esté interceptee auecq plusieurs aultres, par les gens des Princes de l'Vnion* (Brussels, 1592) (BT2161).

II2 BT4727, p. 84; A. Blackwood, *Martyre de la Royne d'Escosse dovairiere de France* (Antwerp, 1588) (BT323), pp. 429, 537-8.

II3 K693, K695.

II4 Vermaseren, *De katholieke Nederlandsche geschiedschrifving*, pp. 49-50.

II5 D. Freedberg, 'The Representation of Martyrdoms in the Early Counter-Reformation in Antwerp', *The Burlington Magazine* 118:876 (March 1976), p. 132; Gregory, *Salvation at Stake*, p. 305.

II6 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 314.

II7 Cf. J. Andriessen s.j. 'Costerus en zijn tegenstanders uit het Noorden', in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen* (Brussels, 1947), pp. 776-7.

II8 BT736, p. 4.

II9 Marnef, 'Protestant Conversions in an Age of Catholic Reformation', p. 45.

II10 *Danckbaerhert van der verdreuen Catholijcken wedercomst / tot Gods lof / ende van die hyliche dry Coningenhen / ende tot danckbaerhert van die weldaden / so die van Antwerpen in huer treuren hebben ontfangen niet alleen in die loffelijcke ende geluckighe Stadt van Cuelen maer oock in andere plaetsen* (Antwerp, 1592) (BT324).

II11 Cf. Marinus, *De contrareformatie te Antwerpen*, p. 273.

II12 BT324, p. 277; Thijs, *Van geuzenstadt tot katholiek bolwerk*, p. 172; Lottin, *Lille*, p. 277.

II13 Cf. Soenen, 'Fêtes et cérémonies publiques', p. 83.

II14 Thijs, *Van geuzenstadt tot katholiek bolwerk*, p. 171.

II15 Marinus, *De contrareformatie te Antwerpen*, p. 273.

II16 Thöfner, *A Common Art*, p. 163.

II17 *Kronyk van de sodaliteit der getrouwden te Antwerpen (1585-1773)*, ed. Th. Van Lerius (Antwerp, 1862), pp. 9-10, 14.

II18 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

II19 Lottin, *Lille*, p. 277; Andriessen, *De Jezuïeten en het samenborighedsbesef*, p. 179.

Notes A New Beginning, 1596-1609

1 L. van der Essen, 'Politieke geschiedenis van het Zuiden, 1585-1609', in J. Andriessen, L. van der Essen, H. A. Enno van Gelder, L. E. Halkin, T. S. Jansma, J. C. H. de Pater and L. J. Rogier (eds.), *Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (12 vols., Utrecht, 1949-58), v, 272-3; G.-H. Dumont, *Histoire de la Belgique: Des origines à 1830* (Brussels, 2005), pp. 245, 251-4; Ch. Terlinden, *L'Archiduchesse Isabelle* (Brussels, 1943).

2 Duerloo, 'Pietas Albertina'; Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety'; Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*; Thöfner, *A Common Art*.

3 For calls for Philip's return or the appointment of a prince of the blood, see i.a. Remonstrance of the States General, 7-11 June 1574; Baron de Rassenghien to Philip, 10 March 1576; Council of State to Philip, 31 March 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iii, 462-3, 466, 480-2, 539-40; Granvelle to Philip, 23 March 1576; States of Brabant to Philip, 17 April 1576; Council of State to Philip; Brussels, 22 April 1576, in Gachard, *CPbII*, iv, 2-3, 85, 101-2.

4 *Cession et transport des Pays d'embas et de Bourgogne, fait par Philippe II Roy d'Espagne, a sa fille ainsnée Isabella, Clara, Eugenia, en avancement de son mariage avec l'Archiduc Albert* (1598) (K1033), p. 3.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

6 W. Thomas, 'Andromeda Unbound: The Reign of Albert & Isabella in the Southern Netherlands, 1598-1621', in *idem* and Duerloo (eds.), *Albert & Isabella*, pp. 3-4; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 254.

7 The following discussion owes much to the historiographical overview provided by Ch. H. Carter in his 'Belgian "Autonomy" under the Archdukes, 1598-1621', *Journal of Modern History* 36:3 (1963), pp. 247-8.

8 E. Gossart, *La domination espagnole dans les Pays-Bas à la fin du règne de Philippe II* (Brussels, 1906), p. 209.

9 Carter, 'Belgian "Autonomy" under the Archdukes', pp. 248-9.

10 Van der Essen, 'Politieke geschiedenis van het Zuiden, 1585-1609', pp. 272-3; P. C. Allen, *Philip III and the*

Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy (New Haven, 2000), pp. 15, 18–20, 70, 111–12, 174, 191, 212, 221.

11 Cf. Monod, *The Power of Kings*, p. 129; Thøfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 20, 82.

12 In addition to the many rebel pamphlets against Alva, see for example Perrenot's accusations against Farnese, the justification of the arrest of the Council of State in September 1576, and the declaration of Don John as an enemy of the country. *Mémoires de Frédéric Perrenot Sieur de Champagney*, pp. 266, 275–7; BT1673, A3r-v.

13 See *Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, eds. L. P. Gachard and Ch. Piot (4 vols., Brussels, 1874–82), iv, 525–58. For the different cities' tendency of focusing on Isabella's sovereignty rather than Albert's, see M. Thøfner, 'Domina & Princeps proprietaria: The Ideal of Sovereignty in the Joyous Entries of the Archduke Albert and the Infanta Isabella', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds.), *Albert & Isabella*, pp. 55–64.

14 Thøfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 175, 204.

15 *Voyages des souverains*, iv, 543–4; Th. Louïse, *La Joyeuse Entrée d'Albert et d'Isabelle à Valenciennes (20 février 1600)* (Valenciennes, 1877), p. 29; *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, p. 73ff.

16 Cf. *Voyages des souverains*, iv, 542, 548.

17 Cf. Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 14.

18 Louïse, *La Joyeuse Entrée d'Albert et d'Isabelle*, pp. xii–xiii, 17.

19 Thøfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 175.

20 Thøfner, 'Domina & Princeps proprietaria', p. 55.

21 Cf. ibid., p. 61. For a discussion of this gendered relationship in the Burgundian Low Countries, see Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, p. 22.

22 Thøfner, 'Domina & Princeps proprietaria', p. 58.

23 Thomas, *Andromeda Unbound*, p. 2.

24 Kaper, *Pamfletten over oorlog of vrede*, p. 7.

25 Ibid.

26 *Placaet. Van haere dorlvchtige hoocheyt infante, etc. vrovvve prinsesse sovveryne van dese Nederlanden Grauinne van Bourgnen. Nopende t' verbocht / en[de] interdictie van alle communicatie / traffijcke / en[de] Coop-manschappe met die van Hollandt / Zelandt / ende andere haere ghe-vniederde ende Adherenten* (Brussels, 1599) (BT3854), A2v.

27 *Placcart et ordonnance sur l'ovverture et restauration du Traffiq & Commerce d'Espaigne avec les pays de pardeça, encores qu'ilz soyent distractz de l'obeyssance des Serenmes Archiducqz noz Princes souuerains & naturelz* (Brussels, 1603) (Bodleian: BOD 4° O 1(6) Jur.Seld.), A2r.

28 Ibid., A2r-v.

29 Ibid.

30 V. van Zuijen, 'The Politics of Dividing the Nation? News pamphlets as a vehicle of ideology and national consciousness in the Habsburg Netherlands (1585–1609)', in J. W. Koopmans (ed.), *News and Politics in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800)* (Leuven, 2005), pp. 66–7.

31 *Ordonnance et instrucion syvant laquelle de la part des trios Estatz du Pays & Duché de Brabant l'on collectera ... les moyens accordez ... en subisde ... des garnisons & autres gens de guerre en Brabant*, A2r. See also *Ordre... se conduyre au fait du passage ... & personnes venans ... des Prouinces rebelles ...* (1602) (KBR: LP 5305A), A2r, B2r.

32 Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, pp. 150, 156–7; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 400.

33 *Relation de ce qve s'est exhibé en la ville de Bruxelles, à l'entree du serenissime prince, Albert, Archiduc d'Austrice, &c.* (Brussels, 1596) (BT4121), B2v, C1r, C4v-Dir.

34 *Voyages des souverains*, iv, 522–3, 536, 553; Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 204; *Cort Ende warachtich verhael va[n] de incomste des Eertshartoch Albertus / met de Infante van Spaengien syn Huysvrouwe: ende hare Huldingh in diuersche steden / als Hertoghe ende Hertoghinne van Brabant / met andere circumstantien* (s.l., 1600) (BT6120), A2r.

35 *La Bellone Belgique* (Antwerp, 1596) (BT4860). For the description of the crimes of the Gueux, see pp. 87–99, and for the negative characterisation, see pp. 80–1.

36 *Chanson nouvelle pour rendre action de graces au bon Dieu* (Arras, 1598) (K1010), verse 9 where heresy is identified as what causes trouble.

37 *Complaincte et doleance de la paix, contre les XVII. Prouvinces du Pays-bas, auecq requisitio[n] du rappel de son bannissement tortionnaire, & iouissance de son retour esdicts Pays* (Brussels, 1600) (BT679), B4r, see also B2r-v, B3v. Van Zuilen treats this pamphlet as an unproblematic expression of hopes for unity, but in light of the criticism it levels against the rebel provinces, this may be too optimistic. Van Zuilen, 'The Politics of Dividing the Nation?', pp. 61-2.

38 J. David, *Domp-hooren der Hollanscher fackel, Tot blusschinghe des Brandt briefs ende Missiue die onlancks met de volle Mane vut S'Grauen haghe gheschoten vvierden* (s.l., 1602) (BL: 1508/61), C3r; BT2, A1r; *Hochepot ou salmigondi des folz* (s.l., 1596) (BT1472), E4v; *Complainte de certaine personne de marque* (s.l., 1596) (BT678), A2r-v, A4r, B3r, B4v, C4r. See also *Responce ov solvotion, Sur vne Lettre des Estatz de Holland, le vij. de Iuin en cest an 1602. escripte aux Estatz des Prouvinces fideles du Pays bas* (s.l., 1602) (BL: 8079.b.11), D5r-v.

39 Ibid., A3v-4r.

40 BT678, D2r-3v. See also *Bref et sommaire examen de l'assassinat pretendu attenté en la personne du Comte Maurice par Pierre Panne, natif d'Ypre, & que l'on dit estre à la suasion des Peres Iesvites de Douay* (s.l., 1598) (BT5303), B2r-v.

41 BT1472, B6v. The association between Hollanders and the heretics in other countries was also made by Guillaume Estius, professor of theology at Douai, in his *Histoire veritable des martyrs de Gorcum en Hollande* (Douai, 1606) (BL: 4886.aaa.36), +3r-4r.

42 BT1472, C4r-v; BT678, C2r; BT679, B3v-4r; *Domp-hooren*, B2v; *Aen Hollandt* (Leuven, 1598) (BT2), A1v, A3r.

43 Rutger Velpius, Farnese's printer, appears to only have produced one single Dutch translation of the otherwise all French pamphlets he published in the reconciliation period, although he himself was a native Dutch speaker. Pierard and Ruelle also attribute an anonymously published pamphlet to Velpius (K538), whose Dutch translation is in that case also likely to have been published by him. Cf. Pierard and Ruelle (eds.), *Les premiers livres imprimés à Mons*, p. 28; Stensland, 'Not as bad as all that', pp. 103-4.

44 Thus, BT4860 and Kro26 were collections of poems of praise, written by Wachtendonck and De Meyere respectively; whereas the monks Franciscus Costerus and Jan David both produced numerous anti-rebel pieces, e.g. K1197, *Dompe-trompe*, etc.

45 K. Porteman, 'Na 350 jaar: De 'Sermoonen' van Franciscus Costerus', *Ons Geestelijk Erf* XLIII:3 (1969), p. 235ff; Andriessen 'Costerus en zijn tegenstanders uit het Noorden'; Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 95ff.

46 Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, p. 102.

47 Freedberg, 'The Representation of Martyrdoms', p. 135.

48 BT678, A3r, B1v, B3r.

49 Estius, *Histoire veritable des martyrs de Gorcum*, p. 399.

50 Ibid.; E. H. J. Reusens, *Iconographie des bienheureux martyrs de Gorcum* (Leuven, 1867); BT4860, p. 91.

51 Cf. Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 37.

52 Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety', p. 267; Tanner, *The Last Descendant of Aeneas*, p. 208.

53 Duerloo, 'Pietas Albertina', p. 3.

54 Ibid., p. 4; Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 258.

55 Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety', p. 268.

56 For the Valois' devotion, see Tanner, *The Last Descendant of Aeneas*, p. 211.

57 Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 256.

58 Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 43.

59 Ibid., p. 85.

60 Ibid., *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 85.

61 Cf. Thøfner, *A Common Art*, p. 280; P. Lombaerde, 'Dominating Space and Landscape: Ostend and Scherpenheuvel', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds.), *Albert & Isabella*, p. 178.

62 Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 84.

63 Ibid., p. 46.

64 Ibid., pp. 13, 62.

65 Lombaerde, 'Dominating Space and Landscape', p. 178.

66 Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 27.

67 Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety', p. 275.

68 Ibid., p. 272. For a discussion of the origins of the confraternity and its political *raison d'être*, see S. S. Sutch and A.-L. van Bruaene, 'The Seven Sorrows of the Virgin Mary: Devotional Communication and Politics in the Burgundian-Habsburg Low Countries, c. 1490-1520', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 61:2 (2010), pp. 252-78.

69 The exact date is unknown, but their membership was certainly a fact by 1606, when they bestowed costly presents for the decoration of the chapel; *ibid.*

70 Cf. Duerloo, 'Pietas Albertina', p. 11.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

72 Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety', p. 272.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 273.

74 *Ibid.*, pp. 276-7.

75 *Discours. Av particulier de ce qui se passa a l'isle de Hulst la nuictée du Jeudy & le vendredy ensuyuant 19. iour de Iuillet, 1596* (Antwerp, 1596) (BT923), p. 8, see also p. 27; *Discours touchant la prise admirable de la grande et puissante Ville d'Amiens Capitale de Picardie, saisi par les Espagnolz, le XI iour de Mars, l'an 1597* (Antwerp, 1597) (BT925), A2r; *Discours véritable et la signalee et miraculeuse prinse de la ville & Chasteau de Calais* (Brussels, 1596) (BT932), B4r.

76 *Balade op de belegeringhe ende verlossinghe vande stadt van t'Hertogen-bosche*, reproduced in C. R. Hermans (ed.), *Verzameling van kronyken, chartres en oorkonden betrekkelijk de stad en meijerij van 's Hertogenbosch ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1848), pp. 781-9; BT925, A4v; BT486o, pp. 10-11.*

77 BT486o, p. 11; BT923, pp. 4-5.

78 Poncelet, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, i, 525-6.

79 *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, pp. 96-8.

80 Cf. Duerloo, 'Archducal Piety', pp. 268, 274.

81 J. D. Tracy, 'With and Without the Counter-Reformation: The Catholic Church in the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic, 1580-1650', *The Catholic Historical Review* 71:4 (October 1985), p. 552.

82 Cf. J. I. Israel, *Conflict of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713* (London, 1997), p. 1.

83 *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, pp. 78, 96-8.

84 For Manteau's entry on the fall of Ostend, see *ibid.*, p. 88.

85 *Voyages des souveraines*, iv, 536, 544, 546.

86 *Ibid.*, pp. 548, 550.

87 Cf. Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 43.

88 Louïse, *La Joyeuse Entrée d'Albert et d'Isabelle*, pp. x-xv, 17.

89 J. Lipsius, *La nostre dame de Hav. Ses bien faicts & miracles fidelement recueillis & arrengez en bel ordre* (Brussels, 1606) (BNF: H10309), pp. 6, 127-44. For the mention of the Archdukes, see p. 142.

90 E. Ydens, *Histoire du S. Sacrement de miracle. Reposant a Bruxelles, en l'Eglise Collegiale de S. Goudele, & des Miracles faictz par iceluy* (Brussels, 1605) (BL: 861.d.3), pp. 5v-7r.

91 Ph. Numan, *Miracles lately wrought by the intercession of the gloriovs virgin Marie, at Montaigu, nere unto Siche[m] in Brabant* (Antwerp, 1606) (KBR: LP 644A), pp. 1-2, 18-19, 26-7.

92 Duerloo and Wingens, *Scherpenheuvel*, p. 37.

93 Although without experience, Spínola turned out to have military talent in spades, with the added advantage that he was also so rich that he offered to put his vast wealth and credit at Spanish disposal. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, pp. 98, 146.

94 *Chanson nouvelle de la renditon de la ville d'Ostende* (s.l., 1604) (KR282).

95 *Chronique de Mahieu Manteau*, p. 101.

96 Thöfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 180-96; BT4121.

97 *Voyages des souverains*, iv, 527.

98 *Ibid.*, p. 533; Thöfner, *A Common Art*, pp. 216-17.

99 *Voyages des souverains*, iv, 540, 548, 556.

100 Louïse, *La Joyeuse Entrée d'Albert et d'Isabelle*, pp. 21, 23-4, 31.

101 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

102 Cf. Thöfner, 'Domina & Princeps proprietaria', p. 55.

103 Ibid., p. 58.

104 G. van Loon, *Histoire métallique des XVII provinces des Pays-Bas, depuis l'abdication de Charles-Quint, jusqu'à la paix de Bade en MDCCXVI. Traduite du hollandais* (5 vols., The Hague, 1732-7), i, 511, 513, 531.

105 *Les articles et conditions de la paix et perpetuelle alliance contractée entre ... Philippe ... & Henry quatriesme de ce nom* (Delft, 1598) (K1005), A2r-v.

106 Ibid., A3r; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 254; Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, p. 161.

107 Cf. *Chronique de Mabieu Manteau*, pp. 60, 62-3, 65-6.

108 K1010, verses 6-7, 10-11. For Albert's entry into Brussels, see BT4121, especially A4r-v, B4r-v, C1r-v.

109 Cf. P. Croft, 'Brussels and London: the Archdukes, Robert Cecil and James I', in Duerloo and Thomas (eds.), *Albert & Isabella*, pp. 81-2.

110 Although Philip III did contemplate ways of retrieving the Low Countries under his own rule. Cf. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, pp. 15, 20, 96, 167.

111 Ibid., p. 15.

112 Ibid., pp. 51, 70.

113 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

114 Cf. Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 235.

115 Ibid., p. 235; Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, pp. 55-6.

116 Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, p. 256.

117 Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, pp. 89, 92.

118 Cf. Spínola's letter to Philip III, 25 June 1607, cited in ibid., p. 187.

119 Cf. ibid., p. 200.

120 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 259-60.

121 Ibid., p. 400; Kaper, *Pamfletten over oorlog of vrede*, p. 17; Article 12 of *Capitulations de la paix* (Brussels, 1660 reprint) (K1252b), pp. 8-9.

122 Kaper, *Pamfletten over oorlog of vrede*, p. 8.

123 Ibid., pp. 11-13.

124 Israel, p. 404.

125 On the basis of statistical sampling, Harline concludes that only 9 percent of the pamphlets argued in favour of peace. Harline, *Pamphlets, Printing, and Political Culture*, pp. 8, 112.

126 Kaper, *Pamfletten over oorlog of vrede*, pp. 12, 20-1, 23, 25; Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica*, p. ix.

127 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 256.

128 *Dagboek van Jan de Pottre*, p. 194.

129 *Chronique de Mabieu Manteau*, pp. 60-7.

130 Ibid., p. 89.

131 K1252b, Articles 4, 5 and 8, pp. 6-7.

Notes Conclusion

1 The point that Philip could have ended the rebellion by going to the Low Countries himself has also been made by Geoffrey Parker; see his 'What if ... Philip II had gone to the Netherlands?', *History Today*, 54:8 (2004).

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BT₂ *Aen Hollandt* (Leuven, 1598)

BT₁₁₂ *Annales indiques, contenantes la vraye narratiot advis de ce qu'est aduenu & sucedé en Iapon, & aultres lieux voisins des Indes* (Antwerp, 1590)

BT₁₇₄ *Les articles donnez de la part du roy catholique* (Leuven, 1579)

BT₂₀₇ *Advertissement chrestien contenant vne declaration sommiere de l'effect d'aulcunes causes, sur lesquelles lon a jetté tart l'oeuil suffissantes à retarder le progres du Repos general de ces deplorables Pays bas* (Mons, 1582)

BT₃₂₃ A. Blackwood, *Martyre de la Royne d'Escosse dovairiere de France* (Antwerp, 1588)

BT₃₂₄ *Danckbaerheyt van der verdreuen Catholijcken wedercomst / tot Gods lof / ende van die hyligne dry Coningen / ende tot danckbaerheyt van die weldaden / so die van Antwerpen in huer treuren hebben ontfanghen niet alleen in die loffelijcke ende geluckighe Stadt van Cuelen maer oock in andere plaetsen* (Antwerp, 1592)

BT₄₁₀ *Briefve relation de larrivée de sa maieste a Almada* (Mons, 1581)

BT₆₁₁ *Certaines novvelles de la bone & heureuse victoire, que par l'ayde de Dieu, le Comte Charles de Mansfelt at obtenu en Honguerie, pres la ville de Strigonia.* 1595 (Brussels, 1595)

BT₆₁₈ *Die Christelycke Leeringhe* (Brussels, 1591)

BT₆₇₈ *Complainte de certaine personne de marque* (s.l., 1596)

BT₆₇₉ *Complaincte et doleance de la paix, contre les XVII. Prouinces du Pays-bas, auecq requisitio[n] du rappel de son bannisseme[n]t tortionnaire, & iouissance de son retour esdicts Pays* (Brussels, 1600)

BT732 *Bewiis der ovder catholiicker leeringhe, met antwoorde op sommighe teghenstellenghen* (Antwerp, 1595)

BT736 *Corte christelyke leeringe, In maniere van tsamensprekinghe / tusschen den Meester ende den Discipel* (Brussels, 1590)

BT739 F. Costerus, *Schildt Der Catholijcken / Teghen de ketterijen*, translated by G. vanden Berghe (Antwerp, 1591)

BT811 J. David, *Kettersche spinnecoppe waer inne (deur de natuere der spinnecoppe) claerlijck bewesen wort hoe degelick ende orborlick een saecke een ketter is* (Brussels, 1595)

BT840 *Defaictes des Hugenots albigeois deuant la ville de Lautrech, par Monseigneur le Duc de Joyeuse, avec les noms des Chiefs & Principaux de l'Armee Huguenotte, qui apres le combat ont esté trouuees morts ou priso[n]niers* (Brussels, s.d.)

BT923 *Discours. Av particvlier de ce qui se passa a l'isle de Hulst la nuictée du Ieudy & le vendredy ensuyuant 19. iour de Iuillet, 1596* (Antwerp, 1596)

BT925 *Discours touchant la prise admirable de la grande et puissante Ville d'Amiens Capitale de Picardie, saisi par les Espagnolz, le XI iour de Mars, l'an 1597* (Antwerp, 1597)

BT928 *Discours de la trahison de la ville de Malines, quec les Noms & Surnoms, Tiltres, Estats, & Offices, des Sectaires, Traistres, & Proditeurs de la surprinse d'icelle, & des rebelles & assasins de la liberté, utilité, & prosperité de leur Patrie, ensamble la harangue du Gouuerneur, pipeur de verité, & la responce des Catholicques Bourgeois, par forme d'Incarnation, en quatre Huicteins* (Antwerp, 1572)

BT932 *Discours veritable e la signalee et miraculeuse prinse de la ville & Chasteau de Calais* (Brussels, 1596)

BT933 *Discours veritable de la deliurance miraculeuse de Mon-seigneur le Duc de Guyse nagueres captif au chasteau de Tours* (Brussels, 1591)

BTIII1 *Copie de la lettre envoyée par l'Ex^e du Prince de Parme a Monsieur le Baron de Licqves, Gouuerneur pour sa Ma^{ste}. de la Citadelle de Cambray, & à present de la ville de Louain, sur le bon & heureux success que sadicte Ex^e a eu à la poursuyte des ennemyz léz la ville d'Anuers* (Leuven, 1579)

BTIII2 *Copie d'une lettre de l'Ex^e du Prince de Parme, envoyee aux deputez des Prouinces de ces Pays Bas, estans assemblez en la ville d'Anuers, Le dousiesme de Mars, M.D.LXXIX* (Leuven, 1579)

BTIII3 *Copie d'une lettre du prince de Parma, envoyée aux Estats generaux des païs bas ... du douziesme de mars M.D.LXXIX. Et la response ... du XIX ... mars* (Antwerp, 1579)

BTIII4 *Copye van eenen brieff, by ... den prince van Parme, ... den xiien. martii 1579 ... aen de gedeputeerden vande provincie der ... Nederlanden* (Leuven, 1579)

BTIII5 *Copie van eenen brief, by den prince van Parme, ... aen de generale Staten vanden landen van herwaerts over tot Antwerpen vergadert ... ende antwoorde ... den XII^{sten} martii ...* (Antwerp, 1579)

BT1117 *Lettres de Monseigneur le Prince de Parme, Plaisance, &c. Lieutena[n]t, Gouverneur, & Cap^{ne}. general pour le Roy, en ses pays d'embas, Addressantes Aux Bourguemaistres, Escheuins, Conseil, Ghuldes, & Bourgois manans & habitans de la Ville de Bruxelles: Par lesquelles son Ex^e leur resente la grace de sa Ma^{te} moyennant leur reconciliation (Mons, 1580)*

BT1410 *Declaration de la volonté du roy, depuis ... Paris (Brussels, 1588)*

BT1412 *Articles accordez av nom du Roy, entre la Royne sa mer d'vne part, Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon, & Monsieur le Duc de Guyse, tant pour eux, que pour les autres Princes, Prelats, Seigneurs, Gentilzho[m]mes, Villes, Co[m]munautez, & autres quy ont suiuy le party, d'autre part (Brussels, 1588)*

BT1472 *Hochepot ou salmigondi des folz (s.l., 1596)*

BT1534 *Den willecomme en congravlatie vanden hooghgeboren, machtighen, ende seer doorluchtighen Vorst Ernesto: Des Roomschen Keyzers Broeder, Aertshertoghe van Oostenrijck, Hertoge van Bourgundien, Stiers, Carinthen, Crain, en[de] wirtenberch, Graue van Habsborch, Thyrol, &c. (Brussels, 1594)*

BT1673 *Iustification du Saisissement & sequestration daulcuns S^{rs}. du Conseil d'Estat & aultres au pays baz (Brussels, 1576)*

BT1707 *Claer Bewijs / dat den Prince van Orangien de oorsake ende iersten oorspronck is gheweest van dese langduerighe allende ende tweedrachticheyt: Oock mede culpabel ende deelachtich gheweest te zijn van den grouwelijken aenslach by den Francoysen opde stadt van Antwerpen voorts. ghekeert den xvij. Ianuarij / int Iaer M.D.LXXXIII (s.l., 1583)*

BT1759 *Extract de deux lettres (Mons, 1581)*

BT2122 *L. de Meyere, Prosopopee d'Anvers à la bien-venve du serenissime Prince Ernest par la grace de Diev Archiduc d'Avstriche, Duc de Bourgoigne, &c. (Antwerp, 1594)*

BT2161 *Copie d'vne lettre enuoyee a Sedain au Vico[m]te de Touraine, qu'on pensoit estre audit lieu par le Prince Dombre, filz du Ducq de Monpensier: Laquelle a esté interceptee aucq plusieurs aultres, par les gens des Princes de l'Vnion (Brussels, 1592)*

BT2510 *Ordonnance placcart et defence du Roy nostre Sire, faite contre ceulx qui à cause des troubles & alterations passee, vouldroyent se retirer & absenter des pays de pardeça, ou transporter & emmener hors d'iceulx, leurs biens & meubles (Brussels, 1567)*

BT2515 *Ordinantie sConincs ons gheducths Heeren / waer by beuuolen is / dat alle onder-saten en[de] inghesetenen vanden lande ende Graefschepe van Vlaenderen: hen sulckx versien en[de] ordene stellen [?] / dat den Gheesteliken persoonen (diemen alreede groot ouerlast gedaen heeft) beschut / beschermt en[de] bygestaen worden / op dat zy geen inconuenient / ouerlast / oft schade an lijf / etc. (Brussels, 1567)*

BT2518 *Ordinantie sConincs ons gheducths Heeren / daerby alle Officieren beuolen is /*

dat si binnen den bedrijue van heure Officie ende Jurisdictie / goede ende zorchfuldiche toesicht nemen / ende doen vertrecke[n] alle vremde ende wtlanders aldaer wesende / ofte dier alsnoch souden moghen co[m]men: up peyne etc (Ghent, 1568)

BT2519 *Placaet ons Heeren des Conincx / opt feyt vanden Rebellighen / seditieusen / ende wederspanninghen in onsen landen van herwaerts ouer / ontlancx gebuert* (Antwerp, 1568)

BT2523 *Placcart et ordonnance, contre cevlx qui composent, controuuent, sement, diuulgent, impriment, mettent en lumiere, ou tiennent soubz eulx, aucuns libelz, articles, ou escriptz fameux, schandaleux, ou seditieux, ou font courre mauuaise bruitz & mensongiers* (Brussels, 1568)

BT2528 *Copie. Don Fernando Aluarez de Toledo Duc d'Alua &c. Lieutena[n]t Gouverneur & Capitaine general* (Ghent, 1569)

BT2537 *Grace et pardon general, donne par le Roy nostre Sire, A cause des troubles passez* (Brussels, 1570)

BT2544 *Philippe II. Regis catholici edictum de Librorum prohibitorum Catalogo obseruando* (Antwerp, 1570)

BT2553 *Ordonnance, statut et edict provisionnal du Roy nostre Sire, sur le faict & conduyte des Imprimeurs, Libraires & Maistres d'escolle* (Brussels, 1570)

BT2562 *Ordonnance edict et decret du Roy nostre Sire sur le faict de la iustice criminelle es Pays-Baz* (Antwerp, 1570)

BT2589 *Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire sur le fait de la leuée & collection du x^{me}. & xx^{me}. denier de la vente de tous biens meubles & immeubles* (Antwerp, 1571)

BT2598 *Par le Roy* (s.l., 1571)

BT2604 *Copie. Don Fernande Aluarez de Toledo, Duc d'Alue, &c. Lieutenant, Gouverneur, & Capitaine general* (Ghent, 1571)

BT2605 *Copie, des lettres patentes du Roy nostre Sire, endroit la prorogation du terme, donné par le Pardon general de sa Maiesté* (Brussels, 1572)

BT2645 *Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire, Par lequel est deffendu & inhibe, si bien aux estra[n]giers que aux subiectz de sa Maiesté, de conuerser, traicter ou negotier avecq aulcuns Rebelles. Ne aussy d'e[n]uyer aiceulx aulcunes prouandes ou victuailles* (Brussels, 1572)

BT2650 *Placaet en[de] Ordinanntie ons Heeren des Conincx / op tstuc van het Crijchsvolck zoo wel te voete als te peerde / loopende den Huysman asteeren / verdrucken ende oppresseren* (Ghent, 1572 o.s.)

BT2651 *Copie* (Ghent, 1573)

BT2659 *Ordinantie ende verbodt ons hee-ren des Conincx / dat niemant met de vyanden en zal handelen / oft correspondentie hebbe[n]: noch brieuen oft tydinghen ouer zeynden oft van hen ontfanghen / viciuaillen oft ghelt furnieren / bystandt oft*

adresse bewysen / oft eenichsins metten zeluen composeren / op verbeurte vanden lyue (Ghent, 1574)

BT2664 *Placaet / Ordinantie ende Ghebodt onss Heeren des Conincks / datmen ververschen ende repupliceren sal de Placcaten daer by verboden wordt mette rebelle te communiceren / noch yet van hen commde te doen ouerbringhen* (Ghent, 1574)

BT2669 *Placaet byden welcken alle goed / coopma[n]schap ende waerren / gheconfisquiet / verbeurt ende van goeden prysen worden verclaert / dat naer onze vyanden ende rebelle ghevoert werdt: metgaders tgone va[n] daer commende / ofte die lyden ende passeren moeten voorby tquartier by hemlieden gheoccupeert / oft die deur haerlieder tollera[n]tie / permissie ofte oochluyckinghe herwertsouer commen* (Ghent, 1574)

BT2673 *Copie. Translat de la responce des deputez du Prince d'Oranges & des Nobles & Villes de Hollande & Zelande sur les offres & présentation faictes par les Commissaires de sa Majesté* (Ghent, 1575)

BT2698 *Placcart prouisionnal du Roy sur Lordre & Riglement à tenir doresenauant, par la Cauallerye Legiere de sa Maiesté pardeça* (Brussels, 1576)

BT2700 *Discours veritable sur ce qui est aduenu touchant l'alborote & esmotion des Espaignolz mvtilinez es isles de Zelande incontinent apres la prinse de Ziericzee, le second de Iuillet 1576* (Brussels, 1576)

BT2710 *Placcart sur l'indeue usurpatio[n] de Hieronimo de Roda, au faict du gouuernement des pays de pardeça* (Brussels, 1576)

BT2719 *Traicté de la Paix, faict conclude & arrestée entre les estat de ces pays bas, assemblez en la Ville de Bruxelles, & le S. Prince d'Orenges, Estatz de Hollande & Zelande, auecq leurs associez* (Brussels, 1576)

BT2727 *Placaet byden welcken van nieus yeghelyken verboden wert eenighe intelligentie ofte onderling verstant te houden / ofte handelen met de ghrebelleerde Spaengnaerden ofte heure[n] aenhangheren / hemlieden eenighe Victuaille / Amonitie ofte andersins aen te vueren / oft eenighe goeden / die sy te Maestricht / t'Hantwerpen als elders / ghebuyt / gherooft / ofte gheplundert hebben / af te coopen / oft te verbueren / of synen naem daertoe te leenen / op verbeurte van lijf ende goede* (Ghent, 1576)

BT2795 *Lettres patentes du Roy nostre Sire, contenantes, que ses subiectz de pardeça ne obeissent à nul aultre, que au Seigneur Don Iehan d'Avstrice, comme Lietenant, Gouuerneur, & Capitaine general des pays bas: & la dissolution de l'assemblée des Estatz generaulx, auecq aultres pointes esdictes lettres plus amplement contenus* (Leuven, 1578)

BT2861 *Placaet byde welcke Valentin de par Dieu / verclaert wert voor rebell / vyant en[de] verrader vande Landen van herwertsouere* (Ghent, 1579)

BT2879 *Edict perpetuel sur l'accord, faict entre le Prince de Parme ... de la part & au nom du Roy Catholique des Espaignes, &c. d'une part, Et les Estatz generaulx des*

BT2910 *Prouvinces de Haynnault & Artoys, & villes de Douay, Lille, & Orchies d'autre part* (Mons, 1579)

BT2966 *Ban et edict en forme de proscription, fait par la Maiesté du Roy nostre Sire à lencontre de Guillaume de Nassau, Prince d'Oranges, comme chef & perturbateur de l'estat de la Chrestienté; & speciallement de ces pays bas: Par lequel chacun est authorisé de l'offenser & oster du mo[n]de, co[m]me peste publicque, avec pris à qui le fera & y assistera* (Leuven, 1580)

BT3204 *Lettres patentes du Roys nostre sire, Par lesquelles l'Auctorité, que usurpent presentement les quatre membres de Flandres, est abolie, & declaré nul ce qu'ilz ont faict, & feront durant ceste leur rebellion* (Mons, 1581)

BT3332 *Poinctz et articles sovzb lesquelz Les Magistratz, Consaulx & Doyens de la Ville de Gand, se sont reconciliez à Sa Ma^{te}* (Mons, 1584)

BT3389 *Placcart du Roy nostre Sire. Par lequel est pourveu que tous censiers, paysans & autres pourront librement laborer & cultiuer leurs terres sans estre oultragez par les souldatz & gens de guerre ny leurs cheuaux, bestials & aultres instrumens de labeur arrestés, ny execuez* (Antwerp, 1586)

BT3424 *Om goede ordre te stellen* (s.l., 1586)

BT3447 *Ordonnance du Roy contenant commandement de faire Recherche des grains tant és villes que plat plat pays* (Ghent, 1587)

BT3534 *Novveau placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire. Pour plus pres pourueoir contre les apparentes chiertez du grains, Monopoles, & aultres exces & abuz* (Brussels, 1587)

BT3626 *Pvncten ende articulen by mynen Heere den Hertoch van Parme, en[de] Plaisancie, Ridder vande[n] Gulde[n] Vliese, Stadhouder Gouuerneur, ende Capiteyn Generael vande Landen va[n] hervvertsouer Geaccoerdeert aende Borgers en[de] Inwoonders der Stadt S. Geertruyen Berghe* (Brussels, 1589)

BT3635 *Placcart et ordonnance du Roy nostre Sire. Contre les Voleurs & Vrybuters, Deffendant a tous de prendre Saulue-gardes d'iceulx, & de leur payer aulcune Contribution ou composition, Aussi de les mectre a rançon, quand ilz seront prins prisonniers, Auec plusieurs aultres poinctz concerna[n]s ceste matiere* (Brussels, 1591)

BT3645 *Copie. A noz treschiers & bien amez, les President & gens du Conseil du Roy Monseigneur en Flandres. Pierre Ernest Conte de Mansfelt, Cheualier de l'ordre, Lieutenant, Gouuerneur & Capitaine general, en absence de S.A.* (Ghent, 1592)

BT3646 *Ordinantie ghemaect by Syn Excellentie tot beurydinghe vanden Lande, tegens die Vrybuters, Kneuelaers, Straetsche[n]ders, ende andere dyergelyke quaetdoenders* (Brussels, 1592)

BT3686 *Placcart et ordonnance de Son Excellence pour l'affranchissement du pays, contre les Volleurs, Vrybuters & autres Brigans* (Brussels, 1592)

BT3686 *Ordinantie ende instruictie Ons Heeren des Conincx, nopende de Wacht ten plat-ten lande* (Brussels, 1593)

BT3854 *Placcaet. Van haere dorlvchtighe hoocheyt infante, etc. vrovvve princesse sovvryne van dese Nederlanden Grauinne van Bourg^{nen}. Nopende t'verbocht / en[de] interdictie van alle communicatie / traffijcke / en[de] Coop-manschappe met die van Hollandt / Zelandt / ende andere haere ghe-vnieerde ende Adherenten* (Brussels, 1599)

BT3984 P. Canisius, *Petit Catechisme pour les Catholiques tres-necessaire au temps present pour instruire la Jeunesse* (Antwerp, 1575)

BT4066 *Propos tenuz av Roy a la presentation de la requeste des Princes Seigneurs & Communautez de l'Vnion pour la deffence de la Religion Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine* (Brussels, 1588)

BT4121 *Relation de ce que s'est exhibé en la ville de Bruxelles, à l'entree du serenissime prince, Albert, Archiduc d'Austrice, &c. Cardinal, Archevesque de Toled, & Gouverneur general pour sa Ma^e. Catholique des pays bas & de Bourgoigne, l'vnsiesme iour de Feburier, 1596* (Brussels, 1596)

BT4123 *Relation véritable du succès de la guerre, de sa Majesté Imperiale au Royaume d'Honguerie après le trespass de haulte mémoire de Prince Conte Charles de Mansfelt, recuilly des a'duertences donnees de jour a autres a sa Majesté tant du siège de Strigonia, qu'ailleurs* (Brussels, 1595)

BT4313 *Exhortation de Monseigneur l'ill.^{me} Cardinal de Plaisance legat de N.S.P. le Pape Clement VIII. & du S. Siège Apostolique, au Royaume de France. Aux Catholiques du mesme Royaume qui suivent le party de l'Herétique* (Brussels, s.d.)

BT4375 *Sommaire et substance du ban et proscription contre Gvillamme de Nassau Prince d'Oranges* (Mons, 1580)

BT4603 *Van die verlossinghe der vermaerde Coopstadt van Antwerpen / ende van die groote goedertierenheyt des Heeren / een zeer schoone Onderwysinghe tot ghemeyn ruste ende Weluaren des Landts* (s.l., 1585)

BT4627 *Op de Gheluckighe ende heerlyke in-koomste des hooghgeboren Vorstes Ernesto / by der gratien Godts / Eerds-Hertogh van Oostenrijck / Hertogh van Bourgoignen. Graue van Tyrol / etc. Gouverneur ende Capiteyn general der Nederlanden* (Antwerp, 1594)

BT4716 *Verhael van de warachtige ghelegentheyt des grouwelijsken aenslachs / by den Francoysen gedaen op de stadt van Antwerpen / den xvij^{sten}. Ianuarij stylo nuuo, In den Iare M.D.LXXXijj* (Leuven, 1583)

BT4722 *Vercleringe der rechtverdiger saecken vande plunderinge geschiet der stadt van Mechelen* (s.l., 1572)

BT4723 *Verclaringe der rechtverdighe saecken vande plunderinghe gheschiet der stadt Mechelen* (s.l., 1572)

BT4727 R. Verstegan, *Theatre des Cruautez* (Antwerp, 1588)

BT4731 *Vertoog ende openinghe, om een goede, salighe, ende generale vrede te maken in*

dese Nederlanden, ende deseluen onder de ghehoorsaemheyt des Conincx, in haere oude voorspoedicheyt, fleur, ende weluaert te brenghen, By maniere van Suppli-catie. Aende hoogmoghende, edele, eervveerdighe, vvijsje, ende seer voorsienighe Heeren, mijn Heeren representerende die generaela Staeten van herrevvaert-souere. Ghedaen inden name der verdructe ende bedroefde ghemeynnten der seluer landen (s.l., 1576)

BT4808 *Vray discouvr et relation de la batai[l]le donnée le 17. de Iung. 1580* (Mons, 1580)

BT4814 *Vraye relation de ce que Monseigneur le prince de Parme & de Playsance. &c. Lieutenant Gouverneur, & Capitaine General pour le Roy nostre Sire es Pays de pardeça, a fait proposer aux Estatz des Prouinces reconciliées, touchant le retour des forces estrangiers* (Mons, 1582)

BT4860 *La Bellone Belgique* (Antwerp, 1596)

BT4922 *Sekere Redenen tusschen die goetwillighe Ghemeynte van Antwerpen / ende de Hoocheydt vanden seer Doorluchtighen Prince van Parme* (Antwerp, 1585)

BT5303 *Bref et sommaire examen de l'assassinat pretendu attenté en la personne du Comte Maurice par Pierre Panne, natif d'Ypre, & que l'on dit estre à la suasion des Peres Iesvites de Douay* (s.l., 1598)

BT5360 *Ad ... Ferdinandum Alvarum Toletum Albae ducem, encomium* (Antwerp, 1573)

BT5479 *Copie d'une lettre escripte par les govvernevr, bovrge maistres, escheuins & Conseil de Malines au Prince d'Oranges le xx. du mois de Iuillet. l'An. M.D.LXXIX* (s.l., 1579)

BT5480 *Copye van den brief, die den groten Turck ghesonden heft, aan de Coninclijske Majesteyt van Spaegnien* (Antwerp, 1585)

BT6120 *Cort Ende warachtich verhael va[n]de incomste des Eertshartoch Albertus / met de Infante van Spaengien syn Huysvrouwe: ende bare Huldingh in diuersche steden / als Hertoghe ende Hertoglinne van Brabant / met andere sircumstantien* (s.l., 1600)

BT6409 *Discours ov briefve description de la venue de la Royne d'Algierre à Rome* (Antwerp, 1587)

BT6526 *P. Canisius, Catechismus oft een ghemeyn christelijck onderwijs, om die jonckheyt bequamelijck te onderwijsen ... Nu overgeset uit den latijn in nederlantschen duytsche* (Antwerp, 1574)

BT6527 *P. Canisius, Een ghemeyn christelijck onderwijs om die jonckheyt bequamelijck te onderwijsen ... Nu overgeset uit den latijne in nederlants duytsche* (Leuven, 1561)

BT6929 *A. de Ulloa, Commentaire premier du Seig. Alphone d'Ulloa, Contenant le voyage du Duc d'Albe en Flandres, avec l'armee Espagnole* (Antwerp, 1570)

BT9356 *Vray discours et relation de la bataille, donnée le xvii. de juing 1580. entre Har- denberge & Gransberge, pais d'Overysle ... par les gens de guerre de sa Majesté,*

conduicts par Marten Schenck de Nydeggen, au secours de Groningen (Cologne, 1580)

BT9400 *Die wonderlycke groote Armade die zije Mag^t. den Coninck van Spaengien heeft toegherust op Enghelandt* (Ghent, 1588)

BT9525 *Copie. Don Fernande Aluarez de Toledo, Duc d'Alue &c.* (Ghent, 1571)

BT9704 *Par le Roy. A noz Chiers & feaulx les President & gens de nostre Conseil de Flandres* (s.l., 1588)

Knuttel: *Catalogus van de pamphletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek*, ed. W.P.C. Knuttel (9 vols., Utrecht, 1978)

K156 *De Artijckelen ende besluyten der Inquisitie van Spaengnien, om die vande Nederlanden te overvallen ende verhinderen* (s.l., 1568)

K195b *Brief discours de certaines victoires spirituelles advenves en Hollande & Zelande* (s.l., 1579)

K196 *Declaration des ivstes causes du saccaigement de la ville de Malines* (s.l., 1572)

K244 *Letteren Van Verbande, tusschen Brabant ende Vlaenderen: Ghedaen ende besloten int Jaer derthienhondert ende neghenendertich* (Ghent, 1576)

K245 *Letteren Van Verbande, tusschen Brabant ende Vlaenderen, Ghedaen ende besloten int Jaer derthienhondert, en neghenendertich* (Delft, 1576)

K304 *Copie de la requeste presentée av Conte de Lalaing gouvernevr et grand bailliev de Hainault &c. par les bons Patriotz de la Ville de Bruxelles. Ensemble Leur Requeste presentée aux Deputez des Estatz generaulex, pour auoir Iustice, exécution des Placcartz, & accomplissement du Traicté de la Pacification faict a Marche en Famine* (Brussels, 1577)

K309 *Discours sommier des ivstes causes et raisons qvi ont contrainct les Estats generaulex des Païs bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Iehan d'Austrice: Auecq plusieurs lettres missives interceptes, en plus grand nombre, & aultres ampliations & corrections tant desa dites lettres que dudit discours, non comprinses en l'impression ja faict en Francois & Flameng. Et pource que en plusieurs passages de ce discours lon se refere à la pacification de Gand & l'Edict perpetuel d'accord convenue avecq le Seigneur don Iehan, ils y sont adjoustez, avecq la ratification de sa Ma^t* (Antwerp, 1577)

K310 *Cort verhael vande rechte oorsaecken ende redenen, die de Generale Staten der Nederlanden ghedwonghen hebben, hen te versiene tot hunder beschermenisse, teghen den Heere Don Jehan van Oostenrijck* (Antwerp, 1577)

K316 *Apologie contre certains discours emis sovbs le nom des Estats généraux des Pays bas. Par laquelle sont rembarrées les cauilllations & impostures dudit Discours. Auec un recit véritable de ce que c'est passé des l'arriuee de son Altesse esdicts Pays* (s.l., 1577)

K330 *Verclaeringhe Vande meynunghe des Doorlvchtichsten Heere Don Iohan van Oistenrycke, stadhovdere, Gouuerneur ende Capiteyn generell vanden Neder-landen, al voor ende eer te trekken ouer die Maeze, ende te versuecken den vvech van vvapenen, Vervveckende alle die ondersaeten om hun te bekeeren tot Godt, ende Conincklycker Maiesteyt. Met een Ordinantie ende Reghel, hoe het volck van oirloghe syns Maiesteyts hun sullen houden ende reguleren* (Luxembourg, 1578)

K336 *Lettres patentes de Monseignevr Don Iehan d'Austrice, Cheualier de l'Ordre de la Toyson d'or, Lieutena[n]t, Gouuerneur, & Capitaine general, contenant la charge donnée par sa Ma^{re}, au Baron de Selles gentilhomme de sabouche, & Lieutenant de la garde ses Archiers de corps, auecq copies des lettres de sadicte Ma^{re} aulx Estats generaullx, particuliers, Co[n]saulx, & Villes principales, Instruction & patente donnée au dict Baron de Selles* (s.l., 1578)

K349 *Lettres d'advertissement a la noblesse et avltres depvtez des Estats generaullx du païs bas, esrites par vn serviteur du Seigneur Don Iehan d'Autrice. Auecq Leurs responses par lesquelles la vraye cause des troubles dudit païs est exposee, et le masque de don Iean & ses adherens leué* (s.l., 1578)

K368 *Religioensvrede* (s.l., 1578)

K372 *L'advertissement et responce des Estats de Hainault sur la requeste faicte pour la liberte de la Religion, et l'exercice d'icelle* (s.l., 1578)

K383 *Remonstrance aux habitans du Païs Bas, declarant amplement les vrays moyens pour les induire à demeurer consta[n]s en leurs deüe obeissance* (s.l., 1578)

K385 *Les lamentations du Pape de Rome sur la Mort de Don Jean d'Austrice avec les reponses de la Mort et l'Epitaphe dudit Don Jean* (s.l., 1578)

K392 *Le Vray Patriot Aux Bons Patriots* (s.l., 1578)

K394 *Veritable recit des choses passeees és Pays Bas, depvis la venve du Seigneur Don Iehan d'Avstrice, Lieutenant, Gouuerneur & Capitaine general pour le Roy, en iceulx. Auec Solution des obiects contenus au Discours non veritable, mis en lumiere par les Estats desdictz Pays, touchant la rupture par eulx faicte de la derniere Pacification* (s.l., 1578)

K396 *Copie de l'indvlgence envoyee de Rome pour Don Ioan d'Avstrice et son armee, avec le translat en françois* (Brussels, 1578)

K423 *Advertissement à ceulx du pays Bas* (Antwerp, 1579)

K427 *EErsame goede manne[n]/ het is nv hooch tijt dat ghy lieden eenmael bestuyt oft ghy het Spaensch tock wilt teenemael aflegghen ofte niet* (s.l., 1579)

K437 *Traictie et accord faict et passe entre Monsievr le baron de Montigny &c. et le Seigneur de la Motte* (Douai, 1579)

K467 *Lettre d'vn gentilhomme, vray patriot, a messievers les Estatz Generaulx* (s.l., 1579)

K513 *Discours sur les troubles et miseres de ce temps: et des moyens qu'il faut tenir pur les appaiser, & y mettre fin* (Douai, 1579)

K527 *Ban, ende edict by vorme Van proscriptie, ... gedecreteert by ... de Coninck, tegens Wilhelm ... van Oraignyen, als hoofst, beruerder ende bederuer van tgheheel Christenrijck, ende namentlyck van dese Nederlanden: Waerbij een yegelyck gheauthoriseert wordt van hem te beschadigen, offenderen ende vuyter weereilt te helpen, mit loon ende prys voor den ghenen die des doen, oft daer toe assisteren sullen* ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1581)

K538 *Lettre intercepte du prince d'Oranges av duc d'Alençon. Auecq quelques aduersitatemens sur icelle pour ouurir les yeulx aux bons subiects* (s.l., 1580)

K539 *Eenen Afghevvorpen oft gheintercipeerden brief vanden Prince van Oraignen aen den Hertoghe van Alencon. Met sommighe waerschouwinghen daer toe die-nende, om de ooghen der goeder ondersaten te openen, wt ten walsche inde neder-landtsche tale ouergheset* (s.l., 1580)

K543 *Le retovr de la concorde aux Pays bas* (Mons, 1580)

K544 *Discours veritable touchant plusieurs affaires d'Estat, pour la ivstification des bons et fideles subiectz de Sa Maieste catholique* (Douai, 1580)

K546 *Le renart decouvert* (Mons, 1580)

K546a *Advertissement et conseil av pevple des Pays Bas* (Ghent, 1580)

K548 *Poinctz et articles des charges proposées contre Guillaume de Hornes, Seigneur de Heze. Avecque la sentence criminelle, & capitale sur icelles rendue* (Mons, 1580)

K548c *Vraghe en[de] Antwoort zeer profytelyck ende genoechelyck om lesen, waer inne ghedebatteert wordt waer de bose menschen nu meest al bleuen syn* (s.l., 1580)

K570 *VVaerachtich verhael vanden Oproerigen beleyde, dwelck Broeder Anthonis Ruyksensveld Predikere met zijnen aenhanck hebben aengericht binnen der Sadt [sic] van Bruessel* (Brussels, 1581)

K574 *Sommaire discours sur le moyen de conserver, et maintenir la vraye religion chistienne, & garder & asseurer les prouinces vnies, contre toutes apparentes entre-prises, traibisons, & inuasions, de l'Ennemy de la Patrie. &c.* (s.l., 1581)

K588 *Les articles du traictie des Ville de Bruges, & Païs du Francq* (Mons, 1584)

K607 *Cort ende claeer bevvijfs* (Leuven, 1582)

K686 *Pointen ende conditie[n] op de welcke de Stadt van Brugghe ende Tlant vanden Vrijen veraccoerdeert ende ghereconsilieert zijn met den Prince van Parme plai-sance &c. vut de naeme van zijne Maiesteitj* (Bruges, 1584)

K693 *Historie Balthazars Gerardt, alias Serach, die den Tyran van t'Nederlandt den Prince van Orangie doorschoten heeft: ende is daerom duer growelijcke ende vele tormenten binnen de stadt van Delft openbaerlijck ghdoodt* (s.l., 1584)

K695 *Les cruels horribles tormens de Balthaar Gerard, Bourguignon, vray martyr, souff- fertz en l'execution de sa glorieuse et memorable mort, pour avoir tué Guillaume de Nassau, Prince d'Orange, ennemy de son roy et de l'eglise catholique; mis en francois d'un discours latin envoyé de la ville de Delft, au Comté de Hollandie* (Paris, 1584)

K710 *Lettre envoyee par le Prince de Parme aux Bourgmaistres, Escheuins & Magistrat de la ville d'Anuers, ensemble & au grand conseil, dit, den Breeden Raedt, & aux Confrerries d'icelle. Auec la Responce Desditz S^{rs} Bourgm^{res}, Escheuins, Tresoriers, Receveur, & Conseil, par vn commun consentement & adueu general de toute la ville* (Antwerp, 1584)

K729 *Hiernae volghen de Sentbrieuen van zyne Hoocheyt / ende Antwoorden opde selue. Midtsgaders de Co[m]missie vande voorsz. Ghedeputeerden / eensamentlijck de verthooninghe ende afscheydt van wegen der stadt van Bruessel dedaen ende ghenomen* (Brussels, 1585)

K756 *Clare Belydinge des Christen Gheloofs, twelck alle oprechte Catholike menschen tot allen tijden / daer toe versocht zynnde / schuldich zyn te belijden* (s.l., 1585)

K768 *Beschrijvinghe Oft cort verhael vande harde belegheringhe ende inneminghe vande Stadt ghenaemt de Graue* (Antwerp, 1586)

K770 *Beschrijvinghe Der stadt van Venloo / ende haer stercte / hoe ende in wat maniere de selue beleighert / beschoten ende victorieuselijck ghewonnen is* (Antwerp, 1586)

K773 *Discours ov briefve description du siege & prinse de la Ville de Nuy* (Antwerp, 1586)

K834 *Heylige Bulle, Ende Krusade des Paus van Roomen* (Middelburg, 1588)

K845 *Cort verhael vande groote Victorie die Godt almachtich de Conincklijcke Mayesteyt van Engeland verleent heft, ouer de Spaensche Armade* (Amsterdam, 1588)

K898a *M. Wignacourt, Discours sur l'Estat des Pays Bas* (Arras, 1593)

K930 *Discours veritable de la renditon de la Ville & du chasteau de Cambray, entre les mains du Roy Catholique d'Espagne, Par le victorieux Seigneur le conte de Fuentes* (Brussels, 1595)

K1005 *Les articles et conditions de la paix et perpetuelle alliance contractée entre ... Philippe ... & Henry quatriesme de ce nom* (Delft, 1598)

K1010 *Chanson nouvelle pour rendre action de graces au bon Dieu. Touchant la Paix faicte a Veruin entre les Roys* (Arras, 1598)

K1026 *L. de Meyere, Poeme. Advis pour la paix de la Belgique. A son Altesse* (Antwerp, 1598)

K1033 *Cession et transport des Pays d'embas et de Bourgogne, fait par Philippe II Roy d'Espagne, a sa fille ainsnée Isabella, Clara, Eugenia, en avancement de son mariage avec l'Archiduc Albert* (s.l., 1598)

K1197 *Domp-hooren der Hollanscher Fackel, Tot blusschinghe des Brandtbriefs ende Missioue die onlancks met de volle Mane vt S'Grauenhaghe gheschoten vvierden* (s.l., 1602)

K1252b *Capitulations de la Paix, faicte entre Le Roy nostre Sire, ... Les Archiducqs ... et le ... Roy de la Grande Bretaigne ... lesquelles ont esté conclues par les Deputez cy-embas nommez à Londres le 18. d'Aoust 1660* (Brussels, 1660)

K1282

Chanson nouvelle de la rendition de la ville d'Ostende (s.l., 1604)

Wulp: *Catalogus van de tractaten, pamfletten, enz. over de geschiedenis van Nederland aanwezig in de bibliotheek van Isaac Meulman*, ed. J.K. van der Wulp (3 vols., Amsterdam, 1866-8)

W227

Va[n]de seer schoone gheluckige Victorie / die de Christenen ghehadt hebben / op die Armeye vande Turcken: wt Venegien hier ouergheschreuen den neghenthiesten dach van Octobre xvC. lxxi. (Antwerp, 1571)

W233

Placcart et ordonnance dv Roy nostre Sire, touchant l'annotation, saissement & denunciatio[n] des biens Meubles & Immeubles, ensemble des Droitz & Actions, competans aux Rebelles & aultres, tenans parti contraire à sa Maiesté & leurs adherens (Brussels, 1572)

W252

Exemplaire des lettres patentes dv Roy nostre Sire. Par lesquelles sa Maiesté donne Grace absolute & Pardon general, tant à Estatz, Pays, Villes & Co[m] munaultéz, que tous particuliers voires proscriptz & banniz de ces Pays bas & autres, ayans offendé & fourfait, acause des Troubles, emotions, & reuoltes, tant passées que presentes, aduenues en iceulx Pays (Brussels, 1574)

W285

Placaet op te rebellie vanden Spaignaerden met heuren aenbangeren, ende resistencie tegen de selue ende des dyn aencleeft (Brussels, 1576)

W287

Placcart sur la rebellion des Espaignolz & leurs adherens & la resiste[n]ce alen-contre d'iceulx, & ce qu'en depend (Brussels, 1576)

W301

Edict et ordonnance dv Roy nostre Sire, sur le fait de la leuee & collectation d'un Centiesme denir des biens meubles & immeubles, accordé par les Estatz de pardeça (Brussels, 1576)

W318

Remonstrance faicte par le Sieur de Gomiecourt, de la part de son Altesse, aux Gouuerneur, President, & gens du Conseil de sa Maiesté, Estatz du Pays & Duché de Luxembourg (Luxembourg, 1577)

W382

Origine des troubles et remvment d'affaires es Pays de Flandres penda[n]t le gouuernement du duc d'Alue, don Loïs de Requesenes, du Conte de Mansfeld, & de l'Illustriss. don Iean d'Austrice, grand profligateur des Rebelles, nagueres dececé en la ville de Namur (Paris, 1578)

W410

Recueil des lettres, actes, et pieces plus signalees dv progres et besongne faict en la ville d'Arras & ailleurs, pour paruenir à vne bonne paix & reconciliation avec sa Maiesté Catholicque, par les Estatz d'Arthois & deputez d'autres Prouinces. Par ou chascun peult cognoistre la bonne & sincere intention desdictes Prouinces reconciliées (Douai, 1579)

W412

Discovrs contenant le vray entendement de la Pacification de Gand, de l'vnion des Estats, & aultres traictez y ensuyuiz, touchant le faict de la Religion (s.l., 1579)

W419

Lettres des Estats de la ville de Lille, & Chastellenies dudit Lille, Douay &

Orchies: à Messeigneurs les Estats generaux assemblés en la ville d'Anuers. Avec la responce et resolution desdits Estats generaux sur icelles (Antwerp, 1579)

W₄₇₀ Vray discovr et relation de la bataille donnée le 17. de Iung. 1580 entre Hardenberghe & Gransberghe, pays d'Ouerysle, à tro[is] heures apres mydi, par les gens de guerre de sa Maiesté, conduicts par Martin Schenck de Nydeggen, au secours de Groeningen. Et le Conte de Hol-lac Chiref des ge[n]s de la nouuelle vnio[n] d'Vtrecht (Mons, 1580)

W₄₈₂ Copie de certaine lettre close escripte par son Ex.^{ee}. Aux Preuost, Doyen, Chapistre, Prelat, & autres Ecclesiasticques: Preuost, Iurez, Escheuins, Borgēois, Corpz & Communauté de la Cité de Cambray. Les exhortant de se reco[n]cilier & remettre soubz la protectio de sa Ma^{te} suiuant les sermens qu'ilz ont à icelle (Mons, 1580)

W₄₈₃ Advertissement de la victoire obtenuue par l'armee de Sa Maiesté a la conduicte de Messire George de Lalaing, Conte de Renneburch, Baron de Ville, &c. Gouuerneur & Cap^{re} general des Pays de Frise, Ouerissel, Gruninghen, & Lin-gen, Contre les ennemis de Dieu & de sadicte Ma^{te} au mois de Septembre, 1580 (Mons, 1580)

W₄₉₂ Vant Swingelsche Calf/ Off descriptie des swingelsche Calf/ waer inne bewe-sen wordt voorden simpelen menschen / met vijff redenen off vaste argumenten / dat die caluinisten predicanen Gods wordt / noch godts kercke niet en hebben / met sommige ander stuxkens hier naet op dander sijde ghenoempt / tsamen profijtelyck om lessen (s.l., 1580)

W₄₉₄ Ode in Gvilielmvm a Nassav regis catholici in Inferiori Germania Vasallum, Perduellem (Mons, 1581)

W₅₂₀ VVarachtighe / ende ghetrouwē beschryuinghe vande alteratie ende veranderin-ghe / gheschiet inde Stadt Mechelen / ende oock vande groote Tyranny / ende onghetheerde wreetheyt vande Spaignaerden / daer near ghevolcht / inden Jare XV.LXXII. (Mechelen, 1581)

W₅₄₁ Apologie chrestienne contre aucunes propositio[n]s pernicieuses, mises en auant en la ville d'Anuers, par quelques factieux perturbateurs de la vraye Religio[n] & du repos publicq (s.l., 1582)

W₅₄₉ Advis d'vng bon bovrgois de la ville de Gand, qui resent amerement des cala-mites de sa ville, du comté de Flandres, & en fin de tous les Païs bas translaté de Flamen en Francois. Auec un Aduertissement d'un Gentil-homme Francois à ses amis qui sont en Flandres, pour se donner garde des desseings de Monsieur le Duc d'Alencon, qui sobz ombre d'ageler aux gens de bien, tache de les assurer à vng ioug plus tirannique que celluy d'Espaignol (s.l., 1583)

W₆₃₅ Articulen ende Conditiën vande[n] Tractate / aenghegaen ende ghesloten tusschen de Hoocheydt vanden Prince van Parma, Plaisance, &c. Stadthoudere, Gouuerneur ende Capiteyn Generael vanden Lande van hervvaerts ouere, inden

	<i>name vande Conincklyke Maiesteyt van Spaengien, als Hertoghe van Brabant, ende Marckgraue des heylichs Rijcx ter eenre, ende de Stadt van Antvverpen ter ander syden: Den XVII. Augusti, M.D.LXXXV (Antwerp, 1585)</i>
W8757	<i>Articles et conditions du traicté, arresté & co[n]clu, entre Monseigneur le Prince de Parma Plaisance &c. Lieutenant, Gouverneur & Capitaine General, de sa Majesté, es pays de pardeça, au nom d'Icelle, comme Duc de Brabant, d'une part, Et la ville de Bruxelles de l'autre, le x^e Mars. 1585 (Mons, 1585)</i>
W8795	<i>Brief traicté de la Victoire que le Compte Charles de Ma[n]sfelt, Prince du Saint Empire, Capitaine Lieutenant General en Hungarie à l'encontre du Turc, deuant la ville de Strigoine, a par la gracs [sic] de Dieu obtenu, le 4. iour d'Aougst, l'An 1595 (Antwerp, 1595)</i>
	Petit: <i>Bibliotheek van Nederlandsche (en andere) pamphletten. Verzamelingen van de bibliotheek van Joannes Thysius en de bibliotheek der rijks-universiteit te Leiden</i> , ed. L. D. Petit (3 vols., The Hague, 1882-1934)
P285	<i>Advertissement et conseil au pevple des Pays Bas (Roucelle, 1579)</i>
	TB: <i>Typographia Batava 1541-1600</i> , ed. P. Valkema Blouw (2 vols., Nieuwkoop, 1998)
TB257	<i>Apologie, ofte verantwoordinghe des hooghgeborenen vorsts ... Wilhelms ... prince van Orangien ... Teghen den ban ofte edict by forme van proscriptie ghe-publiceert by den coningh van Spaegnien teghen den voorsz. Heere ... Hier is oock bygevoeght den voorsz. Ban ... (Leiden, 1581)</i>
TB262	<i>Apologie ou defense de tresillustre prince Guillaume ... d'Orange ... contre le ban et edict publié par le roi d'Espagne ... Ensemble ledict ban ou proscription (Leiden, 1581)</i>

Miscellaneous pamphlets

Execution de la sentence & iugement donnez, contre les Contes d'Aiguemont & de Horne, & autres seigneurs declarez seditieux, rebelles à la maiesté du Roy Catholique, en ses pays de Flandres (Lyon, 1568) (KBR: 30106)

Diuersche Refereynen ende Liedekens, seer playsant om lesen (s.l., 1574) (BL: 11555.b.23.)

Epistres Belges (s.l., 1578) (BNF: M-25919)

Map showing Alexander Farnese's military advances (s.l., s.d.) (KBR: VB 10204 VI A)

Translat de l'espaignol en françois de ce q' est svccedé à l'armée de sa Ma.º, à laquelle commandoit co[m] me Capitaine general le Marcquis de Sa.º Croix, par la bataille donnée à celle que conduysoit Don Antonio, es Isles de los Acores (Douai, 1582) (KBR: LP957A)

P. Corneio, *Bref discours et veritable des choses plus notables arriuees au siege memorable de la renom-*

mee ville de Paris, et defence d'icelle par Monseigneur le Duc de Nemours, contre le Roy de Nauarre (Brussels, s.d.) (BNF: LB35-249(C))

Articles accordez av nom du Roy, entre la Royne sa mer d'une part, Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon, & Monsieur le Duc de Guyse, tant pour eux, que pour les autres Princes, Prelats, Seigneurs, Gentilzho[m]mes, Villes, Co[m]munautez, & autres quy ont suiuy le party, d'autre part (Lyons, 1588) (BNF: LB34-495(B))

Propos tenus av Roy a la presentation de la requeste des Princes Seigneurs & Communautez de l'Vnion pour la deffence de la Religion Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine (Paris, 1588) (BNF: NUMM-79617)

Novvelles de l'an M.D.LXXXVII (Douai, 1588) (KBR: VB II.327 A)

Nouveauxx advertissementz des choses qvi se sont passees en la Chine, et av Iapon (Douai, 1589) (KBR: VB II.327 A2)

*Discours sur la venue en France, proggrez, et retraiete du Duc de Parme, & des grands haults, & gne-
reux exploits d'armes par luy faits, pour le secours des Ligueurs rebelles du Roy* (Tours, 1590) (BNF: 8-LB35-298)

Memoire de ce qvi est advenu en la retraitte & deslogement du Duc de Parme & de ses forces hors de France (Tours, 1590) (BNF: 8-LB35-300)

Discours veritable de la deliurance miraculeuse de Monseigneur le Duc de Guyse nagueres captif au chasteau de Tours (Lyons, 1591) (BNF: NUMM-79817)

Discours de ce qvi s'est passe av siege de Roven, de la retraiete du Duc de Parme, & de son retour pour le secours de ladicie ville iusques au 21. d'Auril 1592 (Tours, 1592) (BNF: RES 8-LB35-146 (A, 13))

Sommaire des lettres dv Iapon, et de la Chine de l'an M.D.LXXXIX. & M.D.XC (Douai, 1592) (KBR: VB II.327 A4)

La valereuse expugnation des Ville & Chasteau de Dourlens en Picardie, faicte par les ge[n]s du Roy nostre Sire, le dernier de Iuillet 1595 (Brussels, [1595]) (BNF: 8-LH5-1816)

J. Lipsii Send-brief, in ... antwoorde ... aen een seker groot Heer, op de vraghe, welck van dryen den Coninc van Hispaengien best gheraden ware, oorloge oft Peys, oft liever Bestant niet den Fransman, Engelsche ende Hollander (s.l., 1595) (BL: 573.f.26)

F. Costerus. *Het Boecxken der broederschap, dat is, viij boecken der Christelijcker leeringhen, voor de Broederschap der H. Maghet Maria* (Antwerp, 1596) (BNF: 16-MANDEL-33)

Ordre ... se conduyre au fait du passage ... & personnes venans ... des Prouinces rebelles ... (Brussels, 1602) (KBR: LP 5305A)

J. David, *Domp-hooren der Hollanscher fackel, Tot blusschinghe des Brandt briefs ende Missiue die onlancks met de volle Mane vut S'Grauen haghe gheschoten vvierden* (s.l., 1602) (BL: 1508/61)

Responce ov solvotion, Sur vne Lettre des Estatz de Hollande, le vij. de Iuin en cest an 1602. escripte aux Estatz des Prouinces fideles du Pays bas (s.l., 1602) (BL: 8079.b.11)

Placcart et ordonnance sur l'ovvertvre et restauration du Trafficq & Commerce d'Espaigne avec les pays de pardeça, encores qu'ilz soyent distraictz de l'obeyssance des Seren^{mes} Archiducqz noz Princes souuerains & naturelz (Brussels, 1603) (Bodleian: BOD 4° O 1(6) Jur.Seld.)

E. Ydens, *Histoire du S. Sacrement de miracle. Reposant a Bruxelles, en l'Eglise Collegiale de S. Goudele, & des Miracles faictz par iceluy* (Brussels, 1605) (BL: 861.d.3)

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J. Lipsius, *La nostre dame de Hav. Ses bien faictz & miracles fidelement recueillis & arrangez en bel ordre* (Brussels, 1606) (BNF: H10309)

Ph. Numan, *Miracles lately vvroght by the intercession of the gloriovs virgin Marie, at Montaigu, nere vnto Siche[m] in Brabant* (Antwerp, 1606) (KBR: LP 644A)

J. Lipsii Epistola, qua respondet cuidam viro Principi deliberanti bellum ne an pax, an potius Induciae expediant Regi Hispaniarum cum Gallo, Anglo, Batavo. Scripta III. Januarij MDXCV. nunc primum edita (s.l., 1608) (BL: 106.d.21.(1.))

Balade op de belegeringhe ende verlossinghe vande stadt van t'sHertogen-bossche, reproduced in C. R. Hermans (ed.), *Verzameling van kronyken, chartres en oorkonden betrekkelijk de stad en meijerij van 's Hertogenbosch* ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1848)

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Index

Aalst 74, 115
Abjuration, Act of 81, 99, 101, 106-7
Aerschot, Duke of 61, 82, 95-6, 119
Albert, Archduke 18, 22, 24, 133-50, 153, 158-60
Alençon, Duke of – *see Anjou, Duke of*
Alexander the Great 108-10, 116
Almada 109
almanacs 23
Alva, Duke of 27, 29-37, 39-40, 42, 44-53, 55-67, 69-70, 72, 79, 84-5, 87-8, 93, 97-100, 104, 109, 113, 147, 155-6, 159, 170-1, 179
statue 45-6, 63, 79, 109
unpopularity 27, 29-31, 33, 37, 44-5, 47-8, 50-3, 56, 61-6, 69-70, 84-5, 93, 99, 104, 113, 159
American Revolution 15
Amsterdam 55, 57, 68, 77, 86, 186
Anabaptists 38
Andalucía 117
Anjou, Duke of 83, 89, 96, 102-3, 105-6
Anne of Austria 34, 36
Antwerp 18-19, 21-2, 24, 36, 38, 42, 45-6, 48-50, 58, 60-1, 63-4, 67-9, 78-9, 81-2, 85, 97, 99-100, 102-6, 108-9, 115, 120, 123-4, 126-30, 138, 145-6, 148-9, 180, 184-6, 191
Archdukes 18, 24, 133-53, 158-60
Ardennes 85
Ardres 144
Arras 49, 90-1, 98, 119, 135, 146, 148
Treaty of 91, 98, 119
Union of 90
Artois 61, 79, 86, 89-90, 97, 119
Council of 97, 189
States of 79, 86, 89, 179
d'Assonleville, Christophe 34, 94-5, 115
Baius, Michael 106
bankruptcy 71, 151
Bavaria, Duke of 44
Beeldenstorm 24, 29, 49, 164
Beggars 28, 32, 55-6, 62, 101, 128-9, 156
Bergen-op-Zoom 34, 176
Bergh, Count van den 55
Bertin, Secretary 58-9
Beza, Theodore 107
Blessed Sacrament of Miracles 21, 141-6
Bonhomini, Giovanni Francesco 104
Borromeo, Archbishop 67
Bossu, Count of 59
Brabant 28, 35, 56, 59, 61, 74-5, 78, 82, 86, 105, 133, 142
Council of 59
States of 28, 75, 133
Breda 65, 69, 78, 81, 104, 176
Brill 55-6, 140
Bruges 67-8, 82, 86, 98-9, 101-4, 115, 145, 180, 185
Brussels 18, 21, 28-9, 32, 34-5, 37, 48, 51-2, 57, 59, 63, 74-6, 79-82, 85, 94, 99, 101, 105, 108, 115, 119, 121, 124, 126-7, 135-6, 138, 141, 143-5, 152, 170-1, 176, 180, 182, 185, 191
Union of 79, 176

Burgundian dukes 17, 124, 135-6, 141-3, 153, 158, 165
 Burgundy 28, 135-6, 142-3

Calais 144, 150
 Calvin, Jean 40, 102
 Cambrai 119, 130
 Campene, Philip van 32-5, 38-9, 47-8, 50, 52, 165
 Canisius, Peter 67
 Capuchins 127, 141
 catechism – *see religious education*
 Catherine de Medici 83
 Catholic revival 67-8, 104, 113, 126-7, 130-2, 140, 145
 censors 119, 124
 censorship 25, 37-8, 53, 65-6, 68, 87, 119-20, 123, 127, 156
 ceremonial 17-18, 21-3, 33-5, 44, 53, 56, 69-70, 75, 80, 82, 110, 113, 124-5, 129-31, 133-6, 138, 140-1, 146, 153
 Cession, Act of 133, 136
 Champagney, Lord of – *see Perrenot, Frédéric*
 Charles V 17, 27-8, 35-8, 58, 78, 133
 China 128
 Clement VIII 148
 Cleves-Jülich, Duke of 44
 coins 23-4, 43, 165
 Cologne 97, 129
 Committee of Eighteen 81-2
 Compromise of the Nobility 28
 Confederate nobles 28, 32, 37, 45, 79
 confiscation 28, 30, 32, 48-9, 51, 56, 64, 92
 Confraternity of Our Lady's Seven Sorrows 143, 145
 correspondence 18, 22, 24, 44, 62, 73, 82-3, 94-6, 112, 117, 131, 157, 187
 Costerus, Franciscus 62, 68, 127-8, 140, 194
 Council of State 33-4, 58, 66, 71-6, 80, 82, 87, 97, 133, 156-8, 173
 Council of Troubles 30, 39-40, 47-50, 72-3

Culemborg, Count of 28, 32, 79

Dathenus, Pieter 112
 David, Johannes 140, 194
 Delft 65, 186
 Dendermonde 58, 186
 Diest 58
 Don Carlos 34
 Don Fadrique 58
 Don John 72, 76, 79-90, 94-6, 112, 133, 139, 157, 159, 178
 Dordrecht 65, 186
 Douai 62, 76-7, 90, 135, 146, 148
 Doullens 119
 drawings 23-4, 119
 Drenthe 55
 Duren 58
 Dutch Republic 15, 27, 151, 164

edicts 17-21, 23-5, 32, 37-40, 44, 47-9, 52-3, 56, 59, 66, 69-70, 72, 74-6, 80-1, 84-7, 90-1, 104, 115, 125-6, 131, 137, 140, 150, 155-6, 159

Egmont, Count of 28, 30, 32, 37-9, 44
 Elisabeth de Valois 34
 England 92, 115-16, 128, 133, 139, 151-2
 English Civil War 15
 engravings 23-4, 37, 42, 53, 80
 entries – *see joyous entries*
 Ernest, Archduke 115, 119, 121, 124-5, 133, 136, 148
 Europe 15-16, 116, 142, 151
 executions 21, 30-3, 37-40, 44, 48-50, 52, 68, 97, 128-9, 132, 135, 139, 159, 165

Farnese, Alexander 24, 89-91, 93-105, 108-13, 115-23, 126-8, 130-1, 133, 135, 137-9, 141-2, 151, 157-60, 179-82, 185-7, 189, 194
 clemency 94, 97-101, 103-4, 108-9, 113, 126-7, 157

festival books 23-4, 124-5

Flanders 28, 59, 78, 82, 97, 110, 135, 148
 Council of 59, 97
 States of 28

France 16, 22, 34, 55, 75, 102, 116-20, 123, 125, 128, 131-3, 139, 148, 150-2, 158

Franche-Comté 61

freedom 15, 27, 39-40, 53, 72, 78, 86, 91, 93, 105, 107, 112, 136, 139, 153

French Fury 102-3

French Revolution 15

French Wars of Religion 16, 115, 117-18

Friesland 55, 122

Fuentes, Count of 119, 130

Fugger, House of 32

Geertruidenberg 116

Gelderland 55, 57-8, 66, 86, 89

Gembloix 85

Geneva 95

Gerard, Balthasar 129, 140, 158

Germany 22, 24, 163

Ghent 20, 32-4, 39, 49, 51, 59, 66-7, 78-9, 82-3, 86-7, 89-90, 92, 95, 99, 101-3, 105, 108, 110-12, 115, 120, 145, 148, 165, 180, 185-6

Glorious Revolution 15

Glymes, Jacques de 75

Gorcum 140

Gouda 57, 65, 182

Grand Council 97

Granvelle, Cardinal 28-9, 31, 61-2, 89, 94-6, 98, 100-1, 112, 181

Grave 115-16

Gravelines 90

Gregory XIII 42-3, 64

Gueux 35

Guise, Duke of 129

Haarlem 57, 62, 86

Haecht, Godevaert van 48, 63-5

Hainaut 61, 75, 86, 89-90, 97

Council of 97

States of 75, 86, 89-90

Halle 143, 145-7

Hamont, Michel de 59

Hembyze, Jan van 82

Henry III 83, 117

Henry IV 150

Henry of Navarre – *see Henry IV*

heresy placards 27-8, 30, 36-7, 49, 51, 78-9

Hernighem, van 35-6, 166

's-Hertogenbosch 29, 35, 48, 61, 64, 79, 98, 142, 176

Herzele 115

Hèze, Lord of 96-7, 181

Holland 17, 28, 35, 55, 59, 65-6, 75, 77-9, 81, 92, 102, 106, 109, 121, 128, 137, 139-40, 151, 176, 194
 States of 28, 78-9, 106, 151

Holy League 117-18, 129-30, 158

Hoogstraten 151

Hoogstraten, Count of 28

Hopperus, Joachim 57, 65, 76, 173

Hornes, Count of 28, 30, 37-8, 44

Hornes, Guillaume – *see Hèze, Lord of*

Huguenots 33, 55, 128

Hulst 86, 144

Hundredth Penny 51, 67

Hungary 119, 143, 189

iconoclastic fury – *see Beeldenstorm*

Inquisition 28, 37, 47-8, 67

Isabella, Archduchess 18, 22, 24, 133-53, 158-60

ius de non evocando 27

Jacobsz, Wouter 57, 77

James VI and I 150

Japan 128

Jemmingen 33-4, 45

Jesuits 62, 67, 104-5, 120, 126-8, 140-1, 144, 168

Jonghelinck, Jacques 45, 109

joyous entries 21, 36, 78, 109-10, 124-5, 135-6, 138, 145-6, 148-9

Joyous Entry of Brabant (1356) 105

Kortrijk 52, 86, 105, 135

Laeken 143, 145

Leblon, Léon 50

Leeuwarden 86

Leiden 62

Leoninus, Elbertus 61

Lepanto 33-5, 63, 80, 84

Le Quesnoy 96

lèse-majesté 27, 37

letters 17, 23, 25, 28, 34-5, 37, 40, 44, 53, 58-9, 72-4, 76, 78-80, 82-4, 90, 94-6, 99-100, 103, 108-9, 112, 118, 120-1, 123, 125, 139, 142, 155, 157, 179, 181-2, 185, 187, 189

Leuven 58, 61-2, 79, 83, 85, 106, 119, 144, 148, 182

Lille 33, 51, 74, 79, 81, 86, 90, 97, 130, 135, 144-7, 150, 152, 170, 181

Limburg 85

Lipsius, Justus 123, 146-7

literacy 16, 18, 23-4, 163

Lombardy 81

Longueval, Maximilien de 83

Los 145

Louis of Nassau 33-4, 55

Luther, Martin 40

Luxembourg 47, 79, 82-3, 85, 118, 121, 177

 States of 121

Lyon 38

Maastricht 67, 98, 104, 151

Madrid 28-9, 57, 61, 63, 72, 75-6, 87, 108, 116, 120-1, 131, 134, 150-3, 158, 187

majestas 27

Mansfeld, Charles 118-20, 189

Mansfeld, Count Pierre-Ernest 47, 118-22, 126, 131, 189

Manteau, Mahieu 33, 145, 147, 152, 163

Margaret of Austria 143

Margaret of Parma 28-9, 44, 51, 89, 95, 165, 170

Mariemont 141

martyrs 129-30, 132, 140, 158

Mary Queen of Scots 128-9, 132, 158

Matthias, Archduke 82, 85

Maurice of Nassau 139, 147, 151-2

Maximilian I 143

Maximilian II 80, 82

Mechelen 57-62, 69, 80, 93, 98, 156, 170, 179-80

medals 23-4, 45, 116, 148

Medinaceli, Duke of 58, 62-3, 171

Mediterranean 63

memos 40, 80, 103, 105-6, 115, 118, 120-3, 131, 158

Metsius, Bishop 79

Middelburg 55

Milan 63, 67, 187

Mondragón, Cristóbal de 130

Mons 55-7, 96, 105, 148, 185

Montano, Benito Arias 45, 61-2, 120

Mont d'Azin 30

Moretus, Jan 22, 59, 149

Morillon, Maximilian 57, 61-2, 64, 72, 100, 170-1

Motte, Valentin Pardieu de la 90, 106

mutinies 49, 64, 69, 71-9, 83, 85, 87, 121-3, 151, 157, 159

Naarden 58, 62, 156

Namur 76, 81-2, 84-5, 87, 159, 179

Neuss 115-6

new bishoprics 67

news 18, 21, 23-5, 32, 34-6, 57-8, 69, 79-80, 82-3, 86, 98-9, 103, 109, 116-18, 123, 128-32, 142, 157-8

Nijmegen 36

Nivelles 86

Numan, Philip 146-7

Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van 151-2
 Ostend 141-3, 145, 147
 Ottomans – *see Turks*
 Oudenaarde 58, 86, 103
 Oudewater 66
 Outre-Meuse 86
 Overijssel 55, 58

Pacification of Ghent 78-81, 83-7, 89-92
 Palatinate 92
 pamphlets 13, 16-18, 23-6, 29, 34-40, 44, 53, 56-9, 62, 65-9, 77-8, 80-7, 89, 91-7, 100-3, 105-13, 116-19, 123-5, 128-9, 131-2, 138-41, 144, 147, 152-3, 155-8, 160, 163, 173, 177, 182, 186, 194, 196
 panegyric 39
 pardon 31, 36, 39, 48-50, 63-5, 69, 78, 85-8, 98-9, 113, 159, 185
 Paris 79, 83, 117, 130, 187
 peace negotiations 16, 63, 65, 71-2, 75, 77-8, 80, 97, 138, 150, 152
 periods of grace 98, 113, 126-7, 159
 Perpetual Edict 19, 80-1, 84-5, 90, 159
 Perrenot, Frédéric 101, 120-2, 130
 Philip II 17, 27-9, 31-4, 36-45, 47-50, 52-3, 57-9, 61-4, 67-9, 71-80, 82-3, 87, 89-91, 93-102, 105-10, 112-13, 116-23, 129, 131-3, 138, 148, 150, 153, 156-9, 173, 180-2, 185, 187
 clemency 29, 31, 36, 39, 47-9, 52, 63-4, 78, 95-6, 98-9, 108-9
 visit to the Low Countries 27, 29, 31, 36, 45, 47-8, 50, 52-3, 62, 133, 156, 159
 Philip III 150-1
 Philip the Bold 135
 Philip the Fair 143
 Plantin, Christophe 38, 45, 58-60, 111
 polemic 25, 84, 128-9
 Portilla, Francisco de San Víctores de la 123
 Portugal 144
 Pottre, Jan de 57, 61, 64-6, 81, 101-2, 126, 145-6, 178

prayer 18, 21, 33-4, 39, 45, 57, 74, 130, 145
 preaching 29-30, 32, 52, 69, 112, 127, 165, 170
 preamble 19-20, 37, 39, 74, 148, 167
 print 15-16, 18-20, 22-3, 36-8, 40, 42-5, 49, 62, 64-6, 73, 80-1, 86, 90, 97, 99, 109, 111-13, 118, 130, 140-1
 printers 38, 59, 99, 109-12, 116, 118, 158, 177, 194
 privileges 27-8, 30, 36-7, 40, 45, 50, 53, 57, 78, 86, 93, 96, 102, 105, 109, 134, 143, 156, 160, 170, 185
 printer's privilege 37, 59
 Privy Council 97, 189
 processions 18, 21-2, 33-4, 36, 57, 65, 68, 74, 78, 109-10, 119, 124-5, 129-31, 138, 141, 144-5, 149
 proclamations 18-23, 37, 44, 47-50, 53, 56, 59, 64-5, 69, 73, 75-6, 80, 82, 87, 95, 147, 150, 152, 155-6, 162
 propaganda 17-18, 25-6, 37, 53, 57, 62, 80-1, 88, 93-4, 96, 105, 107, 110-13, 116, 118, 131, 140, 157, 160
 prophecies 23
 provincial States 71-2, 76, 78, 87

Religionsvrede 86, 89, 91
 religious education 67-8, 104, 113, 126-9
 Requesens, Don Luís de 29, 56, 63-9, 71-3, 75, 78, 87-8, 127, 133, 156-9
 resistance 15-16, 37, 40, 51, 56-7, 69, 82-4, 101, 104-7
 Rheims 144
 rhetoricians 38, 80
 Richardot, François 49, 65
 Richardot, Jean 95, 123, 187
 Rio, Martin del 61, 168
 Roca, Count of 27
 Roda, Jerónimo de 73-4, 76
 Romans, St Paul's Letter to the 40, 43-4, 53, 81, 100, 105-7, 139, 147, 160, 168
 Rome 29, 31, 116-17, 128, 187
 Rouen 117

royal army 51-3, 57-8, 61-2, 65-7, 69, 71, 76, 78, 84-8, 93, 97-8, 101, 103, 109, 116-17, 119-22, 131-2, 134, 147, 151, 155, 157, 159

Rudolph I 135, 141, 146

Rudolph II 124

rumour 48, 64, 80, 102, 116, 118, 120-1, 123, 131, 158

Ruremonde 104

Russian Revolution 15

Ryhove, Lord of 82

St Adalbert 144

St Albert of Leuven 144

St Bartholomew's massacre 56

St Clara 146

St Elizabeth of Hungary 143-4, 146

St Eugenia 146

St George 128, 144

St John of Nicomedia 140

Savoy 150

Scheldt 124

Scherpenheuvel 142-7

Schipman, Father 62

Scotland 92, 128

Sea Beggars 55-6, 62, 129, 156

Segovia 28

Selim II 84, 178

sermons 21-3, 25, 33, 49, 65, 120, 130, 147

smeekschrift 28, 45, 78

Soldoyer, Nicholas 30, 47-50

song 45, 61-2, 65, 95, 128, 147, 150

Sonnius, Franciscus 36, 58

sovereignty 78, 83, 105, 107, 133-4, 136-9, 141, 143-4, 147, 150, 153, 158-9

Spa 119

Spain 27, 32, 34, 45, 47, 51, 63, 102, 133-4, 150-1, 164, 168

Spanish Armada 115-17, 130-1, 158, 187

Spanish army – *see royal army*

Spanish Fury 78

Spínola, Ambrosio 147, 151, 195

States General 51, 66, 72-3, 75-87, 89, 92, 101-3, 106-7, 133, 136-8, 150, 157, 185

Steene, Jan van der 59

Strigonia 119

Sunday schools – *see religious education*

Switzerland 95

tableaux vivants 21, 74, 80, 110, 125, 138, 146, 148-9

Tenth Penny 52, 55-6, 58, 61-3, 69, 73, 156

Ter Goes 86

Thirtieth Penny 63

Tongeren 58

Torrentius, Bishop 120

Tournai 30, 33, 38, 47, 51-2, 76, 86, 97, 103-4, 146, 165, 170

Tours 129

town criers 18, 112

trade embargo 56, 137, 151

Trigoso, Father 67

Tsantele, Jacob 52

Turks 33-5, 63, 80, 84, 109, 119, 128

Twelve Years' Truce 16, 141, 143, 152

Twentieth Penny 51, 72-3

Utrecht 49, 57, 151, 170

 Union of 90

Valenciennes 29-30, 33, 49, 86, 104, 135, 138, 146, 148, 170

Velpius, Rutgher 110, 182, 194

Venice 34-5, 63, 187

Venlo 115-16, 147

Verdugo, Francisco 122-3, 189

Verdun 177

Verstegan, Richard 128-9, 140

Vervins, Peace of 148, 152

Vianen 38

Villavicencio, Lorenzo de 61-2

Vivere, Jan van den 49, 101, 103, 106, 115
Vosmeer, Sasbout 129

Walloon Flanders 61, 81, 86, 150, 185
 States of 81, 86

Weber, Max 16

Weydts, Guillaume 101-3

Wignacourt, Maximilian de 123-4

William of Orange 28, 30, 37, 39-40, 42, 47, 51,
 55-8, 62, 64-6, 75, 78-86, 91-6, 100, 102-7, 111-
 13, 123, 129, 137, 140, 142, 155-9, 180, 182

Willot, Jan 121-2

Wood Beggars 32

woodcuts 23-4, 108

Ypres 35, 82, 86, 99, 105


Zeeland 17, 35, 55, 59, 66, 75, 77-9, 81, 86, 92,
 102, 106, 109, 121, 128, 137, 176
 States of 78-9, 106

Zichem 142

Zierikzee 74

Zoetine, Adrien 120-2

Zutphen 57-8, 62, 156



The rebels of the Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, their political thoughts and the media they used, have long been a focus of historical attention. *Habsburg Communication in the Dutch Revolt*, however, focuses on the largely untold story of what the other side, the Habsburg regime and its local supporters, thought about the conflict and how they responded to rebel accusations. To this end, a variety of oral, written and theatrical media have been examined to discover how the regime made use of the different communication channels available. In addition, available sources have been used to document ordinary people's response to the conflict and the various messages they encountered in the public sphere. The result is a study that sheds new and sometimes surprising light on the Habsburg regime's approach to communication and opinion-forming, while also providing a useful corrective to our understanding of rebel propaganda.

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